In recent weeks, the Syrian National Army (SNA), with the support of Turkish forces, launched deadly attacks on areas controlled by the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of the North East of Syria (AANES) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Indeed, the SNA has been acting as a Turkish proxy in Syria since its establishment in 2017 and is provided funding, training, and military support by Ankara. However, on December 23, the SDF led a counter-offensive that pushed the SNA to withdraw from various areas.

The military offensive led by the SNA against Kurdish inhabited areas controlled by the SDF started nearly at the same time as the military offensive that led to the fall of the Assad regime. SNA forces took control of the cities of Tell Rifat and Manbej in northern Syria, resulting in over 150,000 displaced civilians and many violations of human rights.

Following these attacks, the SNA has been continuing its military operations against the SDF in Tishrin Dam. The dam supplies electricity to much of northeast Syria, under the domination of the AANES. The SDF has controlled the facility since 2015, after it evacuated ISIS with the assistance of US troops.

In addition to this, the Turkish army has been bombing the area around Kobani, causing civilian losses, including targeting a grain centre which damaged 300 tons of stored wheat.

The US attempted to mediate a temporary truce between the SDF and Turkey, but Ankara refused to negotiate a ceasefire with “a terrorist organisation”. Turkey considers the People’s Protection Units (YPG) - which constitutes the backbone of the SDF – as the Syrian front for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) which is designated a terrorist group by them.

Several demonstrations were organised in areas controlled by the SDF to condemn Turkish led attacks. People fear a repetition of the invasion and subsequent occupation of Afrin in 2018, which led to the forced displacement of hundreds of civilians (some estimate 300,000), the vast majority of them Kurds.

The latest offensive backed by Turkey is therefore seen by many as an existential threat to Kurds.

 Turkey’s destructive role in Syria

Following the fall of the Assad regime, Turkey has become the most important regional actor in the country. By providing support for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Ankara’s been consolidating its power over Syria. Turkey’s main objective, other than carrying out forced returns of Syrian refugees and benefiting from future economic opportunities during the reconstruction phase, is to deny Kurdish aspirations for autonomy, and more specifically undermine the AANES. This would set a precedent for Kurdish self-determination in Turkey.

Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan declared during a joint press conference with HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, that the territorial integrity of Syria is “non-negotiable” and that the PKK “has no place“in the country. A few days later, president Erdogan declared that the FDS “will either bid farewell to their weapons, or they will be buried in Syrian lands”. The Turkish army has also continuously bombed civilians and critical infrastructures of the northeast of Syria since the end of 2023.

While HTS hasn’t participated in any military confrontations against the SDF in recent weeks, the organisation hasn’t vocalised opposition to the Turkey-led attacks, quite the opposite. Murhaf Abu Qasra, a top commander of the HTS and the newly nominated defence minister of the transitional government, stated that “Syria will not be divided and there will be no federalism inshAllah. God willing, all these areas will be under Syria[n authority]”.

Moreover, al-Sharaa told a Turkish newspaper that Syria would develop a strategic relationship with Turkey going forward, and added that: “We do not accept that Syrian lands threaten and destabilise Turkey or other places”. He also stated that all weapons must come under state control, including those in the SDF-held areas.

In the past, HTS repeatedly supported Turkish offensives against the SDF. 

This is all despite SDF officials making statements seeking negotiations with HTS. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi declared they’re in favour of state decentralisation and self-administration, but not federalism, whilst being open to being part of a future Syrian national army (with guaranties). He declared that the SDF are not an extension of the PKK and are ready to expel non-Syrian fighters immediately after reaching a truce.

In his most recent speech, al-Sharaa stated that they were negotiating with the SDF to resolve the crisis in northeastern Syria and that the Syrian Ministry of Defence will integrate Kurdish forces into its ranks.

US military presence in the northeast is currently the main obstacle to Turkey’s total elimination of the SDF in those areas. However, Donald Trump’s arrival in the White House could potentially lead to a deal with Ankara that leads to the US’ withdrawal. This would green light a Turkish invasion with disastrous consequences for civilians, particularly Kurds, and would put an end to the AANES project.

 Weak solidarity

It is unlikely that HTS is willing to support the demands of the SDF and AANES, particularly concerning Kurdish national rights. After all, the northeastern regions are rich in natural resources, particularly oil and agriculture, and so are strategically and symbolically important.

Ultimately, HTS is no different to the Syrian National Council and the National Coalition of Opposition and Revolutionary Forces – opposition actors in exile who are hostile to Kurdish national rights.

More generally, just like with Afrin in 2018, the main problem is the absence of organised signs of solidarity or opposition to the Turkish-led military offensive on SDF areas, and threats to Kurdish civilians. This is a considerable issue given it is a political necessity for Syria’s democratic, progressive and pluralistic future.

Changing such a trajectory would also be a step towards tackling the ethnic division between Arabs and Kurds. Progressive and democratic forces must wage a struggle against Arab chauvinism to forge solidarity between these populations. This has been a challenge from the start of the Syrian revolution in 2011 and will have to be resolved in order for the country’s people to be truly liberated.

There is a desperate need to return to the original aspirations of the uprising for democracy, social justice and equality—including upholding Kurdish self-determination. Because whilst the SDF or YPG can be criticised for mistakes and repression, it is not the main obstacle to solidarity between Kurds and Arabs. Though, this is the belligerent position held by Arab opposition forces in Syria, as well as HTS and the SNA today.

The Kurdish population in Syria has been discriminated against since the establishment of the state in 1946. Kurds have suffered the banning of their language and cultural celebrations, endured policies of Arab colonisation, been deprived of nationality and basic social rights, and faced the under-development in areas where they formed a majority.

In this context, progressive forces must pursue collaboration between Syrian Arabs and Kurds, including the AANES. After all, the AANES and its political institutions represent large sections of the Kurdish population and have protected it against various local and external threats.

The uprising in 2011 allowed an unprecedented emergence of a deep Kurdish national dynamic in the history of Syria. The Kurdish question raises many other issues about the country’s future, including the potential for a pluralist identity not solely based on Arabness or Islam, as well as the nature of the state and its social model. Ultimately, these are all challenges that are intrinsically connected to the desire for true emancipation of Syria’s popular classes.

Joseph Daher

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