A man holds a portrait of jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in Diyarbakir, southeastern Turkey, on 21 March 2025 (Ilyas Akengin/AFP)

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has created significant challenges for Turkey-Iraq relations, is on the verge of disbanding.

As Middle East Eye reported on Friday, the PKK is expected to imminently announce the end of its armed struggle against Turkey, as requested by jailed leader Abdullah Ocalan.

All eyes are on how the process will unfold from here.

The group’s disbanding will cast uncertainty on the future of its members in the Qandil Mountains, an area that has served as the PKK’s headquarters in northern Iraq for decades.

Ocalan’s appeal, which marks a turning point in the decades-long conflict between the PKK and Turkey, will have repercussions for regional actors. The possible closure of this tumultuous file could significantly alter the course of Ankara-Erbil-Baghdad relations.

This geopolitical shift comes after the launch of Israel’s ongoing war on Gaza in October 2023, followed a year later by the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. While weakening Iran’s allies in the region, these developments also pushed Ankara to recalibrate its stance towards the PKK.

Although Turkey has focused more on disarmament than on democratisation of the Kurdish issue, this process remains of critical importance to the Iraqi government.

 Cross-border operations

Baghdad has traditionally avoided defining the PKK, long embroiled in a conflict with Turkey, as its own issue, suggesting that Erbil and Ankara were responsible for confronting the armed group.

Ankara has drawn the ire of Baghdad by conducting military operations against the PKK in Iraqi territory, interpreted by the Iraqi government as a violation of its sovereignty. With the strategy of “eliminating terrorism at its source” adopted in recent years, Turkey has extended air operations to Sulaymaniyah and Sinjar, while setting up dozens of military outposts inside Iraq.

Iraqi leader Muqtada al-Sadr and some state-sponsored Iraqi paramilitaries within the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) have described the Turkish military presence as an “occupation”.

Ankara’s stubborn diplomacy, at the risk of damaging bilateral relations, resulted in Baghdad banning the PKK last year. The group’s disarmament will thus neutralise a powder keg along their shared border.

Noting that Turkey’s military presence in Iraq has been justified as a response to the PKK’s activities, Iraq’s national security adviser, Qasim al-Araji, has said that once a resolution is in place, “all armed groups and foreign forces” would be expected to leave Iraq.

The PKK’s tactical relations with Iran could also end in this new era. Ankara believes that Tehran uses certain armed groups to undermine its own influence in Iraq; the disbanding of the PKK could thus strengthen Turkey’s hand in Iraq.

Ankara, which has established strong relations with Shia leaders in recent days, should focus on public diplomacy in this process. While Turkey might want to stay in Iraq to fight the Islamic State group, balance Iran, or increase its influence after a possible US withdrawal - despite the PKK problem being resolved - this could reinvigorate the “occupier” rhetoric.

 Basis for dialogue

Disbanding the PKK and putting an end to its attacks on infrastructure such as oil pipelines would also be good news for the local economy, with trade between Turkey and Iraq now reaching $20bn. In addition, the PKK has been seen as a threat to the Development Road rail and highway project.

The group’s disbanding will mark a positive turn for Iraq’s Kurdish region, where the PKK has been a disruptive actor, occupying hundreds of villages. The group’s targeting of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which has collaborated with Ankara, and its clashes with the Peshmerga have harmed the Iraqi Kurdish leadership financially and psychologically.

The strengthening of relations between the PKK and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has complicated matters further, reinforcing Ankara’s anger towards the Sulaymaniyah-based political party.

The PKK laying down its weapons will ultimately facilitate a thaw between both the KDP and PUK, and Ankara and Sulaymaniyah

Amid Ankara’s operations against the PKK in Sulaymaniyah and the closure of Turkish airspace to planes taking off from the northern city, a high-level politician I recently met there expressed excitement about the forthcoming disarmament process, noting: “The PKK has harmed us more than Turkey.”

Ankara values the role of Iraqi Kurdish leaders in the disarmament initiative, which enjoys broad local support. If the PKK is ultimately eradicated, the KDP, a nationalist party, will be able to escape the reputational damage of acting in concert with Turkey in its battle against the armed group.

It is noteworthy that there is no mention of an independent Kurdish state and autonomy in Ocalan’s call for disarmament. One of the main reasons why Ankara opposed the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum in Iraq was its fear of triggering separatist sentiments among Turkey’s Kurds.

The PKK process will create a basis for dialogue among Kurds in Syria and Iraq, while strengthening the KDP’s stance on Kurdish nationalism - at least, in the short term. But amid sharp ideological differences between the KDP and PKK, political competition is inevitable in the medium term.

The PKK laying down its weapons will ultimately facilitate a thaw between both the KDP and PUK and Ankara and Sulaymaniyah. But historical divisions and spheres of influence will continue to be decisive in regional politics in the months and years ahead.

Mehmet Alaca