Scepticism is warranted only when patterns are broken. Normally, prejudice alone will suffice. So if there is a bomb blast in a Western capital, it can only be an Islamist “terror plot”. The motivations could be chosen from a short list of grievances of a peculiarly “Islamic” nature - anger against illegal occupation of “Muslim lands” being the most favourite among them.

In the immediate aftermath of the July 22 terrorist attacks in the government quarters of Oslo, there was no room for doubt. All that was left to be done was to identify the exact name of the “jihadi” group involved (Ansar al-Jihad al-Alami, The New York Times concluded after a swift investigation [1]); and the specific motive that propelled the attack (first choice: presence of Norwegian troops in Afghanistan; second: publication of the infamous Danish cartoons in the Norwegian press; and a distant third: Colonel Gaddafi’s retaliatory attack for Norway’s participation in bombing Libya). Whatever the motive or the group, it was indisputable that it was a “terrorist” attack.

But as the day unfolded with the horrendous massacre of scores of youngsters at a camp organized by Norway’s ruling Labour Party, doubts were raised for the first time. Why should a “jihadi” target a youth gathering linked to one particular political party? Then of course, it emerged that the attacker was not a Kalashnikov-toting Arab with a turban and a long beard (the archetypal terrorist), but a Caucasian male with Norwegian citizenship.

By now the vocabulary used to describe the attack and the attacker had perceptibly changed. It was no longer a “terrorist” attack, but one carried out by an “extremist” who was a “Christian fundamentalist” with links to the “far-right” and who, above all, was most likely to be “mentally ill”. Once his 1,500-page “manifesto” and youtube video calling for a “crusade” against “cultural Marxists” and “Muslims” who were destroying Europe became public, the “he-is-mad” discourse gathered more subscribers. There was talk about the “insane maniac”, the “madman” and the “deranged guy” both in media reporting and in comments made by the grieving people of Norway. The BBC reported that doctors would study the mental health of Anders Behring Breivik to decide whether he was medically fit to stand trial [2]. A forensic psychiatrist interviewed by the BBC put forward three mental disorders that Breivik could be suffering from: paranoid psychosis, a severe narcissistic personality, or a schizoid personality disorder. Although it was not clear at the time of writing if he would plead “insanity”, the BBC cited Breivik’s lawyer as saying that the “whole case indicated that [his client was] insane” [3].

Now, he may indeed be “out of his mind” and require psychiatric care, rather than being made to face charges of terrorism. I have no intention of speculating about what went on “inside” his head. My question is – why is he perceived to be mad, despite the absence of any credible diagnosis? How do the descriptions of Breivik as a “madman” get articulated with certain received wisdoms of our time?

Two possibilities can be considered. True, efforts to portray Breivik as a “madman” could stem from a genuine incomprehension of his bloody acts of terror. Norway has not seen anything like this since the Second World War when the Nazis occupied the country. “Madness” here could be an explanatory variable used to make sense of unprecedented, shocking violence. But this still leaves us with the question why perpetrators of certain acts of violence are perceived as “terrorists”, while some others are termed “madmen”. The terminology itself offers some clues. “Madness” denies agency to the person possessed by it. S/he could not have been in the “right state of mind” to think and act rationally. Such people are irrational, often a euphemism for “mad”. The denial of agency is the crucial factor here.

If Breivik is “mad”, all the atrocities he committed can be dismissed as inexplicable. His manifesto, his youtube video, everything can be easily forgotten as the ravings of a lunatic signifying nothing except his “madness”; a term indicating behaviour that does not deserve much attention, that ought not be taken too seriously.

This precisely could perhaps be the most dangerous fallout of the discourse about Breivik the “madman” – the refusal to confront the fact that the Islamophobia and xenophobia displayed by Breivik are very much part of the mainstream of contemporary European public opinion. That he merely held the radicalized version of a very mainstream perspective. It points to a rejection of the fact that what Norway experienced was its version of Hindutva terror.

Was Osama bin Laden“mad”? The very question sounds odd and inappropriate. Bin Laden was a “terrorist” and he was not “mad” in the sense that he lacked agency.He was a mass-murderer who knew what he was up to. “Terrorism” is religiously/politically motivated, meticulously planned violence against innocent people. Rationality and consciousness define “terrorism”, not paranoid psychosis. Everything about “terrorism” is readily explainable –the motives, the financial sources and so on.Then of course, there are several Qur’anic verses and hadith that could be quoted to nail the charge once and forever.

“Terrorism” in the contemporary world means simply: “violence committed by Muslims” [4] (whom the West – and many in the East – dislike). Breivik’s owes his “madness” to the inability to frame his motives and affiliations in the common sense ideas about “terrorism”. It is the definition of “terrorism” that explains Breivik’s “insanity”, not the other way round.

Breivik is “mad”, but not a “terrorist”. Of course, he had motives (virulent hatred of Muslims being the main one) and he, if his own statements are credible, was inspired by and linked to various mainstream right-wing ideologies and groups in Europe and even India [See on ESSF (article 22361).]]. Breivik may even not have acted alone. But none of this fulfils the criteria to be termed a “terrorist”. He is only “mad” – and it accounts for everything and nothing.

On second thoughts, perhaps even pattern-breaking incidents might not result in a repudiation of prejudices.

Nandagopal R Menon