There is a shift in India’s foreign
policy from non-alignment to
alignment; from the goal of creat-
ing a multipolar world to endorsing the
US concept of a unipolar world. The
strategic environment is being altered
by a slew of agreements between India
and the US where military engagement
is being privileged. The shifts are also
evident with changes in India’s foreign
policy conceptualisations and relations
with traditional allies. The national con-
sensus that existed around non-alignment
has broken down as changes in India’s
strategic thinking are made and articulated
by a small foreign policy elite in and
around the government. This exclusive
domain is actuated because it is not
mandatory for the Indian Parliament to
discuss or ratify international treaties or
policy shifts.
The changes in Indian foreign policy
are based on India’s aspirations for great
power status and coincide with, or at least
follow the Indian economic reforms since
the 1990s. The argument is that India’s
rising gross domestic product (GDP),
its large middle class, its military and
nuclear capability make it a potential
power. India’s strategic thinkers have
argued that non-alignment is “irrelevant”
and not in “national interest”. They
advocate that alignment with the sole
superpower is in the interest of making
India a great power. In this article, we
analyse the context of this shift and its
implications for India.
US Interest in India
US interest in India is recent and based
on a reassessment on their interests in the
21st century. Pakistan has been the major
US ally in south Asia and has the status
as a major non-NATO (North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation) ally. In contrast,
India’s policies of non-alignment and
domestic policies have been dismissed
by the US through its history on vari-
ous counts. They have however shifted
perceptions since 2002 because of a
number of reasons:
(1) The US national security and de fence
depart ment envisage US military domi-
nance, termed as “full spectrum domi-
nance”. This is to be done with: “the abi-
lity of US forces, operating unilaterally
or in combination with multinational
and interagency partners, to defeat any
adversary and control any situation across
the full range of military operations”. [1]
They want “freedom to operate in all
domains” with a set of alliances with
other strong partners. India is seen as
one such potential strategic partner. [2] It is
for this that the US has decided to make
India into a “great power”.
(2) The US has decided to “dehyphenate”
their relation and no longer “balance”
India with Pakistan. US still needs Pakistan
in Afghanistan and in its anti-terrorism
policy but is dissatisfied with the results
on Al Qaida, its record on proliferation,
its shortcomings as a democracy, etc.
(3) The US sees China and India as the
new major emerging powers. The national
security strategy of the US, both in 2002
and 2005, cautions China “to mend its
ways” and argues that China’s capabili-
ties threaten the region. [3] US differences
with China include the issue of Taiwan,
North Korea, human rights, democracy,
proliferation, etc. US policymakers empha-
sise on the “containment” of China and
the need to “balance” its power through
countervailing forces. [4] The Republican
neocon project states that China’s re-
gional leadership is “increasingly at the
expense of the US” and advocates a
new NATO-like organisation for Asia. [5]
India is seen as the potential ally in this
military alliance. The Chinese are com-
mitted towards a multipolar world along
with the Russians.
(4) The US views Russia as a state that
has failed in its reform. US-Russia rela-
tions lack common vision on most issues,
including: the domination and eastward ex-
pansion of NATO; US critique of Russian
democracy; US support to regime change
in the countries of the Commonwealth
of Independent States; Russian anxiety
over US bases in central Asia; US direct
intervention in Georgia, Azerbaijan,
Ukraine; and US control of pipelines
that bypass Russia. Differences on Iran,
Iraq and Kosovo persist, and the Sino-
Russian strategic partnership and Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) provide
an alternate forum for the two.
(5) The US has had different percep-
tions from the European Union (EU) on
their occupation of Iraq; differences on
the International Criminal Court; Kyoto
Protocol; agriculture subsidies; the World
Trade Organisation; handling terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).
Slow European economic growth has led
to stagnation in trade.
It is in this context that the US wants
new allies and an expanded security struc-
ture of which India can become an integral
part if they make the required changes in
their policy. US interest in India is based
on the following assumptions:
(1) India’s economic growth, the large
middle class and opening markets, where
India and US have significant trade, but
the US wants greater market access.
(2) India’s increasing military imports of
which US expects a greater share. Since
2005 a number of such contracts have
been proposed. For example, in a note
to the Congress, Pentagon officials said
that India is likely to purchase $ 5 billion
worth of conventional weapons, includ-
ing platforms that could be “useful for
monitoring the Chinese military”. [6] The
US would like to become the favoured
defence provider to India and in the
process partner India to pressurise China
for US interests.
(3) India’s need for energy where US
officials argue that not only will the US
be able to effectively compete to be a
nuclear power and fuel supplier, gaining
billions of dollars and jobs for US work-
ers, but they might be able to wean away
India from the Iran gas pipeline that India
speaks of as the peace pipeline.
(4) The large and influential group of
Indian Americans that impact on US
foreign policy.
(5) India’s policy elite have an aspiration for
“great power” status that will help India
globalise. They calculate this on the basis
of India’s fast GDP growth, techno logy
base, middle class and military/nuclear
capability. There is thus a convergence
of US strategic, economic and military
interests in India.
US interest in India was endorsed by
US policy, first in the 2002 ‘National
Security Strategy for the US’, which states
that US national interest requires “strong
relations with India”. [7] The same document
argued that by pursuing advanced military
capabilities China was “threatening its
neighbours in the Asia Pacific”. Ironically,
the US believes that its own or its allies
militarisation is non-threatening, unlike
that of China. Further, US analysts see
India as a good contrast and “balancer” to
China. India, similarly, began to see the US
as a benign power since the 1990s when
they initiated privatisation programmes.
The argument that non-alignment was
irrelevant became part of the discourse of
security strategists. India was one of the
first countries to welcome the US ballistic
missile defence in 2001, a programme
that is designed to control space and as
a part of the effort of containment of
China and Russia.
Indo-US Entanglements
In June 2004, Bush and Vajpayee signed
the “Next Step for Strategic Partnership”
(NSSP) after a series of talks between the
two countries that had been initiated by
the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)
government. The US government waived
the nuclear-related sanctions on India in
2001 and allowed exports to the Indian
Space Research Organisation (ISRO) in
2004 as the basis for the NSSP. This
strategy was outlined in their document:
‘India as a Global Power: An Action
Agenda for the United States,’ July 14,
2005, which stated that the US will
make India into a “great power”. This
was unveiled in the Bush administration
strategy paper ‘A New Strategy for South
Asia’, March 2005, where the US invited
India to collaborate with it militarily and
economically in exchange for this “great
power” status. [8]
The Indian government under prime
minister Manmohan Singh welcomed this
alliance with the belief that India will
now become a great power both at the
regional level and internationally. Two
agreements between India and the US
in June and July 2005 tie India with the
US with the intent “to transform Indo-US
relations” stating that: “The leaders of our
two countries are building a US-India
strategic partnership in pursuit of these
principles and interests”. [9]
Military Links
A number of military links between
India and the US have been entered
into and a number of others are await-
ing approval. The new framework for
India-US defence relationship, June
2005, states that (1) the two countries
shall conduct jointly exercises and ex-
changes, (2) colla borate on multilateral
operations, (3) streng then capabilities to
defeat terrorism, (4) expand interaction
to promote regional global peace and
stability, (5) enhance capa bilities to
combat the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, (6) expand the two-way
defence trade between the two countries,
(7) build greater under standing between
our defence establishments, (8) conduct
peacekeeping operations, etc. [10]
This agreement is comprehensive,
allo wing India to become a base for US
military activities on a wide scale. This
sanctions naval exercises in the Straits
of Malacca, Alaska, Bay of Bengal and
the Indian Ocean, as also military ex-
ercises in Mizoram and elsewhere. The
Pentagon argues that collaborations or
inter-operatability with the Indian military
will help the US military agenda related to
counter terrorism, countering proliferation,
peacekeeping, anti-narcotics operations,
etc. Suggestions to deepen cooperation
in the Indian Ocean are proposed. [11] In
2006, India and the US agreed to sign a
military logistics support and maritime
support agreement to ensure and secure
the maritime environment. [12] The defence
framework supports the Access and Cross
Servicing Agreement (Logistics Support
Agreement) that gives US ships access
to Indian naval facilities for maintenance
and repairs. This essentially means that
warships can practically use Indian
facilities without a formal base. Regular
joint naval exercises are part of these
agreements. With this clause, India by
proxy becomes part of the US, Japan and
Australia axis that seeks to dominate the
high seas in the region.
US strategists argue that India’s
naval capability is superior to that of
the Asso ciation of South-East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) countries. India can
thus provide the US easy access to
the entire region and can be used for
the US Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI). The Defence Framework make
no direct mention of the US-sponsored
PSI or the Container Security Initiative
(CSI). These initiatives give the US and
other members the right to apprehend any
ship/ container that they believe may be
carrying WMDs or nuclear material. In
other words, just like Iraq was attacked on
the suspicion of the existence of WMDs,
a similar attack could be carried out on
any container/ship in international waters.
India’s linkage with these initiatives and
US military exercises binds the country
to these operations. But the scope of the
Defence Framework and later agreements
is so wide that it can be indirectly used
for the PSI. The Framework thus allows
complete access of the US military to
Indian military assets of and facilities to
advance its hegemonic agenda in Asia and
Africa. Indian strategists who want a “Blue
Water” navy are willing to be part of the
US naval adventures in exchange. This
is in sharp contrast to India’s traditional
position of the Indian Ocean as a zone
of peace safeguarded by India.
As Rashid and Pervovich state, in
2005 and 2006 there were 21 Indo-US
meetings on issues ranging from defence
procurement, military service to service,
trade and commerce, etc to establish a
comprehensive and long-term strategic
partnership between the US and India.
And further that “the president has ap-
proached the new relationship with India
with a clear vision of the geopolitical
challenges likely to confront the US in
the 21st century”. [13] By July 2006 prime
minister Manmohan Singh had already
promised that in exchange for nuclear
supplies India would separate its military
and civilian nuclear facilities, place the
latter under International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards, maintain a
moratorium on testing and work with
the US to conclude the Fissile Material
Cut Off Treaty. [14]
Democracy as Intervention?
The Defence Framework was followed
by the Manmohan Singh’s and president
Bush’s July 18, 2005 resolve to create a
Indo-US “Global Partnership” and agree-
ments on the Global Democracy Initiative,
where the two would be committed to
promoting democracy in third countries
on a global scale. Both countries dedicated
$ 10 million a year to promote democracy
globally. The question is do both countries
have the same vision on democracy? The
US believes that Russia and Venezuela are
not democracies; they believe that Hamas
is a “terrorist organisation” and do not
recognise it, despite its electoral victory.
The US is the mainstay of Israel’s policies
in Palestine. India has long critiqued the
idea of international intervention on the
grounds of human rights, democracy or
any other social clause. Does the Global
Democracy Initiative bind India to this
vision? Is India going to participate
with the US in spreading democracy to
central Asia, Pakistan and Iraq? If not,
why do they need a common fund and
initiative?
The Indo-US Knowledge Initiative on
Agriculture brings the US agricultural
multinational companies and products into
Indian agriculture that Indian agricultural
scientists argue are based on unequal
access. As opposed to this, India’s inter-
est in becoming a member of the UN
Security Council, in its bid to become
a great power, is not mentioned in any
Indo-US document. [15] The Hyde Act and
the 123 Agreements have to be placed in
this context.
123 Agreement
The 123 Agreement is more than just
an agreement on nuclear supplies and
should be viewed in the broader context
of this new alignment. The Hyde Act of
the US forms the perpetual framework
for this Treaty. It is a US National Act in
keeping with nuclear non-proliferation and
the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR). [16] The Hyde Act makes spe-
cial changes to enable the US to supply
nuclear fuel and technologies to India
as an exception, in return for safeguards
and inspections by the (IAEA) and also
certifications by the US president to the
US Congress on India’s overall foreign
policy positions. The next step for India
to operationalise this agreement would be
to sign similar agreements with the IAEA
and the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group.
The Hyde Act states that while export-
ing nuclear fuel or technology to India
the US has to abide by the following:
The American president will report and
certify annually to the US Congress if
India’s foreign policy is “congruent to
that of the US” and more specifically
on India joining US efforts in isolating
and even sanctioning Iran. [17] The US will
cease nuclear cooperation if India con-
ducts a test. And all materials including
reprocessed material will be returned. [18]
This Act demands that India participate
and ultimately support the PSI that we
mentioned above, which enables the US
to intercept ships in international seas. [19]
This Act wants to bind India into vari-
ous US initiated treaties and regimes of
which India is not part of, including the
MTCR, Fissile Material Cut off Treaty,
etc. [20] The advisory in the Hyde Act points
to specific issues that the US wants India
to do. These include that India sign the
FMCT, and the PSI, that India sign up
to the Australia group and the Wassenar
Arrangement, and that India “dissuade,
isolate, sanction and contain” Iran. The US
would pressurise India on all these issues
and eventually as India gets more bound,
violations on these counts would lead to
suspension of the agreement and a return
of the nuclear technology and fuels.
The text of the 123 Agreement was kept
a secret until the Indian union cabinet
cleared it and it became binding. Public
and parliamentary discussion followed
only after it became irreversible. The
123 Agreement has been reworked by
Indian and US negotiators to make it
more palatable since the Indian political
class outside the ruling, United Progres-
sive Alliance (UPA) found the Hyde Act
highly discriminatory. Thus some of its
provisions remain ambiguous and the text
is open to divergent interpretations. But
this ambiguity will remain only until the
123 Agreement has been operationalised.
Once through, the US can interpret this
to its convenience. It should be remem-
bered that as an act of the US Congress,
the Hyde Act is a national law which is
binding on the US in the 123 Agreement.
This will have serious implications when
India spends billions of dollars for some
seven per cent of its energy require-
ments, ties itself to US defence imports
and has to mortgage its foreign policy
in perpetuity.
The argument by the Indian foreign
minister that India is not bound by the
Hyde Act is at best partial because the US
which is party to the agreement is bound
by it. The Hyde Act functions as “national
law” which binds the US. There is no
ambiguity in the agreement on this at all.
Article 2 of the 123 Agreement states that
the parties to the agreement “shall imple-
ment this Agreement in accor dance with
the respective applicable treaties, national
laws, regulations, and licence requirements
concerning the use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes”. This Article 2 can
be used by the US at any time to delay,
deny or disapprove nuclear supplies and to
therefore pressurise India on any foreign
policy or domestic policy decision. India’s
independent decision-making gets curtailed
in this Agreement in perpetuity. There can
be no doubt that the 123 Agreement is
bound by the Hyde Act.
While there is much debate on the fine
print of this text, as far as the strategic
shift in foreign policy is concerned several
things are clear:
(1) The 123 Agreement is discriminatory.
It imposes a test ban, and more (the rea-
sons for terminating the Agreement are
deliberately ambiguous) without similar
commitments by the US. [21] This is a
virtual acceptance of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) rejected by the
US, without any reference to global and
regional disarmament, that makes the deal
not only unequal but directed towards
capping India’s nuclear deterrence. US
under secretary of state Nicholas Burns
has categorically stated that India’s
nuclear reprocessing facilities would in
fact come under IAEA safeguards in
perpetuity and the agreement would not
support the weapons programme. The
Indian government denies this, leaving
much ambiguity on the issue.
However, for advocates of peace and
anti-nuclear weaponisation, like the au-
thors, a decision on test ban and nuclear
disarmament should be India’s sovereign
decision. In its covert support to the Israeli
nuclear programme and to the apartheid
South African regime, no such condi-
tions were laid down. These deals were
clandestine but the fact is that nothing
in the US law stopped them. So the US
argument that the US Atomic Energy
Act, 1954, etc, bans any such deal or
preferential treatment, including vital
provisions providing reprocessing tech-
nology, is simply not true.
(2) Given the latitude provided for the
termination of the agreement, uninterrupted
nuclear fuel supply is not guaranteed.
Thus, if the US finds any Indian foreign
policy position going against its national
interest, for example, the US is particulary
interested in our cooperation with Iran,
non-participation in the PSI or FMCT,
it can mean that the US can cut off fuel
supplies leading to disruptions.
(3) Nuclear power energy at present is
2.6 per cent of total power capacity.
India projects that it will produce 20,000
MW in 2020, but that will still be only
7 per cent of the total energy generated.
The US has built no nuclear plant since
1973, yet it will become a major technical
supplier because of the strategic partner-
ship. Congressional reports, for example,
show that General Electric will be the
main US company to gain from this. [22]
Scientists have calculated that for import-
ing 30,000 MW e of power reactors, the
capital investments will be at least about
Rs 1,2,00,000 crore. [23] Other scientists have
argued that the “much hyped promise of
nuclear technology doesn’t translate to
much in real terms. Long years of isola-
tion have made us self-sufficient....” [24]
Questions are thus raised whether India
can afford disruptions of fuel supply and
more important, as former prime minister
V P Singh questioned, can India afford
so much for the sake of such a strategic
tie up? Besides this, there are other key
questions, like the safety and disposal of
nuclear waste, alternate sources of energy,
like thorium, and its future that remain
unanswered.
(4) It is crystal clear that this constitutes
a drastic shift in India’s strategic course,
by tying India to the US and making it
dependent on the US for fuel and techno-
logy. India’s foreign policy decisions will
have to be endorsed by the US and coin-
cide with US interests. India will be able
to make more untested nuclear weapons
that will increase the threat perceptions
globally and fuel a nuclear arms race.
The exclusions given to India in the
nuclear non-proliferation regime will
push other countries to do the same,
opening the flood gates for the spread
of nuclear weapons. Traditional and
historically tested allies like Russia, the
central Asian and west Asian countries
will feel alienated from India and its
new pro-US alignment.
India’s Foreign Policy Vision
India officially continues to adhere
to non-alignment. Many of the recent
documents on India’s foreign policy fo-
cus on the concept of a multipolar world
as opposed to the US commitment of a
unipolar world. The unipolar concept
entails US domination to include unilat-
eral decisions on areas of key US inter-
est, placing US law above international
law, forced globali sation, containment of
states, regime change, unilateral attacks
on “rogue” states, US style democracy,
non-proliferation enforced by the US, etc.
The concept of a multipolar world on
the other hand is based on the existence
of multiple power centres, multilateral
institutions and laws, plural methods of
development, democracy and markets,
coexistence of multiple cultures, etc. It
is supported by Russia, China, France
and many other countries. India has
seen it as an extension of the idea of
non-alignment.
US policymakers reject the idea of both
non-alignment and the multipolar concept
and have launched a campaign to convince
India about these. For example: secretary
of state, Condoleezza Rice, who announced
in March 2005, that it was US policy to
“help” India become a world power, said
in June 2005 that New Delhi would have
to abandon “old ways of thinking and
old ways of acting”. [25] Speaking to the
US-India Business Council, she said: “I
know there are some that still talk about
non-alignment in foreign policy.....It has
lost its meaning”. [26] She has repeated this
in different words, asking India to drop
non-alignment and join instead “the coali-
tion of democracies” led by the US. Strobe
Talbott, former deputy national security
advisor to the Clinton admini stration
called the multipolar concept “a pretty
stupid proposition”. [27] In India, sections
of the press and so-called strategic think-
ers have since been echoing these words
and sentiments.
US pressure is working on India. In
September 2005 India went against the
rest of the non-aligned movement (NAM)
countries and voted with the US on
sanctions against Iran. Thus India, which
from 1995-2005 India opposed the US in
the UN on 80 per cent of all its votes,
has now voted with them on sanctions
against Iran, opposition to a Small Arms
and Light Weapons Treaty, on the Kyoto
Protocol, etc. No wonder then, India has
stopped talking of democratisation of the
United Nations and its goal of joining the
Security Council.
Impact on the Region
The Indo-US engagements have raised
threat perceptions in the entire Asia
Pacific region. Even US Congress and
policy analysts have noted that the new
US linkages with India have “significant
implications” for Asia and on US relations
with Pakistan and China. [28]
China Angle
The Indian foreign minister Pranab
Mukherji has asserted that India re-
jects “outmoded” practices such as the
“balance of power” between India and
China. The US however adheres to it
and it forms the crux of their relations
in Asia where the containment of China
is part of national security doctrines.
Strategic advisors to the Indian govern-
ment accept this thesis as central to
their understanding. It is used to justify
nuclear weaponisation and now to accept
the 123 Agreement.
Advisors and analysts including Terescita
Schaeffer, Selig Harrison and others proj-
ect the importance of India as a nuclear
and econo [29] This is mirrored by Indian
strategic analysts like K Subrahmanyam
who argue that India must “balance China”
as the “major balancers of powers would
like”. They project China as a perpetual
threat, playing on select memory of past
Sino-Indian relations, and advocate that
now “China is a surrogate threat to India
through its proliferation of nuclear tech-
nologies to Pakistan”. [30] Will a combination
of the most powerful state in the world,
the US combined with India “balance”
China? Or will such an alliance upset the
“balance” and stability by sheer military
might and threaten China, thus leading up
to a new nuclear race? The stabilisation
of Sino-Indian relations after almost a
dozen rounds of bilateral talks and sig-
nificant trade relations can once again
be destabilised and result in increased
militarisation. The Chinese response to
the Indo-US nuclear deal is muted but
firmly critical of the US on its double
standards on nuclear proliferation. They
will in all likelihood oppose India in the
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, when the issue
comes up there.
Pakistan’s Threat Perceptions
The confidence-building measures
that India and Pakistan have engaged in
over the past few years are in jeopardy.
Pakistan’s National Command Author-
ity, chaired by general Pervez Mushar-
raf said that the Indo-US deal “would
destabilise the subcontinent and fuel a
nuclear arms race”. [31] The belief of some
strategic analysts that an arms race will
benefit India’s development is misplaced.
Pakistan is already urging China for
further access to nuclear technologies.
The confidence-building between India-
Pakistan and India-China will receive a
blow. All the countries of south Asia are
watching the Indo-US strategic embrace
with trepidation. India’s old position of
keeping the US out of the subcontinent’s
politics has not only been reversed, but
India is being seen as the state that will
further the US interests in this region
and beyond.
Other Fallouts
Our traditional time tested relations
with Russia and west Asian countries
will clearly get disrupted as we get
involved in US hegemonic policies.
India’s close defence tie up with Israel
is testimony to this. India’s old posi-
tion of support to the Palestine cause
is much more muted. India voted with
the US on sanctions against Iran and
then abstained a second time. The US
policy that has demonised Islam and
propagated the idea of “clash of civili-
sations” goes against our fundamental
values. The strategic shifts in foreign
policy entail such fall outs.
The Third World and the Strategic Shift
India’s geostrategists have a changed
perception vis-à-vis the third world and
other NAM countries, which the country
was historically aligned to. India has
used both “soft power” and “hard power”
options to increase its influence on third
countries. This perception is based on the
following assessments:
(1) India discontinued its government
to government development cooperation
with all but six bilateral donors (DFID,
EC, Germany, Japan, USAID, Russian
Federation). Instead donors could assist
NGOs directly.
(2) India has gradually changed from a
recipient of aid and assistance to a giver
of aid. Minister of state for external af-
fairs Rao Inderjit Singh stated in April
2005: “Our technical and economic
cooperation programme – ITEC [to 156
states] is almost four decades old. ...a
rough monetary value to the wide range
of training and other facilities that we have
shared with our friends from Africa, I am
sure he would estimate it at well above
a billion dollars”. [32]
(3) India Development Initiative (IDI)
dedicates a $1.5 billion soft credit fund
over five years through the Exim Bank
for supporting development projects
mainly in Africa.
(4) India has leased an air base in Ayni
in Tajikistan which it argues is for non-
military purposes, but others see this is as
part of India’s move towards increasing
its strategic depth in central Asia.
(5) India has assisted Afghanistan in
projects that range from roads to hospi-
tal building as a way of maintaining its
influence in the region. It has extended
more than $100 million in credit to the
outlawed Myanmar regime, including for
upgrading their railway. India has thus
emerged as Myanmar’s second largest
market, absorbing 25 per cent of the
country’s exports.
(6) India maintains its influence in several
south Asian states like Nepal, Maldives,
Sri Lanka, as is well known.
In this context India has gradually dis-
engaged from the large southern groups
that it once partnered and has played a key
role in forming new groups like the G-4,
G-15, G-20 and G-33. India has become
part of many regional groupings, like
India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA), Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi
Sectoral Technical and Economic Coopera-
tion (BIMSTEC), as a more direct way
of promoting South-South Cooperation as
well as establishing a stronger political
and economic relationship. Other African
countries are now asking why they are
not included, as the Ugandan president
did, while offering India direct supplies
of Uranium. [33] India sees this as better
way of negotiating rather than joining
with others who are “left behind”. This
gradual but significant disengagement with
the third world is driven by India’s great
power perceptions. Its aid policies follow
the intentions of the west in the creation
of markets for Indian capital. The concept
of “soft power” policies remains part
of the neo-realist framework, where the
interest of the state is primary, regardless
of the impact on citizens.
National Interests and the Calculus of Power
India’s foreign policy shifts have
been justified in terms of the “national
interest”. The hollowness of this realist
concept has been exposed further in the
recent debates in Parliament and outside,
where both the proponents and critics of
the 123 Agreement claim to uphold the
national interest and yet have diametrically
opposed positions to the agreement as well
as what constitutes the national interest.
Clearly the national interest is nothing
more than a legitimating ideology.
The concept of power needs to be
examined since the whole exercise of
shifting India’s foreign policy is based
on the goal of achieving “great power
status”. Similarly, the US is presenting
to India this “great power” package.
Neither of the two however has explained
what this “great power” is for? Do they
have common perceptions on this power?
Clearly, the US wants India to be a power
as part of its “hub and spokes” principles,
where they need partners to further their
international positions. The ruling party
wants India to be a great power to give
its elite greater access to a globalising
world. Both want power “over others”,
power to dominate internationally and
regionally. Neither wants it in terms
of empowering common people. The
Indian government has not explained
the implications and fallouts of this new
military alliance with the US.
Conclusion
The strategic shifts in India’s foreign
policy are far reaching. The time tested
tenet of non-alignment is being cast off
as an outmoded concept and is being
systematically replaced by a strategic
alliance with the US. India’s stated aim
of sustaining a multipolar world has re-
ceived a severe setback. India’s repeated
advocacy for global nuclear disarmament
is muted and militarisation endorsed. The
strategic shifts tie India into a web of
defence arrangements that give logistic
support and engage in exercises with the
US military, lending support to US de-
signs to maintain an unequal global order
and sustain US hegemony. Becoming a
strategic partner of the US lends support
to its positions like its Ballistic Missile
Defence and various political manœuvres
at a time where even its old partners in
Europe and elsewhere want to disas-
sociate from it. In addition India gets
associated with the cultural aspects of
the US war against terrorism, including
the ideas of “clash of civilisations”, “with
us or against us”, “rogue states” and the
demonisation of Islam. It links us to US
policies that endanger ordinary citizens and
create national security states.In addition,
India gets bound in discriminatory treaties
which the country had opposed when it
did not consider itself a great power. The
Hyde Act and the 123 Agreement are just
the culmination of this policy of strategic
subservience to the US. And most of this
has been done behind the back of Parlia-
ment, keeping the Indian people in the
dark. It is important to contest this shift in
Indian foreign policy and return India to
a non-militarist peaceful path that remains
independent and non-aligned.