The recently held Bihar Assembly elections highlight both the need for and the obstacles against the emergence of a much needed Left Democratic Alternative (LDA). At this time, the LDA can be envisioned only as a future alternative to the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) cum Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA). In the event an LDA comprised of communists, who are currently divided into many formations, does become a reality, the LDA will likely confront both the Congress and the BJP, the latter perhaps as a single merged party or as close allies. But, at this juncture, this eventuality is purely hypothetical because a lot has to happen before an LDA can become a reality.

In the meantime, it is incumbent upon communists to prevent the return of BJP to power either at the Centre or in any other state and dislodge them from Gujarat, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand and Bihar where they have managed to win elections on their own or as part of a coalition. This is not only because of the simplistic, albeit important, issue of secularism and communal harmony but much more. Notwithstanding the inner bickering in BJP, between BJP and RSS and between various sects of Hindutva (in the long run this is of little relevance, although CPI makes a big issue of it), RSS remains the ideological-political head of the NDA. RSS has a long-term plan for India. It does not operate simply as a political formation that wishes to form the government when it wins elections or sit back in opposition waiting to return to power at the next poll as has been true for the Congress. RSS wants to transform India culturally, politically and socially well beyond the immediate policies that are carried out by its political front, which may happen to be in government or in the opposition. RSS’s operations do not depend upon who is in power in Delhi, NDA or UPA. RSS and its many offshoots are doing their job as well, or almost as well, now as they were doing between 1998 - 2004. On the political front, they are not in control in New Delhi but they control six states; four out of these six, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh, are known to possess significant communist influence.

Given the danger of the emergence of Hindutva as the basic polity of India, the policies of the Communist Party of India (CPI) and CPI (Marxist) that are aimed at keeping NDA out of power are rational. At the same time CPI-CPI(M) are doing little to weaken the social and cultural base of Hindutva under the illusion that Hindutva forces will eventually disappear if they are not in power in Delhi and if inner skirmishes in their outfits become uglier. While a rational criticism expressed in a friendly way of the role played by CPI-CPM in the Coordinating Committee is both justifiable and desirable, a hostile attack is not conducive to building an LDA; it reveals a lack of an all-India perspective and a vision of a party for its own sake and not for the people of India. Disagreements should be presented as serious polemics rather than sarcastic ruthless attacks. Denunciation and polemics are not the same; in fact they are negation of each other. For example, there can be serious disagreement on the support offered by CPI and CPM to the UPA government or the economic and labor policies of the West Bengal government but this does not and should not be taken to imply that such support or such policies are criminal or pro-imperialist.

In the final analysis only an LDA can ensure defeat of the Hindutva forces; Congress is neither capable of it nor is its cadre committed to such a task. But an LDA capable of fulfilling this task as yet does not exist and cannot emerge without going through a process.

How can the LDA emerge? To begin with, LDA means a front of communist parties; the main ones, but not the only ones, being CPI, CPI (M) and CPI (ML). Joint activities, seat adjustments during election, mass struggles, comradely and non-antagonistic behavior with the cadre and leaders of other parties, etc. are conductive to the formation of LDA but not sufficient. CPI invited the General Secretary of CPI (ML) to address its Congress and showed a willingness to jointly fight the Bihar elections. CPI highlighted the need of a LDA at its recent 19^th Congress as did CPI (ML) at its 7^th Congress in 2002. And yet CPI fought the elections jointly with Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), Forward Bloc (FB) and the dubious Lok Janshakti Party (LJP) of Paswan; as expected neither CPI nor this front made any gains through this manœuvre, on the other hand it lost seats. It is very possible that both CPI and CPI (ML) would have gained had they fought together. Ultimately, the people punished both parties for following separate paths.

First and foremost, the building of LDA requires a national as opposed to a regional outlook both politically and organizationally. By and large CPI, CPI (M) and CPI (ML) and for that matter all other communist groups do have a national outlook; the differences in the national outlook of different organizations are propelled primarily by organizational considerations. The activities of all communist parties primarily consist of opposing something as opposed to fighting for a positive program; the smaller they are the greater is their vigour and stance as an oppositional force. Ultimately, however, both at regional as well as national level, the LDA has to present itself as an alternative party of governance taking cognizance of international and national constraints. Ideological differences also exist; they may appear major but they are a minor factor because each ideology leaves a lot of room to differ or to unite.

The major hurdle against building a LDA is organizational. CPI (M) which by all accounts is the largest of the communist parties with several mass organizations and significant appeal amongst progressive intellectuals is unfortunately also the major impediment. Because CPI (M) seems satisfied with its strong base in West Bengal, Tripura and Kerala, all its moves are determined by the single consideration of retaining this base rather than expanding it. Any expansion of CPI (M) can only be materialized through LDA and not on its own. An unfortunate corollary of this policy is the dependence of CPI on CPM, more or less preventing CPI from taking independent initiatives. The fact that CPI did not join CPM in a joint electoral front in Bihar was not so much an exercise of its independence but rather showed the indifference of CPI (M) towards Bihar. Unfortunately this is the state of affairs in other major and minor states. It is true that communist parties other than CPI (M) and CPI are weak in terms of parliamentary considerations but they have tremendous mobilizing power, in some way more than the two major parties. At some stage, sooner the better, the bitterness born out of the CPM-Naxalite antagonism of the late 1960’s has to come to an end. If and when CPI (M) and CPI feel that 60 seats in the Indian Parliament are not enough (and indeed they are not enough), they need to take a friendly and comradely attitude towards CPI(ML) and other left groups and parties and begin to think in terms of ruling India rather than just opposing the rulers. If and when this happens, the process of forming LDA will begin earnestly.

There are many countries in the South where an anti-communist culture either does not exist or is not a decisive factor in the country’s polity. India is one of them. People have elected communist governments in parts of India for almost 50 years and have rewarded them with electoral victories whenever and wherever they deserved it on the basis of their political program. People have neither full faith in UPA nor in NDA. A large section of progressive intellectuals find communist parties too dogmatic and undemocratic in their functioning and stuck on the Soviet model of socialism; consequently they form independent pressure groups rather than joining mass fronts of the communist parties. All these forces will welcome the creation of LDA and it is their right to demand that communists meet this challenge.