Following the conclusion of a ceasefire, Bedouin fighters and pro-government tribes withdrew from part of Suwayda city. Local Druze armed factions regained control. At the same time, American officials claimed to have negotiated a truce between Damascus and Tel Aviv. This agreement allowed the deployment of Syrian government forces in Suwayda province, except for Suwayda city, initially rejected by Israel.

After more than a week of fighting, there were over a thousand deaths, both civilians and combatants, and more than 140,000 people were displaced, according to the UN. The news site Suwayda 24 recorded 36 villages destroyed and damaged, most of which are currently emptied of their inhabitants, whilst looting continues.

These latest events follow previous attacks carried out by armed groups linked to or supporting the Damascus government in Suwayda province and near Damascus in April and May, which left more than 100 dead. Damascus seeks to achieve political objectives through these actions: consolidating its power over a fragmented Syria, undermining Suwayda’s autonomy and breaking democratic dynamics from below.

Suwayda Attacked from All Sides and Under a Deadly Siege

Suwayda province, populated mainly by Druze [a religious minority group in the Levant practising an Abrahamic monotheistic religion], acquired a certain political autonomy during the Syrian popular uprising. After the fall of Assad’s regime, many local armed forces and the main Druze religious dignitaries maintained contacts with the new authorities in Damascus, but refused to lay down their arms, lacking democratic and inclusive political transition and guarantees for Suwayda province. However, the region became a war zone from 13^th July, after the arrest and torture of a Druze merchant at a checkpoint held by Bedouin armed groups, which was established after the April and May violence against Druze populations in Damascus and Suwayda. This checkpoint installed on the Damascus-Suwayda road is under the responsibility of Bedouin tribes of Al-Mutallah in the Al-Kiswah region of Damascus countryside, affiliated with the General Security of the Interior Ministry. In addition to committing repeated violations against Druze individuals between Suwayda and the capital Damascus, the central authorities used it as a tool of political pressure against Suwayda. [1]

The Bedouin population represents approximately 5% of the population in the Suwayda region [2] and is established mainly in rural areas, whilst their military organisation is limited and poorly centralised, compared to that of local Druze factions. Several Bedouin tribes exist in the south. As for the Druze armed factions, they are divided into three major military entities (Suwayda Military Council, Men of Dignity, Dignity Forces), and do not necessarily adopt the same attitude towards the new Damascus government. The Suwayda Military Council, for example, has a more hostile position towards the central authorities, whilst the Dignity Forces have collaborated more closely with Ahmed al-Sharaa’s presidency. [3]

Following the initial clashes between Bedouin and Druze armed factions, the Syrian interim government then sent columns of armoured vehicles from Damascus to Suwayda to attempt to assert its control over the province by claiming to want to end the violence, whilst fighting alongside Bedouin armed forces affiliated with the central government.

During the first days of military operations in Suwayda province, the actions of armed forces linked to or supporting the Damascus government in Suwayda alongside it recalled images of the massacre perpetrated in March against Alawite populations [a religious minority in Syria, an offshoot of Shia Islam] in coastal areas, causing the death of more than 1,000 civilians [4]. Murdered civilians, sectarian and hateful speeches and behaviour, such as scenes of humiliation of local inhabitants, moustaches cut or shaved by fighters, circulate on social networks, scenes of destruction and looting of infrastructure and civilian housing... By 18^th July, the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) recorded more than 200 deaths, and several hundred wounded [5]. Meanwhile, many civilians from Suwayda left their homes near military clashes and feared the actions of pro-government fighters to take refuge in safer areas of the province.

Despite military superiority, government armed forces and pro-government militias were forced to withdraw from captured areas in the face of resistance from local armed factions in Suwayda, but especially Israeli airstrikes against the general staff in Damascus and convoys of assaulting forces (see below).

Following this, self-proclaimed Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa announced on 17^th July the transfer of responsibility for maintaining security in Suwayda to local armed factions and Druze religious dignitaries, attacks took place by Druze fighters against civilian members of Bedouin populations in Suwayda province.

After these actions, a number of Sunni Arab tribes, often having links with personalities from the central authority, from different regions of the country published calls and statements on social networks to help their Bedouin “brothers” in Suwayda. This mobilisation was moreover reinforced by media propaganda encouraged by the government and its allies amplifying violence against Bedouin civilians. A new offensive by tribal armed groups then took place on Thursday evening in Suwayda province, whilst hateful and sectarian calls multiplied through social networks in different regions of the country against Druze populations.

Images then began to flood social networks of vehicles and armed men from different tribes, mobilising and heading towards Suwayda province. [6] Some of the tribal armed groups entered the western part of Suwayda city, without opposition from government armed forces, and looted and burned dozens of houses, shops and cars. Following their passage, the walls of these neighbourhoods were covered with graffiti such as “Druze pigs” or “We come to slit your throats”... [7]

Ahmed al-Sharaa condemned the perpetrators of abuses against the Druze population in Suwayda and stated that they “will be held accountable”. [8] However, he had made the same promise after the massacre on the Syrian coast against Alawite civilians, without consequences to this day for these perpetrators. The commission of inquiry set up for these massacres was initially to submit its report within 30 days of its creation, its mandate was then extended by three months on 10^th April. The report was finally transmitted to President al-Sharaa only after more than 90 days, on 20^th July. Moreover, the inquiry committee stated during its press conference on 22^nd July that no evidence existed to demonstrate the responsibility of senior state and army officials in the March massacres, contrary to an investigation conducted by Reuters a few weeks earlier. Similarly, the committee announced having no information on the numerous cases of targeted kidnappings, disappearances and gender-based violence against women and girls, which occurred during the massacres, which have continued since February 2025, particularly against Alawite women. [9]

Moreover, al-Sharaa mainly accused the “outlaw forces” – the term used by the authorities in power to designate local Druze armed factions of Suwayda – of being the main responsible for violence in the province and of having violated the ceasefire agreement by engaging in “horrible violence” against civilians, threatening civil peace by pushing the country towards chaos and security collapse. At the same time, he congratulated the Arab tribal mobilisations and celebrated their “heroism”, whilst asking them to respect the ceasefire... A contradictory message to say the least...

In fact, in the political strategy of HTS [Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the Islamist group that led the overthrow of Assad] central authorities, the mobilisation of Sunni Arab tribes appeared as a useful tool to fill the military weakness of government armed forces in their offensives against Suwayda and obtain political concessions.

At the same time, the dominant media coverage in the country, particularly the Syrian national television Al Ikhbariya, has taken up the official state propaganda by encouraging a reading of events in which Sheikh al-Hijri, a senior Druze religious dignitary, and Druze armed factions are the main responsible for the violence, accusing them of being both “separatists”, “armed gangs”, “allies of the Zionists”, etc.

These general attacks, both military and media, against Suwayda province have considerably reduced the divergences that existed between the different Druze armed groups, but also within the local Druze population. Faced with these threats perceived as an offensive against the Druze population as a whole, the need for unity is felt on all sides. Reflecting this dynamic, several trade unions and professional associations in Suwayda have notably broken all contact with the trade union centres in Damascus in protest against the massacres perpetrated and hold the central government fully responsible for these human rights violations. The Suwayda Bar Association Council, for example, announced its resignation in its entirety, condemning “the terrorist acts, war crimes, sectarian cleansing, genocide and crimes against humanity committed in Suwayda governorate by the government through its military and auxiliary forces”. The Suwayda Engineers Association published a statement of mourning for its murdered members and calling for the creation of a genuine national authority representing the people, and it announced the cessation of coordination with the trade union centre in Damascus. The Agricultural Engineers Union expressed its mourning for three of its members, “dead following the barbaric attack supported by the terrorist regime”. It stated that it “would suspend its contacts with the trade union centre in Damascus until the situation changes and an authority representing the Syrian people is established, protecting its dignity and preserving its rights”. The Veterinarians Union called these events a “crime against humanity” targeting civilians for sectarian motives and denounced the role of central authorities in inciting and directly supporting violations. The union announced the suspension of its relations with the trade union centre until “the de facto authority is removed and an authority representing the Syrian people is established”, according to its terms. The Suwayda teachers’ union, for its part, accused the authorities of being directly responsible for the massacres committed. The union reiterated its attachment to the message of education and democracy, affirming its rejection of mobilisation and calls to takfirism [declaring other Muslims as apostates]. It announced the cessation of its cooperation with the Damascus trade union centre “until the elimination of the extremist ideology that monopolises it”.

In many ways, the action of armed forces belonging to or supporting the Damascus government and their behaviour towards local populations in Suwayda recalled the dark memories of the entry of the former Assad regime into East Aleppo at the end of 2016 and into Ghouta, in the Damascus countryside, in spring 2018, or even of the Turkish army and its Syrian auxiliaries into Afrin, in the northwest of the country, the same year. In other words, a form of armed occupation rejected by local populations.

Sectarianism, a Political Tool of Domination and Control

These armed operations against Suwayda province are part of a broader strategy by the Syrian government, led by HTS, aimed at consolidating its power over a fragmented country.

To achieve this, it has mainly implemented a strategy based on external recognition and legitimisation in order to consolidate its domination inside the country. Syrian President al-Sharaa and his affiliates manifest a clear will to anchor their country in a regional axis led by the United States and its regional allies such as Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, in order to consolidate their grip on Syria. In this context, the new government also seeks a form of normalisation with the Israeli state (see below).

Building on this first dynamic, the new government led by HTS has consolidated its domination over state institutions, the army, security services and social actors in the country. [10] In the case of Suwayda, after the fall of the Assad regime, it was actually local networks and groups that elected long-time activist Muhsina al-Mahithawi to be governor of Suwayda province, but this was rejected by Damascus which appointed its own governor. More generally, al-Sharaa has for example appointed ministers, security officials and regional governors affiliated with HTS or armed groups of the Syrian National Army (SNA), an alliance of Syrian armed opposition groups acting for years as a proxy of the Turkish government. The new authorities have for example appointed HTS commanders among the highest ranked for the new Syrian army, notably the new defence minister and long-time HTS commander, Mourhaf Abu Qasra, who was appointed general. [11] The reorganisation of the Syrian army was carried out by integrating only armed groups loyal to the new Damascus authorities (HTS and the SNA) and recruitment with similar dynamics based on loyalty at the level of new soldiers. At the same time, the new authorities in Damascus accuse armed groups opposed to central power of being “outlaw groups”, like local Druze armed factions, whilst other armed groups more favourable to the government are not bothered by these accusations, as with Sunni Arab tribes fighting in Suwayda. If the unification of all armed groups within a new Syrian army does not raise opposition in itself, large sectors of the Druze population in Suwayda or Kurds in the northeast still oppose it, in the absence of certain guarantees, such as decentralisation and a genuine democratic transition process. The actions and violence of pro-government armed groups have not calmed these apprehensions, quite the contrary.

Similarly, key posts in the new transitional government are occupied by personalities close to al-Sharaa. Moreover, parallel institutions composed of the Syrian presidency and personalities affiliated with HTS have been set up, such as the Syrian National Security Council, led by al-Sharaa and composed of his close collaborators (the Foreign Minister, the Defence Minister, the Interior Minister and the Director of General Intelligence Services), and which was created at the same time as the interim government with the aim of managing security and politics. The new Syrian authorities have also taken measures to consolidate their power over economic and social actors. They have, for example, restructured the country’s chambers of commerce and industry by replacing the majority of their members with people appointed by Damascus. Several new board members are known for their close ties with HTS, such as the new president of the Federation of Syrian Chambers of Commerce, Alaa Al-Ali, former president of the Idlib Chamber of Commerce and Industry, affiliated with HTS. Other members are business personalities from before 2011, such as Issam Ghreiwati, who now chairs the board of directors. Issam Ghreiwati is the son of Zuhair Ghreiwati, founder of the Ghreiwati group, one of Syria’s largest commercial conglomerates.

Furthermore, in mid-April, Ahmed al-Sharaa’s brother, Maher al-Sharaa, was appointed Secretary-General of the presidency, responsible for managing the presidential administration and ensuring liaison between the presidency and state organs. A recent Reuters investigation also revealed that another of his brothers, Hazem al-Sharaa, accompanied by other individuals, is responsible for reshaping the Syrian economy through secret acquisitions of Assad-era companies. [12]

Meanwhile, the authorities have also appointed new personalities to head trade unions and professional associations. They notably chose a trade union council for the Syrian Bar Association, composed of members of the Council of Free Bars of Idlib. Syrian lawyers reacted by launching a petition calling for democratic elections within the Bar Association.

Finally, it has used sectarianism as a tool of domination and control over the population. To be clear, sectarian tensions and hatred are not due to ancient religious divisions nor “essentially anchored” in the populations of the region, or alleged dynamics inscribed in “revenge” of minorities against the Sunni Arab majority. [13] Sectarianism and sectarian tensions are a product of modernity and have political roots and dynamics.

More generally, the rise of sectarian discourse, tensions and attacks by the authorities in power, led by HTS and armed forces supporting the government, first Alawite populations, as shown by the coastal massacres, then Druze communities, aims to achieve three main objectives.

Firstly, the instrumentalisation of sectarian tensions and discourse on Mazlumiya Sunniya (Sunni injustice) seeking to build a sense of popular belonging and federate large sections of the Sunni Arab population, despite the many political, social, regional and other divergences within this community.

Secondly, these sectarian attacks and tensions aim to break the space or democratic dynamics from below. In this perspective, Suwayda has been since the beginning of the popular uprising in 2011 a symbol of popular resistance, including against the former Assad regime, with continuous democratic actions, a dynamic local civil society and attempts to create alternative trade unions and professional associations. For example, continuous popular demonstrations and strikes took place in Suwayda governorate, particularly after the triggering of a relatively important protest movement since mid-August 2023, which highlighted the importance of Syrian unity, the liberation of political prisoners and social justice. Certain local Druze armed factions also participated in the military offensive with other military groups from southern Syria against the Assad regime in its final days before its fall. This is without forgetting the support of local Druze armed factions for tens of thousands of young men from Suwayda who refused to join the Syrian army loyal to the Assad regime and fight in its ranks since 2014.

In March, the sectarian massacres in coastal areas had moreover almost put an end to demonstrations organised in January and February 2025 in different provinces by public officials dismissed by the new government. The Syrian authorities have dismissed since December 2024 several tens of thousands, if not more, public sector employees. Following this decision, demonstrations by dismissed or suspended officials broke out throughout the country, including in Suwayda. These protests were promising, as were attempts to create alternative trade unions or, at the very least, coordination structures. These new entities, besides their opposition to mass dismissals, also demanded salary increases and rejected government projects aimed at privatising public assets. However, the consolidation of the protest movement was considerably weakened, due to fears that armed groups close to the regime might react with violence.

Finally, sectarian rhetoric and attacks have allowed the new Damascus authorities to attempt to impose their total control over regions outside their domination, such as in Suwayda, or consolidate their power, as in coastal areas in March, by mobilising segments of the population on sectarian bases.

Sectarianism acts as a powerful mechanism of social control, shaping the course of class struggle by promoting dependence between the popular classes and their ruling elites. As a result, the popular classes are deprived of any political independence and define themselves – and engage politically – through their sectarian identity. In this regard, the new government in place follows in the footsteps of the former Assad regime, continuing to use sectarian policies and practices as a means of governance, control and social division.

In this framework, the armed abuses committed by pro-government armed forces are not “simply” the result of “individual actions” or a “lack of professionalism” of the army, whether during the March massacres against Alawite populations or today in Suwayda. Indeed, the Reuters agency investigation demonstrated that pro-government armed groups were directly involved in violence perpetrated against Alawite civilians in March, with the knowledge and consent of the highest echelons of the state. Moreover, the new authorities created the political conditions that made this violence possible. Indeed, human rights violations against Alawites, including kidnappings and assassinations, have increased in recent months, some of which – such as the Fahil massacre at the end of December 2024 and the Arzah massacre at the beginning of February 2025 – resembled dress rehearsals before the March coastal massacres. [14] Moreover, Syrian officials have repeatedly presented the Alawite community as an instrument of the former regime against the Syrian people. For example, during his speech at the 9^th donor conference for Syria in Brussels, Belgium, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani declared: “54 years of minority rule have led to the displacement of 15 million Syrians...” [15] – implicitly suggesting that the Alawite community as a whole had ruled the country for decades, rather than a dictatorship controlled by the Assad family. While it is indisputable that Alawite personalities occupied key positions within the former Assad regime, notably within its military and security apparatus, reducing the nature of the state and its dominant institutions to an “Alawite identity” or depicting the regime as favouring religious minorities whilst systematically discriminating against the Sunni Arab majority is both misleading and far from reality.

The authorities have also not put in place a mechanism favouring a comprehensive transitional justice process aimed at punishing all persons and groups involved in war crimes during the Syrian conflict. This could have played a crucial role in preventing acts of revenge and in calming growing sectarian tensions. However, Ahmed al-Sharaa and his allies have no interest in transitional justice, very certainly fearing being judged for their own crimes and abuses committed against civilians. Moreover, on 17^th May, the Syrian transitional authorities announced presidential decrees creating two new government bodies: the Transitional Justice Commission and the National Commission for the Disappeared. However, the mandate of the Transitional Justice Commission, as defined in the decree, is restricted and excludes many victims, notably those of HTS and its allied armed groups such as the SNA. This selective justice is therefore very problematic and risks provoking new political and sectarian tensions in the country. This is without forgetting that certain personalities affiliated with the Assad regime and guilty of having committed crimes, or who contributed to them, have benefited de facto from immunity by the new authorities, such as Fadi Saqr, former commander of the National Defence Forces (NDF) affiliated with the previous Assad regime, or Muhammad Hamsho, famous businessman affiliated with Maher al-Assad.

Consequently, to return to Suwayda province and recent events, the strategy and actions of Syrian government forces in Suwayda province are part of these attempts to centralise power in the hands of the new ruling authority and consolidate their domination over society.

The risk of exclusive power with a central authority having reduced capacities can only lead to more political tensions in the country. This situation also further weakens the country’s sovereignty.

Israel’s Exploitation of Sectarian Tensions

Meanwhile, the Israeli government has sought to instrumentalise recent human rights violations committed by pro-Damascus armed forces against Druze populations to stoke sectarian tensions in the country, presenting itself as the defender of Druze populations in southern Syria and threatening to intervene militarily for their “protection”. Despite calls from Druze religious dignitary Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri towards the Israeli government and greater openness in certain segments of the Druze population towards Israel, particularly after the latest violence against them, there is a largely majority rejection of any Israeli intervention by large sectors of the Druze population of Suwayda, and other regions. Similarly they have reaffirmed on numerous occasions their belonging to Syria and their support for the country’s unity.

But defending the Druze population is not the issue for the State of Israel and never has been. On the contrary, Tel Aviv sends a clear message to Damascus: it will not tolerate any military presence in southern Syria, including in Quneitra, Deraa and Suwayda provinces [provinces in southern Syria near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights], and aims for the demilitarisation of these zones.

In this context, the Israeli occupation army launched new strikes on Damascus, near the headquarters of the Syrian army and the Defence Ministry, as well as in other areas of the country on 16^th and 17^th July, after previous attacks.

In doing so, the colonial and racist Israeli state seeks to further weaken the Syrian state and obtain more political concessions from Damascus, which has displayed its willingness to normalise, directly or indirectly, its relations with Tel Aviv. The Syrian government, led by HTS, has confirmed the existence of negotiations and discussions with Israeli officials aimed at easing tensions between the two countries and finding forms of understanding. This despite the incessant attacks by the Israeli occupation army against Syrian territories, particularly in Syrian territories occupied following the fall of the Assad regime in December, and the destruction of agricultural land and civilian infrastructure. Al-Sharaa has reiterated on numerous occasions that his regime does not constitute a threat to Israel and has apparently also declared to President Trump his willingness to join the Abraham Accords [a series of normalisation agreements between Israel and several Arab countries] if “appropriate conditions” were met.

This is also why Damascus has not condemned the massive Israeli strikes against the Islamic Republic of Iran. It rather positively perceives a weakening of Iran, just as with Hezbollah [a Lebanese Shia Islamist political party and militant group] in Lebanon. This position is not only linked to Iran’s role during the Syrian popular uprising and hostility towards it from large sectors of the population, but it reflects, as explained above, the political orientation of the new ruling elite in Syria which seeks to root the country in an axis led by the United States to consolidate its power internally.

This orientation has not changed despite recent events and the United States is well aware of this. Washington does not want to see this new government in Damascus, which seeks to satisfy these regional political interests and ensure a certain authoritarian stability there, be further weakened. It is in this framework that American leaders asked Tel Aviv to cease its bombardments against Syrian government targets and conclude a truce with Damascus. This truce agreement moreover allowed the deployment of Syrian government forces in Suwayda province, except for Suwayda city, initially rejected by Israel.

Moreover, the military escalation in Suwayda followed discussions in Baku, Azerbaijan, between Syrian and Israeli representatives, according to the Syria in Transition website. [16] During these discussions, the Syrian authorities, led by HTS, reportedly requested Tel Aviv’s approval for Suwayda’s reintegration. If Israeli officials declared themselves open to limited reintegration – that is, the restoration of public services and deployment of a limited local security force – Damascus wrongly interpreted this decision as authorisation for a large-scale military operation. Despite this misunderstanding, this decision by the Syrian authorities reveals a persistent tendency to rely on external validations and support to justify certain policies, notably coercive measures against local populations as in the case of Suwayda, rather than encouraging political dialogue.

According to various sources, [17] senior officials from the United States, Israel and Syria met on Thursday 24^th July to reach a security agreement in southern Syria and prevent new crises.

In other words, international recognition, the search for good relations with the United States and their regional allies, and the promotion of a possible normalisation process with Israel, all aim to consolidate HTS power over the country. The interests of the Syrian popular classes and their democratic aspirations are ignored in this process.

In this context, recent events in Suwayda demonstrate, once again, that Syria is not experiencing a democratic and inclusive political transition. But a process of establishing a new authoritarian regime, structured and led by HTS, under the cover of institutional and international legitimacy.

However, this process remains still incomplete because of the weakness of the political, economic and military capacities of the new authorities in power led by HTS as demonstrated by the failure of its total control over Suwayda. Despite this failure, the authorities in power will probably not change their policies, nor make real concessions in favour of the political and socio-economic interests of the Syrian popular classes in all their diversities, without a change in the balance of power and, above all, without the (re)construction and development of a counter-power within society, bringing together democratic and progressive political and social networks and actors.

New political, social and associative groups and organisations have nevertheless emerged and are organising, but must still develop to become social forces rooted in the population capable of broader mobilisations in society. At the same time, collaborations between different regions of Syria, including with Kurdish organisations present in northeast Syria, must intensify.

However, the 14 years of wars and destruction, and more than 50 years of dictatorship weigh heavily in this reconstruction...

Joseph Daher