The securitization of social life is becoming palpably evident in Southeast Asia. The events of 9/11 have
ramifications for security-development dynamics of the region. Since then, the idea of “security” seems
to have become a master narrative, a dominant discourse—if not, a political-economic imaginary—that
informs and shapes strategies on all scales from the individual to the firm to the wider economy, and on
all territorial scales from the smallest community through the state to the regional and global levels. The
basic idea is being articulated in many organizational and institutional sites (from firm security to state
security), on many scales from national to global (national security, regional security, global security), and
in many functional systems (health security, educational security, environmental security, internet security,
business security, etc.). It has been translated into many visions and strategies such as the various human
security legislations, national security frameworks, and regional security community projects. The
imperatives of security have thus penetrated just about every aspect of human life.
Security and development policy-makers stand again at a historic crossroads in dealing with post-9/11
Southeast Asia, a region of strategic importance in the Cold War. Post-9/11 has ushered in yet another
political-economic contradiction in the region, being perceived as a global security threat in the
contemporary “war on terror” and a promising dynamic economic region in the globalizing world.
Against the background of intensifying globalization, addressing the geopolitics of security and the
political economy of development in Southeast Asia is bewilderingly complex. This complex securitydevelopment
challenge in the region thus requires comprehensive policy responses firmly grounded on
history, geography, culture, and political economy.
This paper argues that 9/11 has accelerated the Americanization of security-development architecture in
Southeast Asia as shown in the increasing institutionalization of principles and practices that are easily
ascribed to US hegemony. In particular, the Americanization of security-development has paved the way
either to the strengthening or resurgence of the hegemony, both in policy and discourse, of:
[a] “global war on terrorism” over historically sensitive conflict resolution mechanisms;
[b] “authoritarian liberalism” over democratization; and
[c] neo-liberalism over developmental statism.
Each of these phenomena is inherently unstable and conflict-ridden. Hence, the securitization of social
life in the region is not resulting in the reproduction of security-development agenda patterned after the
US, but in the reproduction of social antagonisms that spring from the very contradictions of the
securitization project itself. The paper concludes with a proposal for a “democratic security-development
policy” built from the bottom up in which security and development is seen both as “political” and
“economic” ideals in organic synergy.
Global War on Terror over Local Historical Specificities
The US launched the global war on terror as the fiercest response to the 9/11 attacks. The campaign
intensified in Southeast Asia as the Bush administration tagged the region the “second front” in the war
against terror for being the hideout of alleged al-Qaeda operatives and the training camp to radical
Islamist groups (such as Jemaah Islamiah, Abu Sayyaf, and the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia), and
hence one of the weakest links in the quest for global stability. After putting the Talibans to rout, security
policy-makers, especially those from the US, has since then regarded Southeast Asia as the second front
indeed on the war on terrorism, with the US deploying more than 500 troops supposedly to assist in
hostage rescue and counterinsurgency operations in southern Philippines on January 2002. This approach
of looking at Southeast Asia through the lenses of the US-led “Coalition of the Willing” wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq and the global war on terror will, however, result in erroneous conclusions and
hence wrong policies. So long as security policymakers become overly fixated on the global war on terror,
they will never grasp the complex reality of various conflicts in the region in order to put an end to the
roots of violence. There is need to critically situate conflicts in the region in their varying geographical
and historical contexts.
Southeast Asia is a region of conflicts. Most major conflicts from and among identities are homegrown
and fought long before 9/11. These racial, religious, and ethnic conflicts are not at all epiphenomenal;
these are complex conflicts that are related to—but cannot be simply reduced to being byproducts or
secondary symptoms of—poverty, inequality, and uneven development. There are historical reasons why
issues of race, religion, nationalism, and ethnicity have so much purchase on the lives of many peoples in
Southeast Asia. But, at the same time, there are material reasons why these conflicts are articulated in an
increasingly unequal capitalist world. While these conflicts may predate 9/11, the latter has given a much
more conflictual, or even a new, terrain of struggles in the region.
In this multi-cultural region, racial, religious, ethnic and national identities are still at the center of many
conflicts. Burma, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines have their respective
enduring internal conflicts among identities (e.g., the religious conflicts in Poso in Central Sulawesi,
Indonesia; and the ethnic conflicts in West Kalimantan, southern Thailand, and southern Philippines).
There exist politicized and actively struggling organized identities based on race, religion, ethnicity, and
nation. The conflicts in Maluku and Poso islands in the Indonesian archipelago (1999-2003), which were
believed to be instigated by military and para-military forces, resulted in the killing of thousands of
people and the destruction of ethnic and religious harmony in the region. These conflicts exemplify the
intensity of homegrown and largely religious, Muslim-Christian, conflicts that are by no means upshots
of 9/11.
Against the background of economic globalization, the struggle of identities is not only conspicuous in
the cultural arena but also in the materiality of the political economy. Identity conflicts in the region—
such as the Muslim rebel groups in the Philippines and Indonesia—are becoming intractable due to the
fact that their struggles are based on demands both for recognition and for redistribution. The resistance
of oppressed identities is twofold: against their respective states and against increasing material
inequality. [1]
The resurgence of military-oriented 9/11 strategies are gradually unfolding. This hardcore stance is
inimical to peace and stability in the region not only because it equates rebellion, be it pre- or post-9/11,
with terrorism, but it also fails to recognize the legitimate aspirations and demands of struggling
identities and oppositions. For instance, in the case of Bangsamoro problem in southern Philippines,
9/11-oriented policy-makers and strategists have been outright in linking the rebel Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) with the terrorist Jemaah Islamiah at the expense of prejudicing the process of
ongoing peace negotiations between the MILF and the Philippine government. The MILF, which has
been pursuing armed struggle for more than half a century now, has been fighting for a wide variety of
social, cultural, economic and political issues and concerns that include: [a] ancestral domain; [b]
displaced and landless Bangsamoro; [c] destruction of properties and war victims; [d] human rights
issues; [e] social and cultural discrimination; [f] corruption of the mind and the moral fiber; [g] economic
inequities and widespread poverty; [h] exploitation of natural resources; and [i] agrarian reform. [2] The
accusations that MILF has links with terrorist organizations and has been involved in deliberate attacks
on civilians to spread fear and terror are matters to be investigated by an independent, impartial
organization that is free of 9/11 bias without distracting substantive issues of the Bangsamoro problem.
Post-9/11 security policies seem to have given primacy to military actions over peace negotiations in
dealing with the legitimate outcries of rebellion.
A number of key themes can be identified in the complex reality of enduring conflicts in Southeast Asia.
First, existing racial, religious, ethnic, and national identity struggles in the region are anything but
epiphenomenal. Second, there are deep historical reasons these struggles mean so much to their lives.
Third, these struggles have been more or less closely bounded with the evolution of global capitalism and
the increasing material inequality in the world. And, finally, it is therefore necessary that securitydevelopment
policies today must take issues of political identities seriously, firmly grounding them on
historical and materialist analysis. In other words, there is need for historically specific security policy and
a socially embedded development policy.
Authoritarian Liberalism Installed, Democratization Stalled
The process of securitization in Southeast Asia has overshadowed the relatively important post-Cold War
debates on “democratization”, particularly concerning the synergetic relationship between democracy and
development. The idea of security has now become inflected in neo-liberal (Philippines), neo-corporatist
(Singapore), and neo-statist (Malaysia) ways, as well as in authoritarian terms. This suggests that security,
as an idea, is amenable to strategic alliances and institutionalized compromises among disparate interests,
and even among conflicting orientations, in different political regimes.
An emergent political-economic regime referred to as “authoritarian liberalism” (i.e., a mix of strong state
and free economy, or a neo-liberal economy in an authoritarian polity) is being institutionalized in
Southeast Asia not only during the immediate aftermath of the Cold War but also until the contemporary
epoch of post-9/11 neo-liberal globalization. This institutional fit between authoritarian polity and neoliberal
economy is increasingly strengthened, as well as justified, amidst the structural requirements of
post-9/11 security environment. Far from stymieing the pursuit of capitalist market-led development
strategy in a framework of authoritarianism, the imperatives of the war on terror seem to have provided a
deeper logic than ever to underpin its perpetuation for the preservation of elite rule and capitalism in
Southeast Asia.
Against the background of the institutional imperatives of the war on terror, (semi-)authoritarian, strong
states have become strategic sites of opposing terrorism. Malaysia’s Internal Security Act (ISA) and
Singapore’s surveillance measures have once again found badly needed justification amidst growing
domestic and international criticisms against these repressive security policies used to stifle political
dissent. The declining popularity of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s administration has eventually enacted the
Philippine Human Security Act of 2007 or the anti-terror law that had long been under public scrutiny and
strong opposition. Initiated under former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Thailand has implemented
a series of repressive laws and decrees peddled as deterrent to terrorism but in guise of strengthening
domestic security agencies after the slay of over a hundred Malay Muslims in its southern province on
April 2004. And in Indonesia, once one of the strongest military regimes in the past decades under
Suharto, the prospect for the resurgence of military and security powers has come to life, especially as a
result of the Bali and Jakarta bombings in 2002 and 2004, respectively. The war on terror project has thus
provided “exceptional” powers to Southeast Asian governments, and their discretionary powers of
detention and surveillance expanded, which are being used as legal license for abuse of power to
suppress dissent and opposition.
Post-9/11 security under conditions of authoritarianism provides institutional justification for state’s
exercise of exceptional executive power in the name of public order against terrorism, allowing for the
suspension of civil and political rights—even if these rights are protected in the constitution—and
activating the use of coercive force (police and military) during times of perceived emergency. This
“regime of exception” provides far-reaching powers to the state not only by suspending normal political
and legal processes, but also by enabling the reorganization and centralization of its (coercive) apparatus
of power. This regime of exception has become an all too familiar situation in recent Southeast Asian
politics, increasingly becoming the norm, rather than being supposedly temporary and effective only in
times of national emergency. This then implies the hostility of Southeast Asian regimes of exception to
political pluralism, and hence to democracy. Politics in the spirit of political pluralism is easily dismissed
either as disruptive to the presumed political order or simply terrorism.
Contrary to the mainstream globalist pronouncements that globalization will bring about a world of
liberal democracies, post-9/11 Southeast Asia is by far a region of authoritarianisms—a security complex
of authoritarianisms. Regional stability seems to come from a “peaceful coexistence among
authoritarianisms”, rather than among democracies, following the policy of non-interference which every
government in the region normatively proclaims. The region is progressing towards the resurgence, or
deepening of, a variation of authoritarianisms: (semi-)authoritarian regimes in Malaysia and Singapore;
the military governments in Myanmar and Thailand; the monarchy in Brunei; one-party rule in Laos,
Cambodia, and Vietnam; a military general leadership in Indonesia; and an administration predisposed to
authoritarianism and the militarization of the cities and countryside in the Philippines. Time and again,
numerous researches conducted to guide policies for protecting human rights have identified the
conditions under which governments and people are most likely to commit large scale murder, torture,
and arbitrary imprisonment. They conclude that authoritarianism, alongside war and poverty, can lead to
large scale human rights violations. [3]
The toppling of two military regimes—Ferdinand Marcos’ in the Philippines in 1986 and Suharto’s in
Indonesia in 1998—were regarded as democratic moments, signaling the process of democratization in
the broader region. This comes at a time when the dominant discourse from mainstream scholars and
policy-makers adhering to either the modernization theory or the transitions perspective prophesies that
economic liberalization encourages the development of liberal and democratic modes of governance.
Empirically, Southeast Asia appears to demonstrate a quite different prospectus from this dominant
discourse. In fact, pace modernization theory and transitions perspective, globalization may mean the end
of liberal democracy rather than its triumphant ascendancy. Historically, if there is any cogent lesson that
the past two decades have shown about the relationship between democracy and political-economic
regime, it is that capitalism can thrive and survive even without democracy. Southeast Asian elites do not
necessarily become forces for political liberalism and democracy, they can be downright illiberal and antidemocratic
so long as it serves their interests.
What the ongoing campaign against terrorism in the case of Southeast Asia signifies is that “security” can
thrive, and can be promoted, even without democracy. The war on terror project has thus stalled the
process of democratization in the region, paving the way for a protracted institutionalization of
authoritarianism. And herein lies a serious security challenge in Southeast Asia. The war on terror carried
out under authoritarian auspices is not reproducing regional security as its most ardent proponents
suggest. Above all, it is generating the reproduction of social antagonisms that spring from the very logic
of the repressive practices of authoritarianism itself.
From Developmental Statism to Neo-liberalism
Southeast Asia has purportedly followed a development paradigm referred to as “developmental statism”
that made possible the “East Asian Miracle,” in which Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand are
among the high performing Asian economies (together with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong
Kong) that registered high growth with high equity during the period of 1965-1990. This Southeast Asian
model of development is characterized by state involvement in the economy through a strong “industrial
policy” that coordinates a whole set of economic policies and institutions, as well as by a strong
manufacturing sector that is synergistically linked to agriculture and services.
The Washington Institutions consider this development strategy as “bad” economics based on their neoliberal
ideology which posits that markets are efficient and that government intervention in the economy
distorts market efficiency. Instead, they prescribe the realization of an open market economy through
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in the macroeconomic economic policies of privatization,
liberalization, deregulation, and fiscal reforms. These SAPs have been imposed especially to highly
indebted countries of Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. September 11 and its aftermath offered
an opportunity for the Washington Institutions and their neo-liberal proponents to restructure the
political and economic apparatuses of the state to be more responsive to the demands of the market
forces than the multitude, and hence accelerating the financial and economic reforms initiated right after
the 1997 Asian economic crisis. The Americanization of development strategy in the context of post-
9/11 allows for active state involvement in the economy so long as states pursue “market friendly”
policies without fear or favor.
The destructive attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center were initially thought of as a crisis
of US geopolitical security and of global capitalism. Post-9/11 political economy is, however, revealing
that this supposed crisis is becoming functional to US geopolitical and economic interests. The terror
attacks have led to the restructuring of US security and political-economic agenda in the context of
contemporary historical juncture. Importantly, 9/11 has resulted in a series of internal reorganization of
Southeast Asian states in line with the requirements of a “securitized global competitiveness”, or of neoliberal
globalization in the context of post-9/11 security dynamics.
A little over a month after 9/11, the World Economic Forum organized the East Asia Economic Summit
2001 that came up with the conclusion on the need “to tackle the root causes of terrorism and enduring
poverty in developing countries”, and accordingly called for “a new development paradigm based on fair
trade and equitable partnerships between developing countries and developed ones.” [4] State leaders,
business leaders, and technocrats who participated in the Summit recognized the existence of uneven
development in the world between rich and poor countries, realized the close connection between global
political and economic security, proposed development as a security strategy, and affirmed their shared
interests in counterterrorism. However, this common commitment and understanding for securitydevelopment
in East and Southeast Asia has been imperiled because of the apparent return of the US
and other developed countries to the political economy of security along Cold War terms. But this time it
is framed in the language of a bifurcated worldview between “zones of safety” and “zones of danger”.
The categorization of Southeast Asia as “terrorist hot spot”, alongside the release of numerous travel
advisories for citizens of rich countries, defines Southeast Asia as a zone of danger. Notwithstanding the
implied double standard of the US and the West, this categorization discourages the investments needed
for economic growth and overall development in the developing region.
The post-9/11 security-development nexus in Southeast Asia suggests that security concerns have
implications for the restructuring of political and economic relations in the region. In particular, the
selective logic of the capitalist market is guided by the coercive arm of security. Regional supporters of
the US-led war on
terror were promised preferential trade access to US market. For instance, when
Thaksin’s Thailand implemented tough counterterrorism measures, the US called
it a major “non-NATO ally”, and signed a bilateral trade agreement with Thailand.
The securitization of neo-liberal globalization in Southeast Asia compels the restructuring of institutions
in ways that are much more responsive to capitalist market forces than to popular democratic ones. It also
calls for change in human values, putting premium on private sector, private property, and their attendant
values in the conduct of social life. This is the context within which security is promoted at this time—
one that works for the market and with the market. Government and social institutions are mobilized to
sustain this system of private appropriation to provide certain degree of predictability for capital. To a
large extent, they also manage market forces through policies of privatization (the sale of public assets to
private investors) and liberalization (opening up of restricted markets to competition). Equally important
for the system is that market forces are institutionally managed through the reorientation of regulation—
in particular, a regulatory framework in a regime of de-regulation. However, the central task of this
regulation under a neoliberal regime is to secure the interest of business, and not of the broader citizenry.
But again, the accountability of the market—whose conduct of business implicates the rest of the society
—is not sanctioned. It therefore enforces the separation of “the economic” from “the political” in
capitalist discipline as well as the paradox at the heart of capitalist production: the exclusion of the poor
and workers from wealth and yet their inclusion in the circuits of its production. Furthermore, it implies
that states, and hence the people of Southeast Asia, will be the absorber of risks as well as failures of
market adventurism.
Particularist and exclusivist identities are so often a response to something universal. The neo-liberal
development paradigm, with its mathematics-like attempt for universal applicability as well as its allembracing
social implications, is essentially conflictive for human relations. Accordingly, neo-liberalism in
a framework of authoritarianism is inherently unstable and conflict-ridden. Likewise, the attempt to
reproduce capitalism across Southeast Asia is tantamount to reproducing social antagonisms from society
to society in the region. A much bolder security-development project that brings back Southeast Asia to
the track of democratization is, by all means, ambitious; but it is utterly necessary to resolve the
contradictions of authoritarian liberalism.
Towards a Democratic Security-Development Policy
Mindful of the historical dynamics of the political economy of conflicts in Southeast Asia, as well as the
contemporary regimes of authoritarian liberalism across the region, a democratic security-development
policy built from the bottom up is herein proposed. The starting point for the proposal is that securitydevelopment
policy is essentially a social endeavor that implicates the rest of society. Any securitydevelopment
policy must therefore be historically sensitive, socially embedded, and culturally specific.
Hence, the only social ideal that can perfectly capture this proposal is democracy, especially if by
democracy we mean “democracy as a social relation”, in which “the political”, “the economic”, “the
cultural”, and all the other spheres of social life are not separated from, or merely reflective of, one
another, but rather organically connected.
In this sense, then, political democracy does not only mean the enjoyment of liberal freedoms and equally
weighted votes among enfranchised citizens, it also means the rule of the demos and its original
signification as “popular power”. Cultural democracy is about being and not about having, in which every
human being is respected for who one is and not for what one owns. Economic democracy is not simply
about equitable distribution of wealth, but democracy as the driving mechanism of the economy.
Democracy is therefore suggested both as means and ends of security-development for purposes of
developing peaceful security and securing real development for human beings. In a word, it is
democratization, rather than securitization, that can best develop security and secure development in the
region.
In practical terms, a program for a democratic security-development policy offers not extravagant claims
for “what to-dos”, but modest reflections on “what not to do” to guide policy for the time being in
Southeast Asia:
i. Not to imperiously deny the cultural capacity of the peoples of Southeast Asia for
economic, political, and cognitive development;
ii. Not to come up with security-development policies that are devoid of context,
history, and culture; and
iii. Not to forget the salience of state-level perspective in security-development
analysis and policy because the state remains the point of concentration of
instability, and hence remains the most strategic site for containing it, and, at the
same time, the only arena for acquiring peoples’ legitimacy.
The pressing need now is to have the political will at all levels of governance—from the workplace to the
state to the regional and global levels—to regard democracy both as a security-development tool and
goal. Each and every security-development policy must therefore be oriented towards the deepening of
the institutions, processes, and visions of democracy.