The Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) [1] and Aleksandar Vučić [2] have, at least declaratively, continuously enjoyed support from that section of the citizenry with poorer material circumstances. After all, all their political campaigns have been directed towards the economic betterment of the poorer part of the population, those downtrodden who can barely make ends meet.

Such tactics, aided by media propaganda and cheap populism, have indeed been profitable. As a rule, perhaps even counter-intuitively, public opinion polls showed that the ruling party had support from the poorest - from ordinary workers and pensioners to social cases.

However, the student rebellion, and consequently the general citizenry rebellion in Serbia, may have changed this already established picture.

Even the Poor See Corruption

In his analysis for Peščanik [3], Vujo Ilić from the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory [4] implies that the student movement currently potentially enjoys majority support from the population, regarding the relationship between class and protest support.

As reference points, Ilić uses data from three surveys by the organisation CRTA [5] (December 2024, February 2025, April 2025). Ilić used two questions from the questionnaire, about material and employment status, as approximate indicators of class position. He also points out that although the parameters are not ideal, certain conclusions can be drawn from them.

“Two conclusions can be drawn. First, there is majority support for the protests that transcends differences in household material status and labour market status. Second, although these indicators are not sufficiently developed for us to get a precise picture of class position, they show that the base of support for the student movement is broader than the middle or upper strata, however we define them,” states Ilić.

Ilić notes in his analysis that although these studies do not allow for a comprehensive class typology to be made, they point to general trends and are sufficient to re-examine the established opinion about pronounced class differentiation in support for protests in Serbia.

“The data shows that support for political protests is very broad and that it transcends differences in citizens’ material or employment status,” believes Ilić.

As he adds, based on data from CRTA’s surveys, we cannot clearly answer why there is no more pronounced class differentiation, but some assumptions can be made.

“First, it seems that the high levels of support for anti-regime protests in recent years reflect a decline in the regime’s legitimising power. This is particularly visible in recent months, when an increasing number of citizens in surveys express doubt that the country is moving in the right direction. Moreover, lower strata feel the consequences of inflation in their daily lives most acutely and, if they are not completely closed off in the media bubble of pro-government media, information about naked corruption through which individuals close to the government have shamelessly enriched themselves reaches them. This creates a sense of resentment that the government tries to mitigate through anti-corruption campaigns and price-limiting campaigns, which we see increasingly often and which, it seems, will only continue,” notes Ilić.

Class Alliances

Sociologist Đokica Jovanović, in conversation with Mašina, notes that from a sociological perspective, reality is more extensive than any statistics can show. However, as he says, if we are guided by the assumption that citizens of lower material status are devoted to the ruling party, such a picture is not surprising - rather, it is a tradition.

“In Serbia, it is a tradition that those who are in existential distress must listen to the ruling party and follow its interests. Simply put, deprived strata are always placed in a position of existential dependence; this is the essence of our politics for centuries. And these strata will, at least declaratively, support the party in power. On the other hand, we could never know what these people think privately,” begins Jovanović.

As he says - if we take as an accurate assumption that there has been greater support for protests in Serbia from lower strata - probably people from these deprived strata, given that the momentum of dissatisfaction is enormous, have at least partially transferred their private sphere into the public, because protests are themselves a public sphere.

“I say probably, because there is currently no sociological research that can confirm this,” believes Jovanović.

Nevertheless, Jovanović points out that due to the worsened material situation of all citizens in Serbia, that is, the economic situation in the country, there has been a kind of “inter-class alliance”.

“Although class differences are growing, it seems that an inter-class alliance has emerged amongst citizens, because there was a need for it. Simply put, citizens need peace and certainty, and the current regime cannot offer that at this moment,” says Jovanović.

Ilić noted at the very end of his analysis that, if we take into account the aforementioned media propaganda, the government’s campaigns directed at lower strata are temporary, whilst the problems are permanent.

“Protests in the past two years, from protests against violence, through protests against lithium mining [6], to the student movement caused by the canopy collapse [7], have concerned life issues with which citizens can identify regardless of socio-economic status. Thus a combination of factors emerges that year after year leads to mass mobilisation against the government, to which the government has no adequate response and which it fails to resolve. Because this is not a rebellion of elites, this is a rebellion of the people,” concludes Ilić.

M.B.