The political opposition in Egypt had,
until recently, been characterised by
bitter rivalry and mutually antagonistic
ideological positions. Collaboration
between Leftist and Nasserist elements
took place sporadically in the
second half of the 1990s. The turning
point for joint political activism came
in September 2000 with the outbreak
of the second Palestinian intifada
which gave rise to a very strong spontaneous
reaction on the Egyptian
street. It created a general sense of
anger among large sections of the general
public, most of whom had never
participated in organized politics before.
The Egyptian Popular Committee
for Solidarity with the Palestinian Intifada (EPCSPI) established by some twenty Leftist civil society organizations and activists became a
locus for a variety of political activism. It drew both Islamist activists
and Nasserists who participated either as individuals or union representatives.

The Committee organized campaigns for fund raising for
medical convoys to the Palestinian areas stimulating unprecedented
grass root participation. A first public demonstration organized on 10
September 2001 in Cairo was followed by a series of demonstrations in
support of the intifada in squares of central Cairo, major mosques, and
almost all Egyptian universities.

With the threat of war on Iraq, and later the outbreak of the war,
more demonstrations and public rallies were organized by EPSCI all
over Egypt at a level unknown in over two decades culminating in the
massive demonstration of 20 March 2003 in Cairo. Almost all political
groupings and opposition parties took part. It became a common sight
in Cairo’s main squares and universities to see banners from the
banned Communist party next to, for example, Muslim Brotherhood
controlled unions and professional syndicates, side by side with copies
of the Quran and Nasser’s photographs, all condemning the war on
Iraq. Elements of different political groups intensely collaborated and
negotiated to plan demonstrations, campaign to boycott US and
British products, send relief convoys to the Palestinian territories and
issue joint statements to prominent politicians worldwide.

While the main focus of political activism in the last three years has
been the intifada and Iraq, this new mood of joint activism has led to
the rise of initiatives, networks, and forums for political action around
different, yet related issues. For example, the Anti-Globalization Egyptian
Group (AGEG) founded in June 2002 by a group of Leftist activists
brings together people from different, if not conflicting backgrounds
such as, factory workers, leftist intellectuals, medium-size businessmen,
underground socialist activists, and unaffiliated individuals. In an
interesting development, the Muslim Brotherhood, for the first time
since the re-emergence of political activism and street politics three
years ago, participated as a group in a joint activity with the Left, the
Nasserists, various trade unions, and some civil society organizations at
the Second Cairo Conference held in December 2003 under three slogans:

“No to Capitalist Globalization and US Hegemony,” “No to the Occupation
of Iraq and Zionism in Palestine,” and “No to Authoritarianism
in the Arab Region.” Furthermore, there are recent signs of the rising
potential of an “Islamic Left” such as Islamists who are starting to articulate
their ideas more clearly along lines of class conflict and adopt a
more pluralist emancipatory approach partly in reaction to an aging
and rigid leadership.

Significantly, this new political activism is no longer organized within
formal, bureaucratic, and hierarchical political or civil society organizations but within loosely-established
horizontal networks with often fluid
and interchangeable memberships and
no hierarchical leadership structures.
Moreover, activities are organized by
individuals belonging to disparate political
camps, though mostly from the
Left, and not by organizations or political
parties. Finally, the value of individuality
and the possibility of retaining
one’s independent programme is one
of the main principles upon which alliances
between previously rival political
groups have been taking place.

  Principles of cooperation

Building an alliance between the traditional
enemies of the political opposition has not been easy. The differences
in the political programmes and ideologies of the two groups
are deeply rooted and might often seem unbridgeable. It is interesting,
therefore, to explore the foundations upon which representatives of
both groups have based their negotiations for joint action in the last
three years. Two basic principles have been employed in the process:
consensus and independence. Consensus implies that no slogans or positions are adopted that are not supported by all participants. For example, in all demonstrations, organizers emphasize the need to avoid
sectarian slogans and adopt only those which do not offend the sensibilities and ideas of participants. For example, the famous slogan of the Islamists: “Khaibar Khaibar Oh Jews, Muhammad’s army will be back,”
which is often enthusiastically endorsed by the nationalist Nasserists,
but deeply abhorred by elements on the Left, has been discarded by the
organizers at every demonstration. Achieving a consensus, besides
being time-consuming, is very limiting as certain contentious issues,
such as Palestinian suicide bombers and how to react to 11 September,
are simply dropped, causing considerable frustration to many participants who do not always want to compromise on their priorities. The second principle is to maintain independence. The objective of joint activism is not “programmatic co-operation” or achieving a “third way”
but coordinated work for specific short-term goals. Each side retains its
independent political character and its activities reflect its particularity.

  Alliance as a necessary tactic.

The rising cooperation between the Left and Islamists has also come
about as the result of the Left’s serious reconsideration of its overall
strategic approach and, in particular, its relationship with opposition
religious forces.

Based on the work of several Leftist authors,2 many leftist activists, in
Egypt have undertaken a self-critical analysis which has led them to regard political Islam as an ambivalent political force which could play either a radical and progressive role, or a conservative and reactionary
one, depending upon the historical moment. The conclusion drawn by
the Left is that it can neither unconditionally support the Islamists nor
ally with the repressive state against them, which were the two dichotomous
positions adopted by various Leftists in the past. It is acutely
aware of the need to analyse Islamists’ (and others’) potential at each
specific historical phase to devise a new formula for working with, or,
opposing them. Furthermore, Leftist activists stress the pragmatic
need to work alongside religious groups when they make up part of
the opposition, particularly as religious activists have become much
closer than the secular Left to the grassroots.
Another debate influencing recent forms of joint activism is the Left’s
reassessment of its role within non-class politics. Class-based movements have been receding worldwide and replaced by more issue-oriented
activism that cuts across class interests due to the changing
structure of the global economy and the ensuing changing class configurations.
The Left in Egypt, as elsewhere, has found itself forced to
choose between concentrating on its “historic” class-based mission
and expanding its scope to include non-class activism. Those who
choose the latter are attempting to construct a language that will provide
an element of universality in order to appeal to elements from
contrasting political programmes.
The Muslim Brotherhood, a banned yet tolerated political organization
which advocates the establishment of an Islamic state and society,
was established in 1928. Al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya is Egypt’s largest militant
group since the late 1970s. Its primary goal is to overthrow the
Egyptian government and replace it with an Islamic state. It has carried
out several armed attacks on various targets such as tourists, Copts, security
and state officials, as well as opponents of Islamist extremism. It
is equally important to locate reasons for growing political cooperation
within political Islam. Both reformist and radical Islamist groups
have altered some of their tactics in recent years. Al-Jama‘a, for example,
has renounced violence while the Muslim Brotherhood has been
adopting a more general discourse of democracy and political freedom
rather than its traditional emphasis on implementing its goal of shari‘a.
While both streams of Islamists might have ulterior motives for these
recent redefinitions of objectives and tactics, there is little doubt that
they have been instrumental in creating a potential for alliance with
the Left.
Furthermore, internal crisis within the Muslim Brotherhood could
also play a role in encouraging some of its members to seek new opportunities
for political action. Growing dissatisfaction with the ageing
leadership’s rigid approaches and inflexible ideas, as well as the leadership’s
conciliatory approach to the government, is leading some
younger members to seek new forms of activism which offer space for
freer thinking and progressive ideas. The 76 years old leader elected in
January 2004 Muhammad Mahdi Akif, replaced the late Ma’mun al-Hudaybi,
who died as acting leader, at the age of 82.
Finally, the Islamists have taken the brunt of the regime’s repression
in the last decade, which has weakened them organizationally. Perhaps
the Brotherhood feels the need to work more in the shadow of
other groups that are not so persecuted.

 A new challenge for the state

These new forms of opposition cooperation with their loosely organized
political activities are presenting a novel challenge to the state
which is somewhat confused by the absence of clearly-defined political
organizations or leadership. The presence of various forums for political
action, on the other hand, has offered activists the space to move
their projects and activities easily from one network to another, and to
have different events organized under different umbrellas without
being easily identified by the authorities.
In its earlier stages, the ECPSPI had the implicit endorsement of the
regime. Later, as the Committee rapidly gained popular support and its
activities became the locus of mass rallies, the regime grew suspicious.
Only a few arrests of the more active members were made in the
months subsequent to the establishment of the Committee. The more
violent and extensive crackdown did not come until the aftermath of
the 20 March 2003 demonstration when about 1500 people including
organizers and ordinary demonstrators were arrested. Interestingly, in
contrast with usual practice under the infamous Emergency Law in effect
for over twenty years which gives the authorities extensive powers,
including detaining suspects for prolonged periods without trial,
trial of civilians under military courts, and prohibiting demonstrations
and public meetings, the majority of the detainees were released very
shortly after their arrest. This could indicate the state’s weakness and
indecision regarding the best course of action against a widely-supported
and difficult to identify opposition.

 The future of a “coalition”

This new joint political activism is clearly not easy to realise. The time
consuming nature of consensus building has already been mentioned.
Even the simplest logistical steps can become battlegrounds. Arguments
over the details of a demonstration or a conference can exhaust
the time and energy of the organizers. Issues of who gets to talk first iin
a conference or a rally, choosing slogans acceptable to everybody, and
most contentious and time consuming points of disagreement. This
does not augur well for quick and flexible decision-making in a crisis.
There is also no doubt that antagonism between Leftists and Islamists
is very deeply rooted. Many Leftists still feel uncomfortable about the
presence of the Islamists in any activity in which they participate. Areas
of disagreement between the Islamists and the Left are numerous, not
least of them being the fundamental differences on issues of class
analysis, women, and the rights of minority groups. For their part, Islamists
still cannot forgive the Left’s siding with the regime against
them in the early 1990s. This deeply-rooted antagonism poses the danger
of deepening internal conflicts within each camp. On the Left, in
particular, the old guard and certain factions are increasingly critical of
those who seek the Islamists’ cooperation and to dilute the working
class struggle. Some observers and activists fear that the already divided
Left might become even further polarized because of the new approach
they are taking towards Islamists.
The still experimental nature of this new activism makes any projections
about the future difficult. The phenomenon is still very fluid and
how it develops depends on various factors. Hence, over-optimistic expectations
about significant results being delivered in the immediate
future are unjustified. On one hand, the nascent coalition holds the potential
to become the precursor of a vibrant, broadly-based, and democratic
grouping. But on the other, efforts at cooperation have been
slow and beset with major obstacles. For the most part, collaboration
has taken place at the initiative of individuals rather than organizations.
The future of collaboration, therefore, remains fragile and vulnerable
to party leadership withdrawal. Moreover, initiatives for cooperation
have mostly come from the Left, which is objectively the weaker
group in the coalition, rather than from the Muslim Brotherhood.
Without the will on the part of the Brotherhood,
the achievements of the last three years will be an
isolated chapter. While there are signs that the
Brotherhood is engaged in self-reassessment, political
observers can only speculate on how the
process will evolve.

Notes
1. The Left is a case in point: it consists of
various factions and groups including the
banned Communist Party, the Tagammu‘
Party, and the Revolutionary Socialists.

2. A widely read author in Egyptian Leftist
circles is C. Harman, “The Prophet and the
Proletariat,” International Socialism 64
(Autumn 1994): 3-64,
http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.