Pakistan is 60 years old. For over 40 years of
its life, it has been ruled directly or
indirectly by its army. Each cycle of military
rule has left the country in desperate crisis.

The rule of General Pervez Musharraf, who seized
power in 1999, has been no different. Beset on
all sides, he now seeks, with American help, to
ride out the storm and stay in power.

Down this path lies even greater disaster.
Origins of Failure

Pakistan’s leaders have failed it from the
beginning. At independence, its founding father,
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, adopted the British colonial
title and powers of governor-general. He died
within a year, leaving no clear vision of the
country’s identity or future, no broad-based,
cohesive, national political party or movement to
guide it, no tradition of democracy. Pakistan
fell into the hands of a civil service and army
that knew only colonial habits.

There were four governor-generals and seven prime
ministers in the first 10 years, rising and
falling through palace intrigues, but all
powerless in the end. Pakistan could not even
create a constitution. Then, in 1958, came the
first military coup. General Ayub Khan told the
country the army had no choice. There was, he
said, "total administrative, economic, political
and moral chaos“brought about”by self-seekers,
who in the garb of political leaders, have
ravaged the country."

General Ayub Khan ruled for a decade. His two
goals were strengthening the army and modernizing
of the society and economy. The General
negotiated a close military alliance with the
United States, which was looking for Cold War
clients around the world. American dollars,
weapons, advisors, and ideas poured into
Pakistan. The result was the 1965 war with India,
wrenching social change, and grievous inequality.
By the end of his rule, it was said that 22
families controlled two-thirds of Pakistani
industry and an even larger share of its banking
and insurance sector.

Eventually, the people rose in revolt. The
demands for representation were greatest in East
Pakistan, home to the majority of Pakistan’s
people. Elections were held and a nationalist
party from the East emerged victorious, but the
army and its political allies were mostly from
West Pakistan and would have none of it. The army
went to war against its own people. There were
appalling massacres. In 1971, with help from
India, East Pakistan broke free and became
Bangladesh.

 Lost Generation

The army relinquished power in the West. But the
new civilian leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, lacked
a democratic temperament, and treated opposition
as threat. He nationalized large sectors of the
economy, further strengthening already
unaccountable bureaucrats, doled out government
jobs to his followers, established Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons program, and refined the practice
of buying public support by appeasing the mullahs.

In 1977, the army took back control, and executed
Bhutto. The new ruler, General Zia ul Haq, sought
to Islamize Pakistan. He introduced religious
laws, courts, and taxes, supported radical
Islamist madrassas (seminaries) and political
parties, and altered school textbooks to promote
a conservative Islamic nationalism. Work on the
bomb proceeded apace.

The United States turned a blind eye to both the
dictatorship and the bomb. It poured billions of
dollars into Pakistan to buy support for a war
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The
Pakistan army trained and armed Islamic militants
from around the world, with American money, and
sent them across the border to fight godless
communism. The jihad was born.

General Zia died in a mysterious plane crash in
1988, and the Soviet Union admitted defeat and
left Afghanistan. Elections were held, only to
have the army become the power behind the throne.
America re-discovered that Pakistan was building
the bomb, and imposed sanctions. It was too late.

The new crop of leaders, including Bhutto’s
daughter, Benazir, descended into corruption and
intrigue, each seeking the army’s help to take
office. There were nine prime ministers in 10
years. Some actively courted the mullahs, none
tried to undo the Islamic order created by
General Zia. A generation was abandoned to
intolerance, violence, and radical Islam.

The army demanded the lion’s share of national
resources. The politicians paid up, even though
the economy crumbled and one-third of Pakistanis
fell below the poverty line. The army continued
to dominate foreign policy. It helped create,
train, arm, and lead the Taliban to power in
Afghanistan. The goal was to create a client
regime and secure Pakistan’s western borders. The
people of Afghanistan paid a terrible price.

A similar strategy was tried in Kashmir. Pakistan
organized and armed Islamist fighters and sent
them to battle. Kashmiris, who have struggled for
decades for the right to decide their own future
free from Indian rule, found themselves trapped
between the violence unleashed by Indian armed
forces and Pakistan-backed militants.

Amid the chaos, in 1998, India and then Pakistan
tested nuclear weapons and a year later went to
war. Both sides hurled nuclear threats.
Pakistan’s elected politicians went along,
claiming credit at every opportunity.
The Musharraf Era

There were few protests when the army, led by
General Pervez Musharraf, seized power in 1999.
"The armed forces have no intention to stay in
charge longer than is absolutely necessary to
pave the way for true democracy to flourish," he
promised. Instead, he rigged elections and made a
deal with Islamist political parties willing to
support him as president.

After the September 11 attacks, the United States
dropped its opposition to General Musharraf. It
needed Pakistan’s support for another American
war. Money poured in (over $10 billion so far),
and demands for a return to democracy disappeared.

After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001,
many Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters fled across
the border to Pakistan’s tribal areas where they
have reconstituted themselves. Under U.S.
pressure, the Pakistan army has tried to go into
the tribal border areas to show they are tackling
the Taliban and al-Qaeda there. They have met
resistance. Also, there are many in the army who
do not want to fight what they see as an American
war. The army has resorted to missile attacks
from aircraft, helicopter gun ships, and
artillery. As civilian casualties have grown,
local people have turned against the army, and
some have joined the militants.

The al-Qaeda and Taliban influence has started to
spread from the remote border areas to larger
towns and even major cities in the two border
provinces. These militants have made common cause
with local Islamist groups, who find recruits in
Pakistan’s countless madrassas and its many
Islamic political parties. Militants have
attacked soldiers, policemen, local officials,
ordinary people, and national leaders, including
Musharraf. Suicide bombings have claimed hundreds
of lives across the country.

Islamist fighters have taken over whole villages.
Emulating the Taliban, they repress women, close
girls’ schools, attack DVD and music shops,
destroy TVs, and demand men grow beards and go to
the mosque. The movement has spread even to the
capital. For six months, Islamist students and
fighters occupied a mosque in Islamabad and set
up their own court. The government sat by until
forced to act by national and international
pressure. The bloody storming of the mosque
served only to fuel the militancy and enrage
public opinion.

Sectarian violence has accompanied the rise of
the militant Islamists. Armed Sunni groups, some
linked to major political parties, have attacked
Shias and religious minorities with abandon.
Hundreds have died. Even though the groups are
banned, they operate with impunity, their leaders
appearing in public.

The Islamists are not the only armed resistance
to the state. There is an insurgency in
Pakistan’s largest province, Baluchistan, fuelled
by demands for greater autonomy and control over
their natural resources. It is a longstanding
grievance. The Pakistani army crushed the latest
in a series of four insurgencies. Baluch groups
have obstructed and attacked gas facilities, gas
and oil pipelines, electricity transmission
towers, and train tracks. They have also targeted
foreign companies seeking to explore new gas
fields in the province and working on other
development projects there. They have also called
protests and strikes.

 The Democratic Challenge

The army’s effort to confront Islamists and
Baluch insurgents has created its own crisis.
Over the past few years, the government has taken
into custody hundreds of people and, after they
“disappeared,” denied ever having arrested them.
Their families found an ally in the chief justice
of Pakistan’s Supreme Court. He has demanded that
the government produce the missing people in
court. General Musharraf responded by firing the
chief justice. Musharraf’s greater fear is that
an activist court would block his effort to
continue in power as president.

There was a national movement for the
reinstatement of the chief justice. Judges
resigned, lawyers went on strike, and police
attacked demonstrations by lawyers outside the
Supreme Court. Across the country, large crowds
gathered to hear and support the chief justice.
The Supreme Court declared that the chief justice
must be reinstated. Musharraf had to concede
defeat.

The Court is now hearing the cases of the missing
people. The government has produced some and
dragged its feet on others. The chief justice has
threatened to jail a senior law enforcement
official and summon the chiefs of Pakistan’s
armed forces if the government will not produce
the people in court. As elections loom, and
Musharraf seeks to retain power, the Court has
already begun to hear appeals on voter
registration.

Some hope that restoring a semblance of democracy
could turn the tide against the Islamists and
reduce the nuclear danger. Musharraf, with U.S.
help, is trying to cobble together a deal to stay
in power. He is considering dumping his Islamist
allies in exchange for support from Benazir
Bhutto, who would be cleared of the corruption
charges that she fled and allowed to return from
exile. It will not be enough.

In the Musharraf years, the army has consolidated
its power in new ways. Generals rule provinces,
run government ministries, administer
universities, and manage national companies. The
army’s business interests now span banking and
insurance, cement and fertilizer, electricity and
sugar, corn and corn flakes. They will not give
this up without a fight.

For the army, the outside world appears
threatening too. As India’s economy grows and it
increases military spending in leaps and bounds,
Pakistan’s army looks for ways to keep up. With
the United States cultivating a new strategic
relationship with India, the army fears losing
its oldest ally. It worries how it will sustain
its nuclear, missile and conventional weapons
arms race with India. The army must extract yet
more from Pakistan’s economy. A civilian
government rule will not be allowed to challenge
these priorities.

Military rule and puppet politicians have brought
Pakistan to its present dreadful state. Rather
than keeping Musharraf in power, the world must
demand that Pakistan’s army yield control over
government and economy once and for all. Only a
freely elected and representative government that
can actually make decisions can pursue economic
development as if people mattered, confront the
Islamists, and make peace with India.