LAHORE, Pakistan — As lawyers, civil society
activists and now journalists protest President
Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s ham-handed ouster of
Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry last March and
his recent crackdown on the press, most
Pakistanis are convinced the military strongman
is a “goner.” Most international commentators see
Mr. Musharraf’s increasingly repressive measures
as a sure sign of his regime unraveling. Others
are already calculating the beneficial effects of
a likely return to “civilian democracy” sooner
rather than later.
Mr. Musharraf has other ideas. Last week he told
worried bigwigs of the ruling Pakistan Muslim
League party that he might be down but was
definitely not out. This storm will pass, he
assured them, the next general elections would be
held as pledged by the end of this year, and they
would win.
So how is the United States’ core ally in the war
against terror going to fare? Who will replace
him if he is ousted, will there be greater or
lesser democracy, and would that be good or bad
for Pakistan?
The protests aren’t sufficient to end Mr.
Musharraf’s rule. They lack a mass base. There
haven’t been any prolonged countrywide shutdowns.
Traders and businessmen still support Mr.
Musharraf. Opposition parties have failed to
impress in the numbers game. The two main
opposition leaders, former Prime Ministers Nawaz
Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, are reluctant to end
their exile and return to Pakistan, fearing
arrest. Even the most virulent opposition from
the Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA), an alliance of
six religious parties who hate Mr. Musharraf
because of his support for the U.S. war against
terror, is tempered with pragmatism. Its leading
political party, Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam, is
averse to clashing with the federal government,
which could endanger its political rule in two
provinces.
All political parties fear that any head-on
confrontation with Mr. Musharraf might lead to
martial law. As if to reinforce this fact, Mr.
Musharraf last week called a meeting of his top
military commanders — who duly warned against
the expression of any anti-army sentiment in
public or in the media.
The situation could worsen for Mr. Musharraf if
the Supreme Court were to reinstall the chief
justice and thereby invigorate the pro-democracy
movement. Or if the government were to blunder
into killing protestors, fueling their anger and
swelling their ranks. Or if Ms. Bhutto and Mr.
Sharif were to return to the country and succeed
in whipping up a storm. Or if Washington were to
nod at another general to take over.
But all these scenarios are uncertain. The
Supreme Court case may drag on until next year.
The government may successfully avoid provoking
more violence. Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Sharif might
stay away longer. Finally, the U.S. is unlikely
to ditch Mr. Musharraf, partly because he is
still shoring up the war against terror in
Pakistan and partly because there is no guarantee
that his military or civilian successor would
fare any better in fulfilling this international
agenda.
Pakistan’s experience with “democratic”
governments hasn’t been reassuring. Previous
administrations under Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Sharif
saw corrupt, squabbling politicians drive the
economy to bankruptcy. They lost their sheen when
they became dynastic, autocratic and repressive.
Worse, their political failures no less than
those of the military led to the growth of the
religious right.
If Mr. Musharraf were to be ousted by the popular
forces of “undiluted democracy” in a country that
is deeply fissured by regionalism, ethnicity,
religious sectarianism, separatism, Talibanism
and class struggle, the result could be political
anarchy and economic meltdown. There is no single
mainstream party strong enough to hold the center
and the periphery. Stumbling and squabbling
coalition governments would bring democracy into
disrepute again. This would only benefit the
forces of political Islam, which are the real
long-term pretenders to the throne in Pakistan
because of their strategy of merging religious
ideology, Islamic nationalism and class struggle.
Meanwhile, shorn of all responsibility for its
actions after retreating to the barracks, the
powerful army would start pulling strings to
destabilize and discredit elected governments
from behind the scenes, as it has done during
every civilian stint in power. Under these
circumstances, the gains made under Mr.
Musharraf’s regime, like the peace initiative
with India, economic revival, efforts to stall
religious extremism and support for the war
against terror — however insufficient — would
fall by the wayside without generating an
alternative sustainable governance paradigm.
One other significant issue needs to be factored
into the analysis. In the next five years, many
middle-class army officers recruited from the
urban areas of Pakistan during the Islamicization
years of Gen. Zia ul Haq in the 1980s will become
three-star generals. These homespun officers are
all imbued with Islamic nationalism, anti-India
sentiment and anti-Westernism.
Their anti-Americanism is rooted in the 1990s,
when the U.S. cut off all military aid to
Pakistan for pursuing its nuclear program. As
field officers they compelled Mr. Musharraf not
to wage war against "our own people in
Waziristan" at the behest of America. They remain
unhappy at the ostracism of Pakistan’s nuclear
hero, A.Q. Khan, by Gen. Musharraf, again at
America’s behest. And they have personally
benefited in terms of perks and privileges from
the direct intervention of the army in politics
and civilian affairs. If the army is not led in
the future by a strong, moderate and cosmopolitan
leader, it could institutionally succumb to the
collective mindset of Islamic nationalism.
Pakistan’s military has historically been part of
its problem. But, left to themselves, Pakistan’s
mainstream democrats, conservative and liberal
alike, have not been able to provide the
solution. Meanwhile, the country has become
seriously ungovernable and the state’s writ has
progressively broken down in large areas of the
nation. Political Islam is seeking to fill these
spaces.
What is needed is a transitional power-sharing
partnership between the military and political
parties on the basis of an agreed moderate and
liberal reform agenda — a sort of truth and
national reconciliation process that heals
political wounds and charts the road to a new
Pakistan. It is a tall order.
Much will depend on whether or not Mr. Musharraf
can pull off the next general elections without
provoking an effective opposition boycott and
further instability. That, in turn, will depend
on renewed efforts to diffuse the current
judicial crisis and make new political allies.
After the elections he will have to take off his
uniform and share power with mainstream
politicians in order to enlarge the new
government’s capacity to reform state and society.
In the past, Mr. Musharraf has demonstrated the
skills of a commando in blasting his way out of
trouble or beating a tactical retreat when the
odds were against him. But in recent times he has
seemed isolated, arrogant and rigid. Which Mr.
Musharraf will prevail? What will Pakistan look
like with or without him in the near future? The
conclusions are not foregone.