India has wilted under pressure from the US and agreed to accept
conditionalities that were not part of the G-33 proposal. The text of
the agreed draft can be accessed below (see section WT/ MIN 913)/ W /
10 - Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes):

The text:

https://mc9.wto.org/system/files/documents/decw1.pdf

and the various parts to the declaration:

https://mc9.wto.org/draft-bali-ministerial-declaration

What India has traded away:

1. Anand Sharma had unambiguously stated that the “peace clause”
should be in place till such time that a permanent solution is found.
The word “interim” that he had used IS IN the text (a clear victory),
but in what is being described by the WTO Secretariat as "constructive
ambiguity" the US position that it should be only for four years also
finds its place (Para 1) in the text by adding, "for adoption by the
11^th Ministerial Conference" (there is a WTO Ministerial once every
two years and Bali was the 9^th Ministerial. (Some experts though are
interpreting it as being in India’s favour since “interim” can be
interpreted as holding on till a permanent settlement is found
irrespective of the reference to the 11^th Ministerial).

2. While India (G-33 draft) had demanded that no member country can
drag a member state to the dispute settlement mechanism, till a
permanent settlement is found under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)
and the Agreement on Subsisdies and Countervailing Measure (ASCM),
only the AoA is mentioned in Para 2. which means that member states
can still drag India India to the dispute settlement process under
ASCM. The language has also been whittled down and instead of "shall
not“replaced with”shall refrain from", which means this guarantee is
not secure even under the AoA.

3. Most disturbingly, this agreement is (Para 2) only, "in pursuance
of public stockholding programmes for food security purposes existing
as of date". This has the following implications

(a) Minimum Support Price Mechanism cannot be introduced for crops
other than those already provided for.

(b) The quantity of foodgrains procured under the MSP cannot be
increased beyond the procurement as of date which would threaten the
NFSA in the near future.

(c) Pulses, cooking oil and other foods (other than rice, wheat or
millets specified in the NFSA) CAN NO longer be introduced in the PDS
either by the Government of India or the State Governments if they are
not being provided now. Future

(d) Governments CANNOT increase the entitlements of foodgrains
guaranteed under the NFSA which has been notified. For instance,
Chhattisgarh, amongst other states, provides 35 kgs per households but
no other state which is now providing 20 kgs or 25 kgs can increase
the quantity to 35 kgs.

(e) This may also be interpreted to mean that Government of India or
the State Governments cannot increase the price of the MSP from beyond
what has been specified now for the next four years.

4. India will now be subject to ONEROUS DATA requirements that have
been made mandatory in the agreed text. This was there in the US/ EU
text but not in the G-33 proposal which means that India has accepted
to provide details of all holdings in procurement by both States and
Government of India.

5. India will also now have to notify that they have been exceeding
the de minimis level (10% of agricultural production as the
permissible subsidy for developing countries). Para 3 (a)

6. Para (4) is one of the most problematic proposition for India which
has made its way from the US/ EU draft, "shall ensure that stocks
procured under such programmes do not distort trade or adversely
affect the food security of other members" This leaves open to
interpretation that the entire MSP mechanism that is in place for
decades and India can be dragged to the dispute settlement mechanism
by the US alleging that the entire MSP mechanism distrorts trade. So
can Pakistan alleging that India’s rice exports is distorting trade.

7. This also means that even with the most generous interpretation of
this agreeement, India will still have to continue negotiations for
the next four years till a permanent settlement is done and we have to
continue to agree to further concessions to the US/ EU while this is
being negotiated.

8. In Bali, the African Group, many members of the G-33 and LAC are
very upset with India for having bilaterally with the US a text,
whereas till this morning, they were seeking the support of all the
countries for the G-33 and Indian position. Anand Sharma had taken a
strident note till last night, and raised the hopes of most developing
countries that India would not buckle to pressure from the US/ EU.
Today his credibility and that of India is severely eroded.

As is evident, what is contained in the agreed text is a big climbdown
from what had been stated by Anand Sharma in his strongly worded
statment. We have put at stake not just the interests of 650 million
Indian farmers but also every single one of the 820 entitlement holder
under the NFSA.

Anuradha Talwar & Biraj Patnaik (Right to Food Campaign)]

(At the WTO Ministerial, Nusa Dua, Bali)