The new ruling authorities are following in the footsteps of the former Assad regime, continuing to use sectarian policies and practices as a means of governance and social division, writes Joseph Daher [photo credit: Getty Images]

The euphoria that followed the fall of Assad’s regime in December 2024 has largely dissipated after the large-scale massacres of Alawite civilians in coastal areas, carried out in early March 2025 by armed forces within the newly formed Syrian army.

In the aftermath of these tragic events, additional assassinations and attacks against Alawite civilians have been perpetrated by armed groups linked to the new ruling authorities. Following the release of a report by Amnesty International on the recent deadly events in the coastal regions, the organisation’s Secretary General stated, “Deliberately killing civilians, or intentionally killing injured, surrendered, or captured fighters, is a war crime.”

While the initial outbreak of the violence was caused by remnants of the Assad regime who coordinated attacks against members of the new ruling authorities’ security services and civilians, the campaign of repression led by the Syrian army’s various factions expanded massively to include campaigns of assassinations of Alawite civilian and families, resulting in the death of several hundreds of civilians.

In addition to this, nearly 13,000 Syrians have fled to northern Lebanon from the massacres on the Syrian coast and tens of thousands of others within the country.

Justified under the pretext of combating the “remnants of the Assad regime,” the massacres were primarily driven by sectarian hatred and a sense of “revenge,” falsely equating the entire Alawite community with the former regime. This occurred despite the fact that the vast majority of Alawites did not support the attacks carried out by regime remnants against the security forces. Moreover, many of the civilians who were assassinated had actually opposed Assad’s rule and had celebrated its fall in December 2024.

In the wake of these tragic events, social media has been inundated with sectarian rhetoric and hate speech, while prominent human rights activists, including Fadel Abdulghany, Director of the Syrian Network for Human Rights, have faced threats and slurs for reporting on and documenting the massacres.

The responsibility for the massacres against the Alawite population in the coastal regions lies with the new Syrian ruling authorities.

They not only failed to prevent the surge of sectarian violence and hatred but also actively contributed to it — both directly and by fostering the political conditions that led to these massacres.

Indeed, human rights violations against Alawite individuals and communities, including kidnappings and assassinations, have been on the rise in the past few months, some of which — like the Fahil massacre at the end of December 2024 and the Arzah massacre at the beginning of February 2025 — felt like dress rehearsals before the coastal massacres.

The ruling authorities continuously described these acts as isolated, while taking no serious actions against their perpetrators.

Moreover, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Syrian officials have repeatedly misrepresented the Alawite community as a tool of the former regime against the Syrian people.

For instance, during his speech at the 9^th edition of the donors’ conference on Syria in Brussels, Belgium, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani stated, “54 years of minority rule led to the displacement of 15 million Syrians...” — implicitly suggesting that the Alawite community as a whole had ruled the country for decades, rather than a dictatorship controlled by the Assad family.

While it is undisputed that Alawi figures held key positions in the former regime, particularly within its military and security apparatus, reducing the nature of the state and its dominant institutions to an “Alawite identity” or portraying the regime as favouring religious minorities while systematically discriminating against the Sunni Arab majority is both misleading and far from reality.

Sectarianism was never the ultimate end of the former regime, but rather a means to maintain power.

We have to be clear that these sectarian tensions and hatred are not due to ancient religious divisions or as something essential to the people of the region. Sectarianism and sectarian tensions are a product of modernity and have political roots. In this case, they are the result of the former Assad regime’s sectarian policies and practices, which were used as a tool to divide Syrians, as well as the actions of the new ruling authorities, including HTS and other opposition armed groups. These groups have actively instrumentalised sectarianism and continue to do so through their policies, actions, and rhetoric.

Unless every Syrian has justice, chaos will only deepen

Sectarianism is fundamentally a tool for consolidating power and dividing society. It serves to distract the popular classes from socio-economic and political issues by scapegoating a particular group — defined by sect or ethnicity — as the root of the country’s problems and a security threat, thereby justifying repressive and discriminatory policies against it.

Moreover, sectarianism acts as a powerful mechanism of social control, shaping the course of class struggle by fostering dependence between the popular classes and their elite leadership. As a result, the popular classes are stripped of independent political agency and instead come to be defined—and engage politically—through their sectarian identity.

In this regard, the new ruling authorities are following in the footsteps of the former Assad regime, continuing to use sectarian policies and practices as a means of governance and social division.

In addition to the sectarian dynamics, the recent events also stem from the failure and unwillingness of the new ruling authorities to establish a framework for comprehensive, long-term transitional justice aimed at holding all individuals and groups accountable for war crimes.

Confronting the legacy of the Assad regime’s systemic brutality is crucial for paving the way toward a sustainable and peaceful future. Such efforts could have played a vital role in curbing acts of revenge and mitigating rising sectarian tensions.

President Ahmed al-Sharaa has established a fact-finding committee to investigate the events on Syria’s coast and created a higher committee to preserve civil peace. However, the findings are still pending, with the official deadline set for April 9. Meanwhile, human rights violations against Alawite civilians in these areas continue.

In response to the Amnesty International report on the recent events in the coastal regions, as well as broader criticisms of the government’s role, a source from the Syrian Ministry of Interior told The New Arab’s sister-publication Al-Araby al-Jadeed that “disregarding field data and facts, and slandering the work of the investigation committee, is unprofessional and goes against the most basic standards of objectivity. It represents a bias toward a political agenda by actors whose history is well-known and whose alliance with countries hostile to Syria, both the nation and its people, is clear.”

However, Ahmed al-Shara and his allies in power have no interest in pursuing a comprehensive transitional justice mechanism, fearing that it would also expose them to accountability for their own crimes and abuses against civilians and various communities.

In addition, transitional justice can also include a social dimension by integrating efforts to recover state assets and hold accountable those responsible for serious financial crimes, such as the privatisation of state and public assets, or the distribution of public land to businessmen linked to the former regime, at the expense of the popular class and the public state.

Once again, the economic stance of the new ruling authorities, which seeks agreements and reconciliations with business figures linked to the former Presidential Palace, along with their focus on deepening neoliberal policies and privatising state assets, conflicts with the principles of a comprehensive transitional justice process.

Recent events highlight the importance of continuing to document human rights violations in Syria to gather evidence for future criminal prosecutions, while also preserving the memory and history of the victims.

Only a democratic and inclusive process, with broad participation from the popular classes across all sectarian and ethnic backgrounds, can break the cycle of sectarian violence and ensure accountability for all victims of human rights violations.

To achieve such a process, Syria’s democratic and progressive actors and groups must form a counterforce to the new ruling authorities, pressuring them to make concessions on these issues, including justice and accountability. As the saying goes: No Justice, No Peace.

Joseph Daher