The term ‘post-LTTE’ is a misnomer; there will be no post-LTTE period in a political sense. There will certainly be a ‘post-LTTE as a conventional army’ phase, and there will be a ‘post-Prabaharan’ phase if the government succeeds in catching and killing him as it intends to. I can also discern a ‘post-hope’ or disheartened and subdued stage in Tamil nationalism, within the Island, which could last maybe months or over a year. It is not uncommon to see middle class Tamils slink around, cowed down, head bowed. People with deep LTTE paranoia, have pointed out to me: “See, so-and-so, he is really an LTTE sympathiser; remember the way be used to talk? Now not a squeak out of the bugger - slinks away when he sees me”. Indeed, a great majority of Tamils, whether previously sympathetic to the LTTE or not, are downcast; only a particular type of Tamil rejoices in GoSL’s military victory.

Yes, all this is post-something, but it is not post-LTTE in three important ways. First, it is not ‘post Tamil nationalist’; on the contrary we are entering a period when Tamil nationalism is angry and its mood hardening. That ‘so-and-so bugger’ is only biding his time; only fools imagine that he has mended his ways, seen the true unitary light, and come to the blessed faith at the alter of state and regime. What goes on in the diaspora and what goes on in the Island cannot be polar opposites. Indeed, in private, Lankan Tamils voice pleasure when they get a chance to talk freely about the big protest movements overseas. Sinhala chauvinist state power, including the current version, is incapable of solving the national question for reasons to do with its own internal composition and because of Lanka’s historical carryovers of decades.

At the same time, one thing is certain, the Sinhala State is not about to disappear, hence the national question will remain unresolved and bitterly contested, because, at the core of the matter, lies the question of the nature of the state. Therefore, continuance of conflict by this, or other, or several means is inevitable. This is not what intelligent people should be inclined to describe as a post-LTTE scenario. Whether post-war Tamil nationalism will be led by the old or a new LTTE, or by a new grouping (in which former LTTErs will, necessarily, play a major role), I cannot now say.

Secondly, there is the question of the Tamil diaspora. Post! Heavens no, the diaspora seems to be all pro-LTTE, more so than before. It is my prognostication that the diaspora will move increasingly into a leadership role in the Lankan (internal) Tamil national movement. In the absence of a credible alternative within the Island, this will be the trend. It is a good development if it facilitates a change from silly, AK-47 and RPG popping youth militancy, to a more balanced political and global diplomatic approach, and closer alliances with non-opportunist left and democratic organisations in the south. The slogan of the moment has to be: Put politics in command. My concern is whether the diaspora, as yet, understands and grasps this task, whether it can get its act together and evolve a unified leadership to win acceptance among Tamils across the West.

These are early days; it remains to be seen. Obviously the ability of the diaspora’s different strands to rise up to this historic task, to change; that is the issue! A new leadership will not come out of thin air; it will emerge from existing proven forces, so this is a critical question. The real test comes in the months ahead, post prevailing hostilities, when the drama of mammoth demonstrations is past and the time for patient political and organisational reflection resumes.

The overseas ‘13^th Amendmentists’ (there are but a handful among Tamils domiciled at home), the overseas Sangareeites and Douglasites (in cahoots with the regime), and the recent Mount Lavinia Hotelites and Basil’s much sought after Tamil investors of the morrow, none of this menagerie constitute a credible alternative leadership for Tamil nationalism. These guys don’t count, so forget about them. [It’s nice to be a Marxist and not a Tamil nationalist; one can take a step back, survey the scene like “stout Cortez”, and make unpopular pronouncements!]

The third reason I think ‘post-LTTE’ is a misnomer is that the outcome of the next phase of LTTE combat, reversion to guerrilla warfare, is uncertain. I concede that this is the weakest of the three points – though all other commentators dwell exclusively on this matter. Conditions for going back to the 1980s and 1990s do not exist; hence ‘back to the bush’ is a low priority. I certainly hope so, because it would be a diversion from what Tamil nationalism needs to do. That is, it needs to (a) put politics in command, and (b) enter into alliances with the left and democratic activities in the rest of Lanka.

We are not entering a post-LTTE phase, rather a new phase of political struggles, in the north and south, the east and west, against anti-democratic politics and a chauvinist state, not a period of compromises and capitulations as the regimes fellow travellers, the weak hearted who are forever searching for a compromise, and left opportunists within the regime, try to persuade us. How silly! Some people saw the military defeat of the LTTE, without a single step forward on the national and the democratic questions, as the opening up of some phantasmagoric new world – where, on Planet Mars? And I haven’t even touched on the impending economic debacle!