Musharraf does deserve criticism for the
deterioration of Pakistani civil society. About
his only defense is that things were worse under
his predecessor, the insecure Nawaz Sharif.
Musharraf had a golden opportunity to set things
right and develop a strategy that would build up
civilian competence and allow for the army’s
retreat from governance. He missed it. After his
coup he rejected advice that he impose emergency
rule for a few months, meanwhile ordering the
intelligence services to round up the extremists
they had nurtured for years. But as a strongman
Musharraf had a fatal flaw: He wanted to be liked.

Since then his actions as a politician and leader
have been consistently flawed. He implemented a
crazy scheme of local government that further
destroyed Pakistan’s civilian bureaucracy. He
refused to allow former prime ministers Benazir
Bhutto and Sharif to return to Pakistan and meet
a real electoral test. And he fabricated a phony
political party to provide the illusion of
popular support. He also entered into alliances
with the Islamists (only to betray them) and with
a party responsible for rule by terror in certain
areas of the country.

As a general, Musharraf got mixed reviews from
his peers. As a politician, he has shown little
talent. His one strength, until Chief Justice
Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry defied him, was that
his opponents were even less inspiring.

Musharraf’s rule has not been without merit.
Going against the views of army hard-liners, he
lobbed one Kashmir proposal after another at the
Indian government, putting it on the defensive.
Under Musharraf, Pakistan’s position has changed
from insistence upon a plebiscite (something
India will never allow) to one of several
alternative arrangements, all designed to save
face for Islamabad.

Musharraf did preside over economic reform, but
the World Bank has pointed out that income
disparities and rural poverty have both grown
while the urban elite make money hand over fist.
His treatment of the press has been retrograde.
It is Orwellian for American officials to claim
that Pakistan is on the road to democracy.

Musharraf receives unstinting American support
because of his turnabout after Sept. 11, 2001,
regarding support for the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
No one doubts his sincerity regarding al-Qaeda;
as he writes in his fanciful autobiography, these
were the people who several times tried to kill
him.

But there is room for skepticism about Pakistan’s
role with regard to the Taliban. Pakistani
officials freely admit that their main concerns
in Afghanistan are Indian penetration (which
would mean encirclement for Islamabad) and Afghan
President Hamid Karzai’s dependence on New Delhi.
Given this strategic compulsion, it is not
surprising that Pakistan tolerates, if it does
not directly support, the Taliban; it has no
other instrument available to it than this
Pashtun tribal hammer.

Whatever happens in coming days, we are not
approaching the end of the “Musharraf system” in
Pakistan. Even if he were forced out of the
presidency and ceased to be army chief, his
military colleagues would continue to rule from
behind the scenes, finding a pliable politician
or two to serve as their public face. Abroad,
they might get tougher with India (what better
way to unite Pakistanis than a crisis with New
Delhi?), and they would try to fake it with the
Americans regarding Afghanistan: They will not
willingly give up their Taliban assets.

Perhaps such a second coming of the Musharraf
system would work better with a military leader
more perceptive than the ebullient but shallow
Musharraf. But in the end, the army cannot rule
the state of Pakistan by itself. Perhaps it will
come to the realization that what it needs is a
strategy for a systematic withdrawal from
politics. This would involve heavy investment in
the quality and competence of the civilian elite,
a rebuilding of liberal Pakistan, and tough
measures against defiant, radical Islamists.

The United States is paying lip service to a
regime that is collapsing before its eyes and
that may yet turn truly nasty. Washington treats
Pakistan as if it were a Cold War ally, dealing
only with its top leadership. The great danger is
that this time around, Pakistan may not have the
internal resources to manage its own rescue. If
that is the case, then in years to come, a
nuclear-armed and terrorism-capable Pakistan will
become everyone’s biggest foreign policy problem.