A March 2025 survey conducted by the Future Forum think tank with the Focus agency revealed surprising contradictions in Slovak public opinion:

Support for the European Council and NATO membership
• 63.5% of Slovaks support Western (EU) orientation while only 19.2% favour Eastern, pro-Russian orientation
• Almost 71% want Slovakia to remain a NATO member
• 54.8% express negative opinions about the current government’s foreign policy
• 54.4% support Slovakia’s participation in the emerging “coalition of the willing” for European defence
• 51.5% view Russia as a security threat

Neutralist and Eurosceptic Positions:
• 49.8% support the idea that Slovakia should be a militarily neutral country
• Asked about military conflicts in neighbouring countries, 79% of Slovaks want to either remain neutral (29.5%) or provide only humanitarian aid (49.5%)
• Only 34.4% support Ukraine’s integration into the EU, with 51.2% against
• A mere 17.1% favour Ukraine’s admission to NATO, with 57.5% opposing
• 49.6% want to maintain current defence spending levels rather than increase them

Historical Context: EU Integration and Democratic Deficit
According to Jakub Bokes, a doctoral candidate at the London School of Economics, this apparent contradiction can be understood by examining how Slovakia’s Euro-Atlantic integration established a formal democracy while simultaneously narrowing its meaningful boundaries.
“While Slovakia’s entry into Euro-Atlantic structures guaranteed formal democratic competition after years of normalisation and the rise of ’Mečiarism’ [after the left nationalist populist leader and first Slovak Premier Vladimir Mečiar] it simultaneously narrowed its boundaries to such an extent that it created conditions for the growth of populism we observe today. It was not democracy, but the free market, positioned outside the democratic process through European integration, that determined the course of political development in Slovakia in the 21^st century.”
Bokes argues that neoliberal economic reforms were imposed not as a result of democratic choice but as non-negotiable conditions for EU membership, creating a system where the market was positioned beyond democratic control:
“The free market was not so much the result of democratic choice as the reason why democracy needed to be limited. The driving force behind economic reforms was not Central European publics... but a new national elite who, whether out of conviction or for personal benefits, willingly opened the doors to Western neoliberal economists and foreign investors.”

Competing Visions of “Western” Identity
The debate around Slovakia’s geopolitical positioning has revealed fundamentally different understandings of what constitutes “Western identity” and European values.
Former left-wing politician and diplomat Peter Weiss offers a critical interpretation of the seemingly contradictory poll findings:
“The seemingly majority inclination towards the EU and NATO, as well as towards the emerging initiative of the ’coalition of the willing’, is not associated with the citizens’ readiness to make sacrifices for maintaining such an orientation or at least to demonstrate opinion and value consistency in relation to such a geopolitical and security anchoring of Slovakia.”
This analysis aligns with research from the DEKK institute, which Bokes cites:
“The Slovak anti-system is not pro-Russian – it is anti-Western. It rejects the Western and ’systemic’ narrative, and thus logically reaches for alternatives... But the average Slovak does not want more Russia in his life – he wants less of the West. And less of the West, in his understanding, means a less cruel and more egalitarian economic system, stronger rights for the majority, more comprehensible political decision-making, less complicated and bureaucratised interaction with the state, and a more community-oriented and solidary lifestyle.”
However, left-wing activist Eduard Chmelár presents a different interpretation, arguing that Slovakia’s Western identity is primarily cultural and historical rather than military or geopolitical:
“Our rootedness in Western civilisation has always been determined and shaped by our language, writing, culture and religion. Our easternmost statues of the knight Roland and Gothic cathedrals, the works of Master Paul of Levoča, medieval frescoes in Gemer, the poetry of Sládkovič, Hviezdoslav, Smrek, Novomeský and Rúfus, Dobšinský’s fairy tales and folk songs... Here are the roots of our firm anchoring in Western civilisation. You can add to that democratic achievements, freedom of expression, women’s rights, separation of church and state, our legal culture and philosophy of state/” Chmelár insists that “militarism has never determined whether we belong to the West or not. Actually, pacifism has done so more.”

Fico’s Influence and Public Opinion
Weiss points to a troubling trend regarding Prime Minister Fico’s increasing use of geopolitical proposals associated with the far right, with whom he has no problem forming coalition governments.
“Premier Fico’s Smer party’s ’peace policy’ and ’sovereign Slovak foreign policy in all four cardinal directions’ has led to a strong radicalisation of its voters. Their attitudes are even more radical than those of Republika voters, founded by former members of Kotleba’s fascist ĽSNS.”
Bokes, however, suggests this relationship is more complex, noting that the EU’s structure actually enables populist politics:
“EU membership suits Smer’s populist instincts. It is thus premature to claim that Smer would be preparing a ’Slovexit’ in the foreseeable future – despite frequent declarations about the sovereign policy it allegedly implements. The EU is now a welcome autopilot for politicians who have become unaccustomed to exercising power over decades.”
Fico himself has carefully cultivated his image as a peacemaker, stating:
“Every day of the war in Ukraine means Slavs killing each other, which I have opposed from the very beginning of the conflict. I am the prime minister of a country that loves peace.”
This rhetoric resonates with many voters who oppose military intervention, but creates tensions with NATO allies and the European Union’s broader security strategy.

The Legacy of Democracy Without Sovereignty
According to Weiss, the political landscape appears deeply divided:
“The views of voters of the strongest coalition party Smer and the strongest opposition party Progresivne Slovensko (PS) on fundamental foreign policy issues are so distant that it is difficult to imagine the formation of such a foreign policy and security consensus as prevailed in the 1990s before the accession negotiations with the EU and NATO.”
Bokes argues that this division stems from a fundamental democratic deficit that has characterized Slovakia since 1989:
“The fact that citizens of post-socialist states did not have a democratic option to reverse, or at least soften, neoliberal reforms undermined the already weak political self-confidence of Central European societies.”
Looking ahead, Weiss observes:
“Smer’s aggressive, emotionally charged ’peace’ rhetoric, as well as this party’s ideas about Slovakia’s place in shaping the future form of Europe after the inauguration of the Trump administration and after the end of the war in Ukraine, have affected the electorate of opposition parties much more than they are willing to admit.”
Chmelár, however, directly criticises Weiss’s stance, accusing him of distorting reality and misrepresenting European solidarity:
“Peter Weiss has gone mad. In his hatred of the current coalition, he goes so far as to completely identify with the progressivist distortion of reality... If we comply with Brussels, Berlin or Paris, we usually don’t confirm our European values, but the subordination of the weaker to the stronger. The principle of solidarity should not be confused with the principle of domination.”
On the contentious “coalition of the willing” initiative, Chmelár draws historical parallels that cast doubt on its legitimacy:
“Many have probably forgotten that the term ’coalition of the willing’ is associated with illegal military aggression in Iraq, with flagrant violation of international law. Then as now, the ’coalition of the willing’ wants to bypass the UN Security Council... And it is no coincidence that it is precisely those heirs of Dzurinda’s politics, who drove us into the Iraqi hell 22 years ago, who are dragging us into this irresponsible military adventure.”
Meanwhile, Bokes concludes that Slovakia’s political situation cannot move forward “without coming to terms with the legacy of three decades of democratic deficit with which post-November liberalism has been associated from the beginning.”

Talking Peace, Selling Arms: The Economic Reality
Adding another layer to Slovakia’s paradoxical stance is the striking contrast between its government’s peace rhetoric and the country’s booming arms industry. Despite Prime Minister Fico’s vocal opposition to military aid for Ukraine, Slovakia’s defence exports have skyrocketed.
In 2024, Slovakia’s arms exports more than doubled from the previous year, reaching €1.15 billion—up from barely €100 million in 2021. Relative to GDP, these exports accounted for 1.1 percent, nearly matching the United States’ 1.2 percent share, and even surpassing neighbouring Czechia’s figures.
Defence Minister Robert Kaliňák explains this apparent contradiction between policy and practice:
“We said before and after the elections that we would not restrict (defence) companies because we need economic growth. It’s great because it creates jobs.”
He also added that “weapons don’t just kill – they also protect peace,” and stressed that export figures reveal nothing about whether Slovak arms are ending up in Ukraine.
The Slovak government has maintained this dual approach—halting direct military assistance from Slovakia’s armed forces to Ukraine while allowing private defence contracts to flourish. Even as Fico dismisses informal gatherings of European leaders on Ukraine aid as “war meetings” he refuses to attend, Slovakia continues to have representation at such forums through military officials.
This economic reality adds another dimension to Slovakia’s contradictory positioning—officially promoting peace while economically benefiting from conflict—further illustrating the gap between rhetoric and practice in the country’s foreign policy.

A Nation at a Crossroads
The paradox of Slovakia’s position—nominally supporting Western institutions while simultaneously favouring neutrality, talking peace while profiting from arms sales—reflects a nation at a geopolitical crossroads, with potentially significant implications for European security and cooperation. These contradictions stem not merely from current political rhetoric but from deeper tensions between formal integration and substantive sovereignty, between economic interests and political principles, that have characterized Slovakia’s post-communist experience.
The debate reveals not just differing policy preferences, but fundamentally different conceptions of national identity, sovereignty, and what constitutes “European values.” As Slovakia navigates these turbulent waters, the question remains whether these competing visions can be reconciled, or whether the country’s paradoxical stance will persist, leaving it caught between nominal Western alignment and practical neutrality.

Adam Novak