Sixteen years ago, the Philippine Senate made the historic vote to shut
down what American analysts once described as “probably the most
important basing complex in the world” — the US military bases in Subic
and Clark, along with other smaller support and communications
facilities in the country.

Taken after long and emotional debates, the Senate vote shook the
Philippines’ relations with its most important ally. That one small and
weak country could say no to what by then had become the world’s only
remaining superpower reverberated across the world.
Since then, every move by the US military in the Philippines has
provoked controversy. For the most part, however, the question has
tended to be framed in terms of whether the US is seeking to
re-establish the kind of bases it had in the past. Such framing has
consequently allowed the US and Philippine governments to categorically
deny any such plans.

But what has since emerged is not a return to the past but a new and
different kind of basing.

 GLOBAL POSTURE

Since the end of the Cold War, but in a process that has accelerated
since the Bush administration came to office, the United States has
embarked on what American officials tout as the most radical
reconfiguration since World War II of its “global defense posture.”
This term no longer refers simply to the over 850 physical bases and
installations that the US now maintains in around 46 countries around
the world. [1] As US Defense undersecretary for policy Douglas J Feith
explained, “We are not talking only about basing, we’re talking about
the ability of our forces to operate when and where they are needed.” [2]

Billed as the “Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy,” the plan
seeks to comprehensively transform the US overseas military presence-
largely unchanged since the 1950s - in light of perceived new threats
and the USÕ self-avowed “grand strategy” of perpetuating its status as
the world’s only military superpower.

“The [US] military,” declared President George W Bush, “must be ready to
strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world.” [3] To do
this, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, an official document required
by the US Congress of the Pentagon to articulate US military strategy,
states that the US is seeking to move away from “obsolete Cold War
garrisons” to “mobile, expeditionary operations.” [4]

 REDUCED FOOTPRINT

The plan is simple: Instead of concentrating its troops and equipment in
only a few locations, the United States will decrease the number of
large well-equipped bases and increase the number of smaller, simpler
bases in more locations. [5]

Marine Gen. James Jones, commander of US forces in Europe, described the
aim as developing a “family of bases” that could go “from cold to warm
to hot if you need them” but without having the “small town USA”-feel,
complete with schools and families that have typically come with such
bases. [6]
Recognition of the rising opposition to the US military presence around
the world is also driving these changes. As early as in 1988, a US
government commission created during the Reagan administration concluded
that, “We have found it increasingly difficult, and politically costly
to maintain bases.” [7]

Apart from those in the Philippines, US bases have been closed or
terminated in recent years in Puerto Rico, Panama, and recently Ecuador,
as a result of public mobilizations. Turkey refused to allow the US to
use its bases for the invasion in Iraq. Even in Japan and Korea,
hostility to bases has been growing.

Hence, the US has been trying to restructure its overseas presence in a
way that aims to undermine this growing opposition. As US Navy Rear
Admiral Richard Hunt, the Joint Staff’s deputy director for strategy and
policy said, “We don’t want to be stepping all over our host nations.
“We want to exist in a very non-intrusive way.” [8]

The aim, according to the Pentagon, is to “reduce the forward footprint”
of the military while increasing its agility and flexible. [9]

 MISSION PRESENCE

As part of this over-all reconfiguration, the Pentagon now categorizes
its overseas structures into three: Main Operating Bases (MOBs), Forward
Operating Sites (FOSs), and Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs). (See
sidebar).

FOSs and CSLs are also called “lily pads” intended to allow the US to
hop from MOBs to their destinations rapidly when needed but without
requiring a lot of resources to keep them running when not needed. [10]
Referring to this kind of base, Gen. Jones said, “We could use it for
six months, turn off the lights, and go to another base if we need
to.” [11]

But, as mentioned earlier, the US definition of “global posture” goes
way beyond physical structures. In an effort to maximize its forward
presence while minimizing opposition, the US has also been seeking to
increase what US Air Force-sponsored analysts call “mission presence”
and “limited access.”

“Mission presence” is what the US has in countries where there are
ongoing military missions which “lack the breadth and capability to
qualify as true forward presence but nonetheless contribute to the
overall US posture abroad.”

“Limited access” is the kind the United States gets through exercises,
visits, and other operations. [12]

Hence, the US’ global posture encompasses, by definition, not just those
who are “forward-based,” or those units that are stationed in foreign
countries on a long-term basis such as troops in Korea and Japan, but
also those who are “forward-deployed,” or those who are sent overseas to
conduct various kinds of deployments, exercises, or operations.

 THE GREATEST POTENTIAL TO COMPETE

If, in the Cold War, the USl overseas presence targeted the Soviet Union
and other communist and nationalist forces in the Third World, today,
the US’ current “global posture” is aimed at any state or non-state
forces perceived to be threatening the interests of the United States.
“Terrorists” stand in the line of fire. Regional powers hostile to the
United States, such as Iran and North Korea, have also been singled out.
But, in light of the United States’ self-declared grand strategy of
preventing the rise of rivals who could threaten its preeminent status,
one rising power is now clearly in its sights- China.

For years, American officials have been divided between those who
believe that China could be a “strategic partner” to be engaged and
those who believe that it is a “strategic competitor” to be confronted
militarily before it grows more powerful. Since the end of the Cold War,
indications are that the latter view has prevailed.

As early as 1997, the Pentagon’s QDR had already identified China, along
with Russia, as possible “global peer competitors.” [13] In 1999, a
pivotal Pentagon think-tank conducted a seminar to lay down all the
likely scenarios involving China. Its conclusion: no matter what
happens, China’s rise will not be “peaceful” for the US.

In 2000, a US Air Force-funded study argued explicitly in favor of
preventing China’s rise. Also in the same year, Robert Kagan and William
Kristol, two influential commentators whose ideas have evidently molded
US policy, proposed that Beijing — along with Baghdad — should be
targeted for “regime-change.” [14] The Project for the New American
Century (PNAC), a grouping whose members and proposals have since
staffed and shaped the Bush administration and its policies, supported
the same aims and made similar recommendations.

During the US presidential elections, George W. Bush distinguished
himself from other candidates by singling out China as a “strategic
competitor.” Since then, various officials have successively warned that
China’s military modernization constitutes a direct threat to the United
States. [15]

The Pentagon’s 2006 official report to Congress on China stated,
“China’s military expansion is already such as to alter regional
military balances.” [16]]

If in 2001 the QDR was still vaguely worded, by 2006, when the next QDR
was released, the assessment became more explicit: “Of the major and
emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily
with the United States.” [17]

 MOVING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

The problem for the US is its relatively weak presence in Asia. As a
Pentagon report on China, whose conclusions have been widely echoed,
warned: “Lack of forward operating bases or cooperative allies greatly
limits the range of US military responses..” [18]

What the US does have in terms of presence is now believed to be
concentrated in the wrong place. Since the 1950s, the bulk of the US
forward-presence in Asia has been in South Korea and Japan, directed
towards the Soviet Union and North Korea. To address this, the US has
been seeking expand southwards Ð to Southeast Asia. [19]

By early 2002, the US began negotiating with various governments in
Southeast Asia for use of bases in the region. [20] In 2003, then US
Pacific Command chief Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, stated, “Power projection
and contingency response in Southeast Asia in the future will depend on
this network of US access in areas with little or no permanent American
basing structure.” [21]

Along with the plans for East Asia and Southeast Asia, the US had also
established bases to the west of China, in Central Asia, with new
installations in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. [22] While it had none before
the invasion of Afghanistan, by 2002 it had access to over a dozen bases
in the region. [23]

With the US forward presence northeast of China (in Japan and South
Korea), the deepening cooperation with Mongolia to China’s north, and
its deepening alliance with India, to China’s southwest, the United
States is slowly encircling China from all sides.
It is in light of these large, sweeping changes in US strategy, its
perception of threats, and its tactics, that US military objectives
regarding the Philippines can be best understood.

 IN THE DRAGON’S LAIR

Since the late 1990s, a chorus of American defense analysts, military
officials, civilian leaders, and influential commentators have
identified the Philippines as playing a critical role in the US’ global
posture and a succession of studies sponsored for different US military
services have singled it out for its strategic location.

The PNAC, for example, had proposed that the US Navy should establish a
home-port while the US Air Force should station a wing in the
Philippines. [24] Another study for the US Air Force (USAF) noted the
Philippines is located firmly within what US strategists have called the
“dragon’s lair” or those areas of the Western Pacific where China could
potentially seek to prevent the US from deploying. [25] Another US Air
Force-funded study to develop a “global access strategy” for the US Air
Force proposed renting an island from the Philippines for use as a
military base. [26]

A 2006 USAF-funded study evaluating basing options for storing and
pre-positioning US’ war material included the Philippines as among the
most desirable sites. Exploring different alternatives, a US
Army-sponsored research identified the Philippines as one of the
suitable locations for a new unit of the Army.

Although proposals made by military analysts do not necessarily
translate into action, it is clear that a consensus has been building
that “[A]ccess to Philippine facilities is much more important than most
judged 12 years ago.” [27]

 THE APPEARANCE OF BASES

One obstacle however remains: domestic opposition to US military
presence in the Philippines. As yet another US Air Force-funded study
acknowledges, “On the matter of US access to military facilities in the
Philippines, the general view of Philippine security experts is that for
domestic political reasons it would be difficult to give the appearance
that the United States is reestablishing its bases in the
Philippines.” [28]

Hence, the aim has been to avoid giving this appearance. As Admiral
Dennis Blair, former commander of the US Pacific Command, explained,
“[W]e are adapting our plans and cooperation of the past to the future.
Those plans do not include any request by the United States for bases in
the Philippines of the kind that we have had in the past.” [italics
added] [29]

“Our basic interest,” explained former US Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, “ss to have the ability to go into a country and have a
relationship and have understandings about our ability to land or
overfly and to do things that are of mutual benefit to each of us. But
we don’t have any particular plans for permanent bases if that’s the
kind of thing you mean..” [30]

Thus, instead of “the kind of bases we had in the past”, the US is
trying something new.

 TRAINING FOR ACCESS

First, the US has stepped up deploying troops, ships, and equipment to
the country ostensibly for training exercises, humanitarian and
engineering projects, and other missions.

Though the Visiting Forces Agreement was approved in 1998, it was only
in 2001 that the number and the size of troops involved in training
exercises jumped significantly. Last year alone, up to 37 exercises were
scheduled; up from around 24 in the preceding years. [31] As many as
5,000 US troops are involved, depending on the exercise. As a result of
these continuing deployments, former US Ambassador to the Philippines
Francis Ricciardone has described the US presence in the country as
“semi-continuous.” [32]

Apart from training allied troops, the holding of joint exercises allows
the US to gain temporary -but repeated and regular - access to the
territories of countries in which the exercises are held. As former US
PACOM head Admiral Thomas Fargo noted in March 2003, “The habitual
relationships built through exercises and training is our biggest
guarantor of access in time of need.” [33]

He said: “Access over time can develop into habitual use of certain
facilities by deployed US forces with the eventual goal of being
guaranteed use in a crisis, or permission to preposition logistics
stocks and other critical material in strategic forward locations.” [34]
As US troops come and go in rotation for frequent and regular exercises,
their presence- when taken together- makes up a formidable
forward-presence that brings them closer to areas of possible action
without need for huge infrastructure to support them and without
inciting a lot of public attention and opposition.

As analyst Eric Peltz has told the US House Armed Services Committee:
“Other methods of positioning, such as training rotations, can provide a
temporary “forward position” or sustain a long-term position without
permanent forward unit basing.” [35]

And as US troops depart, they leave behind the infrastructure that they
had built and used ostensibly for the exercises and which could still be
of use to the US military in the future for missions different from
those for which they were initially built.

In General Santos City, for example, the US constructed a deepwater port
and one of the most modern domestic airports in the country, connected
to each other by one of the country’s best roads. In Fort Magsaysay in
Nueva Ecija, where US troops routinely go for exercises, the airport has
been renovated and its runway strengthened to carry the weight of C-130
planes. [36] In Basilan and Sulu, venues of Balikatan exercises, the US,
through USAID, has also built roads and ports that can berth huge ships.

This is consistent with a USAF-funded study which recommended having
more deployments to have more infrastructure. By increasing deployments,
notes the study, the US can get into arrangements that “include measures
to tailor local infrastructure to USAF operations by extending runways,
improving air traffic control facilities, repairing parking aprons and
the like.” [37]

Along with troops, an increasing number of ships have also been entering
the country with growing frequency ostensibly for exercises and
humanitarian missions. “[T]he Navy counts those ships as providing
overseas presence full time, even when they are training or simply tied
up at the pier,” said the US Congressional Budget Office. [38]

As has been discussed earlier, the US sees these regular and frequent
“temporary” deployments as part of its global “posture.” As the US
National Defense Strategy states, “Our posture also includes the many
military activities in which we engage around the world. This means not
only our physical presence in key regions, but also our training,
exercises, and operations.” [39]

 BASE SERVICES WITHOUT PERMANENT BASING

Second, the US has obliged the Philippines to provide it with a broad
range of locally-provided services that would enable it to launch and
sustain operations from the Philippines when necessary.

In September 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo granted the US free
access to its ports and offered it overflight rights. [40] In November
2002, the US and Philippine governments signed the Mutual Logistics
Support Agreement (MLSA) which has been described by researchers with
the US Congressional Research Service as “allowing the United States to
use the Philippines as a supply base for military operations throughout
the region.” [41]

The MLSA obliges the Philippine government to exert “best efforts” to
provide the US logistics supplies, support and services during
exercises, training, operations, and other US military deployments. The
agreement defines these to include food, water, petroleum, oils,
clothing, ammunition, spare parts and components, billeting,
transportation, communication, medical services, operation support,
training services, repair and maintenance, storage services, and port
services. “Construction and use of temporary structures” is also
covered. [42]

In other words, the MLSA gives the US access to the full range of
services that the US military would require to operate in and from the
country. Through the MLSA, the US has secured for itself the services
that it would normally be able to provide itself inside a large
permanent base but without constructing and retaining large permanent
bases Ð and without incurring the costs and the political problems that
such bases pose.

 COOPERATIVE SECURITY LOCATIONS

Third, the US has established in the Philippines a new category of
military installations it calls “Cooperative Security Locations” (CSLs).
In August 2005, the Overseas Basing Commission, the official commission
tasked to review US basing, categorically identified the Philippines as
one of the countries where CSLs are being developed by the United States
in the region. [43] As mentioned earlier, CSLs is a new category of bases
that refers to facilities owned by host-governments but are to be made
available for use by the US military as needed.

The Philippine government has not disclosed the locations and other
details about these CSLs. But the description by Robert Kaplan, a
prominent American journalist and best-selling author who has visited
such facilities around the world, is quoted here in full because of the
dearth of information about them and because parts of it could be
describing the Philippines —
“A cooperative security location can be a tucked-away corner of a host
country’s civilian airport, or a dirt runway somewhere with fuel and
mechanical help nearby, or a military airport in a friendly country with
which we have no formal basing agreement but, rather, an informal
arrangement with private contractors acting as go-betweens. The United
States provides aid to upgrade maintenance facilities, thereby helping
the host country to better project its own air and naval power in the
region. At the same time, we hold periodic exercises with the host
country’s military, in which the base is a focus. We also offer
humanitarian help to the surrounding area. Such civil-affairs projects
garner positive publicity for our military in the local media. The
result is a positive diplomatic context for getting the host country’s
approval for use of the base when and if we need it.” [44]

The terms of the MLSA and the establishment of CSLs reflect the US’
increasing emphasis on just-in-time logistics support and
pre-positioning of equipment to ensure that US forces — dispersed as
they are to be around the world, often far away from main bases where
they store equipment and use all kinds of services — are always ready
and on the go. Therefore, it is not so much the size of the base that
matters but whether it can provide the US military with what it needs,
when it’s needed.

As the Council on Foreign Relations points out: “While host nation
support often carries the connotation of basing, its role of staging and
access is perhaps more critical. Support for port visits, ship repairs,
overflight rights, training areas, and opportunities, and areas to
marshal, stage, repair, and resupply are no less important for both
daily US presence in the region and for rapid and flexible crisis
response.” [45]

 FORWARD OPERATING BASE

Fourth, the US has succeeded in indefinitely stationing a US military
unit in the country.

Since 2002, a unit now called the Joint Special Operations Task
Force-Philippines (JSOTFP) has been deployed to the southern
Philippines. While initially presented as being part of on-again
off-again temporary training exercises, it has since been revealed that
this unit has maintained its presence in the country continuously for
the last six years.

With the Philippine government not giving a definite exit date, and with
US officials stating that this unit will stay on as long as they are
allowed by the government, it is presumed that it will continue to be
based in the Philippines for the long-haul.

The unit is headquartered in the Philippine military’s Camp Navarro in
Zamboanga City [46] but its “area of operations,” according to a US
military publication, spans 8,000 square miles, covering the entire
island of Mindanao and its surrounding islands and seas. [47]

According to a comprehensive compilation of various media reports, the
number of troops belonging to the unit has ranged between 100 and 450
but it is not clear what the actual total is for a specific period. [48]
It varies “depending on the season and the mission,” said US Lt. Col.
Mark Zimmer, JSOTF-P public affairs officer. [49]

When it was publicly revealed last month that the US Department of
Defense, via a US military construction unit, had granted a contract to
a company providing “base operations support” for the JSOTF-P [50]], the
US embassy admitted that US was setting up allegedly “temporary”
structures for “medical, logistical, administrative services” and
facilities for “for them to eat, sleep and work.” [51] The Philippine’s
own Visiting Forces Commission also confirmed that the US maintains
“living quarters” and stocks supplies inside Philippine military
camps. [52]

 FOR THE CONTAINMENT OF CHINA

Referring to their bases in Mindanao as “forward operating base-11” and
“advanced operating base-921,” [53] the JSOTF-P corresponds to what a US
Air Force-sponsored study described as the ongoing “redefinition of what
forward presence means.” [54]

In terms of profile and mission, the JSOTF-P is similar to the Combined
Joint Task Force Ð Horn of Africa (CJTF-Horn of Africa) which was
established in Djibouti in eastern Africa in 2003, also composed mostly
of Special Forces, and which has been described as a sample of the US
austere basing template and the “model for future US military
operations.” [55]

Indeed, more deployments similar to that of the JSOTF-P and CJTF-Horn of
Africa are planned in other locations around the world in the
future. [56] In 2004, former PACOM commander Thomas Fargo talked about
expanding Special Operations Forces in the Pacific. [57] Apparently
referring to the JSOTF-P, former defense secretary Rumsfeld had also
announced that the Pentagon would establish more “nodes for special
operations forces.”

“In place of traditional overseas bases with extensive infrastructure,”
Rumsfeld said, “we intend to use smaller forward operating bases with
prepositioned equipment and rotational presence of personnel. We will
maintain a smaller forward-presence force in the Pacific while also
stationing agile, expeditionary forces capable of rapid responses at our
power projection bases.” [58]

The JSOFT-P’s characteristics fit this description. Modest and austere,
the JSOTF-P has none of the extensive infrastructure and facilities of
the former US bases in Subic and Clark. But with the availability of
local logistics and other services assured, the free entry of ships and
planes and the pre-positioning of equipment allowed, and with the new
roads, ports, and other infrastructure the US has been building in the
area, the US Special Forces will be ready and able at a moment’s notice
to launch and sustain its operations in the region.

As evidenced by the fact that most Filipinos are not even aware of their
presence and their actions, “the JSOTF had succeeded,” notes Kaplan, “as
a political mechanism for getting an American base-of-sorts up and
running.” [59] C.H. Briscoe, command historian of the US Army Special
Operations Command, under which the units of the JSOTF-P belong,
concurs: “After more than 10 years, PACOM has reestablished an
acceptable presence in the Philippines.” [60]

Strategically positioned between two routes at the entrance of a major
sea-lane, the Makassar Strait, at the southwestern rim of the South
China Sea and closer to Malaysia and Indonesia than most of the rest of
the Philippines, the JSOTF-P, according to Briscoe, is “now better able
to monitor the pulse of the region.” [61]

Having secured this presence, the US has become closer to the country
with “the greatest potential to compete militarily” with it. By getting
the US “semi-permanently” based south of Luzon for the first time since
World War II, Kaplan notes that “the larger-than-necessary base complex”
in Zamboanga has delivered more than tactical benefits. [62] In the minds
of the US Army strategists, Kaplan notes: “Combating Islamic terrorism
in this region [Southeast Asia] carried a secondary benefit for the
United States: it positioned the US for the future containment of nearby
China.” [63]

 QUALITATIVELY TRANSFORMED

All of the steps discussed above have paved the way for the gradual and
incremental re-entry of the US military to the Philippines. At no time,
since 1991, has US military presence been more entrenched. At the same
time, this presence is no longer the same; it has been qualitatively
transformed.

No longer are US troops permanently stationed and confined inside large
bases in two locations in the country. Drawn instead from rotational
forces, the troops have been deploying in various locations all over the
country for exercises and other missions. Instead of being massed in the
thousands inside huge fortifications flying the US flag, they are in the
hundreds, dispersed and housed inside camps that technically belong to
the Philippine military.

In the past, US troops could, despite the occasional deployment, expect
to stay for long periods of time, stationed in the same base for years.
Now, they are to be always ready and on the move, prepared to take part
in shorter but more frequent deployments overseas.

Before, they stored their equipment, weapons, and supplies in huge
storerooms and warehouses inside their base complex at all times, ready
to lift and carry them wherever they went; now, they are scattering and
storing their equipment and supplies in various locations, guarded and
maintained by host-nation governments or private companies, and ready to
be picked up on the way to the fighting.

All these changes in the Philippines are driven by the overlapping goals
of building up support for and countering domestic opposition to US
presence while improving the agility and efficiency of the US military.

 TRIAL BALLOONS

But this too could change: for while large bases have their
disadvantages, they also provide the guaranteed access, capacities, and
other advantages that smaller more austere bases cannot. Also, while the
kind of basing that the US is developing now can be useful for certain
scenarios, they may not be appropriate and sufficient for others. In
case of a long drawn-out standoff, for instance, it would take more than
500 Special Forces stationed in relatively simple bases to sustain US
military operations.

Hence, given the right moment and given the need, if plans are not in
fact afoot, the US may still want to re-establish larger bases in the
Philippines. Given US strategy and the Philippines’ location, the
possibility cannot be ruled out. Indeed, the frequent reports that the
US is trying to re-establish bases in the country have been
characterized by an analyst with the Brookings Institute as “trial
balloons” to test the atmosphere. [64]

For the moment, however, it cannot be said that just because the US does
not have large bases of the kind it used to have, the US has not been
securing its military objectives in the country. Through the back-door
and largely out of sight, the US has gradually but incrementally
reintegrated the Philippines firmly within its “global posture.”

All these may have effectively reversed that historic decision, taken 16
years ago, to end nearly a century of US military presence in the
country.#

---

Sidebar:

 CATEGORIES OF US OVERSEAS MILITARY STRUCTURES

Main Operating Bases (MOB) are those relatively larger installations and
facilities located in the territory of reliable allies, with vast
infrastructure and family support facilities that will serve as the hub
of operations in support of smaller, more austere bases; examples are
the Ramstein Air Base in Germany, the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, and
Camp Humphreys in Korea

– Forward Operating Sites (FOS) are smaller, more spare bases that could
be expanded and then scaled down as needed; they will store
pre-positioned equipment but will only normally host a small number of
troops on a rotational, as opposed to permanent, basis; while smaller,
they must still be able to quickly support a range of operations with
back-up from MOBs

– Cooperative Security Locations (CSL) are facilities owned by host
governments that would only be used by the US in case of actual
operations; though they could be visited and inspected by the US, they
would most likely be ran and maintained by host-nation personnel or even
private contractors; useful for pre-positioning logistics support or as
venues for joint operations with host militaries, they may also be
expanded to become FOSs if necessary

Source: US Department of Defense, “Strengthening US Global Defense
Posture,” September 2004