The EU faces a harsh fact. While Asia is politically and economically crucial in today’s world, this region is presently the weakest link in the European states’ chain of international relations despite their past as colonial powers. This explains the need to develop a common EU initiative to overcome such a situation. In the word of the European Commission 2001 “communication”, the EU “should set an overall strategic framework for our relations with Asia in the coming decade based on the core objective of strengthening the EU’s political and economic presence across the region, and raising this to a level commensurate with the growing global weight of an enlarged EU.” (“Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships”, Communication from the Commission, Brussels, 4.9.2001).
ASEM is a privileged channel for this EU “strategic framework” to be implemented. According to official statements, the characterization of ASEM is straightforward: it is a process engaged between equal partners for the benefit of all the concerned states and populations. But in the realm of diplomacy, official statements rarely express realities. The European Union’s policy toward its Asian partners deserves a closer look.
ASEM puts into relations governments from the EU on one hand and from most Eastern Asian countries on the other. It is a somewhat institutionalized inter-governmental process; nevertheless, it is not a free from very strong constraints. Not only does it operate in an international context shaped by capitalist, unequal globalization, but it is also strait-jacketed by a set of so-called “principles”, to begin with, the neo-liberal dogma. These are essential aspects for us to understand the specific characteristics of ASEM and, within it, the role of the European Union.
I/ ECONOMY: the unequal globalization as framework
The economic field represents the main of the “three pillars” in the ASEM process. Here the EU concern is, at first sight, utterly banal: to promote European investments and open the Eastern Asian market to European goods. Its particularity, as mentioned above, lies in that the ASEM process fits into the framework of the capitalist globalization.
Neo-liberal “principles”. All principles are equal, but some are more equal than others. Some “principles” written down in official documents have little practical implications or can be betrayed at will, and others are forcefully and strictly implemented. The neo-liberal dogma is the main guiding line of the ASEM process. It is strongly reaffirmed at each occasion, as it has been once again the case in the October 9, 2004 “Hanoi Declaration on Closer ASEM Economic Partnership”:
“2. Reiterating the principles of ASEM economic cooperation which include commitment to the market economy, closer cooperation between governments and business, non-discriminatory liberalization and regionalism, compliance with the WTO rules, mutual respect and equal partnership, with recognition of the economic diversity within and between Asia and Europe”.
Market economy, close cooperation between governments and business, non-discriminatory liberalization, compliance with WTO rules... The least one can say is that the ASEM process does not leave the socio-economic policies of its member states open to discussion and people-based democratic choices!
These neo-liberal ,”principles” are in accordance with the “priorities” listed in the EU Commission 2001 Communication’s introduction: “ensuring open markets and non-discriminatory business framework, encouraging the integration of state economies into the free market”.
Multilateralism and WTO. The tension between the EU and the USA over “bilateralism” and “multilateralism” does not mean that the European Union has a “milder” concept of globalization (which, first of all, concretely is the globalization of the capitalist market). Multilateralism is the way for the EU to ask for global negotiations as a way of strengthening its hand faced with the number one world power. From the EU point of view, ASEM should then help to bring Asian states on its side, especially within the WTO.
The 2001 EU Commission’s Communication hails “the success of the open and ruled-based multilateral trading system established under the GATT and now the WTO”. The aim is clearly stated: “It is the imperative interest of both regions to see this system strengthen further, and in particular to see the early launch of a new Round of multilateral negotiations (...) on the basis of a comprehensive agenda including such key issues as investment and competition. (...) It will therefore be in the joint interest of the EU and its Asian partners to work towards the further strengthening of the WTO, and a further reduction in both tariff and non-tariff barriers around the world”.
A hierarchical market. “Equal partnership” is one of the claimed “principles” of the ASEM economic cooperation. But this claim runs into direct contradiction with the above mentioned neo-liberal guidelines. The capitalist world market is, by its very nature, hierarchical. In the realm of the really existing free market, there are no relationships between equal partners. How can a third-world peasant family compete with a transnational corporation from the developed North? In addition, the present globalization dramatically aggravates this inner unequal character. For example, governments are forced to remove measures protecting small local producers by the policy of “non-discriminatory liberalization”; big transnational must be given the same “advantages” as national companies may enjoy.
The industrialized European Union does not deal on equal footing with its “Asian partners”. It occupies a dominant position within the hierarchy of the unequal international market. Let us just add that within Europe, unequal relations do exist as well between regions or between big corporations and small producers. French agro-industry represents a threat to French peasants (family farmers) as to Third World peasantries.
Actor of globalization. The EU institutions, the equivalent of a government (the Council and the Commission, backed today by the majority of the European Parliament), actively promote liberal, capitalist globalization. The European Union thus asks for the widening of the WTO competence, of WTO powers. For the implementation of neo-liberal policies: total freedom for foreign investments, destruction of public services (GATS), deadly threat to peasant economies (with a special role played here by French agro-industry), privatization of common goods like water (where the French environmental transnationals are again among the main actors)...
II/ SECURITY: Re-entering the power games in Eastern Asia
A second ambition of the EU is to become more actively involved in the global power negotiations, in Eastern Asia, after more than half a century of growing marginalization. West Europe is very much affected by the new instability in Asia. Indeed, as a whole, the Eurasian continent is the most directly affected by the post-Cold War changes in strategic alliances: wars in Southeast Europe and entry in the EU of many former members of the Soviet bloc, Iran-Afghanistan wars, nuclear stalemate between Pakistan and India, consequences of the “anti-terrorist” crusade (Indonesia, Philippines...), assertion of China as a power in the region, Taiwan and Korea issues, Japan and the US bases...
This ambition of the EU was quite obvious at the time of ASEM 3 (Seoul, 2000), with the adoption of a special declaration on the Korean North-South peace negotiations.
A new place for the “anti-terrorist” ideology. According to the 2001 Commission’s Communication, the EU should “contribute to peace and security in the region and globally, through a broadening of (its) engagement with the region”. Since then, the “anti-terrorist” ideology has become the framework of the EU security policy. The EU Commission published in 2003 another Communication titled “A new partnership with South East Asia”. The wording of the first listed “strategic priority” reflects it: “Supporting regional stability and the fight against terrorism”. It does underline that effective action against terrorism needs to be linked to “broader issues of political, social, economic and financial governance”. But it concludes that “this is why fighting terrorism must be included in the development strategy of all countries concerned”, rather the other way around. Thus, the “anti-terrorism” ideology must frame even the development strategy...
Since 2001, the “anti-terrorist” ideology is beginning to play a similar role in the EU-Asia relations as the neo-liberal dogma.
Militarist Europe. Seen from Asia, the assertion of the EU in international negotiations may be welcomed as a way to balance, to a certain extent at least, US hegemony. But there should be no illusion on the very nature of European military pillars.
The two military pillars of the EU are the UK and France, both nuclear powers and thus permanent members of the UN Security Council. London eagerly aligned itself with Washington to bring war to Iraq. If France refused to join this time (one reason being to protect its interests in the Middle-East), it is actively involved in Afghanistan and its armies still freely move in African French former colonies (see today the Ivory Coast crisis). To have a rather striking picture of the degree of integration of French state corruption, private interests and military intervention, look at Total oil company activities in Africa (and Burma!). Seen from this angle, can the French state be called “democratic”?
The US army’s behavior in Guantanamo and Iraq has been rightly exposed. But, thanks to Blair, there is a “small Guantanamo” right in the UK, where foreigners pointed at by intelligence services can be detained without any formal charge or due process, in secret and for an unlimited length of time. As a French citizen, I feel compelled to recall here that after WWII, France was the first one to massively apply torture as a means of governing by terror; this was during the Algerian liberation war and the terrible “battle of Algiers”. A French general (named Aussarress) who was a recognized specialist in the practice of torture even advised the US army; some say his teaching became instrumental in Iraq. This recent past of the French state has never been judged, and therefore it still remains a part of the present.
In my morning contribution, I already mentioned that the draft European Constitution calls for a (quasi compulsory) strengthening of European states’ military capacities. It also puts as a constitutional duty that foreign European policies should not enter into contradiction with that of NATO: NATO remains the main permanent framework of military cooperation between the EU and Washington... under US hegemony. Let’s remember here that NATO’s potential area of operations has been extended east, toward Asia, far beyond its original Northern Atlantic zone of responsibilities. It is then doubtful that the EU will be in a position to intervene significantly in Asia independently from Washington.
There are contradictions between powers, between the European Union and the United States. It is necessary to use these contradictions to push forward our own agenda, as we indeed did in Seattle and Cancun. But this does not mean to look at the EU as a friendly and independent counter-balance to the US.
III/ REALITIES: EU ambitions and means
The main question mark does not concern the characterization of EU goals in the ASEM process. They are those of any economic and political power in today’s world. The question is: does the EU have the means to achieve its Asian ambitions? The answer is: to a large extent no, at least not presently.
The EU has to face other pressing priorities than Eastern Asia. Like the integration of the ten new members of the Union, most of them from Eastern Europe. Like the Middle East crisis. Like the links with the Mercosur in Latin America. Like the power game with the United States. Without forgetting its own inner contradictions.
In spite of its objective importance for Europe, Asia ranks very low in EU priorities, to a surprising extent given the historical colonial legacy for countries like UK, France, The Netherlands... Moreover, as explained this morning, there are serious contradictions among European states concerning foreign policies (see the Iraqi crisis).
A lost opportunity. Faced with the US, European bourgeoisies have something in common: a much longer history and, as a consequence, a deeper sense of the importance and the diversity of socio-political realities. They have had to deal, for long periods, with stronger labor movements in their own countries. Many of them had to learn, through colonial domination, the importance of understanding the very fabric of non-European societies. Being today the weaker great power, they cannot have too many illusions on their capacity to rule the world at will.
The European bourgeoisies could make good use of this sense of realities inherited from history now that they are again facing the Bush administration, a living self-caricature of socio-political and cultural-religious blindness. But they cannot do it without breaking first with the ideology and policy of liberal globalization of the capitalist market.
The process of capitalist globalization does not affect only the economy. It has very deep implications in all fields. It is a way of ruling as well as a way of making profit. One world unified free market (in the neo-liberal definition) implies one unified way of ruling countries, societies, regardless of time and space. It is a stockholder’s dream, the dream of a free-market fundamentalist ideologue (and a nightmare for the others), but it is hard to see how it could become a reality.
The imposition of IMF-WTO policies, of ultra-liberal regulations the world over, leads necessarily to long-term instability. There is indeed an organic link between economic and military capitalist globalizations. It is very doubtful that opposition to these combined trends will come from the European bourgeoisies. The political establishment, as a whole, thinks and acts in the framework of the existing globalization process. Direct representatives of company boards are now becoming government ministers and European Commissioners, in addition to their traditional lobbyist activities: As we say in French, “one is best served by oneself”. In the governmental political parties, the new generation, which is taking over the leadership, does not have the same training as the previous one. It is difficult to see how a change in orientation could come without an open crisis in Europe itself.
IV/ Europe-Asia: WE, FROM BELOW
Can alternatives come from below, if not from above? Not easily. The Europe-Asia connection represents the weak link in the people’s movements’ international solidarity relationships, as with the states. But last September’s AEPF meeting in Hanoi has shown that this link can begin to be strengthened again.
Thus, European people’s movements have to support the struggle for survival of people from Asia, as it was already the case in the past. But there is another dimension of solidarity, which is new. More than ever, similar policies are implemented in the North and in the South. The liberal counter-reforms are applied in Europe itself. The IMF-WTO regulations are opposed to people’s demands in Europe too. Which means that more directly than before, there is a need for common struggles, against similar policies implemented through the same international centers of power.
French peasants (family farming) use much more capital than third-world peasantry. But, they too (as well as French consumers, by the way) are faced with the domination of French agro-industry. Their disappearance has even been planned years ago by the French authorities! French peasants are also struggling for their social survival. It is why Via Campesina, the militant peasant international, can be both rooted in France, Italy or Spain, as well as in Brazil, Bangladesh and other countries from the South (even if it has been very much weakened in the Philippines by the crisis of the Left).
If French water companies are now moving to privatize the water sector in Asian or Latin-American countries -and even in the United States!-, it is because they previously successfully privatized the management of water in France itself, and made such profit with this hold-up of a common good that they became major transnationals! Struggles are launched to protect water as a common good in Europe as well as in Asia, which allows new networks to expand across the Eurasian continent.
The same can be said for the defense of public services, and many other fields of action. Capitalist globalization aims at bringing under market law all spheres of social lives, at transforming each potential source of profit into a commodity. It is precisely because its aims are so universal that liberal globalization initiated in reaction the dynamics of resistance, with such a variety of movements gathering together within the Global Justice Movement. Alternatives are slowly being collectivized through this new common experience.
Asia-Europe relations are first of all shaped by states and economic powers. But to present here a (controversial) “European perspective” does not mean to fit oneself into this dominant framework of reference, as if there was necessarily “we”, Europeans, on one side and “you”, Asians, on the other. I rather thought that to offer a criticism from within, of EU policies, was an elementary duty of solidarity. All the more because “we”, from below, are victims of the implementation of these policies from above both in Europe and Asia.