Pakistan stands at a fork in history. It could
either decisively shift to wholesome
democratisation, or lapse into military-dominated
half-civilian government. Long-term social and
political trends favour democratisation. But the
actual outcome will depend upon how the main
actors - President Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP) co-chair Asif Ali Zardari,
and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) chief Nawaz
Sharif - play their cards.

Secondarily, the result will depend on how the
United States prosecutes its war against Al
Qaeda-Taleban along Pakistan’s Western border.
India too could help by accelerating the peace
process with Pakistan.

One can be modestly, not exuberantly, optimistic
that Pakistan’s toxic tryst with the “Three A’s”
(Army, Allah and America) will come to a
much-needed end, and that India-Pakistan
reconciliation will become genuinely sustainable.

That’s the conclusion from my Pakistan trip last
week, during which I met political analysts,
social scientists, former diplomats and social
activists.

To start with, four months after national
elections, Pakistan lacks a stable government;
most of the PPP-PML(N)’s promises remain
unfulfilled; and the PML(N) isn’t about to return
to the Cabinet which it quit in protest over the
PPP’s refusal to quickly reinstate judges
dismissed by Musharraf.

The two parties continue their alliance, but are
drifting apart. This wasn’t unexpected given
their disparate bases, leadership backgrounds and
priorities. The central question is whether they
can hold together until Musharraf makes his
long-overdue exit and the army’s role is weakened
enough for a robustly constitutional-democratic
government to emerge.

That prospect now seems uncertain - not because
Musharraf retains the support of an army eager to
defend him, but because Zardari lacks the courage
to confront him and is under US pressure to let
him continue. Washington is convinced, against
sober counsel, that Musharraf remains its best
ally against the Taleban Al-Qaeda-although his
record is patchy.

Zardari is probably too tainted by corruption to
want to risk reopening the National
Reconciliation Ordinance, which indemnified him
against prosecution. Many analysts believe the
NRO will be reopened if Chief Justice Iftikhar
Chaudhry is reinstated. Zardari has simply
appropriated the PPP, but has no independent
standing and is vulnerable to pressure.

To counter growing unpopularity, Zardari has now
called on Musharraf to step down "for Pakistan’s
sake", or face Parliament. How firm he remains is
open to question.

Sharif is adamant, perhaps obsessively so, that
“Musharraf the usurper” must go at once. He has
revived old controversies, e.g. Kargil, which pit
him against Musharraf. His clear anti-Musharraf,
pro-judiciary stand, coupled with the public’s
disenchantment with military rule-and not just
with an individual, as was the case with Ayub
Khan, Yahya Khan or Zia-ul-Haq-has brought Sharif
a groundswell of backing from traditional PPP
supporters, including the Left-liberal
intelligentsia.

Sharif’s stand corresponds to the prevalent mood,
which is against hierarchy and authoritarianism,
and favours openness and democratisation. The
tenacious lawyers’ movement both expresses this
phenomenon and has infused energy into it.

This is in keeping with recent social trends: a
media explosion with free, robust debate - more
vigorous and political than in India -, spread of
education, and the burgeoning of self-confident
urban and rural middle-income strata, which have
broken some shackles of the old feudal order and
are looking for self-expression.

These strata instinctively distrust the army for
its economic mismanagement and corruption, and
demand accountability. Pakistan’s electricity
supply situation is even worse than India’s, with
load-shedding for four to eight hours a day. A
major reason for this is that the military regime
didn’t add a single megawatt to generation in 8
years. This highlights governance issues.

These social trends are related to a generational
shift-from an India-obsessed
military-bureaucratic and political elite, to one
which was born and grew up after Independence.
The old elite’s consciousness was shaped by
opposition between “Hindu India” and "Muslim
Pakistan“,”a clash of cultures" defined by
religion, and bitter memories of Partition.

The new generation which has matured over the
past decade isn’t India-centric. It’s influenced
by its discovery of the common roots of South
Asian culture since the Indus Valley
civilisation, and is unburdened by the uniquely
violent past linked to the mass killings of 1947.

It doesn’t equate Pakistan’s survival with
hostility towards India through a Pakistani
National Security State, to which democracy is
alien and military rule natural.

All this spells a much stronger
pro-democratisation momentum than earlier. But
Pakistan’s squabbling leaders can make myopic
moves. Pakistan’s parties too have very little
experience of, or success in, fighting
dictatorships or external pressures.

These pressures are huge. The US doesn’t quite
have a Pakistan policy, only a Musharraf
policy-of keeping him in power because he’s loyal
and useful in fighting anti-US jehadis.

Musharraf willingly handed over 600 extremist
“suspects” to the US in return for millions of
dollars, and connived at their detention in
Guantánamo Bay. He also sacrificed over 1,000
Pakistani troops in the US “war on terror”. It’s
another matter that he diverted most of the $10
billion-plus “anti-terrorism” aid to buying
long-range weaponry for the Eastern border, and
cut dubious deals with pro-Taleban chiefs in the
tribal areas.

Journalist Ahmed Rashid has just revealed that
Musharraf allowed a secret CIA base to be
established to enable anti-militant missile
strikes. On Tuesday, at least 11 Pakistani troops
were killed by US-led forces.

With this, relations between the US and Pakistani
militaries have reached their lowest point since
9/11. The Pakistani army is being forced to fight
America’s war and has witnessed desertions. Its
Frontier Corps is refusing to fight. Recently,
250 of its troops were captured by the Taleban,
without a shot being fired. All this, hopefully,
might change Washington’s attitude towards
Musharraf.

This is the right moment for India to make
generous gestures towards Pakistan to support
democratisation and demilitarisation. India can
earn tremendous goodwill among Pakistanis if it
unilaterally allows duty-free imports of
Pakistani goods while liberalising visas.

India should offer to discuss gradual
demilitarisation of the border to give practical
shape to the “grand reconciliation” idea. That’s
the way to the future.