In April this year, a group from the milieu of the linXXnet [Left parliamentary and project office] parliamentary and project office in Leipzig travelled to Ukraine. We had already been on the ground in January 2023 – one year after the Russian attack on the entire country – to get to know the political left and civil society and to learn something about expectations of the German left.

The decision to undertake the journey again was made after Donald Trump’s renewed assumption of office, whose foreign policy implications are making waves worldwide. Advances such as the claim to Greenland, the resettlement of the Gaza Strip, or a possible peace agreement with Russia over Ukraine’s head testify to a radicalised US foreign policy in which only the law of the strongest applies. Our goal was to find out what these developments mean in a country that has been shaped by the Russian war of aggression since 2022, and how people on the ground are reacting to them.

On the night of 24 April, we experienced the heaviest bombardment by drones and rockets in months in Kyiv [Kiev]. Whilst German media were headlining that Trump believed in a “deal with Russia”, several people died that night, many were injured. We ourselves remained unharmed, but not without fear. Already during our visit in winter 2023, we had come to appreciate the effectiveness of Ukrainian missile defence.

This time, in spring 2025, our impressions were different. We saw a country that lives normality despite the war and people who accomplish extraordinary things. A vibrant civil society compensates for state inaction, and left-wing structures are committed to social rights and progressive change even under war conditions. Almost defiantly, many people oppose both the Russian attack and attempts by the USA to sacrifice their country geopolitically. In contrast to 2023, the conversations focused less on further arms deliveries or Germany’s role in the conflict. However, it became clear that resistance to the Russian attack or possible Russian dominance over Ukraine is overwhelming.

This text attempts to focus on the main points of what we experienced. There would be much more to report.

Left Politics in Ukraine

A central focus of our trip, as in 2023, was contact with actors of the Ukrainian left. The fact is: the left is marginalised in Ukraine, as in many Eastern European countries. After the upheaval of 1989/90, it has not been possible to establish a credible, reformed left alternative that critically examines the state socialist past – including clientelism and repression – and positions itself cleverly in the charged field of tension between Western and Eastern orientation.

In countries of the former Soviet Union, left politics is often associated with Stalinism, paternalism, repression and clientelism. In Ukraine too, the politically relevant left was dominated by the successor parties of the Soviet CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] even after the upheaval. The Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) was able to achieve relevant electoral success in the 1990s through to the 2000s. Nevertheless, it squandered the trust of its voters through corruption and unreliability. In 2014, it failed to enter the Verkhovna Rada [Ukrainian Parliament], Ukraine’s parliament, and in 2015 it, along with two smaller communist parties, was banned [1] from activity.

In contrast to the “old” parties, often nationalist and pro-Russian oriented, there is a diverse, if small, reformed left. These include Sotsialnyi Rukh [Social Movement], the social medical movement Be Like We Are, the intellectual network around the magazine Commons, as well as anti-authoritarian groups like Solidarity Collective or Direct Action. What they have in common is that they understand themselves as democratic, social movements in an independent Ukraine. As a result of the the 2013-2014 Maidan protests [that led to the ousting of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych] and the Russian attack on the whole of Ukraine, the actors affirm European integration. Russia is included as an imperialist power in an anti-imperialist self-understanding.

Sotsialnyi Rukh (“Social Movement”) sees itself as representing workers and focuses on the class question. Registered as an NGO, the path to founding a party is rocky, as Vitalij Dudin, a lawyer who represents employees in labour court proceedings, tells us. The movement is active in Kyiv, Kryvyi Rih [major steel-producing city in central Ukraine], Lviv [city in western Ukraine] and Odessa [major port city in southern Ukraine]. Its goal is to prevent further deterioration of workers’ rights and to promote trade union organisation – a challenge in wartime, when strikes and demonstrations are largely prohibited. Sotsialnyi Rukh cooperates with movements such as the student union Direct Action and the medical movement Be Like We Are. The movement criticises Ukraine’s oligarch-dominated political system and relies on grassroots organisation. The Russian war of aggression is clearly rejected; some members fight voluntarily or in the Ukrainian army, others have been conscripted. Sotsialnyi Rukh sees a long-term perspective in EU membership, whilst criticising the EU as a neoliberal project. “The EU can hardly be worse than Ukraine with its primacy of privatisation and oligarchy,” emphasises Vitalij Dudin. As Western European leftists, we bear responsibility to fight for a social and democratic EU, together with our Ukrainian comrades.

The student union Direct Action (Prjama Dija) has existed since the 2010s and drew attention to itself during the Maidan protests by occupying the Ministry of Education. It has been active again since the Russian invasion of 2022. Direct Action organises students nationwide, defends against neoliberal education reforms and serves as an educational and socialisation place for young people who want to engage on the left. There are successes: the closure of the Crimea Exile University [university for Crimean students displaced after Russia’s 2014 annexation] in Kyiv was prevented.

The medical movement Be Like We Are has existed since 2020. According to co-founder Oksana Slobodiana, it all began in 2019 with a Facebook post by a nurse who criticised the poor working conditions in the health system and reached tens of thousands. This gave rise to a movement that is active in numerous cities and encourages employees to found new trade unions. Old trade unions are considered corrupt and inactive. Be Like We Are acts as a nationwide network and supports local trade unions. The Facebook group has over 85,000 members, the NGO over 700, predominantly women, which reflects the gender ratio in the care sector. The Ukrainian health system is precarious: there is public basic care, but specialised treatments, medicines and operations often have to be paid for privately. Comprehensive health insurance is lacking. The state basic catalogue for medical services has remained unchanged for over ten years – despite inflation, complex needs and war. The government is planning a reform based on the British model, but this has stalled due to the war – so the health system remains chronically underfunded. Be Like We Are organises employees to assert their interests – not a matter of course in war. A concrete success is the introduction of monthly allowances for female doctors (20,000 hryvnia , ca. €400) and nurses (15,000 hryvnia, ca. €300), provided that a hospital’s personnel costs do not exceed 85 per cent.

Solidarity Collective is an anti-authoritarian structure that has formed since the Russian war of aggression to support leftists of different colours who are fighting. They see this work as a contribution in the fight against a colonialist, imperialist system and for a free world. The network maintains international contacts and provides humanitarian aid for civilians in contested areas.

The annual Filma event of the queer-feminist scene distinguishes itself from conservative feminism and nationalist tendencies in the Pride scene. It pursues an intersectional approach, includes trans people and understands itself as anti-racist, anti-colonial, inclusive and non-hierarchical. Ira Tantsiura from the Filma collective criticises the increasing rightward shift of Ukrainian society, which she also links to the militarisation promoted by the state.

The landscape of left actors in Ukraine is small, but the activists appear determined. The new left in Ukraine is grassroots-oriented and operates in movement-like structures. Sotsialnyi Rukh remains a central actor, but must integrate the diversity of left themes and forms of organisation more strongly; progressive class politics means being feminist, anti-racist and inclusive and pursuing diverse approaches to action alongside theoretical work. The war is rejected by all actors, as is life under Russian influence or a dictated peace. The duration of the war is particularly wearing down those who fight in the army. For the protagonists, defending Ukraine remains a necessary evil in order to live freely and democratically and to help shape society. After the war, this is unlikely to become easier for leftists.

Social Infrastructure

Ukraine suffers from an immense debt burden that has massively worsened since the Russian war of aggression. Even before the annexation of Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014 and the large-scale attack on the entire country in 2022, Ukraine was heavily dependent on international lenders such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The Ukrainian economy had been unstable since independence in 1991, and money flows into social systems or infrastructure often remained opaque due to corruption.

The poverty situation has deteriorated considerably due to the war: before the war, about 18 per cent of the population was considered poor, now it is 24 per cent. Around 40 per cent of people depend on humanitarian aid, and almost 6 million people are internally displaced. The extremely precarious social and health system is on the verge of collapse and cannot be maintained without international humanitarian aid. There is no comprehensive health insurance, only basic care that is difficult to access for people in rural regions. Access to high-quality medical care often depends on private co-payments. Especially in war, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have proven to be indispensable actors in caring for vulnerable groups, internally displaced persons and people in areas close to the front.

Due to the stop of foreign aid announced by Donald Trump through the US development aid agency USAID [United States Agency for International Development], the services of these NGOs in Ukraine threaten to collapse. This would affect vital measures such as the evacuation of people from contested areas, mobile medical and psychological care, and HIV prevention and treatment. In 2023, Ukraine was the largest recipient of USAID aid with a volume of $US 14.4 billion, which was mainly used for humanitarian support and reconstruction.

Using the example of the organisation Skhid SOS [Eastern SOS] and the Ukrainian Foundation for Public Health, it becomes clear what consequences the loss of these aid funds would have. Since 2022, Skhid SOS has evacuated about 12,000 people with disabilities and a total of 88,000 people from contested or occupied areas. The organisation finances itself exclusively through donations and takes on tasks that the state cannot perform. It helps in the search for accommodation, converts empty buildings into shelters, supplies displaced persons and documents war crimes. Skhid SOS cooperates with organisations throughout Europe and also evacuates people abroad. There are also pilot projects that enable children from crisis regions to attend regular schools. In regions where schools cannot offer protection, children and young people in Ukraine are taught online – a model that is even applied to kindergartens.

A similar fate threatens the Ukrainian Foundation for Public Health, which operates women’s shelters nationwide as well as mobile teams and contact points for medical, psychological and social support for vulnerable people. The foundation integrates services for victims of sexualised violence and psychological care into primary care. It also makes an essential contribution to the care of HIV-infected people. Ukraine has one of the highest HIV infection rates in Europe: in 2020, the incidence was 41 per 100,000 inhabitants, in Germany 3.1. Thanks to international support, prevention and care could be improved until the beginning of the war. Since then, however, the situation has deteriorated drastically, and with the loss of humanitarian aid programmes, a further worsening of the crisis threatens.

Reconstruction of Ukraine is already underway, and billions have already flowed into the reconstruction of residential buildings, schools, infrastructure, and energy and water supply. However, the challenges remain enormous. Only to a limited extent is Ukrainian society involved in the reconstruction. We meet Yanna, who works with the method of forum theatre [2] One of her interventions aimed to ensure that in the reconstruction of housing for people with disabilities, self-determined living in their own flats rather than in institutions is considered.

Left politics must address the unequal living conditions in Ukraine and address the economic destruction caused by the war as well as growing social inequality. Dependence on international aid makes the country vulnerable; loans and interest lead to a massive debt burden borne by the population and force neoliberal restructuring. A debt cut is as necessary as preventing support for Ukraine from being linked to the sell-off of its resources. EU membership poses risks but can improve living conditions and strengthen democratic rights. This requires a stronger left movement that influences social systems, healthcare, workers’ rights and reconstruction.

Memory Culture, Extreme Right and Military

Memory culture is a contested topic in Ukraine that concerns both the processing of National Socialism and Stalinism. This is crucial for understanding the marginalisation of the left and the formation of the political right.

On 8 May 2025, the 80^th anniversary of liberation from National Socialism was commemorated in Ukraine, deliberately no longer on 9 May since 2024, in order to distance itself from Russian commemorative celebrations. This is a direct consequence of the Russian war of aggression. The view must also be sharpened here in Germany: from 1941, people from all 16 Soviet republics – from Russia as well as from Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, etc. – fought in the Red Army against the German Wehrmacht [German armed forces during WWII]. Ukraine suffered disproportionately many casualties both militarily and civilian. Massacres such as in Babyn Yar stand as a warning, where German SS special commandos shot almost 34,000 Jews in just two days in September 1941 and buried them in the ravine of the same name near (today in) Kyiv, some whilst still alive. These atrocities by the National Socialists remained a blind spot for a long time, even in German research and processing. In the Soviet Union, attempts were made to fight for processing and commemoration; Soviet victims were brought to the forefront of state remembrance. This also obscured the view of the murdered Jews, Sinti and Roma, people with disabilities and, alongside communists, Ukrainian nationalists. Only after Ukrainian independence in 1991 was space created for comprehensive commemoration and processing, also through the opening of archives. There are now numerous individual monuments in Babyn Yar that commemorate the various victim groups; a larger memorial and research centre is also planned by the Babyn Jar Holocaust Memorial Center, which is highly controversial due to the involvement of many oligarchs, including from Russia. Local memorial initiatives also criticise the threatening “Disneyfication” of remembrance in this context.

A difficult topic is the collaboration of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), the military arm of the ultra-nationalist Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B) under Stepan Bandera [Ukrainian nationalist leader during WWII], with the National Socialist regime. The OUN-B pursued an anti-communist, ultra-nationalist and partly anti-Semitic programme and was involved in ethnic cleansing and pogroms in Poland and Ukraine. After the National Socialists rejected the goal of an independent Ukrainian state, the OUN-B turned against the Wehrmacht in 1943. Bandera himself was imprisoned in Sachsenhausen concentration camp from 1941.

The 2015 decommunisation law emphasised the historical significance of OUN and UPA by declaring them fighters for independence and granting their members veteran status. It also equates the crimes of communism and National Socialism and bans corresponding symbolism in public spaces. Soviet monuments were removed, streets named after Bandera. According to historian Viacheslav Lichachev, this historical-political debate is on ice during the war, but the equation of communism and National Socialism fuels anti-left narratives.

Russia exploits this by portraying the war as a fight against “fascism” and defaming the EU as its supporter. The Russian reinterpretation of the Holocaust and the heroisation of Soviet history – whilst ignoring Stalinist crimes such as the Holodomor [3] – serve an imperial policy against “the West”.

The organised extreme right in Ukraine refers positively to UPA and Bandera but has remained parliamentarily weakened and quasi non-existent since 2019, especially since 2022. In the 2019 parliamentary election, the extreme right Svoboda [Freedom party] in alliance with, among others, Right Sector and National Corps achieved only 2.4 per cent and is represented in the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, with only one direct mandate. In a society that rejects Russia’s attack and is European-oriented, it has little support. Individual units, such as the 3^rd Assault Brigade led by Andriy Biletsky (who formerly led the Azov Regiment and the extreme right party Natsionalnyi korpus [National Corps]), draw capital from military heroism.

The Azov Brigade, much discussed in Germany, is no longer considered by political observers to be what it was. Founded as a volunteer battalion in 2014, it came under criticism for extreme right members and human rights abuses. The USA only lifted the 2015 ban on supplying Azov with weapons last year. The brigade was already integrated into Ukraine’s National Guard in 2014 and converted into a regiment. In the battles for Mariupol [major port city in southeastern Ukraine] in 2022, Azov made a name for itself because of its bitter fight against Russian attacks and is glorified in Ukraine as a symbol of resistance. Since its integration into the official army and after the departure of extreme right protagonists, de-ideologisation has taken place. The Azov movement should be distinguished as a loose network of military, political, civilian and paramilitary groups.

The extreme right is little present in society with its organisations; the number of right-wing attacks has decreased since the Russian invasion in 2022. This is due to neo-Nazis joining the army. Since last year, activities by members of extreme right youth organisations have increased; as in Germany, they are directed primarily against activities of the LGBTIQ scene.

A danger lies in the primacy of the military, which glorifies masculinism and fighting spirit – a phenomenon that is not limited to Ukraine but can also be observed in Russia and other countries. The armament logic in reaction to the war suggests similar developments for Europe.

Leftists in Germany must stop seeing and vilifying Ukraine as a haven of fascism. This is not only wrong but nourishes Russian narratives with which the brutal imperialist war of aggression is justified. Ukrainian state memory politics is problematic and prevents a differentiated processing of the Soviet era and the role of Ukrainian nationalists in National Socialism. The reformed left suffers under this. In war, a correction of this policy is unlikely; heroising narratives of the Ukrainian independence struggle are strengthened and linked to current resistance against Russia. In war, national identity, focus on the military and also blind spots regarding extreme right, authoritarian influences grow. But there are civil society actors who observe this and counter it.

After the war, differentiated processing will be crucial, in which progressive leftists and academics should gain influence.

Political Implications for the Left’s Foreign Policy Positions

Our trip to Ukraine is also embedded in an unfinished debate of the left about supporting Ukraine. The party Die Linke [The Left] clearly commits itself through party conference decisions to international law and thus against Russia’s war that violates international law and for Ukraine’s right to self-defence according to Article 51 of the UN Charter. Support for the country with weapons, however, is clearly rejected by the party. This position appears difficult to maintain in view of the resumed massive Russian attacks on Ukraine. Without effective missile defence, many more civilians would have been killed in Ukraine. Without support with weapons, many comrades at the front line would also be powerless.

The Left positioned itself clearly for effective sanctions against Russia and demands unrestricted humanitarian support for Ukraine as well as, as the only party in Germany, a debt cut for the economically weakened country. The aggressor and its imperial aspirations are also clearly named and the demand for diplomatic initiatives to end the war is put in the foreground.

A glaring gap remains the question of how the country can effectively defend itself and thus exercise its right to self-defence enshrined in international law. Diplomacy to end the war depends directly on the military balance of power: a defenceless Ukraine would have no negotiating mass in negotiations.

Ukraine is currently supported by Western states. The civil society solidarity movements also come mostly from the liberal spectrum. This makes it difficult for leftists to take a clear position. A credible left must critically question the geopolitical strategies of the West, especially NATO, without undermining support for Ukraine. That is precisely why an alternative left idea for securing international law and peace is needed. The guiding principles must clearly be the preservation of human rights and the prohibition of violence. Existing international bodies such as the UN are dysfunctional and ineffective. Therefore, it is necessary to rethink the role of the European Union and shape it from the left in the context of confrontation between autocratic power blocs in the West and East. Jan Schlemermeyer already wrote about this in 2022: “The medium-term goal would be an EU that makes itself independent from the bloc confrontation between the USA on one side and Russia/China on the other. This is not only the demand of left parties in Eastern Europe. It would also be a completely different starting point communicatively. Then The Left could actually open up a third position and understand itself as the left wing of the European project.”

Many Eastern European states – and also progressive left forces there – are pushing towards the EU. This leads to new tensions with Russia, for example through Russian disinformation campaigns and attempts to influence Europe-friendly parties and politicians in elections in countries like Romania, Georgia or Moldova. Western actors also try to create economic dependencies and take ideological influence on societies, for example through NGO financing.

However, the striving for a life in freedom, democratic and socially just conditions is an important point of reference for an emancipatory left. A goal could be to combine positive elements of Eastern European experiences in state socialism, such as social security or collective economy, with democratic and libertarian perspectives to develop a new, emancipatory vision of society. Perhaps something new can be created from this.

That is precisely why we advocate for an intensification of cooperation with left actors in Ukraine and other Eastern European countries in order to use their experiences and needs as a basis for solidary and emancipatory action.

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Juliane Nagel is a member of the Saxon State Parliament; she won a direct mandate three times in succession in the Leipzig-South constituency. She is co-founder of the open parliamentary and project office linXXnet, which has existed since 2000. The linXXnet has repeatedly been part of and a driving force for projects and cooperations with Central and Eastern European leftists throughout its history.