Wa territory / The Irrawaddy

This decision did not emerge in isolation. It followed years of mounting pressure from both the Myanmar military and China, and signals a recalibration of the UWSA’s role in the country’s fragmented civil war.

Historical Backstory
After its 1989 split from the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), the UWSA entered a ceasefire with the Myanmar military. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, it collaborated with the military in offensives against Khun Sa’s Mong Tai Army and later the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS).

These joint operations served both sides’ interests: they enabled the Tatmadaw to eliminate rivals while helping the UWSA to strengthen its hold along the Thai border.

Relations between the two sides seemed to be good but were managed through the UWSA leadership and Military Intelligence Chief Gen. Khin Nyunt, who accommodated UWSA demands. Junta No. 2 Maung Aye, however, viewed the UWSA as an autonomous force that refused to fall in line. This divergence led to confusion among field commanders, who were caught between conflicting orders from Yangon. In 2005, junta-UWSA relations began to unravel.

Three developments triggered the rupture: the dismissal of Gen. Khin Nyunt, UWSA’s refusal to continue fighting the RCSS in Loi Tai Leng, and the junta’s retaliatory arrest of UWSA brigade commander Bao Aik Kham as he returned from Loi Tai Leng with “a haul of drugs.” The arrest was overseen by Min Aung Hlaing, then chief of Triangle Region Command.

Relations were further strained in 2009 when the military pressured the UWSA to rebadge as a Border Guard Force as per the 2008 Constitution, which had been drafted to entrench military rule in civilian guise.

In 2010, medics, teachers and other government employees withdrew from Wa territory and military fortifications were established in contested areas.

Under President Thein Sein, ceasefire agreements were signed at state and Union levels, helping to ease tensions. But the UWSA’s refusal to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015 reignited hostilities. The military then blocked World Food Program (WFP) humanitarian aid deliveries to Wa territory, including rice and fuel.

The UWSA’s refusal to sign the NCA also drew pressure from China. In response, the group helped form the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), an alliance of seven ethnic armed groups aimed at forging an alternative to the NCA.

The UWSA had never before joined an ethnic alliance, only maintaining friendly ties with groups that had split from the Communist Party of Burma. Following the FPNCC’s formation, the UWSA emerged as a powerful patron of smaller ethnic armed groups, including the SSPP, MNDAA, TNLA, and the Arakan Army (AA), supplying them with weapons, funding, and sanctuary within its territory.

The UWSA’s aid suspension announcement confirmed it previously supported fellow ethnic armies with funding and arms. That support—whether direct or indirect—also extended to resistance groups that emerged after the 2021 coup.

UWSA vs Myanmar Military
Following the coup, the UWSA kept its distance from the junta, refusing to host regime envoys in its northern Shan stronghold of Panghsang and meeting them only twice in neutral territory. Although it attended peace talks in Naypyitaw in 2022, no substantive agreements were reached.

However, it maintained its engagement not only with armed groups in northeastern Myanmar but also ethnic organizations in other areas.

During the anti-regime Operation 1027, it gained control over strategic areas such as Hopang, Tangyan, and parts of Mongkyat and Mongyaw, with tacit approval from the military. This mirrored earlier arrangements in which the Myanmar military allowed the UWSA to expand its territory as a buffer—particularly against attacks by the MNDAA.

Beijing Tightens Grip
Before the coup, China had been the sole buyer of tin produced in Wa territory.

China’s concerns escalated after the putsch, when ethnic forces seized towns near the border, disrupting trade. For Beijing, maintaining its $1-billion annual trade with Myanmar—along with security for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—trumped concerns over widespread atrocities and other human rights abuses committed by the regime.

Beijing began ramping up pressure on the MNDAA and TNLA to halt their offensives against the regime. But when that pressure proved insufficient, it turned its focus on the UWSA.

The UWSA reported China had frozen billions of yuan held in Chinese banks by UWSA leaders and affiliates. In a dramatic move, Chinese authorities detained UWSA deputy commander Bao Junfeng along with several of his officers for alleged involvement in scam operations. Bao Junfeng was set to take over as UWSA top commander from his 70-year-old uncle, Bao Youxiang, after his appointment as deputy commander in 2021. His arrest disrupted UWSA’s leadership transition and signaled Beijing’s determination to assert control.

For nearly two years, the UWSA endured a financial blockade from Beijing. But as the regime lost more and more territory, China threatened to expand the blockade of Wa territory to food, medicines, fuel and other necessities. With the region’s 500,000 residents facing imminent hardship, the UWSA finally yielded to China’s demand.

Female UWSA soldiers on parade / The Irrawaddy

Not Collaboration, but Capitulation
The UWSA’s decision to suspend support for EAOs was not a strategic pivot but a reluctant concession under Chinese pressure. Speculation that UWSA is cooperating with the junta to hold elections in Wa territory is unfounded.

First, the UWSA does not recognize the authority of Shan State’s nominal junta-controlled government and places little value on local administrative figures. It only engages with decision-makers in Naypyitaw.

Second, the military continues to rely on the UWSA to prevent the resistance from advancing in Tangyan, but is offering no meaningful leverage or incentive in return. Strategically, the regime is in no position to demand concessions from the UWSA.

Third, although Wa-controlled townships were designated as electoral constituencies in the 2010, 2015, and 2020 polls under the 2008 Constitution, elections were never held there. The constituency designations are merely symbolic assertions of sovereignty—not indicators of any future vote. Without a political agreement between UWSA and the military, elections in Wa territory remain implausible.

The UWSA has supported not only ethnic armed groups but also Spring Revolution forces. Its withdrawal of aid does not mark collaboration with the regime but rather a reluctant response to Beijing’s escalating threats.

The UWSA could have said it suspended support to ensure regional stability, but instead it explicitly stated the decision was driven by Chinese pressure. Beijing is unlikely to be happy with this statement.

The UWSA appears more concerned with preserving its reputation among Myanmar’s ethnic communities than appeasing its powerful neighbor. Yet the cost of this concession—cutting off weapons, funding, and territorial access—will be felt acutely by resistance forces across the country.

Ko Oo is an ethnic affairs analyst.