Whither Nepal: Will the New Deal Bring a New Dawn?

Editorial, “Liberation”, July, 2006

Propelled by the enormous power of an awakened people, events continue to move with stunning swiftness in Nepal. The 237-year-old feudal monarchy, which seemed to be in control of Nepal till the other day has already been relegated to the background. It may now even be consigned to the museum of history if the people of Nepal can have their way and thwart the last attempt to save the monarchy as a ceremonial showpiece. If the reconvened Parliament had taken everyone by surprise with its sudden proclamation stripping the King of most of his royal powers and privileges, the outcome of the hurriedly convened meeting between Koirala and Prachanda has been no less stunning. A committee has already been constituted to draft an interim constitution within 15 days, which, in turn, would pave the way for dissolution of the existing Parliament within another 15 days. There would now be an interim government with Maoists participating, which would preside over elections to the constituent assembly.

This spectacular pace of developments in Nepal must not however blind us to the underlying elements of friction and contention not all of which are quite open yet. Having declared ceasefire, Maoists had been constantly complaining of being bypassed by the seven-party alliance. Just the other day when Koirala came to New Delhi, Prachanda described it as a conspiracy to deceive the people of Nepal and warned of further bloodshed if the seven-party alliance treated the parliament as all powerful and went ahead with signing hasty deals with foreign countries without first resolving the all important question of holding elections to the constituent assembly.

Ironically, it was precisely after Koirala’s India visit that talks with Maoists acquired extraordinary momentum and the eight-point declaration of June 16 came just hours before Koirala was scheduled to leave on a foreign trip for his treatment. The ailing octogenarian Prime Minister however did not attend the post-summit press conference in which Prachanda described the eight-point agreement as a potential instrument to free Nepal and its people of all kinds of foreign interference.

Prachanda has also gone on record describing the accord as a revolution made successful jointly by rebels waging war and political parties involved in parliamentary politics. A little rhetorical flourish at such a juncture is only to be expected, but we still need a proper analysis of the new juncture in Nepal. The way the accord is implemented in the coming months, especially the election to the new constituent assembly, will of course enable us to have a better and more realistic appraisal of the situation. Commenting on the June 16 accord, the New York Times has already raised the crucial issue as to “how the army high command will react ... and whether the interim government will be able to keep the state security forces under its command.”

Viewed in a strategic perspective, the best estimate of the new alignment of class forces in Nepal will be available only in the new constitution. So far, the Maoists have come out clearly in favour of a democratic republic while Koirala has made his preference known for a ceremonial monarchy. Maoists have also begun to talk about radical land reforms and industrialisation and in his first public press conference, Prachanda hinted at a drastic restructuring of the Nepali army. The question of recasting Nepal’s relations with foreign countries, India in particular, should also be expected to come up sooner rather than later. All these changes, if effectively implemented, would surely have a revolutionary bearing on the development of Nepal.

But will the restructuring of the state in Nepal take the country along a people’s democratic direction, or will we see a gradual consolidation of bourgeois rule in Nepal? Will we now see a big unification of communists in Nepal giving them a clear political edge as the pre-eminent political force in the new Himalayan Republic or will the faction-ridden Nepali Congress come from behind to emerge as a powerful bourgeois platform? What will be the role of the proposed UN supervision in Nepal? The ongoing transition in Nepal would keep throwing up many such questions of strategic import, but it is early days yet, and we will have to wait for definitive answers to emerge.

Revolutionary communists and other progressive forces in India will of course hope for a grand consolidation of revolutionary democratic forces in Nepal. A great possibility for a new social advance has certainly opened up in Nepal and we wish the communists and progressive forces of Nepal every success towards a successful transition.
[Ed. - Editorial written on June 23^rd]

 The Historic Agreement in Nepal and the Immediate Challenge

Pratyush Chandra

Nepal continues to create history. If everything goes well, we will soon see an interim government with the Maoists’ participation to pre-empt any further betrayal to the basic immediate demands of the Nepali people for a constituent assembly and for exercising their right to decide the fate of the moribund monarchy and its institutional shields. Definitely, the political developments in Nepal after the April mobilisation have approximated to what the parliamentary parties agreed upon in their understanding with the Maoists.

After the restoration of their parliamentary privileges, the Nepali democrats have re-baptised the established institutions with new names and cut the wings of the royalty. Of course, all these do help in building the atmosphere amenable for taking the first step towards the resolution of the “Nepali crisis”, which is the formation of the Constituent Assembly as the body that will have the capacity to establish the basic rules, norms and ’institutions’ necessary for, what Chairman Prachanda calls, “political competition”.

The local elites and their global sponsors had thought that the April radicalism on the urban streets of Nepal would die down after the restoration of the old parliament. But they were time and again rebuffed when the vigilant Nepali people took to the streets to check and decry every compromise and regression in the air. The Maoist rejection of the April compromise did not allow this radicalism to sleep. Deuba, Koirala and others known for their moderate royalism and elitist anti-Maoist stance in the past are constantly watched, and any statement and action from them that reek of the design to give space to decadent institutions and their representatives are duly criticised by spontaneous showdowns on the streets.

Not a single day has passed since the April agitation without meetings and gatherings where diverse sections of the Nepali people discussed the future regime and contents of the future constitution. Various sections of the marginalized majority of the Nepali society have been coming and demonstrating in Kathmandu for ensuring their representation and the inclusion of their demands and rights in the future political system. This remarkable spirit of self-determination rejects any compromise that is short of what the Nepali people have promised themselves. It is this spirit that destroyed the “Royal Regression” and continues to eliminate any possibility of the Parliamentary Regression, of making the old parliament an end in itself. And the June 16 agreement between the Maoists and the government is the definite result of this popular defiance.

But the Nepali crisis was never just related to the accommodation of the Maoists and establishing institutions for such accommodation. It is most importantly linked with the political economic empowerment of the Nepali downtrodden. Until and unless the radical needs of the Nepali labouring classes - workers and peasantry - that have found expression in the Maoist movement are not dealt with, the crisis is not going to be resolved. And here lies the tension that is clearly visible in the political developments in Nepal.

Just before the recent June agreement the Prime Minister arrived from a very “successful” trip to India. And as expected the parameter of this success in Nepal is how much monetary aid the leader is able to raise. And India as the new recruit in the imperial project struggling to obtain a definite share in the continuous re-division of the world has recently been too ready to fulfil such requests. Hence, the success was unprecedented.

In return, Finance Minister Ram S. Mahat sold the newfound peace and sovereignty, for which the Nepali people have been fighting, to “captains of Indian industry” at a function organised by the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII): “This is a new era after the establishment of the people’s sovereignty in Nepal. Peace has now been restored after the end of a decade long conflict that had held back the country’s socio-economic advancement... It is in this context that our attention is now focussed on increased investment, public and private, domestic and foreign.” An Indian newspaper, The Hindu reports, “Referring to the fact that India faced higher labour and operating costs of production, Mr. Mahat said cheap and abundant labour, educated technical workforce and other less expensive inputs provide investors incentives for producing intermediate products for Indian companies in Nepal.”

This economic hyper-activism just before the installation of the interim government is meant to pre-empt any future attempt to radically transform the economic path that the Nepali state and ruling classes have pursued for the last five decades - of economic clientilism and dependency. It seeks to depoliticise the arena of economic policy by overburdening the future political regime with all sorts of economic arrangements that would maintain status quo in the basic political economic structure. The Koirala government has effectively utilised its time to ensure that the basic economic framework is in place, which would be difficult to change drastically under any future political transformation. Only after this did it become comfortable with the idea of the dissolution of the parliament and the formation of the interim government with the Maoists.

All this is very aptly complemented by the recent attempt to reduce the “Nepali crisis” and the democracy movement to the question of the position of the Nepali royalty and the accommodation of the Maoist “rebels” in the mainstream political system. Clearly, the most formidable way to dilute any radical resolution of this crisis is to simply ignore what it is all about. The recent political discourse of “People’s Movement” and “People’s Power” which sought to de-“classify” the movement, ignore its class constituents and their diverse aspirations, homogenise it under an amorphous category of the “people” was the first attempt in this regard. Moderate royalists, corporate media (foreign and national), foreign funded NGOs and “civil society” groups led this santisation campaign. Foreign interests too found this discourse worthwhile, as it minimises the damage, by eliminating the clarity of the demands. It effectively evades the Maoist element and puts the Nepali movement in line with the “colour revolutions” of Eastern Europe, colouring the corrupt elements of the old regime to provide a “stable”, yet “experienced”, leadership to the new.

Obviously on every front, the Nepali ruling classes are trying hard to de-link the question of democracy from the issue of building the essential institutions for fulfilling the popular needs, giving “land to the tillers”, political and economic self-determination of the diverse downtrodden sections of the Nepali society. They seek to sweep aside the whole question of endogenous development - of accounting the endogenous resources, putting them under democratic control for fulfilling the popular needs.

On the other hand, the popular classes of Nepal - Nepali workers and peasantry - were for the first time mobilised independently during the People’s War, undiluted by the opportunism of the disgruntled sections of the landlord-merchant-moneylending classes and the clientele petty bourgeoisie nurtured as local “nodes” for implementing the social agenda of imperialism. It was in the Maoist movement that for the first time the Nepali landless and near landless, involved in circular national and international migration to meet their ends, found an organised political expression. The rural roots of the Nepali labouring classes even in the secondary and tertiary sectors allowed the popular democratic aspirations unleashed by the Maoist movement to integrate virtually the whole Nepali society behind the New Democracy Movement, despite the claims by other political forces to have achieved democracy in 1990.

Obviously, Prachanda’s concept of “political competition”, which the Maoists in Nepal have developed in one or the other way right from the time they put forward their 40-point demand in 1996, has to be interpreted in this background. They seek an open competition between the “democracy from above” that the 1990 arrangement established and the aspirations for the “democracy from below” that they have inculcated in the daily lives and struggles of the Nepali downtrodden. In standard terms, at the level of economic policy, it is a competition between the growth-oriented and need-oriented frameworks. With the June 16 agreement, the possibility of such competition as the new level of class struggle has become almost certain. But it will be interesting to see how the revolutionaries in the interim government, when established, are able to undo what the Nepali ruling classes have already achieved to make this competition inherently lopsided in their own favour by imposing the basic framework for pre-empting any conclusive assault from below.

 Disbanding of the Royal Nepal Army is Necessary for a Lasting Democracy

Daya Varma

One of the key demands of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN)-Maoist was the replacement of the Hindu Kingdom of Nepal with a secular democratic republic. All other political formations in Nepal including the CPN (United Marxist-Leninist) had conceded that Nepalese people look upon the monarch in a special way and would not want to completely do away with monarchy; according to them, curtailing the power of the monarch is sufficient, which is closer to the status of the king before he usurped all powers on February 1, 2005. Many in the Seven Party Alliance (SPA), specially the Nepalese Congress whose aging leader G.P. Koirala is currently the Prime Minister still hopes that a monarch with restricted powers is a preferred option. India favours this solution. CPN (Maoist) alone among the significant players consistently demanded the abolition of the institution of monarchy and the election of a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution for Nepal.

How could King Gyanendra by a brief pronouncement at 10 A.M. of February 1, 2005 usurp all powers, dismiss the existing elected parliament and unleash a war of terror against the people of Nepal making CPN (Maoist) the preferred target? The source of his strength lay in the Nepalese Army. What actually happened on February 1, 2005 was that the Royal Nepal Army headed by General Pyar Jung Thapa felt confident of routing the CPN (Maoist). In short, it was not the King but the Royal Nepal Army which staged the coup and it was not the King but the General who decided that the King should make a retreat.

What followed the coup of February 1, 2005 was way beyond the expectations of the King as well as of the democratic forces in South Asia and the world. The protests throughout Nepal and specially in the capital Kathmandu demanding democracy were so massive, prolonged and defiant that King Gyanendra and his Chief of Army had no choice but to surrender hoping to salvage something for themselves - perhaps until people calm down and the organs of repression are able to regroup. Every one recognized CPN (Maoist) to be the moving force of democracy and all parties in Nepal requested them for a ceasefire, and the CPN (Maoist) complied. Most of the communist parties, with the exception of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) who have long felt that armed struggle is a matter of the past began to address Nepal Maoists as comrades.

Every one recognizes that the mass upsurge in Nepal was possible because of the confidence the Nepalese people had in the strength of CPN (Maoist), which exhibited utmost flexibility, political maturity and vision in forging a united front with the SPA while staying steadfastly with their principal demand. The massive demonstration, a call by the CPN Maoists, of more than 200,000 people in Kathmandu on June 2 clearly indicates who is in command. Yet there are still many players in Nepal besides the CPN (Maoist) - the King and his Royal Nepal Army (RNA) and the seven parliamentary parties including the Nepalese Congress and CPN (UML) who had the support of the Maoist in launching the democracy movement. Of these the future of democracy in Nepal will be determined by what happens to the Royal Nepal Army and the People’s Army under the political command of CPN (Maoist).

A demand that CPN (Maoist) should disarm is in essence a call that the forces who compelled the King and his army to concede to the popular demand should cease to exist. CPN-Maoist’s People’s Army is not an army in the usual sense - technically, organizationally and functionally. Neither does the Maoist army possess the armaments, tanks, helicopters and ammunition nor does it receive training from the US, British or Indian army; it does not hunt but is hunted. The Maoist army has no history of serving as a coercive organ of state; in contrast it has been the backbone of the democratic popular upsurge just witnessed in Nepal. The overwhelming majority of Maoist Army comprises of young Dalit women, who have shared and witnessed the feudal oppression of their folks from childhood. In this sense it is part of the solution, which has evaded many countries of South Asia, notably India. The Maoist army has been the backbone of immensely popular people’s courts, which has imparted justice to the victims; this has been possible because in South Asia and perhaps everywhere, people except the courts know the truth behind every crime. If the Maoist army has children, they enjoy an alternative to being street urchins. In short, the Maoist army is ordinary citizens of Nepal with arms; it is not an army. Indeed CPN (Maoist) could be treated as a split from CPN (UML) very similar to the split of CPI (ML) from CPI (M); CPN (Maoist) grew into a force because (1) they combined three organizational features, the underground party, an army and an open front just as CPI (ML) had in the early days of Indian People’s Front (IPF) and (2) followed a correct political program in the given conditions of Nepal.

In contrast, the Royal Nepal Army, likely to be named Nepal Army has been the backbone of general oppression not only since Gyanendra usurped power but throughout the history from the days of the Ranas to the present. There is nothing good that can be said about its role in Nepal. It will be closer to truth to say that King Gyanendra was merely the formal expression of the power of the army. South Asia has a notorious history of the army. With the exception of India, it has yielded power - rather absolute power - from time to time in all other countries. The Nepal army is more likely to follow the footsteps of the Pakistan army than that of the Indian army. Even in India, steps were taken soon after the independence to ensure against military takeover; the most important of which was establishment of regional commands. In Nepal, fourteen peaceful demonstrators were killed during the recent movement by the army. So as long as this army remains intact under whatever name and under whomever’s command, democracy in Nepal cannot be assured. The Koirala government would have done better to imprison heads of the Royal Nepal Army than ministers appointed by the King.

Nepal’s economy is primarily feudal with significant Indian control. Neither of these two features are conducive to democracy. The only factor favoring democracy in Nepal is the consciousness of its masses, especially its youth. This awakening can sustain only if there exists a political formation like CPN (Maoist) desirably in alliance with CPN (UML) with a policing force committed to democracy; the existing People’s Army under the CPN (Maoist) can be transformed into such a force under state control. In any case the existing Nepalese Army must be disbanded to ensure a lasting democracy in Nepal; transferring the command of the Nepalese army from the King to the Parliament is not enough.