Russia offers Myanmar advanced military technologies, space cooperation and nuclear energy

The most emblematic case is that of Vietnam. In June 2024, at the height of the third year of war in Ukraine, Putin was received in Hanoi with full honours. Vietnamese President To Lam stated that the Russian leader “has contributed to peace, stability and development in the Asia-Pacific region”, announcing the intention to strengthen cooperation in defence and security sectors. The two countries signed over a dozen bilateral agreements, ranging from energy to nuclear technology, whilst Russia continues to have access to the naval base at Cam Ranh Bay [1], fundamental for projecting its presence in the South China Sea.

Even more significant is the relationship with India. During the India-Russia summit of July 2024, Modi met Putin for the second time in a few months, calling him a “dear friend” and emphasising how their bond “has been tested multiple times, emerging stronger each time”. India has continued to increase imports of Russian oil, which in 2023 represented 40% of the total, and has implemented alternative payment systems to circumvent Western sanctions. Simultaneously, New Delhi remains heavily dependent on Russian military supplies, which for over twenty years have constituted more than 65% of its arms imports, although India is now diversifying its procurement sources.

This dual approach, defined by analysts as “balancing-hedging” (that is, a balance between strategic alignment with one power and caution in maintaining relations with its rivals), is not accidental. On a global scale, Russia increasingly relies on China as an economic, military and political partner to counterbalance American influence. On the regional level, however, Moscow adopts a diversification strategy, avoiding taking positions in favour of Beijing in territorial disputes and maintaining open channels with countries that compete with it.

Russia’s position on the South China Sea issue is particularly indicative. Moscow has never openly criticised China nor publicly questioned the so-called “nine-dash line” [2], with which Beijing claims almost the entire maritime basin. At the same time, it does not clearly and directly support its claims. When in 2016 the Hague tribunal ruled against Chinese claims, Putin defended China’s choice not to recognise the verdict, but only because Beijing had not participated in the proceedings, without entering into the merit of the dispute.

Russian balance is based on well-calibrated strategic logic. Although aware of Moscow’s relationships with its regional rivals, Beijing silently accepts this line of action, recognising that possible Russian disengagement would push countries like Vietnam and India towards closer understanding with Washington. As an expert on Sino-Russian relations has observed, China prefers its neighbours to rely on Russia rather than the United States. Growing tension with Washington, moreover, makes strengthening the understanding with Moscow even more important for Beijing, considered the only possible major ally in the long confrontation with the United States.

Nuclear energy as a long-term influence tool

Nuclear energy has become the most sophisticated element of Russia’s penetration strategy in Asia, an area where Moscow still manages to compete on an almost equal footing with Western powers, despite sanctions. Rosatom, the Russian state nuclear company, controls 88% of the global nuclear power plant market and in 2024 recorded foreign revenues exceeding $18 billion [3]. Behind these figures, however, a long-term geopolitical strategy emerges, where nuclear cooperation, once initiated, creates lasting structural dependencies over time linked to plant maintenance, fuel supply and waste management.

The case of Vietnam is particularly indicative. The Ninh Thuận-1 nuclear power plant project, suspended in 2016, was reactivated in January 2025 with the signing of a new memorandum between Rosatom and Vietnam Electricity. During the nine years of suspension, Russia continued to invest in the country. According to Rosatom CEO Aleksey Likhachev, between 2019 and 2025 the company trained approximately 400 Vietnamese technicians, employing them in its projects abroad. Today, beyond resuming work at Ninh Thuận-1, Russia also plans the construction of a new research reactor, with construction expected to begin in 2027.

Indonesia appears as the most ambitious testing ground for this strategy. Rosatom has presented Jakarta with a modular development model, designed to adapt to the country’s archipelagic geography. The first phase envisions floating nuclear power plants, subsequently followed by high-power installations built on land. Rosatom deputy CEO Andrei Nikipelov has emphasised that floating units represent a rapid path to accessing nuclear energy and involve minimal costs for Indonesia, since fuel replacement would be managed through Russian infrastructure. This proposal fits perfectly into the country’s energy development plans, which envision activating 250 MW of nuclear energy by 2032, 7 GW by 2040 and 35 GW by 2060.

Beyond Vietnam and Indonesia, Russian nuclear expansion involves a growing number of Southeast Asian countries. Among these, Malaysia has shown increasingly marked interest towards technologies proposed by Moscow. During a meeting held in June 2025 between Rosatom CEO Aleksey Likhachev and Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Fadillah Yusof, Kuala Lumpur expressed particular attention towards 100-megawatt floating nuclear power plants. Even countries with more limited technological capabilities, such as Cambodia and Laos, are exploring possible cooperation with Russia in the nuclear field. Both have signed preliminary agreements for civilian use of atomic energy and Moscow has offered training programmes aimed at developing local competencies.

The long-term objective is creating a network of technological dependencies such as to make potential Western sanctions against Rosatom much more difficult. According to Rafael Grossi, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, striking the company with punitive measures could have negative repercussions even on global security, since Rosatom provides fuel and services to numerous countries.

Myanmar as a laboratory of the Russian-Chinese alliance

Myanmar governed by the military junta that seized power in a coup [4], currently engaged in civil war, has become the most advanced laboratory of Russian-Chinese cooperation in Asia, a context where Moscow and Beijing are experimenting with a division of roles that could anticipate future regional dynamics. China invests billions of dollars in the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and large infrastructural projects, whilst Russia concentrates on transferring advanced military technologies, space cooperation and nuclear energy. The result is a form of complementary partnership, developed in a framework of complete international isolation of rebel forces.

The creation of Myanmar’s Space Agency, which occurred in June 2024, is a strong signal of this strategy. The agency was placed under direct control of junta leader Min Aung Hlaing, and was born three months after his visit to Moscow, during which various memorandums were signed with Russia, including one on space exploration and peaceful use. Putin confirmed that a centre for satellite data processing is already operational in Myanmar with Moscow’s support, whilst Min Aung Hlaing declared to have learned much during his visit to Samara [5], a Russian region known for spacecraft and satellite production.

Military cooperation has also intensified. Russia completed delivery of all six Su-30SME fighters ordered in 2018 for a total value of $400 million [6]. The last two aircraft were delivered during a ceremony held in December 2024 at Meiktila air base, where Min Aung Hlaing had the aircraft blessed with holy water, defining them as essential to protect the country’s territorial integrity and face “terrorist threats”, namely the armed democratic resistance. Despite this air superiority, however, the junta has lost control of vast areas in ethnic states and central Myanmar, including two regional commands in northern Shan and the Western Command headquarters in Rakhine [7].

Nuclear cooperation introduces a further strategic dimension. Rosatom is engaged in developing a modular reactor project in Myanmar, based on an intergovernmental agreement signed in 2023, whilst Russian experts collaborate with local institutions through training programmes and scientific initiatives designed to strengthen internal competencies. Simultaneously, China continues to play the role of main economic investor. During the year alone, Myanmar China Harbour Engineering signed memorandums worth a total of $61 million [8] with the Myanmar Rice Federation and four public companies, aiming to build port infrastructure designed to boost the country’s agricultural exports.

The Myanmar case clearly shows how Russia and China are implementing a complementarity strategy that goes beyond simple economic cooperation. On one hand, Beijing guarantees the regime’s survival with massive investments and market access. On the other, Moscow provides high strategic value technologies, such as satellites, fighters and nuclear reactors. This division of roles allows both powers to extend their influence without entering direct competition, outlining a model of joint penetration that could be applied in other contexts marked by crisis or international isolation.

Structural limits and future prospects

Despite the apparent expansion of Russian influence in Asia, data reveals structural limits such as to put the sustainability of this strategy at risk. The arms sales sector, historically the most profitable for Moscow in the region, has registered a drastic collapse. From $1.4 billion [9] in 2014, it dropped to less than $100 million [10] in 2024. Western sanctions have called into question Russia’s reliability as a military supplier, pushing many Southeast Asian countries to turn not only to traditional suppliers like the United States and Europe, but also to new emerging actors like South Korea and Turkey.

Logistical difficulties represent a further obstacle. Russia encounters problems in accessing Southeast Asian markets due to still underdeveloped port infrastructure in its own Far East region and strong dependence on Chinese commercial routes. Bilateral trade with Cambodia, for example, fell from $239 million [11] in 2021 to about $55 million [12] in 2024, whilst that with Laos reduced to only $5 million [13]. Russian authorities themselves have admitted difficulties in entering new markets, as demonstrated by the case of the project for recruiting one million Indian workers. Officials involved have recognised they have no experience with labour force from India or Sri Lanka, highlighting cultural and linguistic barriers that obstruct expansion.

Even dependence on Western financial institutions by many Asian partners imposes strong limits. Pakistan, despite signals of growing rapprochement with Moscow and a trade volume that reached $1.3 billion [14] in 2024, remains chronically tied to the International Monetary Fund for managing its economic problems. This situation has forced Islamabad to publicly condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Russian oil import project has also stalled due to lack of modernisation of Pakistani refineries.

The case of the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s presidency demonstrates how political changes can rapidly influence regional balances. After an opening phase towards Moscow during Duterte’s mandate, Manila has brought its foreign policy back to positions closer to Washington. Consequently, bilateral trade with Russia fell from $1.16 billion [15] in 2021 to about $600-700 million [16] in 2024. Until 2022, over 80% of Philippine exports to Moscow consisted of electronic products. However, sanctions imposed by the United States in 2023 against companies involved in the Russian defence industry supply chain have made these exchanges even more complex.

Russia is not limiting itself to traditional economic and military strategies, but is also experimenting with information influence operations in contexts that may appear impermeable. The case of Japan is emblematic. In 2024, government news agency Sputnik more than tripled dissemination of its content on the Japanese account of platform X, exceeding 1.04 million shares compared to 320,000 the previous year. From October 2023, the strategy became more sophisticated. Publication times were moved from evening to morning hours to favour greater visibility, and content alternates apparently innocuous material, such as images of king crabs or sea otters, with anti-Ukrainian propaganda and conspiracy theories.

The objective is not so much promoting a pro-Russian narrative as destabilising Japanese society. This objective became evident when, during the electoral campaign for renewal of Japan’s upper house, the Russian broadcaster in local language gave space to an exponent of the far-right party Sanseito [17], already showing strong growth and which then went from 2 to 17 deputies with the vote.

A particularly significant moment was the May 2024 meeting between Putin and Akie Abe, widow of the former Japanese Prime Minister and ex-leader of the governing LDP party [18], assassinated in 2022. The twelve posts published by Sputnik on the event were shared almost 10,000 times, reaching over 12 million views. The attempt to legitimise Russia through the public image of a respected figure like Akie Abe demonstrates the level of sophistication reached by these campaigns, beyond naturally the availability of Tokyo’s governing right to become involved. Unlike what happens in Europe and the United States, Japan has not imposed restrictions on Sputnik, which remains banned in the European Union since March 2022.

The growing confrontation between the United States and China could, paradoxically, both expand and reduce Russia’s room for manœuvre. On one hand, uncertainty caused by Trump’s policies towards traditional allies could induce various Asian countries to diversify their alliances, creating new openings for Moscow. The fact that a growing number of ASEAN [19] members are approaching BRICS [20], with Indonesia now fully integrated and with Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam involved as partners, reflects the desire to explore alternatives to traditional Western channels.

However, the intensifying global polarisation risks progressively narrowing space for Russia’s “dual-level” strategy. The more the rivalry between Washington and Beijing intensifies, the more systemic alignment mechanisms tend to prevail, reducing the possibility for individual countries to maintain autonomous foreign policy. Southeast Asian governments, whilst eager to preserve their strategic independence, could be forced into clearer choices. In this scenario, Russia’s capacity to cultivate relationships with China’s regional rivals would depend not only on its own diplomatic ability, but also on Beijing’s willingness to tolerate certain strategic ambiguity in a context marked by increasingly direct confrontation with the United States.

Andrea Ferrario