As General Pervez Musharraf continues his crackdown on his opponents,
the meaning of “the state of emergency” becomes brutally clear. It’s
crude, unadulterated, despicable martial law imposed by a desperate
dictator bereft of a strategy to resolve any of the problems which
his own eight year-long rule has aggravated. Through his
recklessness, driven by a quest for absolutist power, he has not only
undermined Pakistan’s nascent and fragile democratic institutions; he
has plunged his nation into frightening instability and turmoil.
Gen Musharraf’s principal targets are unmistakable: the higher
judiciary, lawyers, the media, and civil society organisations
(CSOs). That explains the detention of thousands of their members,
including the non-official Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, on
whose office the police swooped down one day after the emergency was
proclaimed.
Even more brazen was the General’s assault on the Supreme Court, his
dismissal of Chief Justice Iftikhar Choudhry, and his order directing
all judges of that court and the High Courts to take an oath of
allegiance to the new regime. To their credit, a majority of the
judges refused.
It equally speaks to the craven submissiveness of the four Supreme
Court judges who fell in line that their very first act was to cancel
all pending litigation, including most importantly, petitions against
Gen Musharraf’s election as President, on which the court was meant
to pronounce judgment before the expiry of this term as chief of army
staff on November 15.
Gen. Musharraf has selectively arrested political leaders, mainly
from the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) and the Islamic-Right
Jamat-e-Islami. But their detention seems aimed, like his railing
against “extremism” and “terrorism” during his national address, more
at pleasing his backers in the West than at containing real
opposition.
Meanwhile, pitched battles continue between the police and
anti-martial law protesters, primarily lawyers, whose intensity and
defiant spirit have surprised many. If the political parties join in,
the protests could acquire irresistible force. Although the protests
were blacked out, because private TV channels were off the air, their
news is fuelling public anger against the military.
Signs are emerging that the General’s decision to impose martial law
did not have the full backing of the Establishment, not even the
military. Some of own his advisers opposed it.
It’s doubtful if even a small minority believes that the imposition
of martial law was necessary in “the national interest”. Gen
Musharraf cited 11 different reasons in justification, eight of which
pertain to the judiciary’s "constant interference in executive
functions“, including”control of terrorist activity, economic
policy, price controls, downsizing of corporations and urban
planning". These won’t wash.
It’s not that the judiciary didn’t assert itself and try to expand
its powers through suo motu interventions. It certainly did, largely
justifiably-for instance, by questioning the sell-off of Pakistan
Steel Mills at below-market prices, by reinstating Chief Justice
Choudhry, demanding an inquiry into the cases of “missing persons”,
and reprimanding negligent civil servants. Admittedly, it also
indulged in some grandstanding.
However, all this happened well before the crisis caused by the
October 6 Presidential election. Gen Musharraf went along with
it-conveniently forgetting constitutional propriety and defence of
the executive’s domain, until judgment in his own case became
imminent. Then, he used ruthless means to perpetuate his rule while
cynically citing grand causes like threats to the nation.
Some of the Supreme Court’s interventions were questionable, as in
ordering the government to reopen the Lal Masjid and release 61
extremist suspects long held without charges. Yet, ironically, the
judges responsible for this, Mohammad Nawaz Abbasi and Faqir Mohammad
Khokhar, were Musharraf loyalists who took the new oath of allegiance!
The plain truth is that Gen Musharraf chose to voice his complaint
against the judiciary only when he sensed, apparently through an
illegally tapped telephone call, that the Supreme Court was likely to
rule against his eligibility for the Presidential election.
Even more unconvincing are the other reasons cited for martial law:
viz, protecting Pakistan against the growing forces of “extremism”
and “terrorism”. These forces have indeed been growing, especially in
the North-West Frontier Province, and tribal Agency areas like North
and South Waziristan, Bajaur, and most recently, Swat, besides
Baluchistan.
However, their growth can be largely attributed to Gen Musharraf’s
inept and half-hearted handling of anti-extremist operations, coupled
with his strategy of cutting unviable deals with pro-Taliban forces.
He has been content to receive $11 billion in assistance from the
United States since September 2001 as part of its Global War on
Terrorism (GWoT). But it’s doubtful if he has used it purposively.
In any case, it’s not lack of military powers, or judicial
constraints on their exercise, that has hobbled the fight against the
pro-Taliban fundamentalists. The real and growing constraint lies in
the demoralisation of Pakistan’s security forces deployed in the
“badlands”, their high casualty rates-more than 1,000 have died-, and
rising desertions, currently estimated at more than 150.
Such desertions have occurred for the first time since the Bangladesh
War. Besides, paramilitary units like the Frontier Corps, recruited
from the tribal population, simply lack the will to fight their own
brothers. At the end of August, pro-Taliban militants kidnapped as
many as 247 Pakistani soldiers, a majority of whom were released
recently in exchange for 25 extremists.
As America’s GWoT spills over into Pakistan’s Federally Administered
Tribal Areas, the Durand Line, artificially drawn by the British in
1893 to run through the Pashtun belt, and not accepted by the Afghan
government or by the Pashtuns, is under serious threat. Gen Musharraf
has no strategy to meet that threat. But over 100,000 Pakistani
troops are deployed in that region-in highly vulnerable conditions.
Meanwhile, the US is threatening to send in troops in hot pursuit of
al-Qaeda and Taliban elements, which have found a sanctuary there.
This rising threat to Pakistan’s control over its volatile tribal
frontiers is an extraordinarily serious matter. It has arisen because
GWoT has gone haywire in Afghanistan, and Gen Musharraf’s strategy of
fighting pro-Taliban forces has proved bankrupt. The US may yet add
to these complications by replicating in the border region the myopic
policies it pursues in Iraq and Afghanistan-to disastrous effect.
The continuation of martial law is certain to increase public
alienation, social turmoil and political instability in Pakistan.
That in turn will prove conducive to the further growth of extremism.
Gen Musharraf has effectively aborted the political process which
alone could have acted as a buffer against extremism. Absent
democratic space, extremism will thrive.
Ms. Benazir Bhutto is perfectly right in saying that military
dictatorship and fundamentalism will feed on each other. It’s another
matter that she herself has been complicit and collusive in creating
conditions which favour this. Had she not entered into a US-brokered
deal with Gen Musharraf, which led to the so-called National
Reconciliation Ordinance-which lets her off serious corruption
charges in return for her tacit support to the General’s election as
President- events could have shaped differently.
Instead, Ms. Bhutto prevented her Pakistan People’s Party from
joining the pro-democracy agitation, and made a series of unsavoury
compromises with Gen Musharraf.
Yet, it’s not clear that she has learnt her lesson. Her 48-hour trip
to Dubai at a critical juncture, probably after being tipped off
about the imminence of martial law, and her unexpectedly quick
return, possibly after secret talks with Gen Musharraf and the
Americans, suggest otherwise.
The future of the other major player, Mr Nawaz Sharif, remains
uncertain. A recent Supreme Court verdict allowing him to return to
Pakistan stands cancelled. Whether his PML(N) can join and energise
the anti-martial law struggle is unclear.
One thing is plain, though. By targeting Pakistan’s CSOs and human
rights groups, which represent the secular liberals, Gen Musharraf
has undermined the chance of building a political climate that could
help him combat extremism without becoming slavishly dependent on the
US.
There’s some uncertainty over how strongly Washington will use its
leverage over Gen Musharraf to get martial law lifted. Left to
itself, it wouldn’t have gone beyond “regretting” the coup and
(unconvincingly) threatening to review aid to Pakistan. The New York
Times says many US officials want to "keep billions of dollars
flowing to Pakistan’s military" because they see Gen Musharraf as
their best bet in fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Yet, when President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,
shamed by strong street-level protests in Pakistan, hardened their
stand to demand that Gen Musharraf “take off his uniform” and
“quickly return to a constitutional path”, the Pakistan establishment
announced that elections would be held soon.
This shows that political pressure can yield excellent results in
tandem with mass protests. In their absence, Pakistan won’t move
towards democratisation. A historic chance now awaits Ms Bhutto: she
can make small, personal gains by colluding with the General and
prolonging military rule, or she can end the darkness and help
transform Pakistan into a real democracy.