The much internationalised Norwegian peace
process in Sri Lanka has failed. And various
international actors, while publicly stating
their hopes for peace, are in reality engaged in
accounting for the unforeseen failure, in
political, monetary and resource terms. The bulk
of the blame will be cast on the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

The LTTE’s stance was characteristically
intransigent. It was unwilling to transform and
adapt itself to democratic politics and cease
from its habitual preoccupation with eliminating
all traces of opposition, it rejected the
possibility of a deal with the south and resumed
a debilitating war for separation. The accounting
will also blame the southern political
formations, which were unwilling yet again to
arrive at a possible solution to the conflict and
continued to prevaricate with minority concerns.
Finally, the Norwegians themselves will have to
take a significant share of the blame for their
design of a process that lacked inclusivity, was
weighted too heavily on an uncertain deal between
the LTTE and the United National Party (UNP),
sacrificed human rights for an erroneous
conception of stability and for their active
internationalisation of a process with grave
foundational flaws.

The international actors, while apportioning
blame and attempting to grasp the utter failure
of their models of conflict resolution, are also
trying to salvage any positive gains from the
internationalised peace process. The last leg of
the international process launched in 2002, is
now an undeclared war. What is open now is the
possibility of putting forward a set of proposals
for constitutional reform and some mechanisms for
the protection of human rights and humanitarian
access. The issue facing the international actors
is whether Sri Lanka will at least deliver on
these dual concerns of constitutional reform and
human rights, or would the process flounder so
completely as to discredit the international
community’s attempts at peace building and
conflict resolution.

The international actors’ accounting and
face-saving measures aside, the war in Sri Lanka
has indeed come back with a vengeance to the
detriment of the civilian population. While there
can be no illusions about the LTTE’s project of a
separate state and fascist rule over the north
and east, the reaction of the Sri Lankan state
and the Rajapkse government strongly indicate
moves towards a military solution accompanied by
brutal repression of any opposition to that
military project. The Sri Lankan state then is at
the crossroads, it has to either choose a
military solution with the attendant repression
of human rights or it has to choose a political
solution with protection of human rights. The
military solution will involve the imposition of
the majoritarian agenda on the minorities,
whereas the political approach would demonstrate
concern for the wellbeing of minorities and
respect for international humanitarian law, even
when the state is responding to provocations by
the LTTE.

 Dangerous Turn

During the last many months, the Sri Lankan state
has taken a dangerous turn. It has, in responding
to calculated provocations by the LTTE, got
muddled up in a territorial war with adverse
humanitarian consequences. Politically, the
controversial Supreme Court has ruled for the
demerger of the North-East Province, which was
temporarily merged as part of the Indo-Lanka
accord. A process of engagement with the LTTE
characterised by appeasement during the first few
years of the peace process, has now turned into
an engagement based on the war on terror,
particularly with the announcement of new
anti-terror regulations in December 2006.

There has also been a militarisation of the
state, in actions ranging from the
disproportionate influence of the defence
establishment to even the appointment of
governors and a government agent in Trincomalee
with military backgrounds. There has been a
resurgence of disappearance, torture and other
grave violations reminiscent of the darkest years
of the war in the 1980s and early 1990s. In most
estimates, over 3,000 people were killed in 2006,
over 2,50,000 internally displaced and another
16,000 have found refuge in India. In short, the
ground reality points to a major shift in the
direction of a militarist approach to the
situation with scant regard for human rights.

On the other side, there is also hope for a
political solution arrived at through a parallel
process initiated by the Sri Lankan president.
There are mechanisms which were perhaps
instigated by the prodding of the international
community, which have the potential to address
both the questions of constitutional reform and
human rights.

In July 2006 the president initiated the All
Party Representative Committee (APRC) and the all
party conference to produce proposals for
constitutional reform in Sri Lanka. A
multi-ethnic experts committee consisting of a
total of 17 members was formed to provide advice
to the APRC. In December, after much deliberation
a majority of the committee, 11 of them from all
three ethnic groups produced a report promoting
the need for devolution of power and power
sharing at the centre with a bicameral
legislature. While a minority report consisting
of four Sinhala nationalists was also produced
calling for a unitary constitution unacceptable
to most members of the minority communities, the
majority report was a testament to the ability of
Sri Lankans to propose imaginative solutions for
the complex problems related to the ethnic
question. Thissa Vitarana, the chairman of the
APRC, has put forward his own report based on the
organisation’s deliberations and findings of the
majority report, for the consideration of the
APRC’s final proposal. The advancement hailed by
both these reports themselves was a victory,
given the climate of intimidation and
manipulation by Sinhala nationalist actors within
the state. It should be noted that this victory
also came at tremendous costs, as Kethesh
Loganathan the secretary to the experts committee
was assassinated by the LTTE a month after the
committee was convened.

On the human rights front, in response to
pressure from the international community on some
of the grave violations of human rights such as
the massacre of the 17 ACF aid workers, the
president appointed a commission of inquiry (COI)
consisting of eight commissioners, a number of
whom have an excellent reputation and an
international eminent persons group to support
the work of those commissioners. The
commissioners, with a tenure of one year, are to
look at 15 serious violations beginning in August
2005 and have the mandate to take up other cases
in the future. It is yet to be seen if the COI,
which is just beginning its work, will be able to
challenge the climate of impunity in the country.

 Dual Mechanisms

These dual mechanisms meant to shift the
militarist and repressive approach towards a
political and human rights approach are the
minimum necessary for the task at hand, and it
will be an ongoing struggle to see if the
mechanisms can also challenge the Sinhala
nationalist forces that have reared their heads
during the past year. It further raises questions
about the resiliency of the political approach if
the LTTE continues to escalate the undeclared
war. But here again, the cards are with the
state, as to whether it will attempt to contain
the LTTE, defeating it politically, or will it
adopt a purely militarist position and engage in
a “war for peace” manœuvre, with elusive
military gains and definite humanitarian costs
and the alienation of the Tamil community?

One of the lost opportunities of the years of the
peace process was the absence of efforts towards
building social movements for human rights and
democratisation. Sections of the Sri Lankan
elite seem all too keen to oppose the current
trajectory in Sri Lanka, by merely mobilising
neocolonial labels such as a “failed state”.

Appealing to the international community alone
will not solve the problems in Sri Lanka. The
crisis in Sri Lanka is one of a crisis not only
of the state, but also of civil society and of
its elite. Just as the majority report and the
Vitarana report are victories in the direction of
a political solution that addresses the
aspirations of the minority communities, the COI
also needs to deliver a serious challenge to the
climate of impunity in the country.

Today, as the state swings between a political
solution and a militarist approach with possible
infringement of democratic rights, not only in
the north and east, but also in the entire
country, a balance in favour of a political
solution would also hold out hope of a democratic
future for the country.

For Tamil aspirations, every past attempt at
constitutional reform has been that of being
kicked around like a football by the two major
southern political parties in Sri Lanka. This
football game reached the international arena
with the much internationalised Norwegian peace
process, where Tamil aspirations were again
booted between the sole representation claims of
the LTTE and the majoritarian claims of the
southern political forces. The international
games for legitimacy and support seem to be now
taking a different direction, with the government
leaning towards Pakistan and China as its
diplomatic dancing partners. Such games are bound
to unnerve India, which has had a clear and
consistent position over the last two decades
calling for a political solution within a united
Sri Lanka while addressing the aspirations of the
minority communities It is in that long-term
context that the APRC process should be actively
engaged.

The mechanisms described above, intended to find
a political solution and address human rights,
however fragile and despite the withering attacks
and scepticism, are the only major mechanisms at
work in Lanka during this volatile period. The
work of such mechanisms needs to be above the
local, regional and international political fray.
The APRC process needs to deliver an acceptable
political solution, the Sri Lankans need to
engage with it and others should come out in
solidarity. The odds of success are not great,
but cynicism in the face of a once in a decade
opportunity is irresponsible. It is now a time
for praxis to defeat extremism and chauvinism on
all sides and to strengthen those standing for
peace and justice.