Many of Pakistan’s best known newspaper
columnists and analysts, especially those who
were politically active in the late 1960s, are
calling the present times and mood in Pakistan,
“revolutionary”, and are making numerous
references to the 1968-70 period. Of a later
generation of writers, there are those who are
comparing Pakistan today to the 1986-88 period,
and here too, one hears the word revolution
repeated many times in columns, as well as on the
electronic media. Whatever one wants to call it,
there is no doubt that the political process
underway in Pakistan today is probably the most
significant development that has taken place in
many, many years. Numerous events and
developments have taken place in the last 10
weeks, which may have changed Pakistan’s future
for some time to come, if not permanently. If one
looks at just the last few weeks, there are four
main events - or series of events, or processes -
that have taken place which have changed
Pakistan’s political map.
A number of smaller happenings have also added
additional dimensions to these developments. The
four main actors/events which have come to the
fore relate to the chief justice “issue”, the
muhajir Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), Benazir
Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), and the
extraordinary new role and power of the
electronic media.
Chief Justice Resigns
On March 9, the fully-uniformed chief of the army
staff, president general Pervez Musharraf,
summoned the chief justice of Pakistan Iftikhar
Muhammad Chaudhry, to his office, and is supposed
to have kept him waiting for five-and-a-half
hours. In this period, it has been stated, that
the chief justice was pressurised by the
president along with a number of uniformed
generals, to resign his post. The president’s
team had created a charge-sheet against the chief
justice on a number of accounts related to the
misuse of his office. He was accused of many
things, including using a government helicopter
to attend a funeral and ensuring for his son, a
public servant, privileged postings. When he did
not voluntarily resign, the chief justice was
made “dysfunctional” and sent home to await
further charges, and an acting chief justice of
the Supreme Court of Pakistan, appointed in his
place.
There is no denying the fact that this has been
president general Musharraf’s worst mistake and
greatest miscalculation, and that he was
ill-advised in taking this decision. He himself,
very soon after it became clear what the reaction
to this move was, said that a “conspiracy” had
been hatched against him personally. For the
government, there may have been reasons to take
some action against the chief justice since he
had taken a stand in a major privatisation case
last year which embarrassed the government and
revealed its wrong-doings, and the chief justice
was increasingly making some (albeit muted)
sounds, about Pakistan’s disappeared people, many
of whom are Baloch, who have been picked up by
one of Pakistan’s many “agencies” and have
disappeared. It is important to state that the
chief justice is no trail-blazing revolutionary
for, as a judge of the Supreme Court, he had
signed all the nefarious laws and constitutional
changes which president Musharraf designed
without a whisper of protest.
Chief justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry was as
much part of the establishment as was the chief
of the army staff himself. With the chief of the
army staff seeking a second term as president of
Pakistan - which many judges and politicians feel
is unconstitutional - he was advised by someone
close to him that the chief justice would create
a problem when it came to his re-election and
hence should be removed. No one, least of all
president general Pervez Musharraf, could have
expected a response of this order, by all means
novel in Pakistan’s military-led history, that
has made these last 10 weeks the weakest and most
difficult of his seven-and-a-half years in
office. Initially, seeing that their chief
justice was not bowing down to military pressure,
some lawyers were emboldened and started a public
campaign to have a fair trial of the deposed
chief justice and to have him reinstated. Slowly,
this small campaign grew in nature and size, and
some judges resigned their posts in pro- tests,
and many judges started supporting the ousted
chief justice. In the first few weeks of the
campaign, the slogans were largely those related
to the restoration of the chief justice and
regarding upholding the stature and sanctity of
the judiciary. The judiciary fought back to
protect its own institutional interests and so in
the process, emerged united. There was little
“politicisation” and political parties, as always
the opportunists most have been in the past,
watched from the sidelines.
However, very soon it became clear that this was
not just a protest against one decision, but
there were clear beginnings of a “movement”, for
justice with political overtones. The lawyers
were joined by a few activists from some
political parties and by members of the public.
While there has been considerable public support
– as seen by popular meetings and response to the
chief justice’s various visits and trips to
different parts of Pakistan - this has not been a
“public” movement, but very much a lawyers’
protest movement, with some though growing help
from political parties. However, the colour of
the protest has changed, and from a collective
action issue concerning the lawyers and their
self- interest, the slogans and the politics of
the movement have become far more politicised.
From initially favouring the chief justice and
his reinstatement, the protests soon became
anti-government, anti-Musharraf, and have now
become audibly anti-military. There is growing
support for the lawyers’ movement amongst
different cross sections of society, as can be
envisaged by the number and nature of people who
are participating in the movement, many as
observers rather than as activists and
participants. Even the more radical slogans are
being repeated in many quarters and the "Go
Musharraf, Go" chant heard at most of the jalsas
of the lawyers, is no longer uncommon. Yet, it
must be remembered that while the lawyers’ move-
ment may have a lot of public support and
sympathy and it has increasingly become
“politicised”, this is not, as yet, a "political
movement" in the sense that is usually recognised.
The Issue Turns ’Political’
An extraordinary May 5 road-trip from Islamabad
to Lahore, which usually takes four hours took 24
and completely changed the mood and scale of both
the lawyers and the government. The lawyers and
their supporters realised that they were on to
something bigger than they had envisaged, while
the government/military felt that this was
certainly not a normal issue. After all, this was
the Punjab which was following the journey of the
chief justice.
The MQM
In his address to different bar councils across
Pakistan, the chief justice was scheduled to
address the Sindh bar in Karachi on May 12.
Karachi has been ruled by the Muttahida
(previously muhajir) Quami Movement, since the
early 1980s, when the MQM emerged as an urban
militant political party, speaking for the rights
of the settled migrants (muhajirs) from India
after Partition. Its politics was known to have
been one which was overtly violent, yet they were
also popular. They have won all the elections
that they have participated in since the 1980s
from the larger towns of urban Sindh, especially
Karachi. Because of their urban Sindh vote bank,
they have also been part of the Sindh provincial
government, as they have been since the elections
of 2002. The city of Karachi has faced much
violence, destruction and mayhem since the rise
of the MQM, especially during the second Benazir
Bhutto government in the 1990s. However, since
1999, when general Musharraf and the military
took over power, Karachi has been at peace and
has prospered perhaps more than any other
region/part of Pakistan.
The MQM- Military-Alliance is the other MMA which
is part of the Pakistan political map. The period
since 1999 has been the longest period of peace
and prosperity that Karachi has seen probably
since the 1960s. The first MQM cadre, brought up
in an era of terror and violence in the 1980s and
1990s, is perhaps in its late 30s and 40s, or
even older. The MQM youth have, since 1999, lived
in an era of peace, prosperity and stability as
it has been part of government and has not needed
violenceor terror to achieve its political or
economic interests and goals. Clearly, demography
and economic well-being have remade the MQM and
its supporters, and until May12, overt violence
was not part of the MQM’s strategy. On May 12,
the chief justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Muhammad
Chaudhry was scheduled to make a trip to Karachi.
As a counter measure, the MQM decided to hold its
own rally in support of general Pervez Musharraf.
However, the MQM (which forms the government of
Sindh and a major partner in the federal
government) tried everything possible to stop the
chief justice from coming to the city. After
putting hundreds of road blocks across the main
streets from the airport, they attacked small
groups of those lawyers and political activists
who wanted to come to the airport to receive the
chief justice. Over 40 people were gunned down in
cold blood. This was not the first time so many
people were killed in Karachi in a matter of a
few hours, but it was the first time for almost a
decade, and the peace of the city was destroyed
by those who were responsible for that peace.
The consequence of the killing of the 40 people
in Karachi this time around, unlike the killings
in the past, was unprecedented. Never before has
there been such condemnation of the federal
government, the provincial government and the MQM
and its leaders, as now. The MQM has never had to
make a tactical retreat in the past and has
weathered every political storm that has come its
way. This time however, it has been shaken by the
reaction of politicians and from the media. What
seems of interest is to try and understand why
the MQM has been more loyal than the king
himself. Why did the MQM do what no other
political party in government has done, even when
it could have disrupted the chief justice’s
visits and addresses? One reason for this is,
that there is a strong MQM military alliance,
when both need the other. It could be that the
MQM panicked over the growing support for the
chief justice and against general Pervez
Musharraf. It could be that they wanted to show
him that they were on his side and would not
allow “their” city to be taken over by his
opponents. (In fact, president general Pervez
Musharraf has come out in extensive support of
the MQM’s way of handling things on May 12, and
has said that they are completely innocent of the
killings.)
The MQM needs the military as much as the
military needs the MQM, and hence the
enthusiastic support to each other. Other reasons
suggest that the MQM military alliance is based
not simply on any ideological/ politicalbasis,
but that both have benefited from the billions of
dollars worth of land deals made in Karachi.
While the military may run Pakistan, MQM runs
Karachi. The MQM-military nexus is based on each
benefiting politically and economically through
each others’ support. However, the reaction
against the way the MQM took over Karachi on May
12, has backfired and added to a renewed
resentment against it and many of its supporters
have also been shocked and find it difficult to
defend their party’s actions. Importantly, the
MQM, for the moment at least, stands isolated
from the political mainstream, and only the
president and his prime minister are left with
embarrassing statements in their defence. Even
many of Musharraf’s ministers are unable to
support MQM’s actions of May 12. The PPP The
biggest and most embarrassed loser in the process
which started on March 9, has been Benazir Bhutto
and her PPP, with more egg on her face than she
would like. In April, when the chief justice
issue had neither become as politicised as it is
or had grown in scale to the size it is, Benazir
Bhutto said that she was willing to make a deal
with president general Musharraf allowing her to
come back to Pakistan to participate in the 2007
elections. She had even said that she had no
objection to being prime minister with him as
president. President Musharraf too, had said that
this was a possibility he could work with.
However, after the lawyers’ movement became
bigger than anyone anticipated, and especially
after the May 12 killings in Karachi, the main
route open to Benazir Bhutto, is a littered
minefield. With so much antagonism against the
MQM for breaking with the settled political
parliamentary process since 2002, Benazir Bhutto
would face excessive protest if she were to go
ahead with accepting a minor or junior
partnership with general Musharraf.
The big winner as a consequence of the events of
May 12, and with the deal for the moment in
hibernation, has been the king’s party, the party
in power at the moment, the PML-Q. What would
happen to the 70 or so ministers in government,
or the Chaudhry brothers of Gujarat who rule the
Punjab under the banner of the PML-Q, if Benazir
and Musharraf made a deal, has never been
discussed. Clearly, while Musharraf may have
required an alliance with the PPP, his current
crop of ministers from the PML-Q, do not. Also,
with the MQM and the PPP sharing a bitter past,
it was never quite worked out how both will work
together in Sindh, a province from where they
draw their greatest support. For the moment at
least, the Benazir-Musharraf deal has been put on
hold. Many in government hoping to be elected,
hope this stays so for some time to come.
Role of the Media
The star of the show since early this year has
been what one can collectively call “the media”.
The revolution or political movement with its
consequences are all the making of the media.
They certainly are real and have mass support,
but without constant live coverage, with history
in the making as one watches, the sort of
reaction one sees would not have taken place. The
24 hour long car ride from Islamabad to Lahore of
the chief justice was shown live on television,
as were the murderous at- tacks on citizens and
on TV stations in Karachi on May 12. While the
visuals have been revolutionary in what they have
depicted, what has been even more extraordinary,
has been the media content, which has been truly
revolutionary. Never before has one heard the
slogans of Go Musharraf Go, or "No more military
rule", on live television. Never before has the
MQM been called a fascist party on live
television by dozens of analysts, nor Altaf
Hussain, the leader of the MQM equated with
Hitler. Both in the electronic media and in the
press, these parallels are made with great ease
and with a great deal of space repeatedly, even
daily. Just a few years ago, at least in Karachi,
it would have been impossible to survive after
calling the MQM fascist in private, leave alone
in public, or calling Altaf Hussain, Hitler. Or
for that matter, chanting slogans in the national
assembly which were reproduced in all newspapers
after May 12 ’qatil, qatil, MQM’ or ’qatil,
qatil, Musharraf’ (“killer, killer MQM” or
“killer, killer Musharraf”).
The press has been fairly free for some years
now, but never so free or so powerful. The power
of the press has been recognised and used by both
the government and those who oppose it. Every
speech of the leaders of the lawyers’ movement is
televised live, and they get away with saying
whatever they want, including statements
televised live such as, "down with the generals,
down with the military". There have also been
many attempts to gag the press and to silence it,
but all such attempts have failed and rebounded
back into the face of the government. The press
is emerging as perhaps the most powerful hitherto
unknown force in Pakistan’s politics.
Along with all this, there have also been
dramatic developments in Islamabad around the Lal
Masjid and the Jamia Hafsa, a madrasa for girls.
As all writers have been emphasising, just a few
kilometres from the presidency, a group of ulema
and their students, have raised the flag of the
sharia and of the call to a “talibanisation”, all
in Musharraf’s enlightened, moderate, Pakistan.
It seems that this group of students and their
leaders have been given a free hand to instil the
fear of god in the hearts of Islamabad’s Muslims.
The comfort level of these instigators is so
high, that many believe that the freedom they
enjoy is deliberate and meant for publicity
reasons. The fear, the argument goes, is not to
be instilled in the hearts of the populace of
Islamabad, but in the hearts of the Americans in
Washington. The hope is that these cries of the
“talibanisation of Pakistan” will be heard in
Washington and will lead to continued and further
support to president general Musharraf’s
enlightened moderation (or is it moderate
enlightenment? One forgets), and the Americans -
so critical and influential to the political
economy and geopolitics of the region - will
continue to support the man in uniform and in
power in Islamabad today, rather than bring about
any change over which they may have little
control or influence.
Trouble for Musharraf
While Pakistan is in the throes of major
developments, by no stretch of the imagination is
this a revolution. It is barely a political
movement, although it is in the process of
becoming one. In 1968-70, 1977 or 1983, 1986-88,
all political movements were organised around
political parties and political leaders. Today,
the only “leader” is a chief justice, while some
of the political parties are waiting to see when
they can join president general Pervez
Musharraf’s camp and cut a deal with him, and
most have only shown symbolic support to the
lawyers’ movement. The opposition to military
rule is still as disorganised as it is
opportunistic. Nevertheless, president general
Pervez Musharraf is in a spot of bother, and
needs to extricate himself from this hole he has
dug himself into. It is probable that there will
be some sort of change or transition in this year
of two elections, but at the moment it is
difficult to predict the out- come of this
transition. President general Musharraf may be
further weakened for the moment and may need to
rebuild his rule, more inclusive this time along
with more partners. It does not seem likely that
he will leave voluntarily or give up power. He
can always make a number of tactical retreats,
and salvage some room for himself. One does not
know what his most important constituency, the
army, is thinking, but they may prefer to enjoy
the benefits of military rule by supporting
someone who has ensured that they all benefit. On
the other hand, with the military being abused
publicly, on television, it may be the army which
calls for a collective retreat, to re-emerge
after playing its ubiquitous “behind the scenes”
role, which it did throughout the decade of
democracy in the 1990s. The TINA factor - there
is no alternative - however, might just result in
the general-president’s political longevity. It
is 60 years and still the serving chief of the
army staff general, is the president of Pakistan,
ignominy of the worst kind.