It is incredible, the way the world’s sole
superpower can dictate election issues
everywhere. Post-9/11, “terrorism” has become a
major if not the most important political issue,
not only in the US but in several countries,
including in South Asia. Bangladesh provides an
immediate instance.
Terrorism threatens to emerge as the single
biggest political issue in India, with the
far-right Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) out to
make it so, following the string of bomb blasts
in Kashmir, Mumbai and elsewhere. If and when
General Pervez Musharraf decides at long last on
a date for the promised general election in
Pakistan, terrorism will without doubt dominate
the issues on the agenda. And terrorism will be
more than a mere talking point in the little over
two months ahead to the big battle of ballots in
Bangladesh.
Terrorism, of course, is not really the main
issue in any of these countries. The crusading
“anti-terrorist” doesn’t like to be told that the
root-causes of terrorism are the real issue, but
that does not make it any less true. In all these
three cases, poverty is the most palpable of the
root-causes. It is compounded, in all the three,
by religious communalism with its vicious message
and violent methods. The combination pits each of
the countries against neighbors and thus
represents a formidable counter to peace in the
region.
In the case of Bangladesh, one of the real
issues found recent illustration in the award of
the Nobel Prize for Peace to Bangladeshi
economist Mohammed Yunus for his innovative
scheme of “Grameen (rural)” banking. The
micro-credit scheme, which may be debatable on
points of economic detail, has certainly helped
and even empowered the impoverished Bangladeshi
women. The scheme has succeeded, notably, despite
fierce opposition from Islamic “fundamentalists.”
Still, the self-appointed defenders of
democracy worldwide have declared “terrorism” as
the main issue in the coming elections. Even
while claiming a policy of non-intervention in
the country’s internal affairs, the George Bush
administration has made its preference clear.
Said US State Department spokesperson Sean
McCormack: "We certainly stand with any
government that is in a fight against terrorism.
It is a serious issue. I know it is a serious
issue for the Bangladesh government."
More serious, immediately, is the prospect of
political violence increasing from now to the as
yet unannounced date of the election in January
2007. The run-up to the election, in fact, began
with several rounds of violence in the streets of
Dhaka (formally Dacca) and elsewhere. The cadres
of the main contending parties, the ruling
Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and the Awami
League (AL), clashed as the country struggled
with the very first step toward a constitutional
election.
At least 18 lay dead in the streets before a
compromise solution on a caretaker government
before the election could be found. Under the
country’s constitution, such a caretaker
government under an impartial head had to be
formed and given 90 days to organize the
election. Former chief justice K.M. Hasan
formally met the criteria and was the first
choice of the BNP under outgoing prime minister
Begum Khaleda Zia. The AL and Hasina Wajed were
prompt to protest, pointing out that Hasan had
long ago been a BNP luminary.
The AL objected to a caretaker regime under
President Iajuddin Ahmed, criticizing him as "too
close" to Begum Zia. Hasina Wajed, however, has
now asked Ahmed to “prove his neutrality” by
taking steps including "action against corrupt
BNP ministers." Despite the strong language, this
is seen as an indication of implicit acceptance
of the president for the post.
The street fighting, however, is not going to
stop. The next three months are likely, by most
accounts, to witness terrorist activity as much
as political rallies and campaigns. There is a
clear danger that the BNP’s election campaign
will have a place for such threatening activities.
Begum Zia’s five-year term in office has been
possible only with the help of Jamat-e-Islami
(JeI), which wielded a clout out of all
proportion to its meager strength in the
Bangladesh parliament. The JeI’s status as a
ruling party lent a sort of legitimacy to
non-parliamentary Harkut-ul Al Jehadi.
What deserves note, however, is that the
Bangladeshi fundamentalism was a bequest of the
Bush wars and, before that, of the US involvement
in Afghanistan, in those days when the Taliban
were no “terrorists” but “freedom fighters” and
“crusaders against Communism.” The first
Bangladeshi jehadis were returnees from
Afghanistan, and their cause received
considerable fillip with the eruption of the Iraq
war.
At the last unofficial count, Bangladesh
harbored no less than 48 jehadi camps, all of
them in areas where insurgent movements from
neighboring countries (including India) found
refuge.
The Indian peace movement has particular
reason for concern over the role of terrorists in
the run-up. This will, sadly but surely, provide
fresh ammunition to the Indian far right, which
has been shrilling away about the allegedly dire
threat to the country from Bangladesh and the
danger of a “demographic invasion” designed to
make the Muslims a more populous community at
least in some states of India.
It is the Indian far right’s agitprop that is
making thoughtful Bangladeshis worry about
terrorism promoted by not only fundamentalists
but also “foreign agencies.” The added concern
has not been allayed by frequent reports of fire
exchanged between Indian and Bangladeshi forces
on the border.
The run-up to the Bangladesh election and its
outcome will be of intense interest to all South
Asians, who recognize their common stakes in
resisting and routing forces of fundamentalism
and fascism.