Nothing is more shattering and traumatic for a state than to experience a part of its territory seceding because of internal rebellion or external intervention or both. That is, however, exactly what happened to Pakistan when its eastern wing, known initially as East Bengal and then as East Pakistan, broke away on December 16, 1971. Bengali Muslims had constituted the most reliable support base for the Pakistan movement, but they were disillusioned soon after Pakistan came into being because economic, political and military power remained in the hands of a power elite based in West Pakistan. Over the years, separatist tendencies had been growing in East Pakistan. The trigger to the secessionism movement was provided by the 1970 general election results. The East Pakistan based Awami League won an absolute majority of 161 seats in the National Assembly comprising 300 directly elected members on a radical regionalist 6-point programme that virtually rendered Pakistan a confederation or a loose federation. This was unacceptable to the Pakistan military and the main winner in West Pakistan, the Pakistan People’s Party led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The Awami League also assumed uncompromising positions. Consequently, negotations between General Yahya Khan, Awami League leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and ZA Bhutto ended in a deadlock (Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, no publication date given).

On March 25, 1971 the Pakistan military embarked upon a massive crackdown operation in East Pakistan. Hundreds of thousands of Bengali Pakistanis fled to the Indian West Bengal and set up a resistance movement, the Mukti Bahini. The Indian authorities closely monitored the Mukti Bahini and the government in exile that the rebels set up. Thousands of Mukti Bahini cadres entered East Pakistan to fight the Pakistan Army that was seen as an occupation force. Both sides committed crimes against humanity but there can be no doubt that the Pakistan Army’s excesses were far greater. The Pakistan military in particular targeted the Hindu minority of East Pakistan. Anywhere between 300,000 to 3 million people were killed. Thousands of Bengali women were raped.

The Indian Army had been planning for months an offensive in East Pakistan, which was to take place after the monsoon rains were over. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited South Asia in the summer of 1971. He told the Indian leaders that the United States considered India the paramount power in South Asia and hoped that India and Pakistan would resolve their conflicts peacefully. He expressed understanding for Indian concerns about the millions of Bengali refugees that had fled East Pakistan and sought sanctuary in India. Meanwhile India had been preparing for a diplomatic offensive to ensure that if its army intervened in India there would not be any Chinese retaliation against it. Consequently on 9 August 1971, an Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation was signed. The treaty was for 20 years. Having secured a counterweight against possible Chinese intervention Indira Gandhi intensified diplomatic activities to muster support for India’s position on East Pakistan. Alleged human rights violations by the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan became one of the main arguments to justify military intervention. Mrs Gandhi embarked on 25 October on a worldwide tour to explain to world leaders that the situation in East Pakistan was very bad and Pakistan was doing nothing to find a political resolution of the civil war. In November ZA Bhutto was sent to China to solicit help in case of war. He did not receive much encouragement (Khan 2006: 346-7). Foreign Secretary Sultan Muhammad Khan was despatched to some western capitals to present the Pakistani point of view that the conflict in East Pakistan was an internal problem and India had no right to train and arm Bengali rebels to carry out terrorist activities inside East Pakistan. Further, that an Indian intervention would result in an all-out war (Ibid: 349-54).

In any event,a full-fledged Indian attack from all directions by the Indian Army on East Pakistan was launched on the night of 20-12 November. In response on 3 December Pakistan attacked India from West Pakistan. That did not deter the Indians who moved rapidly into East Pakistan and headed towards Dhaka. Despite resistance being put up by Pakistani troops in some placed the Indian Army quickly reached Dhaka. The Pakistan Army surrendered on 16 December. The whole ceremony was shown on Indian and international television channels. Some 93,000 Pakistani troops became prisoners-of-war. Pakistan was roundly defeated and its eastern wing seceded to become Bangladesh.

Yahya Khan was bitter about the fact that the Americans and the Chinese did not come to his rescue. This was not entirely reasonable. Kissinger solicited Chinese cooperation to achieve the limited aim of discouraging India to launch a counter-attack on West Pakistan (Aijazuddin 2007: 367-86). The US also took an initiative on 4 December 1971 to start proceedings in the Security Council for a resolution calling upon both India and Pakistan to ceasefire. Once again it sought Chinese help which was given. Although China outwardly maintained its support for the unity of Pakistan it was disillusioned with Pakistan’s ability to seek a political solution to the conflict in East Pakistan. In other words, a breakup of Pakistan seemed to have been accepted by all the major powers. The trauma of defeat and the breakup of Pakistan greatly undermined the prestige of the Pakistan military whose public relations office had been spreading fictitious stories of spectacular victories over the Indians – identical to the propaganda offensive during the 1965 war.

In any event, following the surrender at Dhaka on 16 December it took the Pakistan Military High Command another two days to agree to the unilateral ceasefire offered by Indira Gandhi in the Western theatre by Yahya, apparently on the advice of President Nixon (Siddiqi 2009: 212). On 20 December 1971 General Yahya resigned and ZA Bhutto a civilian took over as Chief Martial Law Administration, president and the supreme commander!

Ishtiaq Ahmed

References

Aijazuddin, Faqir Syed, 2002, The White House and Pakistan: Secret Declassified Documents 1969-1974, Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Khan, Sultan Muhammad, 1997, Memories and Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat, Karachi: Paramount Publishing Enterprise.

Siddiqi, A. R., East Pakistan, The Endgame: An Onlooker’s Journal 1969-1971, Karachi: Oxford University Press.

The Report of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971 War: As Declassified by the Government of Pakistan, (no publication date given), Lahore: Vanguard.