Slovakia is experiencing protests against questioning EU orientation and against pulling our state into the Russian world under the slogan “Slovakia is Europe”. After Donald Trump’s inauguration, there was a dramatic change in the international political situation. Recent discussions towards the establishment of the “coalition of the willing” have addressed issues of safeguarding Ukraine’s state sovereignty and strengthening Europe’s defensive capabilities to be sufficiently deterrent against recidivism of the Russian Federation’s imperialistic campaigns. The Slovak Republic was not invited.
Surprising Results
In this atmosphere of uncertainty, the results of a survey conducted by the Future Forum think tank with the Focus agency between 3rd and 6th March 2025 are worth noting. Its aim was to eliminate conjectures, political manipulations and media distortions about how Slovak citizens perceive the geopolitical orientation of the country.
Given the government’s open sympathies towards Russia and its stable preferences, the survey - surprisingly for many - showed that 63.5% of voters support the Western (EU) orientation and only 19.2% support the Eastern, pro-Russian orientation. 17.3% could not express an opinion.
To the question “What is your opinion on the foreign policy of the current Government of the Slovak Republic”, only 9.6% of respondents answered decisively positive, 23% somewhat positive, so together about a third of respondents. 54.8% had a negative opinion.
When asked whether Slovakia should or should not remain a NATO member country, almost 71% of respondents answered positively, only 18.4% negatively. This is the country’s highest ever poll score in favour of NATO.
Slovakia’s participation in the emerging “coalition of the willing” also gained majority support. To the question “At a meeting of European leaders and representatives of NATO and the EU in London, a ’coalition of the willing’ countries began to form, which want to participate more intensively and jointly in European defence. Do you support Slovakia’s more active participation in common European defence within the EU and NATO or are you against it?” 54.4% answered positively, 31% were against.
To the question “To what extent do you fear that Slovakia’s participation in common European defence could have negative consequences for Slovakia”, only 39.2% answered positively, with 50.7% not concerned about this participation, while 10.1% did not know.
When asked whether Russia represents a security threat to Slovakia, 51.5% answered positively, 38.6% negatively, 10% did not know.
On 8th March in the daily Sme, sociologist Michal Vašečka drew this conclusion: “Even the first look at the research results, without deeper analyses at the level of second-degree classification, indicates that Robert Fico and his government are going against the majority opinion, will and needs of Slovakia in their steps, decisions and overall logic of their foreign policy.” And he added that “overall, the Future Slovakia Forum research showed that the current government does not represent the will and desires of the majority of Slovakia’s inhabitants with its foreign policy.”
It might therefore seem that no “detour” to Russia threatens us and that the “Slovakia is Europe” protests overestimate such a risk.
Neutral Country or Clever Free Rider?
However, further answers undermine the validity of this assumption. Particularly noteworthy is the response to the question “In general, do you support the idea that Slovakia should be a militarily neutral country or do you believe it should be part of military alliances (such as NATO)?” Almost half of respondents - 49.8% - spoke in favour of neutrality and only 40% for participation in a military alliance, although previously up to 71% of respondents expressed support for our NATO membership.
If we look at these answers in terms of respondents’ inclination to political parties, neutrality has the greatest support among voters of Republic - 80.5%, Smer - 71.2%, SNS - 70%, Movement Slovakia - 51.1%, Hlas - 48.8%. Conversely, neutrality is least supported by voters of PS - 15.6%, SaS - 23.3%, KDH - 29.4%.
The inclination towards neutrality was even more pronounced in the question “In general, what position should Slovakia take on military conflicts in neighbouring countries?” 29.5% want it to remain neutral, 49.5% are in favour of providing humanitarian aid but do not want to get involved in military actions, only 12% would be willing to support a military solution according to international law.
The voters’ approach to defence spending also indirectly indicates an inclination towards neutrality. 49.6% of respondents want to maintain the current 2% level without increases, 27.3% want a slight increase to 2.5% of GDP, 10% of respondents want a significant increase to 3% of GDP or more. This stance is against the Trump administration’s requirement to substantially increase expenditures of NATO member states, but also against objective trends to increase defence spending due to the weakening of the American military presence in Europe and the need to build effective European defence. The Slovak population wants to continue to remain in the position of a clever free rider in NATO, and at the same time is under the illusion that neutrality means spending less on defence, while a look at the recently neutral Finland and Sweden shows that this is not the case.
The strong inclination towards non-engagement, looking at developments in a neighbouring state “from the sidelines”, is also indicated by answers to questions about aid to Ukraine facing war. Given the long-term support for Ukraine defending itself against Russian aggression by both parliamentary and non-parliamentary opposition political parties, given their sharp criticism of Smer’s false peace policy of “not a single bullet to Ukraine” and their advocacy for the continuation of military supplies to Ukraine and support for EU and NATO policy in this area, the acceptance of military support for Ukraine by opposition voters is surprisingly low. Military support for Ukraine is approved by only 13.3% of KDH voters, Slovakia 23.3%, SaS 40%, PS 48.9% and Democrats 50.2%.
Also quite paradoxical are the respondents’ views on supporting Ukraine’s EU membership, if we start from the aforementioned two-thirds pro-Western orientation of Slovak citizens and only about 20% inclination towards Russia. Only 34.4% of respondents expressed support for the integration of neighbouring Ukraine into the EU, while 51.2% were against. And this despite the fact that the benefits of Ukraine’s entry into the EU would be unequivocal for Slovakia. Since the full scale invasion, both the [former, right] Heger and [current, left] Fico governments repeatedly expressed support for Ukraine’s integration.
The rejection of Ukraine’s admission to NATO is even more decisive. Only 17.1% of those asked were in favour, while 57.5% were against. This minimal support is not surprising among voters of [left] Smer and Hlas as well as [far right] SNS and Republika. However, support is also low among sympathisers of [the centre and right] opposition parties (KDH 5.2%, Democrats 20.5%, SaS 30.9%, PS 35%), which support Ukraine’s entry into NATO as a security guarantee against another Russian attack.
More Radical Than Fascists
Looking at the research results comprehensively, we can formulate the following hypothesis: The seemingly majority inclination towards the EU and NATO, as well as towards the emerging initiative of the “coalition of the willing”, is not associated with the citizens’ readiness to make sacrifices for maintaining such an orientation or at least to demonstrate opinion and value consistency in relation to such a geopolitical and security anchoring of Slovakia.
The survey showed that the narratives of proponents of Eastern pro-Russian orientation have strongly affected the thinking of a large number of people who declare orientation towards the EU and support for the “coalition of the willing” initiative. Above all, the great attractiveness of ideas of neutrality is visible, rejecting aid to an attacked neighbour even with weapons supplies and preparation for a situation where Slovakia would have to defend itself against an attack.
It was also confirmed that Premier Fico’s Smer party’s “peace policy” and “sovereign Slovak foreign policy in all four cardinal directions” has led to a strong radicalisation of its voters. Their attitudes are even more radical than those of Republika voters, founded by former members of Kotleba’s fascist ĽSNS, and than attitudes of SNS voters, several of whose far right nominees in the government also entered politics on the ĽSNS candidate list.
To the question “Do you want Slovakia to be oriented more towards the West, i.e. EU countries, or more towards the East, i.e. Russia in the future”, 46.2% of Smer supporters answered towards the East. Only 31% of them expressed support for EU orientation, 22.8% could not answer. Their anti-Western stance is greater than among voters of the [far right] opposition party Republika. As many as 38% of this party’s voters claim Western orientation, 46.2% claim Eastern orientation.
However, Smer voters agree with the Prime Minister’s “sovereign foreign policy in all four cardinal directions” almost unconditionally - 84%, only 7.6% dislike it. Republika voters agree with it at 75%, 17.5% dislike it. 70.6% of SNS supporters agree with it, 19.4% disagree.
Is Consensus Even Possible?
Answers to further questions also show that Smer supporters among the survey respondents in most cases take extreme positions. There are relatively large differences between their attitudes and those of Hlas sympathisers. The views of voters of the strongest coalition party Smer and the strongest opposition party PS on fundamental foreign policy issues are so distant that it is difficult to imagine the formation of such a foreign policy and security consensus as prevailed in the 1990s before the accession negotiations with the EU and NATO and then for a long time, actually until the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Through its policy towards Russian aggression against our eastern neighbour, Smer’s leadership not only demoralised a large part of the Slovak population by inciting it against the victim with its hateful rhetoric while arousing understanding and sympathy for the aggressor. Moreover, claims that everyone in the European Union, i.e. representatives of 25 out of 27 states (with the exception of Orbán’s Hungary), who help Ukraine with supplies of weapons and ammunition, are warmongers, that the West is responsible for the mutual killing of Slavs, etc., caused the isolation of the Slovak Republic among its closest allies and neighbours in the EU.
Fico, who in 2017 called for the Slovak Republic to become part of the EU’s integration core, managed to partly change and partly radicalise Smer’s electorate in favour of supporting Russian aggression, while at the same time turning it away from the EU and its values. This is the result of his turn from the proclaimed values of social democracy to the national-conservative far right, which he culminated by participating in the Trumpian ultra-conservative CPAC conference, where Nazi salutes also occurred.
Early elections are likely. Smer, whose preferences currently oscillate around 22%, is preparing to form a government coalition with Republika with its growing support around 7-8% and with Hlas, whose preferences oscillate around the 10% mark (but apparently also using residual SNS voters). Given the current stalemate in electoral preferences, decisions will also be made based on the offer of foreign and security policy and the perception of protecting the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic in the changing conditions in Europe and the whole world. The fact that Smer has drawn its radicalised voters to the idea of Russia as an alternative safeguard for our future in Europe is not a trivial problem, as might seem from respondents’ answers to the first survey questions, given the resonance of this idea with Republika and SNS voters.
It turns out that Smer’s aggressive, emotionally charged “peace” rhetoric, as well as this party’s ideas about Slovakia’s place in shaping the future form of Europe after the inauguration of the Trump administration and after the end of the war in Ukraine, have affected the electorate of opposition parties much more than they are willing to admit. In particular, it concerns flirting with the idea of a neutral Slovak Republic, avoiding the situation of defending the homeland after an attack by military force (after all, the Russians will leave again sooner or later), refusing to help attacked neighbouring states even militarily, unwillingness to practically cooperate with European allies in creating a new security architecture in Europe after the US departure, etc. On the other hand, Smer, Republika and SNS voters are simply immune to the emotionally lukewarm foreign policy and security narrative of PS and other opposition parties. Nor do voters of [President Pelegrini’s] Hlas party seem committed to Slovakia’s current foreign policy orientation.
There is much to think about...
Peter Weiss is a former left-wing politician and diplomat