The rumour of this meeting spread late, without being confirmed before Kim Jong-un secretly crossed the border in his armoured train. The content of the exchanges between the Russian and North Korean leaders, who had not met since 2019, has not been disclosed, but the symbolism and the context give at least a partial idea.

This meeting demonstrates the willingness of the two regimes to engage in active and strengthened cooperation, certainly covering a wide range of issues and aiming in particular to circumvent the international sanctions against them, as a result of the invasion of Ukraine, on the one hand, and its nuclear tests and missile launches on the other.

The closeness that is now on display was not self-evident. For Moscow and Beijing, the increasingly uncontrollable Kim dynasty represented an unwelcome factor of instability in North-East Asia. In the 1990s, Russia took part in international pressure to limit the development of nuclear technologies in North Korea. Together with China, it has long supported UN Security Council resolutions condemning North Korea’s nuclear tests. These two countries stopped doing so in 2017.

The launch base at the Vostotchny cosmodrome, which opened in 2016, is a “symbol as much of Russia’s technological resilience as of its immense wastefulness, with the project having swallowed up billions of dollars”. The choice of this meeting place, located 1,500 km from the Korean border, suggests that Moscow is ready to support Pyongyang in the ballistic missile and space fields, as improving its capabilities in this area is a key objective for Kim Jong-un. North Korea is said to have reached the limits of both its ballistic programs and its military satellite launches. It is said to “need foreign expertise” and to have “been given explanations of how the new Angara launchers and Soyuz-2 rockets work” [1].

Another taboo has been broken: Russia (and China) have stopped condemning Kim Jong-un’s threats of nuclear strikes - it has to be said that Putin did not hesitate to do the same in Ukraine. Last July, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu was the first Russian representative to attend a military parade in Pyongyang that included nuclear missiles, and Moscow is now hinting that it could contribute to the modernisation of its arsenal. A possibility that can only worry a number of neighbouring countries, given that North Korea regularly launches nuclear-capable missiles. How far is Moscow really prepared to go in this area? It is doubtful that Putin will actually allow Kim to make significant progress in these areas. Nevertheless, the warm welcome given to the North Korean leader is a threat to Seoul and to the strengthening of regional alliances driven by Washington.

Asked about possible Russian help in launching North Korean satellites, Putin was quoted by Russian press agencies as saying: “That’s why we’re here. The leader of North Korea is very interested in rocket technology. They are trying to develop their space programme” [2].

If the decorum of the meeting enhances Russia’s image as a Siberian power on the Chinese border (enough to raise Xi Jinping’s eyebrows? The latter clearly has other things to worry about at the moment), it also allows Kim Jong-un to make his journey part of a national family narrative. Unlike his father, he is perfectly easy with flying, but he has chosen his luxurious armoured train, a legend, even if its considerable weight means it has to travel at quite a slow pace. This is reminiscent of a comic strip by the late, lamented Hugo Pratt; the only thing missing being a blizzard [3].

In addition, Russia is expected to supply agricultural products in quantity to North Korea, which is in desperate need of it, as well as foreign currency (circumventing international sanctions is expensive). The North Korean workforce can return to work on Russian territory in large numbers, on a scale comparable to that before the Covid pandemic of 2019. Moscow needs them more than ever, particularly in view of the military losses on the Ukrainian front and the drafting of recruits. This cheap immigrant workforce has very few rights.

In what other areas will the “enhanced cooperation” between Moscow and Pyongyang be deployed? Technology transfers? Cyber? “Both countries are highly skilled in cyber warfare and cyber espionage: they can disrupt or break key infrastructure and steal sensitive government information. North Korea’s Lazarus hacking group has been identified - through careful process monitoring - as being responsible for cryptocurrency thefts totalling tens of millions of dollars” [4].

The meeting in Vostotchny raises many questions (arms supplies to Russia, modernisation of North Korea’s ballistic missile and space arsenal, etc.) which remain without precise answers for the time being, but it confirms that the “great geopolitical game“continues to be played out at the two extremities of Eurasia, from Ukraine to the Korean peninsula, even as Xi Jinping’s China turns in on itself for the time being. It also confirms that North-East Asia remains a hot”nuclear frontier".

Pierre Rousset