(1) From the very birth of Bangladesh, Pakistan’s military intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has played an active role in shaping the country’s social and political dynamics. After its defeat in the Liberation War of 1971, the Pakistani state—especially the military—viewed Bangladesh as a “lost territory” and consistently sought to reassert influence here. ISI became the key instrument in this pursuit. From the outset, it provided support to political and social forces aligned with the Pakistani state ideology, particularly Islamist fundamentalist currents. Through this, ISI attempted to cultivate an “internal ally” within Bangladesh.

(2) The assassination of Sheikh Mujib [Rahman] in 1975 marked a turning point in Bangladesh’s politics. With the rise of military rule, pro-Pakistan politics resurfaced. Under Ziaur Rahman and later Ershad, new avenues opened for Pakistani influence. Forces that had opposed the Liberation War—especially Jamaat-e-Islami and other Islamist groups—were rehabilitated. During this time, ISI extended financial and strategic backing to Jamaat, Islami Chhatra Shibir, and similar outfits, thereby institutionalizing its presence in Bangladeshi politics.

(3) From a Marxist perspective, the essential character of the Pakistani state rests on military-bureaucratic dominance and the ideological manipulation of religion to control the masses. ISI is not confined to safeguarding Pakistan’s domestic power structure; it has also operated as a regional geopolitical tool, aligning with imperialist and regional forces. Its interventions in Bangladesh must be understood in this context—part of a broader strategy of countering India while simultaneously empowering Islamist-fascist forces to suppress class struggle and progressive politics.

(4) Even after the return of electoral democracy in the 1990s, ISI did not diminish its influence. On the contrary, in the new political setting, it consolidated Jamaat’s strength and developed close ties with sections of the BNP. The 2001 BNP-Jamaat coalition government offered ISI unprecedented space to expand militant networks in Bangladesh. During this period, extremist groups such as HUJI and JMB grew in power, both ideologically and organizationally linked to Pakistan and Afghanistan.

(5) In the social sphere, ISI’s strategy was to channel influence through Islamist educational institutions, NGOs, charities, and Madrassas. These platforms not only imparted fundamentalist indoctrination in the name of religious education but also mobilized the youth for political ends. Funds—either directly or through intermediaries—were funneled into Bangladesh, nurturing a Madrassa-based social class. This strata deepened religious conservatism and sectarian divisions across both urban and rural society.

(6) A Marxist analysis shows that religious fascism has always served as an instrument of the ruling classes. In Bangladesh, ISI weaponized this tool to safeguard the interests of both capitalist and semi-feudal elites. As a result, genuine democratic movements and socialist consciousness among workers and peasants were undermined. Class struggle was replaced with religious polarization and communal conflict.

(7) Progressive movements in Bangladesh—particularly leftist forces and workers’ and peasants’ organizations—have consistently opposed ISI’s intervention. For them, Pakistani intelligence activity is not only a threat to state sovereignty but also a direct obstacle to the emancipation of the laboring classes. Pakistan has always sought to reduce Bangladesh into an anti-India outpost, and ISI stood at the center of that project.

(8) Immediately after 2009, the Awami League government took a strong stance against terrorism, dismantling the bases of multiple extremist groups. This weakened ISI’s direct operational presence, yet it continues to remain active in more covert ways—via social media, informal funding routes, NGOs, and charity networks.

(9) In the present context, ISI’s role has become more subtle. Rather than openly building militant outfits, it seeks to fuel political instability and polarization. Tactics now include infiltration into political parties, influencing diaspora communities, and cloaking intelligence activity under economic enterprises. The objective remains the same: to keep Bangladesh weak and dependent, thereby advancing Pakistan’s India-centric geopolitical agenda.

(10) From a Marxist standpoint, ISI’s actions cannot be seen as isolated intelligence maneuvers. They are embedded in the broader framework of imperialist geopolitics. Pakistan itself operates as a strategic ally of both U.S. imperialism and China. Its interventions in Bangladesh are part of global capitalism’s larger game. Thus, the struggle for workers’ and peasants’ liberation and for genuine democracy requires not only resisting domestic reactionary forces but also confronting ISI and its international patrons.

(11) From the killing of Sheikh Mujib to the present day, ISI’s sustained influence demonstrates how Bangladesh’s politics has been persistently shaped by external actors. This influence is not merely a spy game; it reflects the weakness of the local bourgeoisie and their class interests. One section of the ruling class leans on Pakistani intelligence, while another depends on Indian patronage. This dual dependency has repeatedly delayed the people’s true emancipation.

(12) By sustaining fundamentalist currents in society and fueling corruption-terror culture in politics, ISI continues to wield influence. It has shown that even the post-liberation generation can be ideologically misdirected. Through Madrassas, faith-based NGOs, and the hijacking of certain political causes, ISI has entrenched divisive politics in Bangladesh.

(13) Yet the people of Bangladesh have time and again shown their ability to overcome foreign conspiracies and move forward on the path of liberation. Just as the Liberation War of 1971 defeated the Pakistani state, so too can the people, when organized, defeat ISI and its domestic collaborators in the future.

(14) For the revolutionary left politics in Bangladesh today, the task is not merely to expose ISI’s influence but to struggle against the local class forces that provide it with shelter. ISI is an external actor, but its base has been prepared by the domestic ruling elite.

(15) To grasp ISI’s role from a Marxist perspective means to situate it not as an isolated intelligence activity but as part of the global capitalist structure. Breaking this structure requires international solidarity of workers and peasants and a revolutionary struggle. The liberation of Bangladesh cannot remain confined within nationalist limits; it is part of a broader, long-term class struggle against imperialism and its local agents.

Badrul Alam
17 August 2025
Dhaka