THE PEACE process between India and Pakistan cannot possibly be called
irreversible, as some of our leaders want us to believe, while the
nuclear threat the old rivals pose to each other remains intact. From
this perspective one of the most important statements that were made in
2005 came at the fag end of the year from IAEA chief Mohammad ElBaradei.

In an interview to CNN after he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Mr
ElBaradei had expressed serious concern about the nuclear threat that
came from three seemingly intractable issues that continue to worry the
world - the Palestine question in the Middle East, North Korea and Kashmir.

That Mr ElBaradei’s remarks highlighting the threat from the nuclear
hotspots went largely unnoticed speaks volumes of the cavalier attitude
many of us tend to betray towards an ever looming calamity.

And if Kashmir is a nuclear flashpoint as a person of Mr ElBaradei’s
eminence no less suggests it is then the year 2006 has to see to it that
the threat is weeded out with utmost priority. The proposed visit to
South Asia by US President George W. Bush can go either way in this
regard. It can legitimize India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal by
giving them Congressional approval, while leaving the Kashmir issue
simmering. Or it can leave India and Pakistan with the key task of
resolving their bloody dispute with the kind of seriousness that has so
far eluded them, more worryingly as nuclear states.

Opening up new routes along the Line of Control plus a few other
confidence-building measures in Punjab and Rajasthan-Sindh areas have
marked a tectonic shift in India-Pakistan bilateral relations no doubt.
In 2002 these measures would have looked unthinkable. But seen together
with the frequent negative comments that keep interrupting these signs
of hope, such as the jingoistic remarks that came from the Bharatiya
Janata Party on Kashmir last week, there are serious reasons to worry
for the future.

The medieval sultans of Delhi used to be addressed as a Zill-i-Ilahi, or
shadow of God on earth. President Bush may consider himself the latter
day avatar of the Delhi sultan with a global mission. But he needs to
heed the warnings from history if he wants his mission to Delhi to be
successful.

A 10-year old article by George C. Herring, Professor of History at the
University of Kentucky, deals with the problems faced in the Middle East
and South Asia by the Kennedy administration. There are vignette’s from
history that could serve as lessons for President Bush and for our
policy-makers too.

“In both the Middle East and South Asia, the Kennedy administration
launched bold initiatives to shift the world’s balance of power in
favour of the United States. In each case, the initiative ran afoul of
regional rivalries. In South Asia, John F. Kennedy’s efforts to
cultivate goodwill with India merely antagonized the United States’
longstanding ally, Pakistan, without tearing India away from its
neutralist cold war stance.

“In the Middle East, the administration’s efforts to befriend Gamal
Abdel Nasser’s United Arab Republic (the shrot-lived marriage between
Egypt and Syria) resulted in only limited, short-term success while
alienating the United States’ traditional ally, Israel, and the more
conservative Arab states such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

“The United States enjoyed the most success where it attempted the
least, with neutral Afghanistan. Fearing that a 1961 border dispute
between Pakistan and Afghanistan might force the latter into the arms of
the Soviet Union, the Kennedy administration dispatched diplomat
Livingston Merchant to encourage a peaceful settlement. Merchant failed,
and tensions between the two northern-tier nations persisted, but the
result was not what the United States had feared.

“As Pakistan leaned toward Communist China in the aftermath of the
Sino-Indian war of 1962, Afghanistan eased away from Moscow. A visit to
the United States in September 1963 by the Afghan king and queen seemed
to confirm Afghanistan’s neutralism and establish it as one of the prime
showcases of East-West ‘competitive coexistence’.

“In contrast, the Kennedy policy toward the more complex and intractable
rivalry between India and Pakistan was a notable failure. Kennedy and
his advisers agreed that the Eisenhower administration had erred in
condemning Indian neutralism and tying US fortunes in the region
exclusively to India’s bitter enemy Pakistan. The administration
attached special importance to India, the world’s largest democracy, and
set out to cultivate its goodwill. The president initiated a warm,
personal correspondence with Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru,
dispatched Vice President Lyndon Johnson to New Delhi on a personal
goodwill mission, and initiated a large economic aid programme to
support India’s industrial development.

“Washington’s tilt toward New Delhi was already well along when a border
war between India and China in October 1962 provided what seemed a
splendid opportunity to tighten the relationship. The United States
immediately sent military aid to beleaguered India. To mollify an
increasingly concerned Pakistan, the administration sought to use the
leverage provided by aid to India to work out a settlement of the bitter
dispute between the two nations over Kashmir.

“US policy failed on all counts. Under pressure from the United States,
India and Pakistan did agree to talks on Kashmir, but the gap between
the two could not be bridged and the talks broke down without tangible
results.

“Deeply alarmed at the US tilt toward India, Pakistan moved noticeably
toward Peking. It concluded a provisional border demarcation agreement
with China in December 1962 and arranged a series of much-publicized
state visits between the two nations’ top leaders. Still enticed by the
idea of luring India into close ties with the United States, Kennedy in
his last months in office toyed with the possibility of a vastly
expanded military aid programme. The administration eventually bowed to
budgetary pressures and Pakistani protests, however, and approved a
programme of only $50 million per year. Annoyed at Washington’s lack of
support, India turned increasingly to the Soviet Union for aid. US
policies thus broke down in the face of intractable regional tensions,
alienating Pakistan while failing to gain the United States significant
influence with India.”

The China factor is again being touted by President Bush’s advisers as a
reason to engage more closely with South Asia. Unlike Kennedy’s $50
million military aid to India they seem even willing to commit the
disaster of changing the definitions of non-proliferation to indulge
India and Pakistan. President Bush perhaps needs to have a word with Mr
ElBaradei before coming here in late February or early March.