The new forms of capital accumulation
Let us look first at the unfolding current crisis that for sure is just beginning in global capitalism. As it was in the past, «crisis» must be understood as «opportunity» and «rebirth» (and not just simply as «destruction»). This is how the dominant groups are seeing it themselves.
On the one hand, neoliberal globalist capitalism is continuing tirelessly to destroy the previous regime of accumulation (Keynesianism). This reconfiguration has at least two facets:
Internally, it is displacing popular (and so-called «middle») classes in the global north in an endless «race to the bottom». This is seen as a new central tool to kick-start another cycle of accumulation, not only by reducing labor costs in the global north, but by also expanding the market in the global south (the millions of «middle classes» in China, India and elsewhere who will «benefit» from this shift).
Externally, it is forcing a difficult and conflictual adjustment between the different poles of globalized capitalism, i.e. the US, the EU and China (with maybe other «members» of the «BRICS»1).
Out of this is emerging, in a contradictory and chaotic manner, a new regime of accumulation which is likely to expand for some times. This means that the destructive aspects of the current crisis have to be understood at the same time as a reconstruction process. However, nothing is set in stone as if economics had a life of their own: it is not the case.2
This has of course huge political and social implications.
The accelerated destruction of the industrial working class in the global north and along with it, the proletarization and the fragmentation of the rest of the society (apart from a smaller group of winning «brokers») leads an assemblage of «white» and «blue» collars to have start their descent in life (just as they had started their ascent 50 years ago).3
In the global south, «development» is restructuring societies mostly in the BRICS and perhaps more largely in parts of Eastern and Southern Asia. Because of the expansion of capitalism in these countries, a mild, «half-hearted» Keynesianism «on the cheap» is in the cards, allowing parts of the popular and the middle classes to fell that they are «inside» the system. This neoliberalism with a «semi» human face is getting stronger through autocratic regimes (China) or through semi democratic experiments (Brazil).
Because of this contradictory evolution, current international institutions are deeply destabilized. Not only the UN, but also the World Bank, the IMF and more recently the WTO. Dominant elites are extremely satisfied that this new accumulation takes place. But as we know, these elites are not floating in the sky but embedded in various nation states and alliances.
Out of this, there is tremendous political confusion. On the one hand, Keynesian and social democratic projects are imploding and at the best, instrumentalized to humanize neoliberal globalization. «New» rightwing populist and racists projects are on the rise. Social movements and the left are destabilized, able to capitalize on massive discontent through huge mobilizations, but unable to transform this into a counter hegemonic project.
The wounded tiger
The elite in the US is really threatened by these development, not so much because of the rise of the BRICS, but because the EU (and Japan) are much better placed to profit from the new cycle. The US is blogged with its variety of Keynesianism that «distributed» to popular classes not so much the trickle of its own accumulative process, but the siphoning up of the world surplus. It is like a total inflated obese corpse that is unable to go on a diet. EU and Japan corporate elites on the other hand never had this «opportunity» and were forced to compete in the global market through more mundane strategies of productivity-enhancing capital restructuring and new alliances.
Toni Negri is right by distinguishing the «Empire» related to the new neoliberal accumulation cycle and «imperialism» linked with more traditional forms of control. Certainly, the US is locked in with the latter. But at the same time, it does not have the capacities to sustain the onslaught, as we have seen over the last 15 years (before Bush) in the Middle East in particular. Despite (or maybe because) its enormous military superiority, the US is winning so many battles but losing the war. It has not much to offer to local «multitude», but worse, it cannot assure the re-establishment of its domination on the long term, because of local resistance, but also because of the discrete opposition of the EU and the BRICS).
Because of these factors that are well-known in the US, the elite has been tempted to adapt the «neoconservative» agenda, which is to remilitarize and focus much more the American project on its capacity to intimidate, conquer, destroy. There is consensus yet however, because so far, large parts of the elites are hesitating. For example, the decision to attack Iran taken last year by the Bush administration was put back because there was no consensus about it. Some thought simply that it was too much dangerous especially in the context of the mess in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, the neocons are on the defensive, but let us be careful: it is more on the manner in which they are proposing to rebuild US hegemony than on the substance that there are disagreements. In the meantime, the US is acting often like an erratic and angry wounded tiger. Everyday that goes on, US imperialism is deploying using this «arc in crisis» (from Jakarta to Casablanca) as the epicenter of their new hegemonic aspiration.
Hegemony and counter hegemony
As usual, subaltern groups are at the same time objects and subjects, victims and actors in the global crisis. The main vehicles of political and economic emancipation have been, in the global north, social democratic and socialist movements (political parties and affiliated trade unions and social movements), and in the global south, national liberation movements (from the moderate anti-colonial organizations to radicalized projects like those in China or Vietnam).4
The question is: is this era over? This not to say that all of these movements will fiddle out in the sky (or in the sea), nor they are necessarily managed by corrupted «treacherous» leaders. The big mistake would also to think that they cannot do anything for the working masses. On the contrary to be explicit, these movements will still be around for decades, that they are often led by genuine movements and respectable people and that thy can time and again at least alleviate the impact of the capitalist restructuring. Nonetheless, their political project, their ultimate goal to establish a hegemonic project alternate to global capitalism and imperialism, is dead.
Why is that?
First, socialist counter-hegemonic projects have been strategically defeated in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. There are millions of reasons to that including the fact that it started in a semi-peripheral capitalist country (Russia) and failed to become hegemonic in the heartland of capital (Germany). Also that
the point of departure for the 20th century revolutionaries was a mix of two contradictory ideas: on the one hand, to establish another (post capitalist) social regime; on the other hand, to «catch up» with the powerful capitalist countries, which is the perspective that eventually became dominant. The catching up was basically a trap, not mainly because it could not be done (China is doing it), but because it killed the utopian aspirations that gave its meaning in the first place. Maybe in 500 years, some historians will say that the project came up too soon (it was the opinion of Lenin by the way).
Second, social democratic platforms, which never had the intention to replace capitalism and were happy to tame, control, civilize it, are on the descent. They became powerful because they captured the energy of the surging working classes of the global north during the accumulation phase of the 20th century and also, which is not easily admitted by them, because capitalist elites were afraid of the «red» menace. Once it became clear that this was in a terminal disease, Keynesian «compromises» became more and more useless «lifting the carpet» so to speak of social democracy. Social democrats, out of this configuration, are becoming social-liberals, not because they like it, not because they are abandoning their old ideals, but because there is no political space, under current accumulation patterns, for Keynesianism of the old kind.
Finally, the same process happens, but much more viciously, in the global south. Post independence states are «adjusted» (SAPs) to the «realities» of the «market» (neoliberal globalized capitalism). Ex radical national liberation movements (Mozambique), middle-of-the roaders state builders (India) and of course ex neocolonial territories (Indonesia) are dominating an agenda of social regression for the popular and middle classes whereas millions of people are condemned to death. When it does not work because people resist too much, the process becomes extremely violent, quasi genocidal. The old demons of racism, ethnism, barbarism are all resuscitated. If people and ex and post liberation movements still do not capitulate, there is always the option of fencing and caging them like we see in Gaza to an abusive extent.
In that context by the way, It is probable that Gaza is not an exception or a strange twist, but rather a «laboratory» that will be accompanied by many other encirclements and imprisonments of poor people with ultimately monstrous black holes like Guantanamo or Bagram.
From old to new left
This global apartheid while restructuring the world is forcing «multitudes» to stand up and fight. And all over the place they are resisting. Even when the left was massively crushed in the 1970s and the 1980s in South and Central America for example, the spirit of resistance was never far from the agenda. More recently the mole came out even stronger than before, for example through spectacular uprisings in Bolivia, Nepal and many other countries where counter hegemonic forces were capable of overthrowing apparently strong regimes (Argentina).
In most places, the global intifada remains a «low intensity» insurgency, constantly blocking neoliberal reforms, cracking the walls in terms of social demands and expressing new identities (Mexico, South Africa). In this endless struggle, political and social formations evolved, come up and down, are creatively transformed from below, or drifting towards insignificance. It is a bit complicated !
What is striking is the general disjunction between the global intifada and traditional social and political formations. In most cases, the uprisings are coming from semi formalized networks, often led by subaltern groups within the popular classes. «Old» and even «new» left formations are at the best participating, but most of them they play a minor role (maybe Nepal is an exception).
«Old» left mostly communist parties are faced with a huge identity crisis. Even strong organizations like SACP (South Africa) and CPM (India) are unable to resolve the contradiction between the impossible return to the «glorious» past (revolution and socialist project a la Soviet Union) and the impossible alliance with social liberalism. If they are very clever (like CPM), they keep alive by sub-managing social liberalism but even that becomes very difficult. In Western Europe, this is definitely out of the question.
«Left» social democrats that were dominant in many social movements, mostly in the global north, face similar problems. Now they are inspired by the attempts of «reform» in places like Brazil where the traditional PT alliance (between labor, middle classes, poor peasants) is stressed under the pressure of managing social liberalism. But it is likely that this inspiration will not last. At the best, the social liberals in South America and elsewhere are able to negotiate the terms with global apartheid, as we see in some of the BRICS standing up to USA and EU in the WTO process. The contradiction becomes more intense because the wounded tiger is under stress, not only from the global south, but also from the EU and even perhaps China whose ruling classes now have become convinced to a large extent that the neoconservative is threatening capitalism more than the Jihadists and what remains of the left.
In front of these traditional left formations are «new» left groupings that came alive mostly in the 1970s through left splits within communist and socialist formations or through labor and feminist insurgencies. Some of these refer to a post-Maoist legacy. Others are in more in line with the tradition of the 4th International. Most are now hybrid and recomposed and sometimes able to represent strong opposition to social liberalism like we see in France, Italy, India, Brazil, Quebec and elsewhere. Where they are stronger, the «old-new» left is debating how to rearticulate a political project that appears as counter-hegemonic, a sort of a vast anti capitalist alliance. New «rainbow» alliances are emerging bringing together different «old-left» traditions and new social identities from social activists mostly.
The mobile identity of the global intifada
The challenges of the left are multiple. On the one hand, the left tries to break with the terrible legacy of the past with this strong core that was based on belief (one could say, quasi religious) and not analysis: the proletariat would take over and save humanity, Marxism was the science to lead us on that route, «we» (the organized left) were the webmasters of that science, etc. etc. When these beliefs were not captured and distorted by gatekeepers and spoilers like it was in many places starting with the Soviet Union, it produced at the best vulnerable if not miserable processes that had no chance to become counter hegemonic. When these beliefs were adopted and flexibilized (like in China, Vietnam and Cuba), it succeeded in changing the relation of forces, at least for a while.
But these debates are not central at this point because indeed, who not one cares about the «science of Marxism» and the «revolutionary leadership of the party» these days apart from a few nostalgic. What is more important is to identify the relevance and the importance of the left in the PRESENT intifada.
The positive things are that many proposals are being developed. For sure, the World Social Forum has been the incubator and the space on which a lot of these ideas were confronted, discussed, examined. To diminish that process is ridiculous. To affirm that there are serious limitations in the process is another thing, however, it remains to see exactly what we mean by that.
It is not thinkable that the global intifada can at this point hope to break down the structures of global apartheid. It is exaggerating it’s capacity, scope and utopian thinking. The prospects are not necessarily easy to contemplate, but we are at the beginning (not the end) of a vast social and political recomposition of the left, which is parallel (not identical) to the recomposition of the popular classes through global apartheid. We need time and in that interlude, we need to use a good combination of defense and offense.
We need, in a way, what is a metaphor and not as a model: a new ‘Anti Japanese United Front’ whereas the Maoist insurgency was able to do many things at the same time:
– Become hegemonic in the battle of ideas, appearing as THE political and social project able to save the ‘nation’.
– Position itself at the heart of those of a ‘rainbow’ alliance bringing together social movements and identities.
– Build its own forces, political and otherwise, and not count or depend on other forces (that was the breaking point with the Soviets at that time).
Transform defense into offense (the famous rules of guerilla warfare), imagine how to ‘retreat’ creatively.
– Be modest, adapt a serve the people attitude which is not moralistic but political. Know and say that transformation is a very long term agenda.
If we briefly take these points one after the other, it might help to define our goals and objectives.
It is not true contrary to fantasies sometimes expressed by the left that ‘we’ have won the battle of ideas. Far from it. For sure, people are fed up with the consequences of neoliberalism, they are angry. But more often than not, this anger is captured by demagogues like political Islam in the arc of crises or pseudo left nationalism and populism elsewhere. There are so many ‘fronts’ in that battle. However, the idea of democratic citizenship is perhaps central. Democracy without citizenship is the spin of the global apartheid and we need to debunk that, but, contrary to our past, not by promoting an alternative ‘genuine’ strong leadership, but on the contrary, geometry of power where citizens are at the base.
In addition there is the issue of engaging global apartheid on its own terrain of ‘cognitive capitalism’ where as the forces of science and techniques are harnessed to strengthen the current regime of accumulation and NOT, contrary to what is being said, to free up people from labor and diseases.
Building the ‘rainbow alliances’ is sometimes what most of us are familiar with. This is what happened in India (IPF) back in the 1980s and it was wonderful. Palestinians did it with the first Intifada. Social alliances were developed under labor and community organizations and translated politically in Brazil,, Mexico, Bolivia. Many us of became the core of a new social accumulation of forces through Seattle, Goteborg, Genoa, Quebec City. We created coalitions and coalitions on political, thematic and sectoral lines on which we spent tremendous amounts of energies in Morocco, Niger, South Africa. We pushed that process forward through local Social forums all over the place.
Today, we are centrally engaged in the discussion about ‘politicizing’ these new alliances, struggling at the same time against ‘NGOism’ and attempts on the other side of the political spectrum to instrumentalize the alliances into short term, sectarian projects.
Many of us are parts of new political formations, alliances and networks, however, we see these phenomena as useful as far as it liberates the new social movements and identities, and NOT because they hope to build themselves a little space in the current political reality (we don’t believe in that).
We know we need our own spaces, organizations, apparatus. We do not believe that it is satisfactory to remain at the intellectual level; we need to get dirty, we need our own organizational space, limiting (not escaping) the bureaucratization of. This is the principle of the AJUF: without our own ‘red army’, we are nothing. With it however, we might be totally irrelevant, unless we can define yourself in the broader picture.
Using the Gramscian imagery of the war of position, we need to infiltrate the trenches of the adversary. But contrary to the same imagery, we should not just ‘take control’ of these trenches, but rather destroy them and build alternative fortifications. This is also the metaphor about the State that was expressed by Marx and Lenin: you cannot simply ‘take it’ because it will take you instead. The core values of self-management, collective identities, decentralization, locally-led processes need to be re-emphasized, despite the dangers attached to them (balkanization): the left needs to break out of the authoritarian dead-end.
Once that said, we do not believe that the State and its repressive apparatus will ‘fiddle away’ and that we in our little ‘communes’ will be able to build our socialist islands. We are standing up, we are not escaping, but we decide our own terrains of engagement.
‘When the enemy attacks, we retreat. When it stops, we encircle them. When it retreats, we attack’ once said Mao taking the Q from Sun Tzu and later this was reproduced elsewhere throughout space and time. Only a few political movements were triggered differently to ‘jump’ over history but at the end of the day, as Lenin himself founded after trying his best, it is not possible indeed to re-engineer the shaping of historical forces.5
At the end of the day, we are nothing if we are not parts and parcels of a large popular movement. For this, ethical and moral dimensions are important. The highest moral standards are necessary in order to gain more legitimacy in a world where popular cynicism has reached unprecedented levels in front of the political and moral disintegration of not only the elites, but of other social and political groups as well. This slackening of ethics in the left is by the way fueling the ‘politics of despair’ captured by various brands of demagogic politics.