COSATU CEC Political Discussion Paper September
2010

The Alliance at a Crossroads- the battle against a predatory
elite and political paralysis

 1. Introduction

1.1 This political discussion paper takes stock of developments since the
ANC’s historic 52^nd Conference at Polokwane. It concludes that while
the perspectives advanced at Polokwane represented a major advance
for the working class, battles which have unfolded since then represent
a serious threat, not only to workers, but also to the future of the
country as a whole.

1.2 It traces the roots of these developments to the policies and practices
adopted by the previous leadership of the ANC and government, in
concert with big business, particularly post 1996, which has led to a
perversion of the culture of the movement into one of crass materialism,
and self-interest. It argues that the Alliance, and indeed the country, is
at a crossroads, and that if we fail to arrest the current trajectory, we
face being plunged into a serious crisis.

1.3 This situation confronts COSATU, the Alliance, and progressive civil
society, with some hard choices. One thing is clear - we cannot sit back
and do nothing; and we cannot continue pursuing old strategies if they
are not working. We have to act, and if necessary, act differently.

1.4 The question is, what is to be done? In answering this question we
attempt a number of things: Firstly, to take stock of where the country is
post-Polokwane, and conclude that, despite some important gains, we
are far from achieving the bold vision set out by ANC Conference
delegates. Indeed, we run the risk of moving even further away from
that vision. Secondly, we diagnose the nature of the problem in the
movement and the state, and conclude that, if we don’t act decisively,
we are heading rapidly in the direction of a full-blown predator state, in
which a powerful corrupt elite increasingly controls the state as a
vehicle for accumulation. Thirdly, the Alliance is facing political
paralysis, which needs to be unblocked.

1.5 Fourthly, we consider the strategic options facing the country, and
particularly organised workers, to arrest these developments, and
move the country onto a trajectory of renewal, reconstruction and
development. Finally, we need moving forward to assess different
scenarios, which depending on the actions we take, could either move
us forward, or plunge us into disaster. To serve as the basis for this
discussion, we reproduce the scenarios developed for the 2006
Congress, and those in the 1997 September Commission. After further
discussion of these scenarios in our ranks, we will develop new and
updated scenarios as a guide to action in the current period.

1.6 The issues we address in this paper are confronted honestly and
directly. We believe that we are neither exaggerating the problems, nor
being alarmist, as some will claim. History is replete with examples of
movements and peoples who woke up too late, and found themselves
in the clutches of a ruthless elite, who knew no limits to their greed and
capacity to abuse power.

1.7 Africa itself, as well as revolutions elsewhere, has seen too many
liberation movements with noble ideals, hijacked by corrupt individuals,
predatory classes, and foreign interests, for us to close our eyes to that
danger now. Our liberation movement, and our struggle, will never be
up for sale. It is the working class, and the poorest of the poor, who
always end up the worst victims of these failed revolutions. However,
while the rich have more resources to cushion themselves, a predator
state, will ultimately eat away, and consume the whole of society. No
one is immune. But as we have seen in recent times, it is up to the
organised working class to stand up, and mobilise society, against
corruption, greed, and abuse of power and resources. This is what we
propose to do.

 2. Significance of Polokwane

2.1 The Polokwane Conference represented nothing short of a revolt by
ANC delegates against practices, policies, and a leadership, which had
deviated from the movement’s historic policy perspectives, democratic
organisational culture, and collective traditions. The outgoing
leadership and organisational style was regarded as individualistic, and
elitist; abusive of government power; and having imposed inappropriate
policies, which had failed to take into account the views or needs of the
people.

2.2 Organised workers, as ordinary members and leaders of ANC
branches, played a leading role in this revolt. Delegates articulated
views, which had long been advanced by COSATU, the Party, and
many in the ANC, although these views had previously been
suppressed, ridiculed, and vilified.

2.3 The decade before Polokwane was a painful one for workers, and
leaders of the labour movement. The Polokwane revolt represented a
rejection of the worst elements of this period.

2.4 At a political level, Polokwane was a basic battle against:

1. The closing of political space, and shifting of power from the ANC, to
government leaders and bureaucrats, and marginalisation of the ANC
in policy formulation

2. Sidelining of the Alliance, and suppression of the views of COSATU
and the SACP

3. Parliament being used as a rubber stamp by the Executive

4. Disregarding the people, reducing them to voting cattle, and ‘wheeling
them out for the celebration of historic dates’ (Fanon)

5. Abuse of state institutions to advance factional interests, and illegally
pursue opponents of the power elite

6. Politics of fear and ‘big brother’. Inability to have open discussions in
meetings. Intrusion into people’s privacy.

7. Corruption and nepotism, abusing positions of power for the
accumulation of wealth, and distribution of patronage, especially
through government tenders, blurring the lines between political
leadership and business interests

8. Use of state power to appoint people without capacity to lead
transformation; tolerance of mediocrity and sidelining of talented
individuals for factional reasons.

9. Culture of using media (including SABC) to selectively leak information
to sideline and publicly try opponents

2.5 At the socio economic level, Polokwane delegates sought to reverse
the impact of:

1. Neo-liberal economic policies promoted by Gear, and an elite pact
with big capital, which deliberately excluded labour and mass
movements

2. The job loss bloodbath in the public and private sector

3. Narrow BEE politics which affirmed the elite, but left the masses as
disempowered as before

4. Undermining of the state’s role in the economy, and pursuance of
the mantra of a slim state resulting in cutback in services, and
personnel

5. Slow progress in addressing poverty

6. Deepening inequality and growing unemployment

7. Casualisation, and the worsening quality of employment.

8. Redistribution to the rich. We said the first decade of freedom was a
decade which primarily benefited capital in economic terms

9. Aids denialism: 350 000 people had died whilst the head of state
and the Minister of health adopted a denialist approach and sent
mixed signals against the policies of the ANC on HIV/AIDS.

The key focus of Polokwane delegates was that economic policies must be
centred around the creation of decent work and eradication of poverty.

2.6 On International policy there was unhappiness that

1. South Africa had not been taking a sufficiently principled stand on
various issues, of both human rights, and economic justice

2. Our role in the region and Africa was problematic, and that we were
attempting to export governments neo-liberal policies

3. We were being seen to be too closely aligned to the imperialist
powers. Cf Bush’s statement- ‘Mbeki is our point man in Africa’

2.7 The Polokwane Resolutions sought to address a number of these
issues, and the new leadership was given a mandate for change, under
the banner of “iANC ibuyile” (ANC has returned to its members).
Following Polokwane, the Elections Manifesto took up a number of key
proposals, and prioritised 5 areas for focus by government:

1. Decent work as the basis for all economic policy

2. Rural development agrarian reform and food security

3. Universal, quality, affordable education

4. Health care for all through a National Health Insurance

5. Combating of corruption and crime

 3. Has the spirit of Polokwane been taken forward?

3.1 We briefly assess progress in taking Polokwane forward. Various
discussion documents of the Federation have undertaken a detailed
assessment of different aspects of the current political economy,
including: a detailed assessment of the state of our economy and
society, in COSATU’s proposal for a New Growth Path; a detailed
analysis of economic policy contestation in government, and the extent
to which Polokwane Resolutions have been implemented; and various
CEC documents on the implementation of the manifesto priorities. A
shortened and updated version of the analysis on economic policy
contestation post-Polokwane is attached. We confine ourselves to
summarising the salient points, to avoid repeating the detailed analysis
we have undertaken elsewhere.

3.2 Briefly, our draft Growth Path document details the faultlines of the
current economic epoch:

1. Unemployment among Africans, which was estimated to be 38% in
1995, stood at 45% in 2005, 48% of South Africans live below R322
a month per person, and 25% of the population now survives on
state grants.

2. In 1995, the Gini coefficient stood at 0.64 but it increased to 0.68 in
2008, which has made South Africa now the country with the
biggest inequalities in the world.

3. The top 20 paid directors in JSE-listed companies each earned on
average 1728 times the average income of a South African worker
in 2008, whilst state-owned enterprises paid CEO’s 194 times an
average worker’s income.

4. Approximately 71% of African female-headed households earned
less than R800 a month and 59% of these had no income. As we
celebrate women’s month, she would have to face the reality that
income inequality is still racialised and gendered: an average
African man earns in the region of R2 400 per month, whilst an
average white man earns around R19 000 per month. Most white
women earn in the region of R9 600 per month, whereas most
African women earn on average R1 200 per month.

5. A recent survey of 326 companies by Phillip Theunissen showed
that despite talk of recession, company CEOs were still able to
double their annual earnings.

6. Bank CEO pay packages are obscene- Nedbank CEO Tom
Boardman earned R43m last year, Standard Bank CEO Jacko
Maree R18, 2m and Absa CEO Maria Ramos R13, 5m.

7. All the top 20 paid directors in JSE listed companies remain white
males. In the private sector, top management is 60% white male,
14% white female, 9% African male and 4% African female [1].
Coloured and Indian males account for 4% of top management in
the country, whilst females account for 1.4%. In other words 74% of
top management of the South African economy is drawn from 12%
of the population.

3.3 On Housing: there has been progress in the provision of housing. 74%
of South African households live in brick structures, flats and
townhouses. Nevertheless 15% of households still live in shacks, which
amount to 1.875 million households. A major challenge is the quality of
human settlements: 46% of South African households live in dwellings
with no more than 3 rooms, 17% of households live in 1-room dwellings.

Among Africans 55% live in dwellings with less than 3 rooms and 21%
live in 1-room dwellings, whereas at least 50% of White households
lives in dwellings with no less than 4 rooms.

3.4 Infrastructure: Households with no access to water infrastructure fell
from 36% in 1994 to 4% in 2009. Access to sanitation also dramatically
improved over the same period, from 50% to 77%. Access to electricity
also improved, from 51% to 73%.

3.5 We acknowledge that the roots of these challenges predated the April
1994 breakthrough. Further we acknowledge that the current
leadership has largely not been responsible for many of the challenges.

3.6 Without being overly critical, however, it is fair to say that there has
been very little progress in achieving what was proposed at Polokwane
and in the Manifesto, particularly in relation to the five priority areas:

3.7 Priority one: At the level of health care, the picture, as outlined in the
CEC analyses tabled in the May and March 2010 CEC’s, is very
depressing. All the health care indicators are dire, including the
frightening statistic that maternal mortality has increased from 230
mothers dying (per 100000) in 2000, to 400 in 2005, and over 500
today. While modest progress is being made in some areas, such as
combating HIV/Aids, there is no apparent progress on the most
important undertaking of Polokwane and the Manifesto- to implement a
National Health System, funded through an NHI. Instead there is
increasing reference to public private partnerships as the solution. All
indications are that the state bureaucracy, particularly in Treasury,
together with private sector vested interests, has stalled this project.
Some in Treasury are now arguing that an NHI can only be introduced
in 2025. The ANC doesn’t appear to be taking this seriously-none of
the papers for the September NGC raise this matter. The two tier
health care system therefore remains in place with the rich
appropriating most of the health resources and the majority still trapped
in underfunded and under-resourced public health care.

3.8 The health profile of the population has deteriorated. In 2006, a black
female South African was expected to live 12 years shorter than a
white male, and an average male in Sweden expected to live 30 years
more than an average black South African female [2]. The life expectancy
of South Africans was the highest in 1992, at 62 years. Ever since then
life expectancy fell to 50 years in 2006 [3]. Although we rank 79^th globally
in terms of GDP per capita, we rank 178^th in terms of life expectancy,
130^th in terms of infant mortality, and 119^th in terms of doctors per 1000
people. The situation seems to have worsened since 2006. The life
expectancy of a white South African now stands at 71 years and that of
a black South African stands at 48 years, according to the South
African Institute of Race Relations survey in 2009.

3.9 Priority 2: At the level of education, our previous reports to the
COSATU CEC outlined the state of our education system in detail.
Again the picture is grim, with 80% of South Africa’s schools being
considered dysfunctional. While outcomes based education has now
been abandoned, there is not the sense that the massive intervention
required by the state to meet the outcomes proposed in Polokwane,
and the Manifesto, has yet materialised. Polokwane resolutions
committed to progressively introduce free education ‘for the poor’ until
undergraduate level.

The Manifesto also committed us to work towards free and compulsory
education for all children. As the immediate step it undertook to ensure
that at least 60% of schools are no-fee schools. No clear plan has been
outlined to implement the undertaking of free schooling, up to
secondary level for all poor children, although the 2009 budget
committed to ensuring that 60% of schools would be no-fee schools.
The crisis in education persists and the quality of education is declining:
70% of matric exam passes are accounted for by just 11% of schools.
Only 3% of the children who enter the schooling system eventually
complete with higher-grade mathematics. Of the 1.4 million learners
who entered the system in 2008, 24% were able to complete matric in
the minimum of 12 years.

3.10 Priority 3: On rural development agrarian reform & food security-
Some steps have been taken by the new Ministry of Rural
Development to develop a comprehensive rural development strategy
(CRDP). We need to engage carefully with the details of this proposal.
However, it is clear that the strategy is still in its infancy, focusing on
pilot projects in particular areas. Key questions are whether
government will make available resources on the scale required to
make the type of interventions envisaged in the Polokwane resolutions;
the coherence and urgency of the approach to land and agrarian
reform; and whether there is a coherent strategy for rural economic
development, which goes beyond promotion of rural agriculture. An
issue of concern is that within government, and among the technocrats,
particularly in Presidency, there is still a huge amount of scepticism
about the viability of the rural development strategy proposed by
Polokwane. This is reflected in the Economic Transformation paper for
the September NGC [4], which in essence tries to resurrect the National
Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP), the Presidency strategy
which essentially questioned the viability of a major rural development
thrust, and proposed instead to encourage people to move to ‘viable
economic centres’. This despite the fact that Polokwane clearly
rejected the NSDP approach.

3.11 On food security, there is little sign of progress, or intention to
implement the Polokwane or Manifesto proposals. In particular, the
Manifesto proposes a wide-ranging ‘food for all’ programme, which
envisages government intervening to “procure and distribute basic
foods at affordable prices to poor households and communities”. There
is no indication in government or ANC documents and proposals that
there is a plan to take this forward. A substantial section on food
security in the ANC Economic Transformation paper for the September
NGC, fails to mention the Food for All proposals, as does the
Presidency Outcomes document on sustainable rural communities.

3.12 Priority 4: On the Economy and decent work: the Manifesto and
Polokwane clearly set out that economic policy needs to be realigned
to the central objective of creating decent work and eradication of
poverty. There were high hopes when a new Ministry of economic
development was created to achieve this objective. However, far from
creating more effective policy co-ordination, and aligning the
programmes of all Departments around a coherent vision, the unfolding
reality has been one of intense contestation, contradictory policy
developments, zigzagging in government, and major resistance from
old centres of economic power in the state. The result has been that
economic policy realignment, where it has taken place at all, has been
partial, and has had to coexist within the old macroeconomic policy
framework. The result has been that at times of severe economic crisis,
when over a million workers have lost their jobs (throwing over 5 million
people deeper into poverty), government has dithered and failed to
provide direction. A detailed picture has been provided to previous
CEC’s of the extent of the economic crisis, poverty, inequality and
unemployment, and is summarised in COSATU’S growth path proposal
as outlined above.

3.13 This economic policy contestation in government has seen:

• The blocking of agreement on a New Economic Growth Path (NGP)
proposal. This document is intended to provide the framework for
economic policy aligned to the objective of decent work, but.
Despite the adoption of a framework for the NGP by the Economic
and Employment Cluster in March this year, the July Cabinet
Lekgotla was unable to reach agreement on it [5]. A real concern is
that, given all the resistance to policy change, by the time the NGP
emerges from this process, it will be so weakened and watered
down, that it will have little impact;

• Related to this, is the failure to clarify and legislate the mandate of
the Economic Development Department, thus entrenching the de
facto control of economic policy by Treasury, despite adoption of
the EDD strategic plan, combined with attempts by the Minister for
the NPC to usurp the function of economic planning;

• The half-hearted implementation by government departments of the
far-reaching framework agreement in response to the economic
crisis;

• The attempt by Treasury to develop a new macro economic policy*,
and assert control over economic policy co-ordination;

• The failure to realign the Reserve Bank’s mandate in line with the
approach contained in the Manifesto [6], despite the devastating
impact of contractionary monetary policy on the economy;

• The promotion by Presidency of an outcomes approach containing
conservative economic policy perspectives. Despite this there has
been a failure to reach agreement on the economic outcomes [7]. ;

• The proposed introduction of a Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA)
process* which would vet all laws and policies based on the
regulatory burden they place on business;

• The proposed introduction by Treasury of the wage subsidy
proposals*, which, together with other proposed reforms, including
exemptions from collective agreements, would further entrench the
dual labour market;

• The welcome introduction of IPAP2, but concerns that inadequate
resources were being released for it. Further, that it would not have
the policy instruments it required to succeed, in the absence of the
New Growth Path, an overarching developmental strategy, being
adopted.

A more detailed discussion of this contestation of economic policy
is attached.

3.14 This continued conservatism in government is mirrored in the ANC
Economic Transformation discussion document for the September
NGC, despite the clear mandate in the Manifesto, and from the Alliance
Summit in November 2009. This discussion document, which appears
to be the work of technocrats in government, and not the product of
collective discussions in the ANC or Alliance, proposes a de facto
growth path, within a conservative paradigm, without even engaging
with what government is proposing as a New Growth Path. It therefore
suggests that there are two parallel processes, neither of which is
being subjected to Alliance scrutiny. This discussion document has as
a central reference point, the need to reduce the costs for business in
the economy, and the need to avoid ‘unnecessary regulation’ of
business- suggesting that this is the key barrier to greater investment
and employment creation. It also questions the IPAP2 strategy of
focusing on broad based industrialisation, with manufacturing as the
engine of the new growth path, preferring to focus more on services. A
detailed critique of this document has been circulated separately to the
COSATU CEC.

3.15 Central to the decent work agenda is the combating of casualisation
and elimination of labour broking. The Minister of Labour outlined his
approach to dealing with labour broking to the last CEC. However the
approach he took doesn’t correspond with the proposals being put
forward by the Department of Labour. Therefore these discrepancies
need to be resolved.

3.16 Priority 5: On crime and corruption: Important strides were made
during the FIFA World Cup in jacking up policing. It remains to be seen
whether this will be converted into a sustained strategy, which makes
ordinary people and working class communities safe. We will be
watching in particular to see if adequate numbers of extra police are
employed and deployed appropriately; and whether the growing
militarization of the police leads to worsening of human rights abuses,
and increased violence against legitimate protest. While there has been
a recent improvement on the policing front during the World Cup, it is of
major concern that the socio-economic conditions, which feed crime,
are not improving, as we outline in this paper. Addressing this needs to
be the key priority.

3.17 Because of the frighteningly rapid emergence of a powerful predator
elite, abusing access to the state to accumulate wealth, the question of
tackling corruption has become a growing national priority, so we
therefore deal with it at greater length [8]. Corruption threatens to get out
of hand. It is seemingly now more endemic than in any other period.
Even though some may argue that the media is full of stories on
corruption because government is on its toes fighting and exposing
corruption. There is some truth to this, but there is no doubt as well
those workers’ concerns about endemic and growing corruption reflects
society concerns. The seriousness of the extent to which it has infected
our organisations, our polity, and society is shown by:

• The emergence of death squads in several provinces, linked to
corruption, and the murder of people who have taken a stand, or
have whistleblown;

• The open way in which prominent ‘business figures’, linked to top
political leaders deepen perceptions that there is blatantly abuse of
power to concoct illegitimate business deals worth billions of rands;

• The extent to which factions in organisations are increasingly not
about ideology or political differences, but about access to tenders.

3.18 Notwithstanding the work of government, a danger exist that if the
current trajectory continues, is that the entire state and society will be
auctioned to the highest bidder. Given that state procurement is on a
massive scale (over R800 billion for infrastructure over 3 years), failure
to deal with endemic corruption would leave us with a huge challenge.
Corruption covers a range of activities in society, but the most insidious
and dangerous is the systematic abuse of access to state power and
political contacts, to accumulate capital illegally. This includes abuse of
political influence to corrupt state tenders and procurement processes,
and illegitimately win contracts; and abuse of political access and
manipulation of BEE provisions to manufacture illegitimate business
‘deals’ (e.g. Arcelor Mittal, AMSA, and ICT) etc.

3.19 All these practices have in common the systemic creation of a network
of patronage and corruption which means that over time no-one will be
able to do business with the state, without going through corrupt
gatekeepers, who don’t merely demand bribes, but systematically
leverage their power to control large chunks of the economy. Once this
becomes the norm, we will have become a predator state. And there
must be no illusions that mainstream business, with all their codes for
corporate governance, will fight this predator elite, if they are their only
route to state-controlled resources. AMSA were prepared to pay a
premium of billions to get access to their mineral rights and apparently
the necessary political influence. When key actors in this patronage
network are close relatives or friends of people in power, the situation
is particularly serious, since the likelihood of decisive action being
taken to stop these practices becomes increasingly slim. So it becomes
crucial to examine what steps are being taken to act against these
practices, and implement the measures agreed at Polokwane. Further,
we need to assess whether the measures proposed at Polokwane are
still adequate to address the challenges being faced.

3.20 Polokwane and the Manifesto, proposed that to combat corruption:

• The NEC must develop a framework on post-tenure rules, including
a cooling-off period during which public representatives and senior
officials will be prohibited from accepting appointment to a board,
employment or any other substantial benefit from a private sector
organisation that has benefited from a contract, tender or
partnership agreement with the public service/state in a process
that the official has participated in. (Polokwane)

• Government will step up measures to ensure: politicians do not
tamper with the adjudication of tenders; the process of the tendering
system is transparent; as well as ensuring much stronger
accountability of public servants involved in the tendering process.
(Manifesto)

3.21 Neither of these commitments appears to have been followed up, by
the NEC or government with the necessary urgency. Papers for the
NGC on leadership, and organisational renewal, which deal with
related matters cite these commitments on tackling corruption, but don’t
comment on the lack of progress, or make recommendations on how to
take them forward. [9] The Organisational Renewal NGC paper only
proposes an internal mechanism to discipline members found guilty of
corruption, but no measures to effectively combat the roots of
corruption which has become so endemic, such as abuse of tenders,
shady BEE deals linked to access to the state etc. While it is welcome
that the paper proposes dismissal of “members found guilty of
corruption and abuse of power” it doesn’t suggest the necessary
mechanisms to give either the state or the party real bite when it comes
to acting against corruption.

3.22 The NGC paper’s proposal for an internal ANC ‘Integrity Committee’
also doesn’t adequately respond to the seriousness of the situation.
The Committee “will manage the interests of those who hold office in
the state and organisation and investigate any allegations of improper
conduct.” Whilst this responds to some to the issues we have raised
and is therefore welcome, the emphasis appears to be more on
protecting ‘genuine’ ANC business people than ruthlessly cracking
down on corruption. The paper states: “This will protect ANC leaders
from false accusations and … misdemeanours by some in our ranks
and in society who give a bad name to all genuine black
businesspeople and entrepreneurs who have links with the ANC... As a
matter of principle, all members of the ANC are free ... to engage in
legitimate and clean business activities in the public and private
sector…”

3.23 The Organisational Renewal paper only proposes an undefined
‘protocol’ which will address conflicts of interest: “Public representatives,
public servants and serving members of the constitutional structures
require organisational protocols that will [combat] conflict of interest
and abuse of office for commercial gain. …” Again this doesn’t appear
to address the seriousness of the challenge, nor confront the fact that
almost 3 years after Polokwane, the NEC has still not produced the
relevant guidelines.

3.24 The paper suggests that the root of corruption is the fact that access to
political influence is for many members, the only way to improve their
lives “… too many ANC cadres and members cannot make a living
independent of deployment by the movement. …The movement needs
to encourage its members… to invest in their own self-development...
Members of the ANC should be encouraged to earn a decent living
through their own legitimate initiatives…” While this is important, it
doesn’t adequately acknowledge that since corrupt networks provide
the vehicle for untold wealth, it is only through cracking down ruthlessly
on those networks, and creating a new political ethos, that such a
‘career path’ will be discouraged.

3.25 Another issue which surfaces in the NGC leadership paper is that
secret party funding is used to exercise improper influence over the
organisation, and secure various favours. Polokwane resolved that:
“The ANC should champion the introduction of a comprehensive
system of public funding of representative political parties… [and] an
effective regulatory architecture for private funding of political parties…
The incoming NEC must urgently develop guidelines and policy on
public and private funding…” The NGC paper asks “what about monies
raised by candidates and lobby groups, with no accountability and
disclosure about the sources (and legality) of such resources, nor how
these monies are being used. Are we already in the trap of vested
interests and those with money having more influence about the
direction of the ANC than its membership? Our approach towards party
financing will therefore have to be broader, so that it also deals with the
“informal” party financing….” This is an important point, but again
nothing concrete is proposed, and the Polokwane resolution has not
been implemented.

3.26 Until recently, Government’s approach to these matters has not
inspired confidence, and has created the impression that government is
helpless or directionless on the anti-corruption front. This impression is
not countered by the very weak approach contained in the performance
agreements on the Presidency website. The Outcome on corruption
only states that: “This is a critical issue if we are to improve investor
perception, trust and willingness to invest. We need a detailed plan on
how we will aim to successfully convict 100 people by 2014 who have
assets of more than R5 million restrained.” And the relevant Outcome
on the public service states: ”There must be an improvement in the
corruption perception index from position 55 of 180 to 40 of 180. A
target must be set for the number of payroll and tendering corruption
related disciplinary cases and convictions that are successfully
completed, and a plan developed and implemented for achieving this
target. The number of South Africans approached for a bribe must be
reduced - a target must be set in this regard and plans put in place to
meet the target.”

3.27 COSATU has welcomed the recent announcements that government
will conduct a series of investigations into seven identified government
departments, including the SAPs; the Department of Human
Settlements has launched investigations into dodgy housing contracts;
and Public Works Department has frozen certain leases subject to
investigations. The Department of Mineral Resources has acted to
suspend granting of mining rights pending an investigation into abuses,
following the Arcelor Mittal scandal. The SA Revenue Services is also
conducting selective lifestyle audits, a measure strongly supported by
COSATU. This is all welcome. However, these all constitute
investigations after the fact, despite their importance. What is needed is
a much stronger legislative framework, and enforcement strategy,
which deals with corruption forcefully, and efficiently. The measures
proposed by the ANC Manifesto, and Polokwane-see above- need to
be implemented. But we need to go beyond these, with measures
specially designed to address all the types of tender fraud, and other
forms of corruption, identified by the AG and other agencies of
government. We also need to push for investigation of allegations that
certain Ministers have been interfering with tenders.

3.28 Democratisation of the ANC and the State: as indicated above,
operation ANC ibuyile was supposed to return the ANC back to
members, and hold leadership to account, both in the organisation and
in government. Has this happened? The expectation post-Polokwane
was that the ANC would return policy formulation to its members. But
there has been little progress in that direction. Policy continues to be
driven by technocrats, and dominated by those in government. Further,
the ANC is not driving a clear programme on the ground,

3.29 At the level of governance, the call at Polokwane was for the ANC,
together with the Alliance, to reassert leadership of all processes of
governance. But where does the power lie today? Luthuli House?
Presidency? Treasury? The Executive? Parliament? Alliance? The
reality again is that the ANC is not on top of processes in government,
and that policy decisions continue to be made in an untransparent way,
without the meaningful participation of the ANC, or Alliance. For
example, some of the key policy debates referred to above, such as the
outcomes process, the new growth path etc., haven’t been debated in
the structures of the ANC, let alone broader society. Even though there
has been an improvement, the ANC continues, in the overall, to
operate as before, with government largely leading processes.

3.30 At the November 2009 Alliance Summit the ANC contested a previous
agreement that the Alliance should be the political centre. The irony of
the resistance by some ANC leaders to take forward the agreement
that the Alliance should be the strategic political centre, is that the ANC
itself is not acting as a strategic centre, and that resistance comes
particularly from ANC leaders who are in government, who don’t want
government to be held accountable by the ANC or the Alliance. Further,
the statement that the ANC is the leader of the Alliance is interpreted
by some to mean that it is the sole political centre, in a way, which
marginalises the SACP and COSATU as the General Secretary of the
SACP, recently pointed out.

3.31 At the same time, there is a more openness in the relationship between
government and parliament. President Zuma made an important
speech to MP’s, shortly after elections, calling on them to hold the
Executive accountable. Parliament does seem to have been more
robust than previously, although there are signs of certain Ministers
returning to bad old habits, of trying to bully Parliament.

3.32 Polokwane was also a revolt against the abuse of state institutions for
narrow factional reasons. Is there progress in this regard? We can still
smell manipulation of institutions by individuals for personal gain; and
appointment of dodgy people into key positions. The jury is still out
therefore as to whether we run the risk of returning to the pre-
Polokwane politics in this regard.

3.33 In summary: the post-Polokwane period has been highly contested.
On paper, Polokwane promised key advances in its commitment to an
economic policy based on decent work, proposals for a new growth
path, a new high impact industrial policy, national health insurance,
comprehensive social protection, comprehensive rural development
strategy etc. But progress on these areas has been very mixed, and on
the whole disappointing. The centrepiece of the new economic policy,
the Growth path document couldn’t be adopted at the July Cabinet
Lekgotla, and has been referred to a Cabinet Committee. There are no
time frames set for this process suggesting that it may hang in there
forever.

3.34 There was a Honeymoon period post-Polokwane, particularly in the
Alliance, but the emergence of a ‘new tendency’ focused on using
access to the state for a selfish accumulation agenda, disrupted the
emerging unity of purpose.

3.35 The ‘new tendency’ strategy has been to put the current leadership on
the back foot all the time. Public statements that ‘ANC has been
hijacked by communists’ were made as part of the assault on the long
held principle of dual membership.

3.36 The main advances which were registered was an agreement to extend
the Child Support Grant from 15-18 years, reduce the Old Age Pension
from 65 to 60 for men; the introduction of a progressive industrial
strategy in the form of IPAP2; the acceptance, at least in principle for
the adoption of a new growth path, which would guide economic policy;
and the extensive consultation around cabinet appointments. But these
gains were countered by a range of problematic agendas, particularly
on economic policy, outlined above. There is some doubt as to how far
we have progressed in reversing the 1996 class project.

3.37 Nationally and provincially, there is no clear evidence of a fundamental
reprioritisation in budgets to reflect the central importance of the five
priorities. Failure to adopt the Alliance programme for fundamental
transformation led to a failure to mobilise our base to strongly back a
campaign for example to make our schools function. At this moment,
with policy formulation drifting back to cabinet and state bureaucrats,
there is no role played by the grass root structures except during
elections and when celebrating historic dates.

3.38 We haven’t delivered concretely. The main areas of progress have
been on policy processes , including the rural development strategy,
the new growth path to a certain extent etc. IPAP2 is the one major
concrete advance, but will likely be frustrated by inappropriate macro
economic policy, and lack of resources, and will in any case take some
time to bite.

3.39 The concrete impact, post-Polokwane, for working people has been far
from encouraging. Admittedly in the midst of the international economic
crisis, the loss of 1,1 million jobs - has led to deepening poverty. In the
short term, there is no likely major recovery to job creation. Inequalities
continue to deepen, and we continue to see a growing level of profits
and benefits to the capitalist class, which celebrates an increasing
share of profits and a declining share of wages in the GDP.
Nevertheless, capitalism faces a crisis of reproduction and
sustainability, in the context of the international as well as local
situation. Therefore elements of capital are looking for new answers.
Some elements of capital have entered into tactical alliances with
labour on specific issues such as a campaign against high interests
rates, calling for a weaker and competitive currency, as well as
supporting the local procurement campaign. Others are calling for a
social accord between business, government and labour. Amongst our
constituency there is a degree of despondency, and people are
beginning to question our strategies. There is the danger that again,
the 2^nd decade of freedom will belong to capital.

3.40 Briefly, the new international situation holds both enormous challenges
for the movement, as well as opening up significant new possibilities.
The devastating impact of the crisis on workers has been outlined
above. At the same time, the international economic crisis is witnessing
the rapid reconfiguration of international economic relations, with a new
role emerging for countries of the South. We are also seeing the
collapse of the old international economic consensus, and a greater
acceptance of the central role of the state in economic development, as
well as the importance of tighter regulation of capital. This opens up
policy space, and has important implications for our domestic agenda,
particularly in relation to implementing the economic and social
resolutions of Polokwane.

 4. Paralysis in the Alliance and Government

4.1 We are facing political paralysis on two key fronts:

1. In Government, the old bureaucrats and conservatives in Cabinet
continue to block the Polokwane mandate. They are driving old
policies, while ‘debates’ are deliberately prolonged. The New
Growth Path couldn’t be discussed or adopted at either January or
July Cabinet Lekgotla. But key policy initiatives are being rapidly
driven forward e.g. by the Presidency through the Ministerial
performance agreements / outcomes approach.

2. In the ANC and Alliance – the fragmentation and fragile state of the
ANC, means there is no space for robust policy debate. The
Alliance Summit has been indefinitely postponed, because of a fear
of implosion, if the Summit went ahead. However, the fear may not
be so much about implosion of the ANC, as about a serious
contestation, around key issues, such as economic policy, and the
debate around the political centre. COSATU has recently been
excluded from participating in a meeting of the NEC Economic
Transformation Committee [10], which may open the way for our
wholesale exclusion in all other NEC sub-committees.

4.2 A key reason behind this paralysis, as we have said above, is that the
predatory elite has subjected the leadership to so much beating, and
blackmail tactics. It was hardly a year into their term when the
predatory elite started making statements that some in particular the
Secretary General and now increasingly the President will be replaced.
Before the Deputy President was insulted in public after being smeared
through a media campaign. This has put the leadership in an invidious
position, making them vulnerable, and in the overall led to them losing
confidence, resulting in indecision on many critical questions.

4.3 Recently leadership failed to protect some in the ANCYL seen to be
victims of a wave of intolerance and victimisation of those not
endorsing problematic positions, such as the premature opening of
succession debates, despite this being called to order by the ANC NEC.
When these groupings appealed for intervention, little was done and
yet when they approached the Courts for remedy they were told those
who did this would have dismissed themselves automatically. Today
the balance has been shifted in favour of ‘mabaphume singene’ (let
them vacate we want to lead) grouping who have not hesitated to
launch a public assault on their targets for 2012.

4.4 The indecisiveness on the issues mentioned above constitutes a
political crisis, in which avenues for serious engagement on taking
forward the Polokwane mandate are being closed off. We need to
analyse what the role is of various forces, including the predatory elite,
in blocking movement forward, in the state, and the Alliance. We must
analyse the class basis of the contestation currently paralysing the
ANC and its formations, including the ANCYL, and the extent to which
it is a function of factions attempting to lay their hands on the levers of
state as a basis for accumulation, and to what extent factions are
attempting to defend the organisation from this onslaught.

4.5 What underpins the ANC’s fear of engagement? The notion has been
raised that if we engage at the level of Alliance, the ANC could be
‘taken over by hostile forces’, because the leadership is facing serious
difficulties [is this ‘paralysis’ real, or is it exaggerated perhaps as a way
to neutralise Alliance partners, and stop them from pushing too hard?]
Yet the cooling of contact, itself breeds conditions for growing mistrust
within the Alliance.

4.6 ANC leadership is afraid of losing positions in 2012, and therefore don’t
want to alienate any powerful group. So, as a result of internal ANC
dynamics, the Alliance is now in limbo. If this ‘unstable equilibrium’ in
the ANC is accepted at face value, it means among other things, that
the ANC is now not capable of negotiating a binding agreement or pact.
Alternatively there needs to be consideration of how to tilt the balance
of forces away from the predatory elite in the movement, to enable the
ANC to play its rightful leadership role.

4.7 A case in point is the way in which the movement has chosen to
respond to the attempted marginalisation of the ANC Secretary
General, in the face of this onslaught by the predatory elite. Attempts
have been made to distance him from the left, and for him to play a
more ‘neutral’ role. However this merely hamstrings him and other
progressives in the movement, and deepens confusion amongst the
membership, as to where the leadership wants to take the organisation.

4.8 To complicate this, while the SACP’s membership has grown to a
significant 109 000, it has challenges in reaching its full potential.
Increasingly the SACP is unable to play its proper role. It is in danger of
becoming more and more invisible, given the full-time role of its office
bearers in government and in the ANC. This equally makes it difficult
for the Federation to take forward its Congress Resolution on Socialism,
as its key partner is hobbled. Further, the SACP’s cautious approach
has in come cases been seen as a move towards conservatism and
defensiveness. Its initial approach to the nationalisation debate has
emboldened demagogues in the ANCYL to use radical populist rhetoric,
to disguise a right wing agenda of accumulation, and anti working class
politics. The SACP needs to re-establish its focus, and ensure that it
has full time leadership whose primary commitment is to driving the
organisation forward, at national and provincial level. It needs to ensure
capacity, visibility, and ideological clarity.

4.9 COSATU is aware of the link between the situation facing many in the
SACP leadership and the unavailability of resources to pay full time
elected office bearers. The organised working class has not adequately
played their role in supporting a viable and truly independent working
class party capable of being a vanguard for a struggle for socialism.

4.10 We therefore have seen three phases post Polokwane: the initial
honeymoon period; then a mixed bag of contestation and zigzagging;
and now a period of limbo, leading to paralysis of the Alliance, and of
certain processes in government:

---

The post Polokwane Era December 2007 to 2010 – The Key Phases

Note- this is a broad indicator. The periods actually overlap

PHASE I- ‘Honeymoon’ December 2007 to mid 2009

1. Post-Mbeki transition.

2. Alliance transitional management team manages process to elections.

3. Progressive Manifesto.

4. Successful elections.

5. Reconfiguration of government, including new Ministry to co-ordinate
economic policy.

6. Consultation on the appointment of the new Cabinet

7. Successful Alliance Economic Summit 2008, and May 2009 Alliance
Summit.

8. Nevertheless clear signs that old bureaucracy and leaders of the 96-class
project continue to contest the agenda, in ANC and government.

What were real gains? This phase is about reorganisation and stabilisation

PHASE II ‘Fight back’ and contestation mid 2009 to 2010

Government

1. Conservative bureaucrats, particularly in Presidency and Treasury drive
old polices and block new ones, supported by some leaders in Cabinet.

2. Treasury continues to use control of fiscus, to assert conservative
economic policies, and thwart the mandate of EDD to align economic
policies towards objectives of Manifesto.

3. Attempt to use NPC as centre to assert overall control of government
policy. This was later defeated and confined to a more limited agenda.

4. Bureaucrats in Presidency, in Monitoring and Evalution department, also
drive a policy agenda, under cover of technocratic outcomes and
performance agreements.

5. Progressive Ministers struggle to assert new IPAP2, Growth Path, rural
development agenda, NHI etc., in face of this.

ANC

1. Role of elements within the ANCYL and tenderpreneurs linked to the
movement, in undermining ANC leadership, and opposing closer Alliance
relations including through making wild claims that the communists have
hijacked the ANC.

2. Attempt to isolate ANC Secretary General, and attack on left/ ‘communists’
in Alliance.

3. Alliance Summit Nov 2009 effectively reversed agreement on the Alliance
political centre resulting in a failure to adopt a programme for
transformation to take forward Manifesto commitments. Even the
compromise proposed by the ANC Deputy President that both the ANC
and ANC led Alliance are the strategic politic center does not appear to be
winning ground.

4. Blocking of progressive resolutions of 2008 Economic summit on
macroeconomic policy.

5. COSATU continues programme of mass mobilisation.

Emergence of new tendency in movement is not an aberration it reflects
changing class basis of state and ruling party and old alliance with finance
capital.

PHASE III Political Paralysis Jan-August 2010

Government

1. Neither NPC nor EDD can assert role as economic planning centre in
government.

2. Failure to discuss New Growth Path at January Cabinet Lekgotla, or to
adopt it in the July Cabinet Lekgotla.

3. Key people leave Presidency and Departments. Removal of some Director
General’s but no clear political agenda, or direction.

4. Lack of decisiveness in leadership to resolve key stalemates.

ANC/Alliance

Engagement with the ANC in April 2010 Bilateral, reveals that the ANC is
deeply divided.

1. Unable to engage on substantive policy issues, and Alliance Summit
repeatedly postponed. Top leadership fearful of broader discussions.
2. Signs of closing down of engagement in ANC e.g. exclusion from ANC
ETC.

3. Issues reduced more to discussion of symptoms, such as problem of
‘public spats’.

Progressive forces wield a degree of social power, particularly through
organised labour. Also have a greater presence in state, post-May 2009. But
not strong enough to dislodge 1996 class project, and new predatory elite.

---

4.11 If we are to address this political paralysis, we need to look beyond the
symptoms e.g. the ‘problem of spats’ in the Alliance. We need to look
at the underlying contradictions, and the root of the contestation, in the
Alliance and in government.

4.12 From the perspective of class analysis, we sit both with a paradigm of
continuity, and change, in relation to the current state:

– Continuity in that the 1996 class project was a long-term project,
which has rooted itself, with concrete class interests in the state and
society. It represented an alliance with big capital, particularly
finance capital, and the creation of a black capitalist class. It laid the
basis for the politics of crass materialism, as a replacement for the
politics of service and solidarity. This new culture in turn laid the
basis for corruption at all levels of society;

– Change, in that the relative prominence of a predator class, which
relies on access to state levers for accumulation, vis. a vis. big
capital (which was arguably more prominent until recently), is
growing by the day, in the most frightening way, with the Mittal deal
and ICT consortium being the latest most obscene example of this.

This presages a form of accommodation between these two centres
of capital. However, this accommodation comes at a big price to
established capital, which would pursue a different path, if this were
open to them.

4.13 A political stalemate, particularly in the Alliance, is to the advantage of
the predatory elite, as they occupy the vacuum, which is created, and
want to use the ANC as their primary vehicle for accumulation. If this
stalemate persists, we will either continue with this unstable status quo,
with all its weaknesses, or the political hyenas will take over completely
in 2012 not only to accelerate movement towards a predator state but
also to put the whole country up for sale to the highest bidder. Such a
scenario will unleash widespread resistance. This raises the spectre of
massively increased abuse of human rights, and even the introduction
of large scale repression, if this scenario is not averted.

4.14 The question needs to be asked in particular of the ANC leadership, as
to why they appear unable to break this impasse. Is the ANC simply too
compromised by developments, and are the leadership unable to
appeal to that same membership who ejected undemocratic elements
at Polokwane? Progressive forces in the ANC and the Alliance need to
look at how to break this paralysis, and assert a progressive hegemony
at the September NGC. The question however is: do the working class
have the power to enforce the Polokwane resolutions, defend the
current leadership collective, and assert a progressive platform?

4.15 The President in particular needs to be called on to play a more
decisive role in addressing the stalemates, which have emerged in the
Alliance and in government. For example he needs to act to unblock
the impasse around the responsibility for economic coordination within
government; and he needs to assert the importance of taking forward
the agreement that the Alliance needs to act as a strategic political
centre, and that this is not incompatible with the ANC fulfilling its
leadership role.

4.16 Further, the ANC top 6 needs to play their leadership role as a
collective, and to complete their term of office in 2012. COSATU will
however carefully consider its continued support for this NEC
leadership collective, in the next term, based on their performance in
addressing the key Polokwane mandate issues outlined in this
discussion document. The battle now, however, is to correct
weaknesses in the movement, not to unleash a regime change debate,
that will defocus and undermine the unity of the ANC.

4.17 We need to respond politically to the attacks on COSATU and the
SACP by elements in the ANCYL. This needs to be done calmly and
maturely, to avoid the trap of reacting to provocation, in a manner
which unnecessarily escalates conflict, and diverts the energies of our
movement from the priority issues facing our people..

4.18 A concern is that, instead of addressing the above urgent challenges,
focus will be shifted now by local government elections, the ANC 2012
National Conference etc.; and that the unresolved questions will
continue to fester, until they burst into the open in uncontrolled and
unpredictable ways. Urgent bilaterals are required with the ANC to
address these matters.

 5. What is the way forward for COSATU?

5.1 We face a serious crisis of legitimacy amongst workers if we can’t
demonstrate concrete gains in terms of worker rights and socio-
economic progress ahead of local government elections. Not only
COSATU but also the Alliance as a whole will be in serious trouble.
Further, a shift towards the opposition in local government elections
could be used as a platform to make gains on a national level in 2014.

5.2 The paradox is that despite these pressures, and this looming crisis,
COSATU is nevertheless an organisation, which is admired by more
South Africans, than at any time in our history. We have earned a
special place as a conscience of our democracy and a fearless
spokesperson of the most downtrodden. This gives us a degree of
leverage and power in society. We wield considerable moral authority
amongst the working class and middle strata, increasingly even in the
capitalist class, and some opposition parties, albeit for opportunistic
reasons at times. But we can’t rely on moral authority alone, otherwise
we will gain influence but lose power. This influence is society needs to
be bolstered both by our own organisational power, as well as forms of
broader organisational coalitions which address the challenges outlined
in this paper.

5.3 While we wield moral authority, this is not uncontested. The media is
full of negative propaganda about the role of trade unions in
marginalising the unemployed, making unrealistic demands, blocking
the wage subsidy etc., etc., No doubt, the tempo of these attacks will
increase as always with the public sector strike. We need to
systematically make our case for new economic policies, the
importance of living wages to address poverty and inequality, the fact
that our proposals are aimed at addressing the needs of the most
marginalised in society etc. We need to use the launch of our growth
path document to popularise this broad policy platform.

5.4 But in terms of asserting our influence in society, it is critical that we
build a strong and focused organisation. We are currently undertaking
an assessment of COSATU, which reveals significant weaknesses,
including the lack of internal capacity to drive a systematic
Organisational Development strategy in affiliates; and the fact that
many manufacturing unions are unable to breach the 40% ceiling of
membership as a basis to consolidate into one federation.

5.5 A key test for us is going to be to launch a dynamic ‘mother of all living
wage campaigns’, which will capture the imagination of the country on
an unprecedented scale. The shape and structure of income, wages,
and inequality must look completely different once this campaign has
taken effect.

5.6 On the other hand, we are going to come under pressure from growing
sentiment in government that employers and workers (through their
organs) must sign a social accord - a social contract on wages and
prices, as is often the case in societies facing economic crisis. This
proposal for a social accord was in fact a central plank of the Gear
package. This raises some key issues which suggest that such an
agreement would be a non-starter:

• Who would we sign with? Labour is relatively organised. But who
sits on the other side? Business is too fragmented. The MLC can’t
cut a deal and force it on all in business to deliver. BUSA doesn’t
seem to hold weight. BLSA is seen by some as a clique of Anglo
American.

• Business will however fragmented as they may be, make us deliver
on wages, and abuse labour broking to drive wages down further
once we give a signal that suggests we are willing to look at a wage
freeze, or that workers salaries are too high. But business won’t be
able to deliver on prices - given the extent of collusion in the
economy. Any deal on wages, suppressing wages to the level of
inflation, will constitute class peace; and entrench the current wage
structure, existing inequalities and massive wage gaps. We won’t
be able to reverse that trend, if we abandon our battle to fight it now.

• If we did sign such an agreement, five years down the line, workers
would create a new Federation, once they see the impact a wage
freeze has had on their lives.

• How does the ANC or government hope to drive a social accord,
when they are unable to negotiate a pact in the Alliance?

• How would we relate such an agreement to our intention to launch
the ‘mother of all living wage campaigns’ next year? If we signed a
wage deal, how would we maintain the capacity to fight for a living
wage?

5.7 Even if we are clear that such a proposal is a non-starter, we need to
be able to clearly explain our objections, and propose a coherent
alternative. This means inter alia that we need to be able to put forward
a comprehensive proposal for the reorganisation of wages and
incomes, within the parameters of an alternative macro economic
framework, and development strategy. Those elements of our growth
path proposal addressing these matters should therefore be developed
further.

5.8 In terms of our political strategy, we are in a ‘rather hard place’. If our
2015 strategy has not worked for us, do we have other tools to take us
forward? In the run up to 2011, we must avoid being too predictable:
articulating our criticisms, and mobilising the masses around our
campaigns, but then calling on members to vote i.e. business as usual.
We need an alternative approach. But what is that alternative approach?

5.9 We must look at what is the combination of levers we can use to
engage, but how we can do this differently. We require a strategy which
combines our tried and tested approach of engaging in all the different
sites of power, and mobilising our mass base, with a much more
assertive drive to build powerful social coalitions, which mobilise
constituencies which are our natural allies, but have been relatively
dormant for various reasons. This must be linked to an engagement
with our strategic allies.

5.10 Our strategy to tilt the balance of forces, should focus on:

1. Assessment and refining of our Swelling of the ranks/ 2015
strategy, which remains important, but over-reliance on this
strategy hasn’t worked. At one level COSATU members haven’t
joined the ANC in large enough numbers. However, even members
of the ANC play a minimal role in defining strategy, and therefore
swelling the ranks alone may be ineffective. NEC sub-committees
and technocrats can still draft strategy documents without taking
account of member’s views. Discussions on policy don’t take place
at branch level. Workers participation at branch level in some
branches is also often frustrated by hostile attitudes from the
leadership of branches. We still need to continue swelling the ranks,
but need to combine this with a campaign for democratic control. If
we contested the ANC today on a class basis, could we secure a
progressive working class oriented leadership and programme?
Analysis of what is happening in provinces suggests that the
organised working class is not the motive force in the ANC at this
point.

2. Massive intensification of the anti-corruption campaign. [Is the
cancer already too advanced, to stem?] We need to go beyond
moral condemnation. We must deal with the systemic issues, which
are reproducing corruption. To do this we need a far-reaching
programme to fight this cancer. What are the institutional, legal,
political, economic changes, which are required to lead society out
of this malaise? Fighting the scourge of corruption requires clear
leadership. We must develop a programme with civil society and
our allies, and host a Summit with a broad range of society. (Invite
the President, Attorney General, Minister of Finance, SARS, etc. to
address the Summit). We need to put the predatory elite on back
foot. We need to strike a strategic blow against the elite- e.g. by
reversing, or taking legal action against the Mittal deal. We need to
commission serious research on the nature of the problem [11]. Action
against corruption must be incorporated into our Section 77
demands at Nedlac.

3. Building a powerful anti-corruption institution of civil society – a
corruption watch, with the capacity - including a team of lawyers,
accountants, auditors, etc to conduct preliminary investigations, and
process these with the relevant authorities.

4. We need to build a coalition on human rights and worker rights
issues, as part of the effort to isolate the agenda of the predatory
elite. This means that we need to mobilise opposition against
attempts to militarise our society, manufacture securocratic
paranoia, or anything, which creates the climate for repressive
measures against people organising to advance their rights. This
includes opposition to: attempts to stifle access to information, or to
suppress a vigorous media; moves to remilitarise the police;
repressive activities against worker and community demonstrations;
deunionisation of the defence force; and attempts to deny
organisational rights to large sections of the public sector by
defining them across the board as “essential services”. Such
measures move us in the direction of autocracy, and are only in the
interests of the new elite, and not the working class, or society as a
whole. Failure to oppose these developments could ultimately see
the introduction of outright repression to deal with those opposing
the agenda of the predator elite.

5. The COSATU post World Cup Declaration is gaining broad
support. We need to create a bigger profile for this, and convene a
platform of organisations to focus on the issues raised in the
Declaration. We can use this to unite South Africa around a positive
campaign of social renewal?

6. COSATU Living Wage Conference. We must link this to our
growth path proposal, and call on civil society to input. We must use
the LWC as a platform to launch discussion in society on the
economic crisis facing ordinary people, and proposed solutions. Key
issues include inequalities, jobs, and poverty. We must consider the
possibility of our Living Wage Campaign culminating in a S77
notice/ mass action.

7. We must mobilise for the immediate introduction of the National
Health Insurance. We shall join forces with civil society and
alliance to demand addressing of the current two-tier health system
– (one for the rich and the powerful who enjoy first class services in
the private clinics and hospitals and the other for the overwhelming
majority who must face the humiliating and worse than third-coach
conditions in the public hospitals).

8. Build a platform on the struggle for socialism. We must clarify
theoretically what this means, and take forward the discussion
document on the NDR and Socialism, which we debated at the
2007 COSATU Central Committee. Our response can’t be the same
as that of the ultra left that says forget about conditions today –
“storm the Bastille”. In our last congress we theorised the
relationship between the NDR and the struggle for socialism. In
brief we believe that the NDR is the most direct route to socialism,
meaning that a successful NDR holds the possibility for a socialist
future. Our assessment is that the NDR is at a crossroads itself, and
therefore all socialists need to contest the direction of this NDR, if
we are to advance the prospects for socialism. But we need a
coherent programme to take the connections between these two
struggles forward. The current trajectory of the NDR is moving us
further away from socialism, not closer.

9. Where to for the Alliance? The Congress mandate is for an
Alliance Pact now, and we need to continue to insist on the
importance of the Pact. But we have reached a stalemate on the
Pact, and the issue of the Alliance as strategic political centre.
Without an agreement on the Pact and worse without the alliance
programme for fundamental transformation we will be back to the
marginalisation of the Alliance. Conditions are different from 2001,
when the dominant centre in the ANC was trying to force the left out
of the Alliance. But, the one common feature with that period is that
the Alliance is again dysfunctional: the centre cannot hold, and
Alliance Summits are no longer possible. What is the way out of this?
Do we need a radical reconfiguration of the Alliance?

10. Why for 16 years since democracy have we not moved closer
towards the ideal which COSATU resolutions speak to? Do we
have the wrong conception of our Alliance – is our insistence on an
Alliance programme that will allow all components to drive
transformation as a political center under the leadership of the ANC
a pipe dream? To what extent are these high COSATU
expectations on how the Alliance should function leading to deep
frustrations on our part? Are these expectations on the part of
COSATU unrealistic – do we need another type of Alliance which
perhaps will only be limited to COSATU backing the ANC during
elections but not insisting on driving a transformation programme
together? The other option would be for COSATU to align itself with
a left party or pro poor/ pro working class party and relate to the
ANC on ad hoc basis, through e.g. governing coalitions. We need to
develop these scenarios further.

11. We need to analyse the outcomes of the ANC NGC, and the
implications these hold for the Alliance, moving forward. There is
real concern, that the current politics of patronage, and deep
factionalism in the movement, will make it unlikely that the NGC will
have the coherent and deep political discussion, so desperately
needed by the movement at this stage. Yet we need the NGC to
make a contribution to the breaking of this deadlock. Our members
are called upon again to discuss this state of affairs, including
strategies to unblock the stalemate. We shall hold special meetings
of COSATU locals, socialist forums and provincial shop stewards
councils throughout the month of September to discuss these
challenges.

12. All discussions will culminate in the Central Committee of COSATU
at the end of March 2011 as part of the mid term assessment and
preparation for the 11^th National Congress in September 2012. We
have been given a mandate by both the 9^th and 10^th National
Congresses of the federation - we therefore do not need a special
National Congress.

13. The COSATU CEC in August reaffirmed its support for the ANC in
the 2011 local government elections but acknowledged that there
will be major problems in some of our poorer communities to
convince voters to stay with the ANC. The CEC adopted a
programme of action to mobilise our membership. It was agreed
however that we would not give the ANC a blank cheque and would
refuse to campaign or support candidates known to be corrupt or
lazy, just because they succeed in manipulating the ANC and even
alliance internal processes, and who enjoy no support in the
communities. We would support candidates who have integrity and
who can advance a programme of action to address the real
concerns facing working class communities.

14. Lastly and most importantly, we must continue to build the engines
of the federation more systematically and coherently, and ruthlessly
examine our own weaknesses. Despite 10 years of conducting
debates on Organisational Development (OD) we still have to
address the unequal development of COSATU affiliated unions. We
must develop the capacity to implement our OD policies, and be
use best practices across all unions. This requires that we create
capacity in the Secretariat to drive implementation of Organisational
Development across the federation.

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 Appendix I: SCENARIOS

The 2006 Congress discussion document and 1997 September Commission
looked at possible scenarios, and we reproduce below the relevant extracts. It
is important that we develop new scenarios, which address the unfolding
realities:

1. 2006 Congress Discussion Document ‘Possibilities for fundamental
social change’

Strategic Options for COSATU

The political tasks facing us are outlined in our 2015 Plan to build working
class power through quality jobs and building a strong organisation. COSATU
also declared that the new decade should belong to the working class. We
are now two years into the second decade and the analysis above show that
many challenges remain. Based on the analysis above the question to pose
is whether all that has been lost to the working class? We here sketch five
scenarios:

Scenario 1: Continue without change i.e. the current situation continues.
No consensuses within the Alliance on what interventions
are required to change the accumulation regime. Alliance is
marginalised from driving the agenda for change and its role
restricted to mobilisation during the election. Substantially,
there is no Alliance as conceived by COSATU, the ANC
continue to zigzag from one political crisis to the other.

Scenario 2: Change the laissez-faire attitude of the COSATU leadership
at all levels and vigorously drives aggressively the 2015
programme. In this scenario COSATU membership grows to
four million in line with recruitment policy framework and
creates a conscious and politicised proletariat out of these
ordinary workers. These trained cadres swell the ranks of the
ANC and redirect it into the framework of the 1969 Morogoro
conference’s strategy and tactics. In this scenario the ANC
led by workers at all levels is not hostile to socialism and
manages internal contradictions towards fundamental
transformation of society as envisaged in the Freedom
Charter and Morogoro.

Scenario 3: Introduce change: this may entail signing an enforceable
Pact within the Alliance. The Pact will stipulate how the
Alliance should operate and the development agenda that
should guide government. The working class also begin to
contest power in the manner that the SACP is beginning to
propose.

Scenario 4: Walk out of the Alliance and call on the SACP to contest
political power or start a new working class Party that would
unite labour, SACP, social movements, civil society
formations and the leftwing political formations committed to
the radical transformation and socialism. Under this scenario
COSATU acts with others to challenge the ANC in power
directly.

Scenario 5: The Alliance disintegrates with no clear direction. Under this
scenario the ANC stops being a broad church but is hijacked
to drive a narrow bourgeoisie’s class agenda whilst purging
those calling for fundamental change. COSATU and the
SACP splits in the middle along ideological lines and loyalty
to personalities in the Alliance.

These scenarios are not predictions; they are tools to help us debate the
strategic options for the labour movement and the working class in general. In
addition, we did not sketch what the drivers are of each scenario. In addition,
we do not define the pros and cons of each scenario to allow for discussion.

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 SEPTEMBER COMMISSION SCENARIOS

(extract from September
Commission into future of the unions, 1997)

We have identified the following as the key uncertainties facing COSATU:

• The extent and nature of economic development

• The nature of the labour market, i.e., what kind of workplaces and jobs
will we be organising in 2005? How many workers will be unemployed?

• The vision and programme of the ANC

• The nature and strategies of the capitalist class

• The degree of coherence or fragmentation of social values in South
Africa (i.e., whether people share the same basic values and attitudes
to justice, fairness, the state, etc.)

• The prospects for socialism.

It is impossible to predict the future. The September Commission has drawn
up three scenarios to explore these uncertainties and provoke discussion
within the federation about the future of labour. The three scenarios are called
the desert, Skorokoro and Pap, vleis and gravy.

The scenarios are stories about the future. The scenarios are not stories
about the strategies of COSATU. They are stories about the forces and
factors outside COSATU, beyond COSATU’s control. Each story is designed
to highlight critical challenges we may face in the future, and provoke debate
about the strategic responses which COSATU could choose. There are other
stories that could be told about the future, but we believe these highlights the
most important issues for COSATU.

1.1.1 The desert

In this scenario there is no economic development, no RDP delivery, and a
high level of class conflict. South Africa finds itself in the desert instead of the
promised land of the RDP. Could socialism provide the way out of the desert
and towards the Promised Land?

In 1996 the ANC government announces its new macro-economic policy. In
the following few years the economy stagnates. There is very little RDP
delivery as the government focuses on reducing state expenditure. There are
retrenchments across the economy. Only the informal sector seems to be
growing.

There is growing conflict between employers and unions in collective
bargaining and at NEDLAC. In 1998 the employers table a demand that
labour agree to wage restraint and industrial peace. Labour rejects this.
Employers stage a walkout. Government closes NEDLAC down.

Centralised bargaining collapses as employers pull out of bargaining councils.
Although workers are militant, unions tend to lose strikes because of the poor
economic situation.

The ANC moves further to the right and signs an austerity package with the
IMF. There are massive demonstrations against the worsening conditions of
the masses. Placards are seen asking, "Where is the RDP? Where is the
promised land?“and,”We the masses are in the desert - where is our
Moses?"

Powerful organisations of the unemployed, the youth and the communities
emerge. The government detains a number of leaders. Government leaders
promise to look into the people’s legitimate grievances, but warn against false
prophets who mislead the people. The SACP splits, with half its leadership
remaining in the ANC, and the others joining an alliance of Left organisations
for building a workers’ party.

Should COSATU remain in alliance with the ANC and campaign for it in
elections, or should it ally itself with the new workers’ party and the growing
popular alliance against ANC government policies? This is the major question
being debated in the federation as it prepares for its congress in September
2003.

1.1.1.1 Threats to COSATU:

• COSATU could lose the gains it made in the years before and after
1990.

• COSATU could become weaker as it become more difficult to win
strikes and improve wages and conditions because of the deteriorating
economy.

• COSATU could become narrowly focused on militant wage bargaining
and lose sight of broader working class issues.

1.1.1.2 Opportunities for COSATU:

• COSATU could become stronger by drawing on its militant tradition to
organise the resistance of workers.

• COSATU could broaden its perspective to take up living conditions and
political issues as well as wages.

• COSATU could play a central role in forging a new popular alliance,
and in building a new socialist movement in opposition to government.

1.1.2 Skorokoro

In this scenario there is some economic growth and modest delivery. The
main features are, on the one hand, increasing social fragmentation and
conflict, and on the other hand, the rapid self-empowerment of black business
and the black middle-class. South Africa is a skorokoro zigzagging from
problem to problem.

By 1999 the growth in GDP has been 4% per year, 300 000 houses have
been built and 400 000 new jobs have been created. However, unemployment
is still at 30%. Despite these problems, there has been a rapid emergence of
black business in these years, and the expansion of a black middle-class.

Newspapers are filled with reports of new millionaires, new corporate deals
and high salaries of government officials and consultants.

Ethnicity, racism, provincialism and regionalism become very powerful as a
result of lack of delivery and conflict over resources. This makes it even more
difficult to deliver. Patronage and corruption become the order of the day in
government and in civil society.

Trade unions face ongoing problems like the “five madoda” at Rustenburg
Platinum, like the Turning Wheel, like violence on the mines. There is
increasing competition between affiliates for members. Union activists
continue seeking greener pastures elsewhere. Provincial governments in
KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape establish EPZs to attract foreign
investment. The government stops extending bargaining council agreements
to non-parties.

Organisations have clear racial identities - the NP is coloured and white, the
ANC and COSATU are African. The NP succeeds in organising “responsible”
coloured unions in the Western Cape and undermining SACTWU and
SAMWU in that region.

On the ground there is a lack of cooperation or violent conflict in communities
and on the shop floor. The rainbow nation does not exist. In 1998 it is
announced that Cape Town has failed in its bid to host the Olympic games.

The ANC zigzags from policy to policy. It announces privatisation, but backs
down when workers take mass action. It announces a crackdown on
corruption and crime, but takes no firm steps. It proposes a new tax on the
wealthy, but changes its mind when they protest that this will discourage
foreign investors. It regularly announces new measures to transform the
public service, but keeps changing its policies under pressure from various
constituencies.

There are repeated calls by business, other political parties and the press for
the Tripartite Alliance to end. While many leaders in the ANC think this would
be a good idea, the dominant view is that breaking the Alliance would
undermine support for the ANC and worsen the divisions in society.

In their secretariat report to the COSATU congress at the end of 2003, the
federation’s leadership states that there is a social crisis in South Africa: " The
government lacks a vision of where we are going. There is no leadership in
civil society. We are rapidly becoming a skorokoro society, and we face the
danger of becoming a skorokoro union movement as well."

1.1.2.1 Threats to COSATU:

• COSATU could be weakened by the many divisions and conflicts in
society.

• The culture of self-enrichment and the growth of a black middle-class
could undermine the unions’ culture of solidarity.

• COSATU could become a reactive trade union movement, responding
to initiatives of others but unable to take initiatives of its own.

• The ANC could move further to the right.

1.1.2.2 Opportunities for COSATU:

• COSATU could develop strategies for unifying workers and overcoming
divisions in the workplace.

• COSATU could win wide public support by developing policies for more
effective delivery by the public service, and for exposing
mismanagement and corruption.

• COSATU could provide leadership to society and the ANC by putting
forward a vision based on clear economic and social policies.

1.1.3 Pap ‘n vleis and gravy

In this scenario there is massive economic growth and development. Jobs are
created and the RDP delivers. There is pap and vleis for most people. The
unions are involved in deal making, joint decision-making and co-
determination at all levels of society. But are they getting caught in the gravy?
From 1996 on, productivity agreements are signed in many sectors. In 1998,
after 18 months of negotiation, a breakthrough social accord is negotiated at
NEDLAC.

Over the next six years there is tremendous growth in all sectors. All kinds of
small and medium companies flourish. There is an increase in sub-contracting,
part-time and temporary work.

This means that there is a wide range of new jobs and new workers: part-time,
casual, seasonal and sub-contracted workers; hotel and restaurant workers;
clerical, service and financial workers; public sector workers; skilled workers,
scientists and technicians; and people working in music, film and advertising
studios. There are big differences in wages and conditions of all these
different workers. Many women are employed in low-paid and vulnerable
sectors - for example, seasonal workers in the tourist industry. Millions of
people are still unemployed and many work in the informal sector.

Companies are under tremendous competitive pressures. Managers put
pressure on workers and their unions to assist in improving productivity and
quality, and to work harder, faster and smarter. There is also continual
pressure for wage moderation in the private and the public sectors.
After 2002 there seems to be some decline in investment and growth figures,
and government calls for new negotiation around wage moderation, flexibility
and industrial peace. After lengthy meetings of the Tripartite Alliance behind
closed doors, and further tough negotiations at NEDLAC, labour agrees on
wage moderation in exchange for greater investment by business and
government in training. The following week, the minister of finance and the
president of COSATU are prominent in the grandstands, cheering the
amabokke-bokke to victory against the All Blacks.

At the same time, a new militant federation emerges. Although it is still small,
it attacks the national agreement struck at NEDLAC as a sell-out. Unions
should fight for higher wages for their members, not get involved in solving
management’s problems, it argues. This federation also argues against
unions getting involved in politics or political alliances.

Informal sector organisations, such as the Hawkers and Vendors Organisation,
apply to affiliate to COSATU. New unions and professional associations
appear among the more skilled and professional workers. They do not affiliate
to COSATU, saying that it does not offer them anything.

Over the years RDP delivery increases. Millions of houses are built, but there
are still huge shack settlements.

Despite tremendous progress, the successes of the new South Africa seem
shaky. There are questions over the political direction of the ANC government,
and over the prospects for continued economic growth. Will there still be pap
‘n vleis for most people? Who will get the gravy? What about those who have
still not benefited from growth or the RDP?

"We need to encourage open debate about our role and future direction.
There is no sign of such debate in our structures or among our members,"
says the general secretary of COSATU in his address to the federation’s
congress in 2003.

1.1.3.1 Threats to COSATU:

• COSATU may be unable to develop the strategies for organising the
many new kinds of workers and workplaces created by economic
growth, and so lose out to other unions.

• Involvement in so many forums of joint decision-making could co-opt
and weaken COSATU, making it dependent on the state.

• COSATU may lack the expertise, information and capacity to enter into
such complex negotiations and participation.

• Agreements on productivity and wage moderation may alienate the
members from the leadership, making the COSATU vulnerable to
competition from more militant unions.

• COSATU may become a TUCSA of the 1990s - complacent, with no
clear strategies, and with no vision of socialism.

1.1.3.2 Opportunities for COSATU:

• COSATU could increase its membership both in traditional sectors and
in new sectors, and build big strong organisation.

• COSATU could make use of its access to tripartite institutions and state
resources to build its organisational capacity.

• COSATU could democratise the workplace, extend worker participation
in economic decision-making, and influence society at all levels.

• COSATU could make significant advances, over the medium term, for
workers in terms of job opportunities, wages, working conditions,
training and careers, the improvement of the social wage, etc.

• COSATU could develop a programme of achieving socialism through
reforms, which democratise institutions and extend social regulation of
the economy.

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