Lyna: This discussion will focus on the aftermath of the Assad regime’s fall and the rise of Ahmad al-Sharaa as transitional president. We’ll explore Syria’s potential economic direction, prospects for transitional justice, and evolving relations with neighboring countries and the West—particularly in light of partial U.S. and EU sanctions relief. Has the U.S.–Syria relationship been revived? President Trump notably praised al-Sharaa’s charisma. So, let me begin with the first question: what are the main pillars of the Syrian regime’s current political and economic survival, and how do these mechanisms reflect a shift from pre-2011 governance structures?

Joseph Daher: The collapse of the Assad regime was largely due to firstly the weakening of its two main allies Iran and Russia unable to support it like in the past, and then the incapacity of the former Syrian regime to maintain even a minimum of popular support. It was indeed largely unpopular. In this perspective, we witnessed the fall of the Assad regime, with no ability to return. This is due to its patrimonial nature, where political, economic, and military power was concentrated in the palace—at the very core of the regime. Unlike Egypt, where power remained with the military after Mubarak’s fall, Syria’s regime left no institutional backbone. This is a key analytical point: we have witnessed the fall of a 54-year-old despotic and patrimonial regime that suppressed all forms of opposition and dismantled autonomous political and social actors.

Since the fall of Assad in December 2024, I wouldn’t describe what has emerged as a fully new regime, but rather a transitional power structure dominated by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). This emerging leadership has a clear political, economic, and military agenda centered on securing international legitimacy. In this regard, Ahmad al-Sharaa has been relatively successful. This was reflected by the announcements and implementation of the relief of U.S. sanctions with President Trump—a move quickly followed by the EU and Japan. These diplomatic efforts soon materialized into economic deals, including the renewal of the Latakia port contract with CMA-CGM, an agreement with Dubai Port World for the Tartus Port, and a $7 billion contract led by the Qatari-based UCC consortium for the construction and reconstruction of electricity infrastructures. This sequence shows that the new ruling elite prioritizes international legitimacy as a foundation for consolidating internal power. This has been translated by a process in state institutions, as well as on the local levels to consolidate its power, including through the nomination of HTS’ personalities and allies, particularly of the Syrian National Army (SNA), in key positions. Yet, there is no sign of a genuine democratic transition. Instead, we are witnessing the establishment of a new authoritarian structure dominated by HTS. The so-called “national dialogue” was a superficial, one-day event with no concrete outcomes. The new constitutional declaration centralized power in the presidency and introduced problematic articles, such as enshrining Sharia as the main source of law.

The formation of an “inclusive” government is largely symbolic—featuring a single woman and minorities with no real base in the population—while actual decision-making remains in the hands of HTS figures. The same applies to state institutions: the military has been reorganized around HTS and SNA forces, and the security services are led by close associates of al-Sharaa. This clearly reflects HTS’s consolidation of institutional control. Economically, the regime is actively engaging in economic and reconstruction deals to secure influence. On transitional justice, a recent presidential decree did address human rights violations committed under Assad, which is a step forward. However, it failed to account for the crimes of armed groups aligned with the current authorities, including HTS itself, or any other armed groups. This selective justice deepens political and sectarian tensions, especially following the March massacre of Alawites and attacks on Druze communities—none of which have led to prosecutions, despite the involvement of armed groups part of the new army, and supportive of the new ruling authorities.

More generally, there are three main objectives in these sectarian tensions and attacks. Firstly, instrumentalizing sectarian tensions, and the narrative of Mazlumiya Sunniya [1] to try to build a popular consentment and unite large segments of the Arab Sunni community around them, despite many political and social differences within this community. Sectarianism is fundamentally a tool for consolidating power and dividing society. It serves to distract the popular classes from socio-economic and political issues by scapegoating a particular group — defined by sect or ethnicity — as the root of the country’s problems and a security threat, thereby justifying repressive and discriminatory policies against it. Moreover, sectarianism acts as a powerful mechanism of social control, shaping the course of class struggle by fostering dependence between the popular classes and their elite leadership. As a result, the popular classes are stripped of independent political agency and instead come to be defined—and engage politically—through their sectarian identity. In this regard, the new ruling authority is following in the footsteps of the former Assad regime, continuing to use sectarian policies and practices as a means of governance, control and social division.

Secondly, these sectarian attacks and tensions seek to break democratic space or dynamics from below. Following the March massacres, people are more scared to organise. For instance, protests in different governorates in January and February 2025 by laid-off public employees have been organised, as were attempts to organize alternative trade unions, or at least coordination structures. However, the sectarian massacres in the coastal areas significantly reduced the potency of the protest movement, because of fears that armed groups close or from the new ruling authorities might react with violence. Finally, these sectarian attacks allowed the new ruling authorities in Damascus to reassess their domination in some territories (coastal areas) and try to do so in the areas with significant Druze populations. The objectives of the ruling authorities in these events were therefore part of a broader strategy to centralise power and consolidate their domination in areas outside of their total control.

In sum, what we are witnessing is not a democratic transition, but the emergence of a process of construction of a new authoritarian regime, structured and led by HTS, under the façade of institutional and international legitimacy.

Lyna: How does the regime’s post-war economic orientation (e.g., war economy, crony capitalism) affect prospects for reconstruction and reform?

Joseph Daher: The issue of economic orientation is crucial. There can be no meaningful democratic transition if the Syrian population remains mired in poverty—as is currently the case. Any post-Assad authority would have faced immense economic challenges. Reconstruction costs are estimated at over $400 billion, with widespread destruction of infrastructure (electricity, transportation, communication, and roads), major urban centers (Homs, Aleppo, Damascus suburbs), and agriculture. The country also suffers from a currency crisis, with the Syrian pound still unstable and suffering from the competition of the U.S. dollar and Turkish lira. The lifting of sanctions is, therefore, a welcome development and removes a significant obstacle to economic recovery. However, the economic direction taken by HTS represents not a rupture, but a continuation—and even a deepening—of Assad-era neoliberal policies, accompanied by austerity measures. While the Ministry of Economy has spoken of transitioning to a free-market system compatible with Islamic principles, Syria never had a socialist economy. Even in the 1960s, it operated a state-led capitalist model, which became increasingly neoliberal under Hafez al-Assad but moreover Bashar al-Assad, with widespread liberalization of the economy.

Today, we are seeing austerity measures being implemented once again, including the drastic reduction of subsidies on essential goods like bread—its price rising from 400 to 4,000 Syrian pounds. These policies disproportionately affect the poor, especially in a context of widespread shortages. Former officials even justified increasing electricity prices in the future as necessary, ignoring how this would further undermine productive sectors like agriculture and manufacturing industry, which depend on affordable power. Public sector layoffs have also occurred on a massive scale, without a transparent or structured process. There are also to some extent sectarian and gender dimensions: many laid-off employees were Alawite, and women—who are more present in the public sector—have been disproportionately affected. No one denies the Assad regime and its public institutions were rife with clientelism and favoritism, but the current government needs to guarantee transparency in its decisions. Layoffs triggered public sector protests in January and February, but stopped after the sectarian massacres against Alawites in March, out of fear of violence repression. The new authorities have also restructured institutions like the General Federation of Trade Unions, appointing new leadership without promoting any internal democratic reform. The current government’s economic liberalization strategy continues to undermine key sectors. For example, potential future cuts to subsidies for wheat come at a time of climate-related agricultural stress. Similarly, manufacturing is collapsing due to unfair competition from imports—especially from Turkey. This resembles the impact of the 2006–2007 free trade agreement with Turkey, which devastated Syria’s SMEs. In the first five months of the year, Syrian-Turkish trade has increased by more than 40% compared to last year, reaching $1 billion, while Syrian producers struggle with many challenges, including expensive and limited electricity, a shortage of skilled labor, and outdated infrastructure.

The manufacturing and agricultural sectors—pillars for Syria’s economic recovery—are being eroded. Prior to a visit at the beginning of the year to the Davos Forum—an emblem of global neoliberalism—Syria’s foreign minister called for privatization, liberalization, and austerity. The recent MoU with a Qatari-led consortium for electricity infrastructure, using mostly Build-Operate-Own (BOO) contracts, allows private actors to own essential infrastructure and determine prices—undermining state sovereignty and public access. Syria does need international assistance, but current efforts primarily benefit business elites rather than the population. Some business figures once close to the Assad regime, like members of Muhammad Hamcho’s family, have also been able to settle forms of reconciliations with the new ruling authorities. Meanwhile, HTS-affiliated businessmen—particularly those with trade ties to Turkey—are gaining influence. These developments could point to the resurgence of a crony capitalist system, dominated by HTS-aligned elites and former regime-linked businessmen. This raises serious questions of transitional justice, as economic crimes and profiteering are not being addressed. Instead, we see continuity—not only in policy but in the actors who benefit and, in the dynamics, connected to it.

In May, the government even temporarily suspended the requirement for businesses to register employees with social security, under the pretext of encouraging investment—at the expense of workers’ rights. Following criticisms, this decision, which was unlimited, was reformulated to run until the end of the year only. This economic model in a post conflict situation closely mirrors post-conflict dynamics in Iraq and Lebanon, where neoliberal reforms and privatization deepened structural problems rather than solving them. In Lebanon, the economic collapse of 2019 is directly connected to the post-war political economy. Today, 90% of Syrians live below the poverty line, surviving largely on remittances. Prior to the uprising, Syria exported $12 billion in goods; now it is under $1 billion. Its productive economy is very much undermined. In both Iraq and Lebanon, authorities also repressed unions and social movements calling for democratic and socially just reconstruction. Syria appears to be on the same path. HTS is consolidating not only political and military control but also an economic system that reinforces authoritarian patterns and social inequality.

Lyna: I agree that trust is essential for any meaningful economic transformation—particularly in the banking system, the business environment, and public institutions. I’ve discussed this with several experts on Lebanon who argue that restoring confidence in the financial sector, especially after its collapse during the 2019 crisis, is key to fostering stability and peace. This likely applies to Syria as well: demonstrating improvements in the banking and economic systems could offer hope for a more credible transitional economy and lay the groundwork for reconstruction. Just yesterday, I came across reports of companies planning to reintroduce telecommunications infrastructure in Syria, with a deadline set for June 10 to submit their proposals. Considering the recent interest from Gulf Arab telecommunications firms in Syria’s fiber optic infrastructure project, how is the government ensuring that such investments contribute to long-term economic growth and benefit the broader population?

Joseph Daher: That’s a good question, Lyna. Let me start with the banking system. Any meaningful economic transition requires a functioning financial sector. The Syrian banking system has been severely impacted, but the recent relief of sanctions and steps toward reintegrating into the international financial system are positive developments. However, we must remain cautious. Lebanon had one of the most developed banking systems in the region, but much of the deposits were funneled into servicing debt, funding real estate, or boosting consumption—not into productive sectors. Syria followed a similar path until 2011. Public banks failed to fulfill their role, and deposit levels dropped significantly.

For the private sector to meaningfully contribute—especially SMEs and farmers—we need better access to credit. That requires more deposits and stronger banking institutions that support productive economic sectors. This would help stabilize the Syrian pound, create jobs, and generate tax revenues. In parallel, we need fiscal reform—specifically progressive taxation, rather than the reliance on unjust indirect taxes that dominates most Arab economies. Unfortunately, the current direction favors business interests. Ahmad al-Sharaa’s meetings have been principally with large Syrian businessmen, both within and outside the country, not with trade unions, professional associations or local civil society actors, which raises concerns about the inclusiveness and equity of this transition.

On the issue of telecommunications and Gulf involvement: for the past few decades, Gulf states have significantly invested in key infrastructure across the MENA region, especially through privatization processes in regional countries. This is part of their broader strategy to expand political and economic influence. While international investment is necessary, critical sectors like telecommunications should remain under state control and democratic oversight to ensure sovereignty and public accountability. Privatization often reduces workers’ rights and limits public access by increasing prices significantly. In Syria, there are currently two telecom providers—SyriaTel and MTN. SyriaTel, formerly controlled by Rami Makhlouf, is emblematic of the cronyism under Assad. Ideally, these companies should be brought back under state control. Telecom revenues could contribute significantly to reconstruction efforts. Any investment in this sector should prioritize expanding access, improving infrastructure, and building local technological capacity—without exacerbating cost-of-living pressures on ordinary Syrians. This brings me to another issue: public sector salaries. HTS promised a 400% salary increase since January, but it hasn’t materialised. Today, civil servants earn around $20–25 per month. Even if salaries rise to $80-$100, it’s still far below the minimum living cost—estimated at minimum at over $600 for a family of five in Damascus. Bonuses during holidays, like Eid al-Adha, mirror old Assad-era tactics and fail to address structural needs. Before the uprising, average public sector salaries were around $200–250, with a significantly lower cost of living.

In short, economic policies under the current ruling authorities show continuity with the past. Investments in sectors like telecommunications and electricity are necessary, but they must be designed to serve the people—not entrench foreign control or deepen inequality. The current trajectory raises serious concerns about sovereignty, workers’ rights, productive sectors of the economy, and the long-term impact on Syrian society.

Lyna: With the lifting of sanctions and the arrival of foreign investors, I thought it was a relevant question to raise—especially as it illustrates how such investments could potentially improve Syria’s economic situation. That said, let’s move on to another important topic. While fostering financial and economic trust is essential, it must go hand in hand with stability and security. Without these foundations, no sustainable economic recovery or reconstruction can truly take place. Given Turkey’s continued military presence and support in northern Syria, how is the Syrian government navigating its relationship with Ankara to ensure sovereignty and stability? As sovereignty is important in international law. And, what steps is the Syrian government taking to prevent further escalation and maintain regional peace with Israel?

Joseph Daher: First of all, regarding sanctions: the process of lifting them must continue. What we’ve observed is that most private companies currently concluding deals with Damascus are backed by foreign governments. For instance, Tartus port’s deal was contracted by Dubai World (UAE); CMA-CGM (France); and the Qatari-led consortium in electricity infrastructures—all of which have the support of state actors. For private investors lacking such governmental backing, significant challenges remain, particularly due to the ongoing red flags associated with sanctions.

Now, turning to Turkey: initially, Turkey may have given a green light to HTS, but it did not anticipate the collapse of the regime. Turkish strategic ambitions were limited to reaching Aleppo, not toppling Assad entirely. It’s important to recall that Turkey had entered a normalization process with the Assad regime, with negotiations on issues like refugee returns and national security—particularly concerning the Kurdish-led autonomous administration in the northeast, dominated by the PYD (affiliated with the PKK). President Erdoğan has made it clear that any form of Kurdish autonomy or decentralization is unacceptable, calling it a “dream.” In this regard, Ahmad al-Sharaa shares the same position: despite widespread demands for decentralization within Syria, he supports a strong, centralized authority across the entire country. Recent attacks by groups affiliated or supportive of the new ruling authorities against Druze majority inhabited areas can be interpreted as efforts to reassert state authority in regions outside Damascus’s full control, such as Suweida or in some neighborhoods and/or towns of Damascus.

Prior to December 2024, the relationship was pragmatic—despite Turkey still officially designating HTS as a terrorist organization. However, after that date, dynamics shifted. Turkey emerged as the main political, economic, and military winner from the regime’s fall. Ankara potentially aims to establish military bases, and declares its readiness to train the new Syrian Army, and entrench itself as a central player in Syria’s future. It remains a key funder—alongside Qatar—of parts of the Syrian National Army, whose commanders hold influential roles in the north despite sanctions. At the same time, Al-Sharaa appears to be diversifying his foreign relationships. He is cautious not to rely solely on Turkish or Qatari backing, which is why his first official foreign visit was to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh holds the key to broader Arab acceptance—a goal that was ultimately achieved. Although HTS has jihadist origins, its disengagement from groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS reflects a pragmatic, power-driven logic rather than ideological commitment.

This pragmatism also explains Al-Sharaa’s outreach to the United States in efforts to push for sanctions relief. Turkey remains the most active external player in Syria, and Turkish construction companies with links to Erdoğan are preparing to participate in reconstruction—likely financed by Gulf monarchies. These monarchies have the capital, but Turkey has the logistical capacities and readiness. Ankara sees Syria as a key market for exports and influence. Under the Trump administration, Israel was urged to seek a form of understanding with Turkey. As a result, tensions and direct confrontations decreased between Ankara and Damascus, although Israel continues to attack and occupy southern Syria.

Al-Sharaa’s approach is not ideologically driven. The normalization process underway of Syria on the regional and international scenes reflects this trajectory. He repeatedly emphasizes that Syria will not pose a threat to any of its neighbors—including Israel. In this framework, he took measures to demonstrate their readiness to satisfy U.S. and Israeli interests, including control of Palestinian actors in Syria as well as increased control of the border between Lebanon and Syria, where weapons destined for Hezbollah are regularly seized.

Lyna: As you mentioned, we’ve seen the government attempting to navigate a complex relationship with Israel, making efforts to de-escalate tensions with Tel Aviv—such as in the case of the Eli Cohen affair. However, recent Israeli strikes in southern Syria raise concerns. Do you think these attacks could affect the trajectory of future relations between Syria and Israel? And considering Turkey’s growing influence over Syria’s political and military landscape, could Ankara play a role in mediating or reshaping the dynamics between the two countries?

Joseph Daher: I’m not sure we can speak of a “good” relationship between Syria and Israel, but rather of potential normalization, which is something quite different. The U.S. greenlight given to Netanyahu regarding the genocidal war in Gaza has complicated any full normalization process with the Gulf monarchies. Saudi Arabia, for instance, had appeared ready to move forward, but unlike some other Gulf states, it must take public opinion into account. That’s why Riyadh seems to have made a strategic choice: to pursue normalization, but it needs something in return, like a Mega Deal with the U.S. on several files, and a so-called road map for a two-state solution, to maintain legitimacy domestically. Regarding Israel and Syria, we need to deconstruct one of the major myths of the Assad regime: its supposed unwavering support for the Palestinian cause. In reality, the regime has blood on its hands when it comes to Palestinians, both in Syria and Lebanon. Moreover, since the 1974 disengagement agreement, not a single bullet has been fired by Syria toward Israel in the occupied Golan Heights. Assad maintained a kind of quiet border that, in effect, protected Israeli interests. Israel knew this, and when the regime began to crumble, it feared instability on what had been a “safe” frontier. That’s why we saw Israel expand its occupation in southern Syria, and repeatedly target the country with multiple attacks in the south and in other areas.

This pattern of Israeli strikes also reflected U.S. strategic approval—Washington supports and enables these operations. We’ve seen this clearly in Gaza: between October 2023 and October 2024, the U.S. provided over $18 billion in military, logistical, and strategic aid to Israel. Without that, the genocide in Gaza wouldn’t have been possible. Now back to Syria: as Ahmad al-Sharaa emerged as a more receptive figure, Israeli strikes slightly decreased. Israel appears to recognize the new leadership’s willingness to build a mutual understanding, although still targeting the country and destroying infrastructures in the occupied southern territories under Israeli armed occupation. That said, there’s no intention on Israel’s part to return the occupied Golan Heights. On the contrary, in December 2024, it reaffirmed its annexation policy with over $11 million in investment, aiming to increase the settler population from 30,000 to 50,000.

So what we’re seeing is a deep contradiction. On the one hand, ruling elites in the region are aligning more openly with Israel and the U.S., even at the cost of legitimizing occupation and genocide. On the other hand, normalization remains politically sensitive because popular support for Palestine remains strong across the Arab world. This is why HTS and Ahmad al-Sharaa are navigating a difficult balancing act. Al-Sharaa seems to be building new alliances with the Gulf and the West, and has even described that Syria and Israel have common enemies, Hezbollah and Iran, a position welcomed by some external powers. The U.S. seems to understand that popular normalization is not viable, especially as the Palestinian cause remains popular, both within Syria and across the diaspora, although less than before. Indeed with general fatigue among the population, deep poverty and economic crisis, and hostility towards Palestinian actors seen as instrumentalized by Iran, there are less criticisms of this normalization path, in the hope that it will create a better future for Syrians. Washington’s conditions for further rapprochement with Syria are becoming clearer: rooting Syrian in a U.S.-led alliance, securing the border with Israel, preventing arms transfers to Hezbollah or other armed groups, and ensuring internal counter-terrorism efforts.