The CPP-NPA is no different from other public associations in that it too releases an annual report of its successes and failings. This year-end assessment centers on where the revolution stands in terms of its goals and an evaluation of political forces that the CPP is either in competition with or arrayed against.
In the past, such reports focused on the state of war against the government and its American “imperialist” master. Discussions of moderate groups and reform-minded politicos were often minimal; understandably so, given that these forces hardly posed a challenge to the CPP. The party simply contented itself with labels to disparage these rivals: “anti-Marcos reactionaries,” “liberal democrats,” or “bourgeois reformists.”
This flippant cataloging continued even after 1983, when moderates and politicos began to attract the middle class after the Aquino assassination. While surprised by the outpouring, the “Reds” still did not see this “yellow power” as a major threat, believing firmly that their roots among the poor had firmly entrenched them as the top anti-Marcos opposition force. This arrogance was most manifest in the decision of CPP front organizations to boycott the 1986 snap elections.
People Power I, however, exposed the brittleness of the people’s allegiance to the Revolution. The masses ignored the party and rooted for Cory Aquino. They then convened at Edsa to protect the clumsy RAM boys. Labels proved inadequate to understand these moderates; careful analysis proved to be equally important. This was why Bayan leader Lean Alejandro was reading the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci when he was assassinated. Like Gramsci, he wanted to know how communists could survive periods of retreat.
The party’s 1992 split and the internal carnage from the purges in the period preceding the breakup made matters worse. For not only have the moderates grown and gained access to state power; cadres expelled by CPP Great Leader Jose Ma. Sison began forming their organizations and challenging the party’s monopoly of the Left flank in the new political landscape.
Most prominent among these new groups was Akbayan, a coalition of former CPP cadres, social democrats, popular democrats, socialists, and academics like Walden Bello. Formed in 1998, Akbayan immediately showed grit, producing sharp analyses of political conjunctures, and in the May elections of that year, successfully won seats in Congress, and in some provinces, cities, and municipalities.
The CPP initially ignored Akbayan (and another coalition, Sanlakas), since it was more concerned with reviving the NPA and plotting the elimination of ex-cadres tagged by Sison as the culprits behind the CPP’s detumescence in the late 1980s. By the late 1990s, the NPA had recovered most of the guerrilla zones and NPA hit teams took care of “renegades” Hector Mabilangan, Popoy Lagman, and Rollie Kintanar. Sison reportedly prevailed upon more bellicose comrades like in-country capo Benito Tiamzon to give “parliamentary struggle” a try, and Bayan Muna’s creation followed shortly. Democratic centralism, good political timing (joining Edsa 2, for one) and a deal with Gloria Arroyo’s Lakas Party enabled Bayan Muna to win seats in Congress.
But uprisings like Edsa 2 were one-time deals, and while Bayan Muna is now at par with Akbayan in Congress, it cannot claim to be the sole militant presence in the House. The CPP’s other legal organizations remain weak (KMU and KMP are empty shells, and no one really believes that Bayan is a real coalition). The “masses” have also become selective in rallies they go to—less and less with the communists, and more with the religious fundamentalists and the movie stars. Then there’s Akbayan and Sanlakas.
It was time to clean house, and of all these problems the one easiest to dispose of are those pesky renegades. The 2004 report thus became a “substantive” critique of Akbayan and other groups, to justify invoking the curse that many leftwing groups fear because of its deadly consequences: renegade Trotskyism.
The killing nevertheless continued, with Arturo Tabara the latest victim (and his future son-in-law as collateral damage). Akbayan organizers were likewise being assassinated in the provinces. In the 2004 assessment, new names were added to the hit list Sison prepared in 1992: prominently, an academic (Bello), the widow of the martyred Lean Alejandro (Lidy Nacpil), and the articulate reformist politician (Rep. Etta Rosales).
But liquidating relatively unknown ex-comrades proved easier than going after the more renowned. Bello and Rosales surprised the CPP with an open letter inquiring from Sison whether they were next in line to be killed after the latter branded them as “Trotskyists.” Sison’s riposte was feisty but it also betrayed considerable backtracking and a hint that the next step in the process—their elimination—would be deferred.
This postponement may not last long. The CPP needs a breakthrough in its urban struggle and united front work to keep up with the NPA’s progress. But Bello, Rosales, and Nacpil are obstacles to this pursuit, with their incessant challenging of the CPP’s monopoly of leftwing politics. It may therefore become necessary to eventually do away with these impediments.
But not in the immediate future. The controversy over the 2004 report needs to die down, and only when it feels comfortable enough to absorb the ensuing public criticism will the party once again carry out its promise to deal with this latest bunch of “counterrevolutionaries.”