Much of politics relating to Sri
Lanka in recent times has been
about legitimacy, ideology and
the public sphere. Thus, writing and speaking on certain issues itself seems to have a
cost in either legitimising or reinforcing
certain tendencies. This is all the more so
around the discourse of the Tamil diaspora particularly in the postwar context.
While the Tamil diaspora had a major
role in sustaining the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) during the decades of
war, its power and influence have greatly
changed following its decimation. How
ever, certain pro-LTTE actors in the Tamil
community outside the country are attempting to continue the mobilisations
that made the diaspora very visible during
the last phase of the war. Furthermore,
there are many commentators who are
giving such mobilisations much importance. Such commentators lack the perspective on the Tamil diaspora’s historical
emergence, its under lying structures and
shifts, and for that matter an analysis of
its transformation in the post-LTTE years.
Some of us who have been analysing the
Tamil diaspora and engaging with it be
lieve it is in a state of great flux and its role,
its coherence and its influence will dimin
ish in the next few years. Therefore to give
the diaspora importance, might also be
giving it unnecessary legitimacy, and only
prolong the inevitable decline of what has
been, over the last two decades, mainly a
source of destructive politics.
My decision then to write about the
Tamil diaspora, at this particular moment,
is in part influenced by my worry about the
impact of the diaspora discourse. In some
quarters an argument has been put forward
that the Sri Lankan state needs to address
the issue of a political settlement, mainly to
neutralise the mobilised sections of the
Tamil diaspora. In my opinion, this instru
mentalist argument and stra tegy is counter
productive. Just as the a ttempt to use the
LTTE as leverage to gain a political settlement
failed and led to immense destruction, the
attempt to use fear of the Tamil diaspora
for this purpose could have repercussions
undermining both the interests of the Tamil
community and broader democratisation
in the country. Indeed, recent Tamil diaspora mobilisations and rhetoric have become
the rationale and alibi for reinforcing the
security establishment, militarisation and
Emergency regulations in the postwar context, and continues to strengthen Sinhala
nationalism to the detriment of the minorities in the country. I must also mention a
worrying tendency I note among some lib
eral commentators in the Sri Lankan public
sphere. Some of these analysts, who focus
their political critique solely on the Tamil
diaspora, fail to critique the policies of the
state and the Sinhala nationalist lobby.
Such intellectual dishonesty is also some
thing we saw among Tamil liberals not long
ago when the LTTE seemed invincible. It is
with such concerns in mind that I want to
turn to the history of the Tamil diaspora
and the present conjuncture.
Classes and States
The Tamil diaspora is not monolithic; it is
differentiated by class and entails certain exclusions of caste, and gendered in its
exploitation. Furthermore, the Tamil diaspora, while having a tortured historical relationship with the Sri Lankan state, resides in
western countries, and is very much affected
by the policies of those western states.
The bulk of the Tamil diaspora in reality
consists of working class communities.
Many of them take multiple jobs which are
often the most unwanted occupations in
the west. It is these jobs, with their long
working hours that have produced the
remittance economy that sustains large
sections of the Tamil community inside the
country. Women in particular lead gruelling
lives, often working for a living and run
ning the home. Domestic abuse is common
and episodes of suicides by women have
from time to time brought attention to the
social alienation women face in the diaspora.
Socially, the working class sections of the
diaspora have been ghettoised, reproducing structures of social exclusion that many
immigrant communities from the Global
South face in the west.
In certain western countries, the Tamil
diaspora consists of fairly successful professionals. In the United States and
the United Kingdom, in particular, there
are many migrants who settled well
before the outbreak of the civil war in
1983. They have now produced a fairly
successful second generation of professionals. Such a second gene ration is also
constituted by sections of the working
class Tamils whose children are begin
ning to gain social mobility through
education and assimilation.
Regardless of the class position of both
the affluent and working class sections of
the Tamil diaspora, they both suffer from
considerable social and psychological alienation, in part fuelled by the economic life
and also by the politics of race in the west.
Such alienation becomes the ground for
the mobilisation of exile nationalism, nur
tured by social forums and institutions
such as temples, cultural forums, Tamil
schools and selfhelp organisations.
The Tamil diaspora, both socially and
economically, has been configured by immigration, refugee and asylum policies of
western states. While only professionals
could immigrate in the 1960s, by the be
ginning of the conflict in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, western states allowed
the inflow of low wage labour. Such low
wage labour and access to cheap housing
inevitably ghettoised sections of the
Tamil diaspora and subjected them to
social inequalities and lack of social mo
bility. These western states encouraged
certain multicultural policies which in
reality furthered exclusion of immigrant
communities from the mainstream. The
racism inhe rent in the law enforcement
arms of the western states meant that
crime within the immigrant communities
was often ignored as long as it did not spill
over into the mainstream.
The refugee policies of these western
states were transformed with the shift
from social welfare policies towards neoliberalism. In Europe, in particular, a
s ocial backlash against immigrants was
coupled with the recession and the budget
cuts that came in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Instead of the rags to riches success
story that they had initially envisioned,
many of the immigrants found them
selves at the receiving end of regressive
economic policies and actions by western
states, particularly with the economic
downturn. This greatly compounded the
situation of intense alienation that they
felt. Thus any understanding of the structure and politics of the Tamil diaspora
inevitably needs to take into consideration
the policies and the politics in their resi
dent western states.
Finally, the predicament of the Tamil
diaspora is in many ways no different
from that of many other emigrant communities, particularly those affected by
armed conflicts. Indeed, the other communities also suffered from the social
exclusion and alienation and also began
social and political forums and organisations in the west. Nationalist mobilisations among exiles, were also common
within these other communities. Therefore, the question of the uniqueness and
particularity of Tamil diaspora politics
inevitably comes to the fore.
LTTE’s Manoeuvre and Separatist Tamil Nationalism
The powerful mobilisation and tremen dous financial support for the war by the
Tamil diaspora, I argue, would not have
been possible without the manœuvre by
the LTTE at a particular moment in history. This moment which I would place in
the early 1990s ensured the uncontested
power of the LTTE. This moment also
marked overdetermination of separatist
Tamil nationalism as the dominant politics of the Tamil diaspora.
The LTTE’s manœuvre consisted, first of
all, of the decimation of alternative political actors; including the elimination of
other armed movements and the Tamil
United Liberation Front (TULF) leadership
inside the country in the late 1980s. And
by the early 1990s, thousands of dissidents
were tortured and killed in its prison
camps, and the LTTE began to gain totalitarian control of the Tamil community
insi de the country. The absence of alternative forces inside the country was critical for the LTTE’s move to consolidate its
power in the diaspora. In the 1980s, in
some European countries, the People
Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam
(PLOTE), for example, was better organised than the LTTE. But with the decimation of all other actors inside the country,
the LTTE could readily claim all support
for the struggle inside the country.
In the 1990s, the LTTE also began to systematically take over social forums in the
diaspora. It used coercion and mobilisations based on exile nationalism. The LTTE
even attacked individuals and forums in
the diaspora to instil fear and ensure its
total control. The assassination of activist
Sabalingam on May Day 1994 in Paris
along with attacks on journalists and
forums organised by dissident activists sent
a strong message to the Tamil diaspora. It
moved systematically, to control the politics of Tamil media outlets in the diaspora.
The LTTE’s position as the only organised force against the state inside the
country coupled with its control of the
public sphere in the Tamil diaspora allowed it to put forward a separatist Tamil
nationalism as the dominant politics in
the Tamil diaspora. It is this manœuvre of
the LTTE and the overdetermination of
separatist Tamil Eelam politics over other
forms of collective politics both in relation
to Sri Lanka and in the context of refugee
life in the west that has made politics of
the Tamil diaspora unique.
The LTTE capitalised on its manœuvre
as the Tamil diaspora became its political
and financial base to the detriment of the
Tamil population inside the country,
which had merely become the recruiting
ground for its war machine. It extracted
finances on a large scale from the diaspora
for its military machinery. The LTTE in the
diaspora perhaps took on three characteristics: of a liberation movement with exiled nationalist politics, a multinational
corporation with attendant finances,
operations and institutions, and a mafia
with underworld and extortionist activities. The LTTE’s relationship with the
Tamil diaspora was one of centralised
control and it kept its diaspora agents in
competition with each other and frequently changed their positions to ensure
control. The LTTE also took advantage of
the social and psychological alienation of
the Tamil diaspora; the working classes
were in particular bussed to protests to
illustrate its political clout and it never lost
sight of possibilities to enhance fund raising.
Despite such overwhelming power of
the LTTE, dissent was never completely
crushed. Actors like the University Teach
ers for Human Rights (Jaffna) continued
to document and report on the abuses and
destructive politics of the LTTE inside the
country and literary groups in Europe
continued to meet regularly and keep
some forums independent of the LTTE.
The Norwegian Peace Process
Following the long decade of protracted
war and consolidation by the LTTE in the
1990s, in early 2002 a much internationalised Norwegian peace process was initiated. The domestic situation of a stalemate
on the war front, including depletion of resources and fighting forces on both sides,
as well as the “war on terror” initiated by
the United States after 11 September 2001
were critical factors that led to the Cease
fire Agreement of 2002. However, among
the sources of international support for the
Norwegian peace process were the western
countries and particularly European countries, pushing to end the conflict and there
by also end the flow of refugees and asy
lum seekers to the west.
The early years of the peace process
were characterised by further attacks on
Tamil dissent including through assassinations by the LTTE within the country,
but the peace process opened space for
dissent in the diaspora. The LTTE found it
difficult to continue its near total hold on
public discourse in the diaspora at a time
when there was a parallel discourse of
peace. Inde ed, the LTTE, with its primarily
military structure and politics, found it
difficult to survive in a time of no war.
There was the eastern split in the LTTE
in 2004 which undermined its strength
on the ground. Furthermore, increasing
cracks began to emerge in the diaspora
with shifts by its supporters due to internal frictions and more importantly the
re-emergence of alternate forums that
began to challenge its dominance.
It is in this context that the LTTE began
to escalate tensions with a view towards
resuming the war. The clearest sign of
such a move was its fundraising campaign initiated in late 2004 in the diaspora,
for what it called the “final war”. The
LTTE’s blatant acts of escalation and
refusal to adhere to international demands led to the listing of the LTTE as
a terrorist organisation by the EU and
Canada in 2006. Furthermore, western
governments began criminal proceedings
against LTTE activities in the west.
It is in this context that western actors
also tried to begin a process of engagement, believing the pro-LTTE sections of the
diaspora might be leverage against the
LTTE, to bring it back to the negotiating
table. This process of engagement was
flawed, as it was the LTTE that controlled
the diaspora. There was little room for the
diaspora propagandists to question the
LTTE as they themselves were subject to its
politics of fear. Therefore, this process of
engagement by western actors with the
Tamil diaspora only entrenched the politics
and position of the LTTE. It is such international engagement with the diaspora
and its legitimisation that also prepared the
political ground for the lobbying and protests in the west during the last cycle of war.
The massive mobilisations in the Tamil
diaspora towards the last two months of
the war were a consequence of two factors.
One, the overwhelming helpless response
of people not necessarily aligned with the
LTTE but genuinely concerned about the
situation of those civilians affected by the
humanitarian crisis. Such expressions of
concerns were hijacked by the LTTE activists in the diaspora who were mainly concerned about saving the LTTE. However,
such massive mobilisation was a onetime
phenomenon, both given the enormity of
the humanitarian crisis where hundreds of
thousands of people were trapped and,
from the LTTE’s point of view, its conclusive
defeat.
It is during this very last phase of
the war that the pro-LTTE sections of the
Tamil diaspora also launched intensive lobbying activities. Here again, it was perhaps
more the case that some of the western actors were trying to use the Tamil diaspora
to send a message rather than the latter
effectively lobbying the western political
actors. The Tamil diaspora, relative to other
more powerful diaspora in the west, is financially and politically weaker and is of
little importance in the domestic politics of
western states. This weak position combined with a colonised mindset has meant
that much of Tamil diaspora’s lobbying has
entailed making grand demands of western
intervention with little understanding of
the interests of the western states. Indeed,
given Sri Lanka’s lack of geopolitical significance, the political will of western actors is
unlikely to change with or without the
lobbying of the Tamil diaspora. Rather,
engagement with the Tamil diaspora has
only become an extension of the diplomatic
and rhetorical tools that western officials
have been, so far, willing to use to pressure
the government of Sri Lanka on certain humanitarian and human rights concerns.
The Tamil diaspora actors continue to be
deluded by the possibilities of advocacy
and international intervention and have
not sufficiently understood the interests
of the west and the politics of current inter
national order.
In any event, despite recent mobilisations, the decimation of the LTTE inside
the country also signals the collapse of the
force that forged much of Tamil diaspora
politics over the last two decades. Furthermore, the separatist Tamil nationalist
overdetermination was a result of the
LTTE’s manœuvre, and with the defeat of
the LTTE, mobilised separatist Tamil nationalism will also begin to unravel. It is
not that separatist Tamil nationalism will
altogether die in the Tamil diaspora, rather its active mobilisation is likely to greatly diminish in the future. Thus the post-LTTE initiatives such as the Global Tamil
Forum and the project for a “transnational
government of Tamil Eelam” are for the
most part hangovers from the LTTE dominated years, as LTTE activists and propagandists in the diaspora attempt to claim
financial and political stakes in a rapidly
changing context of diaspora politics.
The Sri Lankan State and the Tamil Diaspora
The Sri Lankan state has not been a mere
bystander with respect to such Tamil
diaspora mobilisations. Many of the high
commissions and embassies of Sri Lanka in
the west have actively mobilised the
Sinhala diaspora in counter protests. Such
efforts by the Sri Lankan state have only
further polarised the diaspora, as extreme
sections of both Sinhala and Tamil diaspora
continue to reinforce each other. Further
more, engagement by the Sri Lankan state
with sections of the Tamil diaspora has
often been with a view towards appropriating them for shortterm gains rather than
a serious engagement towards mutual
change and shift in policies. In that context, even those sections in the Tamil
diaspora who engage the state often lose
their independence and credibility.
The Tamil diaspora actors due to their
distance and lack of serious engagement
with the political issues in the country and
the various attempts at constitutional reform may not be capable of seriously en
gaging in the political process towards
any political settlement. But sections of
the Tamil diaspora can certainly contribute towards reconstruction and develop
ment in the country provided there can be
a shift of vision from that of separatism to
one of a plural and democratic politics
within a united Sri Lanka. Indeed, the
longstanding demand of democratic and
progressive Tamil politics inside the country has been one for substantial devolu
tion of power to the regions and power
sharing at the centre.
Large sections of the Tamil community
inside the country continue to have a
strong relationship with the diaspora
mainly through familial and village links.
This relationship continues to be one of
economic dependency, both tied to the remittance economy and the possibilities of
migration to the west through marriage or
sponsorship. This dependency and desire
for migration by the middle classes have
undermined political engagement and
commitment towards rebuilding local in
stitutions. It is this economic dependency
that is also weakening a challenge from
the Tamil community inside the country
to reconstitute diaspora politics in the
post-LTTE context. Nevertheless, over the
last few years there have also been
encouraging signs of pockets of Tamils,
Sinhalese and Muslims in the diaspora
working together, particularly to respond
to the humanitarian situation and to put
forward the need for reconciliation. Finally,
a significant shift in the politics and role of
diaspora actors is in part dependent on
the Sri Lankan state and its actions.
The Mahinda Rajapaksa regime’s approach towards the diaspora seems to be two
fold. First, to use the fear of the diaspora to
mobilise nationalist sentiment within the
Sinhala communities and continue the draconian security measures, including continued militarisation and emergency rule.
Second, to cynically manipulate former
LTTE actors towards its own interests. It is
in this context, that the LTTE’s former arms
dealer, K Pathmanathan, renditioned and
arrested last year, has now been allowed to
engage the populations in the north along
with a group of diaspora actors.
Both approaches, which are evidently contradictory, more importantly send a very wrong
message to the Tamil community inside the
country as well as the Tamil diaspora. First,
to harp on a threat that is nonexistent for
the Rajapaksa regime’s own consolidation
of power, also serves to oppress the Tamil
community and polarise the various communities inside the country. Given the
history of many brave Tamil democracy
activists who have stood up to the LTTE
and often paid with their lives, the
Rajapaksa regime’s approach of using
former LTTE leaders for its own political
gains in engaging the Tamil population,
only stifles the emergence of a strong Tamil
democratic leadership within the country.
Ultimately, it is such a Tamil democratic
leadership from within the country that
would be able to effectively challenge the
larger Tamil diaspora to change course
and work constructively towards rebuilding a plural and democratic society out of
the ravages of war.
Ahilan Kadirgamar