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Alexander Dugin’s team argues that prevailing political science’s embedded ideological biases make the discipline a threat to Russia:
[It] serves as a tool for embedding the principles of destructive neoliberal ideology in students’ minds. The existing model of political science education is not only outdated and irrelevant but harmful, shaping dangerous and hostile attitudes in students that contradict Russian civilization and Russian culture.
According to Dugin’s school, political science should instead “strengthen civic-mindedness” in Russia and instill patriotism in students. This teaching concept redefines civic-mindedness as “the prioritization of state life and public life over private life, as well as the subordination of individual interests to the values and interests of the Fatherland, and of private benefit to the common good.”
A new political science built on the ‘sanctity of the Russian state’
Dugin’s school believes refocusing civic energy will help future humanities students develop the “ability to resist the introduction of elements of the destructive ideology of neoliberalism.” According to the teaching concept, neoliberalism is dangerous because it fosters “individualism, cosmopolitanism, permissiveness, and the rejection of the ideals of patriotism, service to the Fatherland, and Russia’s civilizational uniqueness.”
Under this proposed lesson plan, instructors should present the “concept of Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality” as the historical foundation of Russian statehood, teaching students that “the Russian Tsardom was the direct political successor of the Byzantine (Roman) Empire.” In other words, Dugin’s school wants to fight “neoliberalism” with a historical theory that dates back to the 16th century and has served both religious and political agendas in various eras, including during the struggles of the early Romanov tsars against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire over Ukraine in the mid-17th century.
The idea of “Moscow as the Third Rome” was also popular with 19th-century Slavophiles. According to Dugin’s school, instructors should embrace these views, the ideas of “Russian conservatism,” and the concepts of the Eurasianists (Dugin is a leading Eurasianist himself). Meanwhile, topics such as the collapse of the USSR and “Russia’s geopolitical weakening in the 1990s” must be presented in an “unequivocally negative” light.
These events lead directly to Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, and subsequent lectures in Russia’s chronology should “emphasize the historical significance of the president’s mission to strengthen the country’s sovereignty, centralize its power vertical, and transform Russia into a strong and modern power.” In this curriculum, the Russian-Ukrainian war should represent “a decisive stage in Russia’s attainment of ideological sovereignty in political affairs.”
Drill it into students’ heads: the political ‘ideal’ already exists — it’s modern Russia
Dugin’s school urges educators to go beyond historical narratives and explicitly teach students that a “strong, personified presidential system vested in one leader who derives legitimacy from popular backing” is Russia’s most stable “governance and public relations model.” This “ideal” of “plebiscitary democracy” already exists in Russia today — in fact, it was “inevitable,” students should be told. (Thinkers like the historian and Pan-Slavist Mikhail Pogodin made similar claims in the mid-19th century.)
According to Dugin’s school, another crucial element in the relationship between the Russian government and its citizens is the “sacralization of power” in Russian society. Dugin’s teaching concept presents this veneration of the state as healthy and “traditional,” while the real danger lies in principles that ensure the separation and rotation of power, which “lead to the concentration of authority within unelected, anonymous state and party bureaucracies.” Dugin’s school warns that this bureaucracy is dangerous because it “possesses the necessary expertise to govern the state and is closely connected to big business.”
Judging by its teaching blueprint, Dugin’s school is far more interested in religious philosophy than anything that might be called political science. For example, the lesson plan requires students to discuss the theological concept of the “katechon” — a restraining force that keeps the world from lawlessness and the coming of the Antichrist. Roman and later Byzantine emperors are considered the katechons of ancient times, while Russian tsars (but only those who ruled before Peter I) supposedly played this role more recently. The curriculum encourages instructors to guide students to recognize that Russia and its state authorities are today’s katechon.
Another religious theme in Dugin’s proposed political science course is “the state in ontological theories.” In the classroom, this becomes the state’s fundamental place and defining role in the fabric of reality. Teaching students to embrace this perspective is important because:
In ontological theories, the state is not the product of a collective agreement between individuals or the material conditions of existence but rather the expression of a spiritual (intellectual, moral, divine) presence in the world, manifesting in social life.
Naturally, Dugin’s school doesn’t overlook the confrontation between Russia and the West
Several lectures focus on the geopolitical struggle between the “civilizations of Land and Sea,” which has supposedly persisted throughout most of human history. This idea is attributed to publicist and blogger Nikolai Starikov, who unpacks the idea further in his book, Geopolitics: How It’s Done:
Land and Sea are in constant conflict. Geography determines goals, and goals determine means. The civilization of the Sea builds fleets and engages in maritime trade, while the civilization of the Land expands overland. The Land’s objective is to prevent the Sea from blocking it, to take control of coastal zones, and to gain access to the World Ocean. The Sea’s objective is to deny the Land access to maritime space, bring coastal areas under its influence, and, by dividing it, gradually absorb the Land. The land-based civilization relies on its army, the maritime civilization on its navy. To defeat the enemy, one must prevent them from developing either a strong navy or a powerful army, depending on the circumstances.
According to the authors at Dugin’s school, Russia is a “land civilization” with a “system based on the principles of conservatism and stability.” Russia “prefers to exert power through direct territorial control, which requires strong land armies and dictates the primary importance of the army and the security bloc to the state’s functioning.” Dugin’s school clarifies that “political structures of this type often lean toward monarchy.”
Continuing with Starikov’s geography-based worldview, the “collective West” is supposedly a “civilization of the Sea.” It is “dynamic and adaptable,” prefers to control “maritime, trade, and information flows,” and its key institutions are not based on “military might” but rather on “intelligence services, the navy, and capital.”
The course concept and lecture plan frame the war between Russia and Ukraine as an episode in the broader struggle between “Land” and “Sea.” Russia “decided to take another step toward restoring its position in the balance of global power” after the U.S. “initiated the conflict with Russia, invading the formally neutral gray zone of Ukraine (part of the Rimland) with the 2014 Maidan [Revolution], thereby eliminating the last hope for peace.”
Of course, Dugin’s school doesn’t forget Russia’s partners in the Far East. Although the Ivan Ilyin School openly condemns Marxism and socialism, the lesson plan urges respect for China and North Korea. It emphasizes Confucianism’s enduring influence on Chinese politics and how the Korean Juche ideology can be linked to “traditional Korean philosophy.”
The Ivan Ilyin School’s political science lesson plan aligns perfectly with the official legal definition of Russia as a “civilization-state” adopted by presidential decree in March 2023. A required, propagandistic freshman-year college course on the “Fundamentals of Russian Statehood” promotes this same perspective. Curiously, the Dugin school’s course concept ignores the civilizational theories of historian and Eurasianist Lev Gumilev, whom Vladimir Putin often quotes. This may be because, until a few years ago, Dugin did not share Gumilev’s ideas (though Dugin has recently spoken about him more favorably). Meanwhile, Gumilev’s followers accuse Dugin of racism and distorting Eurasianist theory.
Whether this newly developed political science course will become mandatory for university students in “all social and humanities fields” remains unclear. Two academic sources told Meduza that “the issue of promoting the Ilyin School’s ideas is still unresolved,” but Dugin is actively promoting his classroom initiatives.
A source close to the government added that a key motivating factor in this new guidance on political science is Dugin’s rivalry with Andrey Polosin, a vice-rector at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, who was involved in creating the aforementioned “Fundamentals of Russian Statehood.” “Dugin wants his own slice of the ‘ideological pie.’ The presentation for the Science Ministry is part of that lobbying effort,” explained Meduza’s source.
Andrey Pertsev
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