---

Due to the situation (crisis in the RPM-P), I am presenting a long report, following up on my two-week stay in the Philippines. We shall be called upon to make certain immediate decisions (how to react to the falling through of the fusion that gave rise to the RPM-P, how to analyse the underlying political problems) and prepare for the World Congress (which will have to deal with the organisational status of the Filipino group).

Today, it is necessary to better pool our knowledge and analysis concerning the different forces with which we have had relations in the Philippines. So I’m starting off with this detailed report centred on the RPM-P. It is up to all other comrades who have visited this country to correct or confirm the elements it contains, to provide complementary information (in particular on the Visayas) and to present their own viewpoint. This report is an invitation to undertake a discussion. It is internal (you will understand why as you read it) but addressed to all comrades concerned by this discussion.

I am dealing with other aspects of the situation in the Philippines and the balance sheet of my travels in:

* The parliamentary mission report: I was formally sent by the LCR delegation at the European Parliament on a fact-finding mission to the Philippines. For administrative reasons (Patrick and I are employed by the parliament and must justify why we were not working at our Brussels office, especially if we have an accident during our travels). For financial reasons, (access to LCR delegation funds). But also for reasons of substance: the “parliamentary” dimension of the Philippines trip was absolutely real. It adds an important dimension to the relations of solidarity that we have developed with the comrades and the other forces of the Filipino left.

The parliamentary mission report delegation [1] is addressed to the LCR, but it was also provided to the secretariat of the GUE/NGL to prepare the terrain for eventual initiatives - and so that the RMP-P crisis is presented by us and not just via a scurrilous rumour. (Joma Sison has already taken great pleasure in denouncing the RMP-P’s “capitulation” far and wide).

* An IVP/Inprecor article I am working on about the political background (EDSA II and its consequences until the elections) and which will also take up the crisis in the RPM-P.

 1. Nature of the visit

Overall, it was necessary to once again visit the Philippines: But this trip was moved ahead and above all motivated by the situation the organisation finds itself in, and the gravity of the RPM-P crisis. I would like to start off by emphasising to what an extent the situation was difficult seen from Mindanao, despite the rather remarkable dynamism the organisation has shown on this island.

Just after emerging from a long and distressing period of “total war” between Government and Muslim forces, the organisation faced an open crisis in the RPM-P. This involved the failure under poor conditions of the 1998 fusion between the former Mindanao central region (CMR) of the CPP, a part of the former Visayas (with Tabara) and the former military leader of the urban partisans in the capital (Nilo de la Cruz). The majority leadership of the RPM-P signed peace accords seen as capitulation, rejected by Mindanao. This means that on that island, the comrades will probably have no chance of once again taking part in peace negotiations for the time being (despite the importance of this question for them) all the more so as the CPP will insist that the government not negotiate with any other Filipino left organisations.

Furthermore, more generally, the RPM-P was unable to participate on the national level, in a dynamic way, in the mass movement for the overthrow of Estrada, a decisive event (see below). The organisation mobilised in Mindanao, as did a wing of the RPM-P in Manila, but they were unable to take a national initiative.

The assassination of Popoy Lagman (a former CPP leader in Manila) also poisoned the atmosphere due to the suspicions Popoy’s followers entertained about certain components of the majority leadership of the RPM-P (see below).

To top this off, shortly before my arrival, the CPP killed one of the main leaders of the organisation in Mindanao (he had just been elected as military chief for the entire region). Up until now, the CPP had set a few ambushes for the comrades - ambushes that were counterproductive for them. However, it had not yet individually targeted leaders with an eye on a coldly calculated assassination.

All of this occurs at a crucial political moment at which the Mindanao organisation had occupied the political terrain; and hoped to make electoral gains in the 14 May elections and faced crucial choices on several levels (for example, see the parliamentary mission report for the Lumad struggle).

If I made this trip at that time; it was mainly for the reasons explained above: But the journey was also an opportunity to assess the political situation; to re-establish contacts with different forces, to work on initiatives on the parliamentary level:

 II: ACHIEVING PURPOSES

Due to my work, I could only stay in the Philippines for two weeks, including Easter week. It was not enough to fulfil all the objectives of our journey and we had to set priorities and make choices.

From the outset, it was agreed that I would stay longer in Mindanao than in Manila. The final proposal presented by the comrades “stepped up” this initial option. Three days in Manila (including Good Friday) and eleven days in Mindanao (see the maps and programme found in my parliamentary mission report). The stay was well organised in Mindanao, and a bit patchier in Manila.

I discussed this issue upon my arrival in the Philippines, in particular with Ysp. It would have been possible to extend the stay in Manila by eliminating the last stage of the Mindanao tour (i.e. Zamboanga peninsula). We finally decided to retain the plan, as it was the first time I had the opportunity to visit that part of the country and meet the comrades.

In Manila, I took part in a limited number of “summit” discussions. On the other hand; in Mindanao, during each stage I met members of party leaderships militants involved in mass and electoral work, tribal communities and so forth. It was a “multidimensional” visit - important for them (using my presence to the greatest possible extent for their activities on all levels) and for myself (to learn more about the organisation and the situation in Mindanao, better prepare solidarity activities).

1. Making clear the extent of our concern.

The first purpose of the trip was to show that we were very concerned about the situation of the RPM-P and to demonstrate our solidarity. I believe this objective was all the better fulfilled as I met militant networks in Mindanao on several levels and in seven different towns (and in Manila, but to a much more limited extent). It seems my presence was very welcome to the comrades. In the same vein, in the eyes of the other organisations with which we have relations, it was also important to show that we took our relations with the RPM-P seriously enough to travel to the Philippines in times of crisis.

2. Achieving a better understanding.

The second objective was to achieve a better understanding of the organisation and the reasons for the crisis in the RPM-P. This second objective was partially, but not entirely, fulfilled.

– I obviously acquired a better understanding of the organisation in Mindanao and the way it was reacting to the situation in which it finds itself. Let us say from the outset that I got a very positive impression from my visit to Mindanao.

– Other than Ysp whom I met both in Manila and Mindanao, in the capital I was only able to see (twice) two leaders of the former RPM-P (L. and C. - the latter was the former person in charge of the RPM-P for the island of Luzon). I was unable to meet the militant network or to travel to the other provinces in Luzon (Southern Tagalog, Antipolo). The situation is clearly difficult in Luzon for the wing of the organisation opposed to the outlook of the majority leadership of the RPM-P.

– Due to the brevity of my stay, I was unable to go to the Visayas or to meet, as I had hoped, “the other side” of the RPM-P). To do so, I would have needed more time. In fact, there is a break in Manila between Nilo and the comrades. The latter were willing to arrange all the meetings I had wished … except that one. Suspicion reigns supreme (see below). I had no regular, established “natural links” beforehand, with that wing of the RPM-P, which would have been simple to activate swiftly. So, we had some written documents on the outlook of the RPM-P majority leadership (the peace accords, a circular on the anti-Estrada movement of the majority of the RPM-P PB) and since my return I made e-mail contacts to request further documentary information. But we had no oral explanation on their part or in-depth discussions. It is a problem.

3. Contacting a range of organisations on the radical left.

The third objective was to meet other organisations, both to renew our links, to get a better view of the overall situation (particularly on the left) and to see how they viewed the crisis in the RPM-P, the signing of the peace accords between the PB majority and the Estrada government - not to forget the assassination of Popoy. This objective was fulfilled, but just barely.

In addition to the meetings with Ysp, C. and L. (RPM-P pro-Mindanao wing), in Manila, I met five cadres from other movements. For comrades who may know them: Lidy (PPD), Ric (Akbayan-Padayon), Ronald (Akbayan-Bisig), Wim Wim and Enteng. I was unable to meet the persons in charge of the PMP (Popoy’s organisation), the MLP (Luzon Centre), the SPP (close to the Australian DSP) … I also counted on meeting Gus (an ex-CPP) in Davao, but he was in Manila when I was in Davao.

4. Keeping up on solidarity issues.

In terms of international solidarity and co-operation work, this trip above all made it possible to assess the potential on the parliamentary level, which I had been unable to ascertain beforehand (see my parliamentary mission report).

5. An opportunity for a general update.

The last objective was to take advantage of the trip to get a somewhat better picture of the changing situation in the country. It was partially fulfilled.

 III. THE DYNAMICS OF THE SPLIT

The split (or more precisely, the failed fusion) was consummated on the island of Luzon. The “Manila-Rizal Moro Committee” and the “Southern Tagalog Committee” officially split with the RPM-P “majority leadership”. They had just founded a new organisation (Balaraw, an acronym meaning “dagger” for the New Proletarian Party) whose existence is not yet really known.

The split has not been formally consummated in Mindanao. The atmosphere is not super-fractional. The cadres remain cautious when I ask them to explain why Tabara-Nilo signed so-called capitulation accords. Members of the regional committee (the central leadership) even pleaded with me to meet Tabara-Nilo. But the mutual split dynamics remains, it seems to me, and should be concluded after the electoral campaign.

The crystallisation of the disagreements in the RPM-P leadership and the break in the relations of trust among the leaders took place in three major steps:

Division in the electoral arena. Disagreements came to light first on the electoral level; namely under which “party list” name to campaign on the national level (the lists had been regional in the previous elections). Mindanao hoped that the AMIN symbol would be used (as it was already known on the island where the RMP-P has its main electoral base). An agreement seems to have been reached during a national conference, in early 2000. But its interpretation gave rise to disputes and now there are two competing slates: AMIN and ATIN.

I don’t think it is indispensable for us to fully clarify the process that led to the presentation of competing slates. It is certainly unclear and other political disagreements would simply make it possible to make an in-depth judgement about the crisis in the RMP-P. But the electoral question played a major role in the crisis coming to head. The stakes are important (will it be possible to elect members despite the split?). There is a breach of trust among the leadership and, under these conditions, major operational problems have come to light (linked to the overrepresentation of Visayas in relation to Mindanao on the leadership, and the accusations of “packing the hall” and fractional manœuvres during the conferences).

The most problematic of these on the political level bears upon the peace negotiations, the stance taken during the Estrada presidency’s crisis. Not to forget the repercussions of the assassination of Popoy Lagman.

Signing the peace accords and stance taken towards Estrada presidency. The majority leadership of the RMP-P (Visayas, Nilo) signed peace accords with the General Staff and the Estrada presidency not long before the aforementioned president was driven out of power after a massive street occupation in Manila and many other cities and towns. The implications of the timing are obviously problematic: The leadership of the RMP-P denounces the anti-Erap movement as nothing but the product of a manipulation orchestrated by the elites and Washington. The event (called EDSA II in an allusion to the overthrow of Marcos in 1986) was extremely significant. The “Mindanao” wing of the RMP-P (and its partners in Manila) took part in the mass mobilisations, but was unable to derive all the political benefit it could have.

The content of the peace accords (and not just the timing) is also problematic. The peace negotiations had been undertaken with the agreement of the entire organisation (including Mindanao, particularly concerned by the situation on the island). It was supposed to be a long-term process, with a key “confidence building” period during which the government was supposed to provide concrete signals (freeing political prisoners, etc.) and fundamental questions were to have been dealt with (socio-economic policies…). This did not happen: things sped up to such an extent that the signing of the accords was viewed as an outright “surrender” by the press, the wing of the RMP-P that rejects it and many activists in other organisations (some of the people I spoke with were very cautious in terms of a definitive judgement, but nobody thought the accords were good).

What could good peace accords involve? For me, this is not at all obvious, in particular in Mindanao where there is a situation of open or latent war (between government forces and Moros), generalised banditry and in which the CPP is a physical threat to “dissident” organisations. On the one hand, armed struggle is no longer the dynamic axis of a revolutionary intervention on the national level and has no clear political function (except for passive self-defence). As for maintaining military camps, it tends to “weigh down” the organisation financially. On the other hand, in Mindanao, simply disarming can lead to the rapid loss of some of the most important bases of territorial establishment and many armed groups can take advantage of the situation to drive out known militants by threat.

It seems to me that due to its extended, progressive nature, the negotiating process as it had first been defined should have made it possible to clarify the conditions for a good peace accord, which are difficult to define from the word go. This did not happen. As we have seen, the process sped up rapidly. This is part of the problem.

How can we explain that the Tabara-Nilo leadership signed agreements in the context of late 2000 (anti-Estrada mobilisation) and with such a problematic content?

The first explanation that comes to mind is that the weary leading cadres aspired to swiftly emerge from their burdensome semi-clandestine conditions. Another explanation sometimes given: the RMP-P negotiators were taken in by more professional ones (the government’s lawyer drafted the accords). The signature was rumoured to have been decided upon during an informal “drinking session”. And unfortunately, such drinking sessions had become a bit of a habit among the negotiators. These are some (unverified) explanations making the rounds in the Filipino left. This gives some inkling of the mood.

These explanations probably have at least some validity. But others are more disturbing still. The agreements explicitly offer the chance for armed RPM-P elements to be integrated into the periphery of government police forces. If certain press articles can be believed, this relates to events on Negros Island (Visayas). A lot of money seems to have been passed round, and its use (officially development aid) doesn’t seem to have been … let’s say collectively well controlled. Danding Cojuangco played a very active role in the negotiations. And yet, he is a major landlord, a very wealthy businessman, with hired killers and friends among all the powers-that-be - including the outright dictatorial Marcos forces. If he was at the negotiating table, it was not out of humanitarian feeling but because he had something to get out of it.

I was only able to get partial information during my trip. We still need to hear directly from Nilo and Tabara. And it is necessary to visit the Visayas and discuss matters with the cadre of other radical left organisations with a base in that region. But, taking into account the written material in my possession (peace accords and appendices, internal bulletin on Estrada’s fall), the position of the majority leadership in the RMP-P on the anti-Erap movement seems indefensible to me (and very costly given the importance of the event) and the accords are very dangerous due to the dynamics they can lead to in terms of political corruption.

The Mindanao leadership claims not to have been informed of the course of the peace negotiations and to have been placed before a fait accompli upon the signing, in December 2000. The breach of trust is now total. I’ll provide one example.

In Manila, the situation is very tense. Indeed, Nilo set up his new headquarters in the heart of the Moro district of the capital. This is viewed as a provocation by the wing of the organisation linked to Mindanao: it is in charge of the Moro work and this neighbourhood was its “natural base”. But the two fractions are only in direct contact on Luzon Island.

 IV. THE ASSASSINATION OF POPOY

I think we must once again deal with the assassination of Popoy Lagman, a historic leader in the capital region (Manila-Rizal) from the days of the CPP and a founder, after the 1992 split, of an important workers’ party (now the PMP).

First, three important points:

1. Popoy made a lot of enemies and there is more than one possible culprit. As of now, we can’t be sure who ordered the crime. We must remain very cautious.

2. A wing of the RMP-P is often suspected. Cadres of the PMP remain convinced that the murder was committed by one of the fractions of the majority leadership of the RMP-P; if there is no proof otherwise, eventually they will react (even if they have to wait for a year) [2]. This accusation is based on political considerations but also facts: the killers were identified as was the pistol used - and led to the RMP-P. The modus operandi is the ABB’s (Manila urban guerrilla units). But a Filipino secret service is certainly capable of setting up an operation so as to incriminate a far-left organisation. Once again, we must remain very cautious.

3. As much as one year ago, the RMP-P was accused in the press of assassinating an ABB leader. The accusation was unfounded and the RMP-P was “cleared”. After Popoy’s assassination, Nilo de la Cruz held a press conference to deny any involvement in the murder. But what is particular now is the fact that the accusation is seen as credible even among the ranks of the RMP-P itself.

So, we have to distinguish between two questions. For the time being, we have no way of knowing who killed Popoy and above all we must not take up the current suspicions of the majority leadership of the RMP-P. But these suspicions have become a political factor, independently of any real guilt. This political factor cannot be ignored. It weighs upon the situation, relations of unity among radical left forces, the breach of trust in the ranks of the RMP-P and the dynamics of the split.

Let us be a bit more specific about these “rumours”. [3]

When I discussed this question with activists belonging to other organisations, the response was generally: “The PMP is convinced that the assassination was carried out by an RMP-P faction, but it is impossible to draw such conclusions. We don’t really know.”

One of the people I spoke with had discussed the murder in detail with central and middle-ranking leaders of the PMP. These cadres put forth three hypotheses:

– [XX from MR] ordered the assassination. It was a delayed revenge against violent personal and political conflicts that had accompanied the crisis of the regional MR in the course of the 1990s.

– A fraction of the Visayas is behind the assassination (i.e. the Tabara fraction, with or without the latter’s knowledge) because Popoy won over a significant share of the cadres in the Visaya regional election in 1997-1998 (getting his hands on sources of funds).

– It was a contract carried out by an RMP-P fraction, probably as a result of the peace accords and the relations established with Danding Cojuangco.

These three hypotheses all lead to one of the fractions of the Nilo-Tabara wing of the RMP-P. I do not place any particular faith in them; I am simply setting them forth once again. But, as I recall, this suspicion has become a political factor that will not remain without consequences. And it may well feed into the dynamics of fractional violence among the ranks of the Filipino left (see the parliamentary commission report and the IVP/Inprecor article).

So, let us hope that Popoy’s murder gets cleared up before a cycle of violence begins between the PMP and a wing of the RMP-P. This is an extremely important matter.

 V. WHERE MATTERS STAND

I and we still have only an extremely partial version of the RPM-P, which is a problem. We are most familiar with Mindanao and the Manila leadership that is linked to Mindanao. We know very little about other components of the RMP-P (unless the Japanese comrades are more familiar with the Visayas). Above all, we have questions.

In the leadership, the Tabara-Nilo block is clearly in the majority. But this leadership is the product of the initial fusion process of the RMP-P and did not represent the national organisation in a balanced way. The Visayas were over-represented and Nilo wound up monopolising the Luzon delegation.

Can we evaluate the RMP-P’s numerical makeup? To a certain extent, yes. I will provide a few figures, while pointing out that these are merely rough evaluations that go back to 1998 and can be questioned. And we are also talking about the members of a clandestine organisation with much more stringent membership criteria than in Europe…

In terms of regional blocks, at the time of the fusion, the Visayas were in the majority. They had around 1,500 members (one thousand in Negros, five hundred in Panay…). The Central Mindanao Region (CMR) numbered around one thousand members. Numerically, Luzon was very weak (a few dozen members).

Of course, with such problems in terms of outlook, we can no longer think in terms of regional “blocs”. What is the majority outlook in the RMP-P as of now? We don’t know anything about it, because the national congress has not taken place and the debate among options has not filtered down to each region. It seems probable to me that separate congresses will be held in future.

Can we attempt to evaluate the political-organisational course of the forces? I will provide some elements of analysis here.

The question of political generations.

To start off, all the organisations linked to or coming out of the RMP-P are cousins in more than one respect. Beyond their different political paths taken, they bear the mark of the same historical experience (years of dictatorship). The intermediate militants and cadre are similar, as is their implantation - the impression is positive overall. Except for a certain number of “test” political questions (for example, the effective recognition of plurality in the popular and revolutionary movement), the difference seems to be mostly in terms of the central leaderships (methods of functioning, political practices, personal qualities). Which raises the particular question of “generations” - a question that concerns the fractions within the CPP as much as the course taken by its «dissidents».

Among the “historic” generation of the CPP (which often remains the decision-making core of the “dissident” groups) interpersonal relations have broken down considerably. Furthermore, in many cases, leadership has been highly personalised (as in the case of Popoy Lagman…) and we often hear about “leadership couples” (the Sisons and the Tiamsons in the CPP, or the Tabaras and de la Cruz in the RMP-P… The cadre in the following generation (mostly people in their forties, who see themselves as “young”) often complain about this state of affairs that sometimes makes it very difficult to develop unitary relations among organisations that came out of the CPP crisis, or rebuilding intergenerational leadership teams.

My feeling is that one of the keys (but not the only one) that helps understand the different paths taken by the organisations is found there. Unfortunately, we are particularly unfamiliar with the history of each of its leaderships. However, I will attempt to cover it briefly.

A. The RPMP - majority of the leadership

The majority block of the leadership of the RPM-P includes the Visayas delegation (the Tabara couple) and the de la Cruz couple in the capital. The history of these two components is very different and I don’t know to what extent their bloc will resist the ravages of time.

1. The Visayas.

The “Visayas” component of the RMP-P conveys an impression of strength but also of a lack of cohesion.

Here, we are speaking of a leadership that, within the CPP, was responsible for a vast territorial zone - much larger than is the case for the other fundamental component of the RMP-P - a half-dozen major islands located in the centre of the archipelago. In 1992, it broke with the Sison leadership of the CPP, which later became involved in the fusion process that led to the founding of the RPM-P.

The Visayas leadership should have been much more closely tied to the leadership milieu of the CPP (on a national scale) than Mindanao Central (CMR). Its territorial scope and its military capacity and experience were greater than the CMR’s, as was its political reputation. It represented really important forces. But over the 1990s, we can see a slow, long-term process of decline, de-articulation, and partial disappearance.

During this decade, the coherence of the Visayas regional structure could not be maintained. Then, in the second half of the decade, elements that had broken with the CP joined Popoy Lagman, finally breaking with Tabara. Finally, in 2000-2001, cadre of the party seemed to have taken their distances (including one of those who had been to Amsterdam [4]) or resigned from the CC due to disagreements with the course taken by the organisation and its leadership.

We can only observe the process, not really explain it. But it seems probable to me that the leadership problems (including the relations between leaders and the generational questions raised above) played a part in it.

2. Nilo de la Cruz .

What we have said here about the Visayas is truer still about Nilo de la Cruz. He was the major (or one of the major) persons in charge of the urban guerrillas (Alex Boncayano Brigade, ABB) in the capital region (Manila-Rizal - MR - politically led by Popoy Lagman).

Nilo has a reputation of being more “military” than “political”. The “military” structure of the urban guerrillas broke with Popoy Lagman (keeping the M-R reference for Manila Rizal) and took part in discussions on founding the RMP-P. But when all was said and done, the de la Cruz couple was (almost) the sole founder of the new organisation. And yet, Nilo was supposed to be at the head of 2.000 militants! The former ABB (“M-R”) retained their independence. Even those close to the de la Cruz couple broke with them. It was a (disagreeable) surprise for the other components of the RPM-P. What happened? We don’t really know.

Once the RPM-P was formed, the de la Cruz couple seem to have shown effective fractional abilities by progressively taking control of the mass front (Alab Katipunan) and the delegation from Luzon region within the RPM-P. They failed to win over the original members of the RPM-P and probably provoked the departure of independent cadre from Alab Katipunan. But they also rallied other elements of AK. They seem to have some political clout in Manila now, including from the State apparatus, and a fair bit of money.

A. RPMP – Leadership minority

The wing of the RPM-P that supports the AMIN electoral campaign, rejects the peace accords and the positions of the leadership majority at the time of the Estrada overthrow includes the Mindanao organisation, the so-called “Moro” network in the capital, the Southern Tagalog committee and probably, the Antipolo organisation.

1. In Luzon, the “Moro network” in the capital.

The RMP-P has always been weak in the capital region and more generally, on Luzon Island. But the creation of the new party had launched a political dynamics that seemed promising (including the founding of the Alab Katipunan “mass front”).

Before the CPP split in 1992, in the capital there was an organisation under the authority of Central Mindanao (CMR). In fact, this region was responsible for the Moro (and Lumad) work. Many Moros live in Manila-Quezon City – the leadership of the regional CMR had its own organisational network in the capital.

This network (sometimes called “Moro Committee” became the main original component of the RPM-P in the capital. One of its leaders (whom we know well) became the spokesperson of the RPM-P for Luzon Island. This network played a decisive part in founding the Alab Katipunan movement, before the de la Cruz couple got control over it.

2. In Luzon, Southern Tagalog

The Southern Tagalog committee is not one of the original components of the RPM-P. After breaking with the CPP, these cadres rejoined on the basis of their own experience. It was also based on their own experience that they broke with the national Nilo-Tabara leadership (they are perhaps the first to have formally done so) then rejoined the “Moro committee” in the capital for found Balaraw. I did not take down the history of the organisation in Antipolo, but it must be similar.

3. In Luzon – Balaraw

Now, the “Moro Committee and the Southern Tagalog committee have broken any relations with Nilo and the majority leadership of the RPM-P. They have formed Balaraw. Militants in Antipolo may join up with them. They seem to have rallied a large majority of the founding members of the RPM-P in Luzon. But this does not amount to a great many people (considerably under one hundred). The objective remains to take part in building a revolutionary party on a national scale. They are awaiting the developments in Mindanao to reformalise their links. The network of cadre is probably of good quality. But the initial political dynamics has been broken and the current financial situation is very poor. The handicap will not be easily overcome without assistance (whether this help is international or comes from Mindanao).

4. The organisation in Mindanao.

I shall devote a longer passage to the RPM-P in Mindanao.

The forerunner of the RMP-P in Mindanao was the Central Mindanao Region (CMR) CPP. Unlike the Tabara team for the Visayas, the CMR leadership did not have authority over all Mindanao, but only a group of provinces roughly in the geographical centre of the island. Its connections to the leadership milieus on the island seem much less strong. It also seems to me to have been much less closely linked to the CPP national leadership milieus than Tabara (this is all the more the case in that the dean of CMR-connected leaders, Frank G., whom we knew, unfortunately passed away a few years ago).

The seeming “marginal” status of the CMR in the CPP leadership structure may have caused problems. But it has proven beneficial in other ways (little direct involvement in the squabbles within the national leadership network, greater autonomy in decision-making, relative youth of leaderships…). Which is not to say that there are no shadows in the political history of this region. Like (almost) all CPP regions, CMR was affected by the wind of madness that hit the CPP at the time of the great paranoid purges in the mid and second half of the 1980s, but it seems that the violence was lesser there than in other areas.

It is above all with this region (and its correspondents in Manila) that we initially began to develop new relations during the 1990s, after it was no longer in the CPP. It is not the Philippine organisation with which we have the longest-standing relations, far from it. When it was in the CPP, we had no contact. But it is the component of the RPM-P we now know best, thanks to all too rare travels to the spot, thanks to one of its leaders’ participation in IEC meetings [5], and because we have met its activists in various international activities (from the Amsterdam school and the women’s seminars to world-wide or regional conferences in the framework of the movement against neoliberal globalisation).

I got a very good impression of this organisation. This impression was confirmed during my last trip. Especially for the following reasons:

– It has managed to preserve its cohesion despite the 1992 split, and once again today, at the time of the RPM-P split (except for the “defection” of the leader who took part in the peace negotiations). That is a big difference from the other regions that broke from the “Sison” CPP (The Visayas, Manila-Rizal…). This is an important asset and a sign of health.

– Maintaining this organisational cohesion was not at the expense of a political immobility. Other elements coming out of the CPP may have evolved at a quicker pace than the CMR, but with a lack of organisational continuity. This makes such changes more individual and less collective, hence easier. To some extent, CMR enables the generation formed during the struggle against the Marcos dictatorship to “recycle” itself as a group without splintering. This ability to “change in continuity” seems very important to me. It is probably also the case, for example, for the PPD, but the latter came out of a national commission (United Front) of the CPP without a territorial organisation: it was a more compact team from the outset.

– CMR shares with most of the splits coming out of the CPP in 1992 a certain number of strategic re-evaluations: break with the Maoist-Stalinist outlook, a more dialectical vision of the changing articulation among different forms and areas of struggles, a renewed analysis of the social formations in the Philippines, opening to the diversity of international revolutionary experiences, concrete and flexible strategic elaboration, etc. Each current re-evaluates things in its own way, but the questions raised are often the same, breaking with the dogma hammered away by the Sisonian CPP leadership: the rural armed struggle as eternally paramount, “structural” approach to the revolutionary crisis in a “semi-colonial, semi-feudal” country, very “ideological” and abstract definition of strategy, etc.

– What seems more significant to me, or one could say more specific, is how the CMR has evolved on a certain number of essential areas in its traditional intervention:

* The approach to work towards the Moro and Lumad communities has been inverted to some extent. For the CPP, the right to self-determination (in any case for the Lumads, as the Moro independence movements were too strong to be ignored) must only be posed after the revolutionary victory; in the meantime, the national line must prevail in all areas. Today, the Mindanao organisation sets out concretely from the right to self-determination, here and now. In this way, it discovered the importance of traditional governance structures in the tribes and the need to respect sovereignty, tribal authenticity, to mainstream their struggle in a convergence with other sectors of society.

* This approach makes it possible to give more depth to the axis of work with the organisation in Mindanao: build links of solidarity between the “three peoples” (settlers of Christian origin, Moros and Lumads) on an island where inter-community conflicts are a smokescreen for relations of exploitation and oppression. It is often a difficult line of intervention, but which is taking concrete forms (for example, bringing members of the three communities together in development projects, or in sector-based organisation).

* Respect for each community’s authenticity does not mean a static approach. When the Elders’ Council of the Teduray tribe welcomed me, representatives of the “sectors” were present, including youth and women. They had drawn up a series of 8 questions as to what I thought of their struggle, all of them delicate. One of these was: “What rights should youth and women have in Lumad society?” How can I answer when I’m unfamiliar with Lumad society, the members of the Elders’ Council are listening closely (the minimum membership age is 45 and all the members present were men…) and the representatives of the youth and women’s sectors were also all ears? I know at least one woman activist who left the Mindanao RPM-P because she felt their feminist work was too timid. But a real importance is given to this intervention, including among the Lumads and the Moros – which is certainly not a given. And when I met members of the RPM-P regional committee (i.e., the central leadership in Mindanao) I noted that they were not as old as I am and that only the two women in attendance spoke. The men remained silent for most of the meeting.

Since I do not have an adequate knowledge of this intervention, I can only supply anecdotes, but they seem significant to me.

* The concept of peace negotiations has changed. It is tactical in CPP tradition, since rural armed struggle is always seen as the main form of revolutionary struggle: aiming mostly to obtain international recognition and belligerent status. The RPM-P wanted conclusive negotiations … but that would not conclude with surrender.

* The concept of legal work has also changed radically. For the CPP, reform is hateful since it entails a risk of turning forces away from revolutionary urgency. But the RPM-P Mindanao is now aware that it is important to win concrete victories and to do so, it is necessary to know how to use the law. Such as the Agrarian Reform act or the Indigenous Rights act. In general, legal work has its own objectives that are not limited to support for underground activity.

* CMR has also taken up the question of internationalism more systematically than many other Filipino organisations (see below).

* Another significant feature. The RPM-P Mindanao is an organisation that is able to make a political decision, and to apply it. This is not the case of all the organisations, to my knowledge. Here are a few examples of this:

– The organisation wants to win the 14 May elections and cannot do so on the basis of its results in Mindanao (Luzon’s contribution will only be marginal). I don’t know whether they will succeed (let us hope so, given the important stakes, but they would need from 500.000 to 1.500.000 votes… recognised by the Electoral Commission). However, (almost) all the organisation has been mobilised for this purpose. On a terrain that wasn’t at all theirs in the days of the CPP. Rather impressive.

– CMR was convinced that a revolutionary party had to be rebuilt on a national level. One day, they decided that it was important not to wait anymore and became the motor force behind the formation of the RPM-P. The process has fallen through now, but for a long time it had been the most serious attempt in this direction, between forces coming out of the CPP.

– CMR was one of the CPP regions most cut off from international contacts (except, perhaps, through their Moro work?) Nevertheless, they decided to devote their efforts on this level in a very consistent internationalist political logic (not “utilitarian”) which explains how they have been able to meet us as they did. They succeeded in making use of different channels to be present at a rather wide range of activities (Amsterdam schools, women’s sessions, “globalisation” conferences, etc.) and covered a share of the expenses.

* RPM-P’s grounding in Mindanao appears very real. It seems to me that they are one of the political organisations best represented on the island, and are capable of forging unitary relations (for example, in peace mobilisations).

 V. TO CONCLUDE

It is high time to conclude.

Members of the Mindanao regional committee asked me whether I thought they had committed an error by forming the RPM-P – and if we regretted forming ties with them, in light of the current crisis. I answered no to these two questions.

* Retrospective – 1: Forming the RPM-P.

Founding the RPM-P responded to a real need. Six years after the 1992 splits, the forces coming out of the CPP still hadn’t overcome their original fragmentation (produced by internal barriers within the CPP and the specific histories of each of the regions involved). It had become urgent to move ahead in forming a party on the national level capable of bringing in the underground components, (which was not the case for the electoral party – political movement Akbayan! which responded to a different need). Everyone was talking about it. Creating the RPM-P represented the most serious attempt in this field. It has now failed, but that does not mean that the experience should not have been undertaken.

A process of political and ideological clarification among leaderships laid groundwork for the founding of the RPM-P. But each political or regional component was unfamiliar with the others. Given the circumstances, regrouping existing forces was to a certain extent a type of wager on the future. But a well thought out wager and probably inevitable, unless the perspective of a party with a nation-wide base was put off sine die. Even today, the formations coming out of the CPP are often relatively unfamiliar with each other and other, more recent, attempts at reconciliation, for example between the PPD and the PMP have been inconclusive. The problem remains in full.

In retrospect, it seems to me that the rapprochement towards the Visayas (Tabara leadership) could only appear justified at the time, given the importance and the historical “weight” of this component. If the fusion had been consolidated, it would have amounted to a major step forward.

In Manila, the very sectarian stand taken by Popoy makes any rapprochement with his organisation unthinkable; moreover this organisation was going into a crisis. But it was probably an error to finally rely on Nilo de la Cruz, due to his fame, while he was about to lose his organised forces. It was probably not easy for the Mindanao component to understand what was going on in Manila. Maybe the Tabara component was more aware of where matters stood, since there had clearly been interference between the elements in crisis and the recomposition between the Manila-Rizal region and the Visayas (Negros).

The crisis got underway within the RPM-P leadership too quickly for the process of osmosis among regions, necessarily a slow one, had the time to function. There was no counterweight to the breach in trust among the leaders.

* Retrospective – 2: Ties with the FI.

We can also say that in terms of relations between the FI and the CMR, then the RPM-P, there was also a dose of “reasonable wager”. When the decision had to be made to formalise our relations, we had already had time to develop relations of respect and mutual interest, but not to know each other intimately.

However, the choice to consolidate our relations was never based on a “prognosis”. The situation of the revolutionary left in the Philippines was and remains fluid and its is impossible to claim to predict where matters will stand five or ten years down the road. The evolution of the overall political situation (in particular in Mindanao) is also proving rather unpredictable.

Moreover, the positive evaluation we had made of the CMR, then the RPM-P did not imply a negative evaluation of all the other components of the radical left in the Philippines. We had and we continue to maintain relations of solidarity and militant dialogue with other components. Simply, it turned out that it is with the CMR, then the RPM-P that we were able to go beyond such relations of solidarity and dialogue. This is what was concretised in the permanent observer status within the FI, which could lead to section status.

The “reasoned wager” was based on an appreciation of the present and its potential, not on a prognosis in terms of the future. Let us say that it was an opportunity to seize upon and a responsibility to take in terms of tasks to be carried out. The RPM-P experience was called for, as was the experience of mutual relations between the FI/RPM-P.

Despite the current crisis, I believe this experience was positive. I also think that we (the FI) did not give ourselves the means to carry out this experience under the best conditions. The question was not banal and we should have travelled more often and for longer periods to the Philippines. To consolidate our ties, to become more familiar with our partners in a larger number of regions and to become better known among a larger number of activists.

Since this was not done, we were caught unawares by the RPM-P crisis and the gravity of the political problems raised. We were not able to react to what had been warnings. For example, when the Visayas leadership decided to burn the bus used in Negros by a Japanese NGO. We took note of the explanation provided by the Visayas leadership (it was probably an error, given the international repercussions of this vigorous action, but it had been provoked by embezzlement by the Filipino partner of this NGO). Another explanation was making the rounds in Filipino left circles: a measure of retaliation and intimidation against “dissidents” who had joined Popoy and deprived the Visayas of a source of funds. Lacking adequate time to conduct an investigation on the spot, I was unable to set matters straight.

Another example. In June 2000, at the Geneva conference, Lidy told me that the peace negotiations between the RPM-P and the government had got off to a bad start. In retrospect, it seems that in Manila, they were more familiar with what was going on than the RPM-P leadership in Mindanao. Once again, I noted what they said but was unable to delve more deeply into the matter.

Here we are touching upon a more general issue. The flagrant weakness of our financial resources plays a part, but it is not the main problem. Unavailability is more difficult to overcome than the lack of funds. Nowadays, unlike in the past, international travel is not an integral part of our tasks definition; it is an “extra”. Hence it has been cut to the bone. The situation has improved slightly with the takeoff of the movement against capitalist globalisation and our participation in international conferences and mobilisations. But we also need “party-based” travel. One is not a substitute for the other.

Moreover, the new guard is not taking shape. Our internationalised cadre is growing older. And yet, it takes a long time to develop a feeling for realities in other countries. To stop making analogies with your own country. To learn internationalism. To understand a country very different from one’s own. To build lasting political and personal ties. Once again, we can hope that the growth of resistance to capitalist globalisation will create a climate favourable to the education of a new internationalised generation. But we have been very late in this task. And we must do it affirmatively, consciously. It will not occur spontaneously.

* Current outlook.

From all the above, I have drawn the following concrete political conclusions:

1. The failure of the fusion is a political fact that we must accept as such. The separation of the components of the RPM-P has not been formally concluded. But the definitive split cannot be averted unless the majority of the leadership agrees to start out from scratch and discuss everything again – including the peace accords and the makeup of the leadership bodies. Nothing for the time being indicates that this may be the case.

Given the nature of the disagreements and the broken relations of trust among the party leadership, it would be illusory, ineffective and mistaken for us to attempt to glue the pieces back together.

2. Without claiming to pass definitive judgement on the course taken by the majority leadership, take our distances politically. Since we have been unable to hold discussions with the Nilo-Tabara leadership, and remain very unfamiliar with the Visayas, we must remain cautious in our judgements. The way things are going, it is probable that a certain number of questions will be answered relatively quickly. These include the situation within the RPM-P Visayas (scope of eventual disagreements) and on the real dynamics of the peace accords. We should try to seek out the clearest response to the questions asked by the Nilo-Tabara leaderships and leave ourselves the time needed to draw conclusions.

But we cannot overlook the grave nature of the questions asked or the answers that have been given. The text of the peace accords is quite frankly disturbing. The RPM-P leadership’s position with respect to Estrada is indefensible. We must take our distances publicly from that political course, without delay. All of this is known to the other political currents and we cannot remain silent any longer, now that we have been duly informed. This is the only condition under which we can reserve our definitive judgement on the course taken by the Nilo and Tabara components of the RPM-P and await clarification on a certain number of points.

3. Strengthen our links with the organisation in Mindanao and its correspondents in Luzon. We must not only maintain our links with the Mindanao organisation (and its partners in other regions, including Manila), but also consolidate these. For the moment, in Mindanao, they seem to have coped relatively well, but they have undergone a series of difficult tests and the situation remains volatile (including the military threat the CPP is holding over their heads). Especially at this time, they must be able to count on our solidarity.

Furthermore, Balaraw in Luzon finds itself in a doubly difficult situation. On the political level, the process of building the organisation must resume on new bases, and on the financial level, they find themselves in dire straits while about half of them are de facto staff members (involved in mass work, in particular). We must look into whether we can provide them organisational support (teaming up to support a staff member?) It is important to reinforce both political dialogue and in so far as possible links of solidarity on all levels (“party-based”, NGO type projects, and united campaigns…) including developing the field of parliamentary solidarity (see the mission report on this subject).

4. Reinvigorating the range of our Philippines solidarity relations. Over the years, we have developed many relations of solidarity with various political organisations and militant networks in the Philippines (during repeated travels and common work on specific campaigns – such as the debt – or during international meetings against capitalist globalisation. Several of these organisations have taken part in the Amsterdam school. We have always maintained this range of solidarity links (in agreement with CMR, then with the RPM-P). But, in the recent period, due to the weakness of our financial resources, we have had to limit invitations to Amsterdam and have logically given priority to consolidating our ties with the RPM-P.

The organisation in Mindanao and Balaraw think that once the situation within he RPM-P is clarified, they will be able to re-establish freer inter-party relations with other radical left forces in the Philippines. It seems in effect that in Luzon, Nilo acted as an effective smokescreen to the development of such ties over the past two years. This unitary initiative would be a means of overcoming the crisis “from above”. And overcoming the isolation caused by the stand taken by the RPM-P majority leadership during the anti-Estrada mobilisations. This means eventually once again raising the question of building a revolutionary party with a nation-wide base in the Philippines – an essential task but still unsolved and a challenge for the entire radical left in the country. We can help our Filipino comrades with this prospect, if we reinvigorate this range of ties of solidarity established over the past twenty-five years.

5. Travelling to the Philippines. Despite the crisis of the revolutionary movement and its relative fragmentation, the Philippines remains the Southeast Asian country where radical political parties and social movements are the best organised. It is also the Eastern Asian country where we have established relations with the most important organisation, and the oldest and most continuous links of broad solidarity. The stakes in the Philippines are very high, objectively and for our International in particular.

We must take this question into account as we prepare for the upcoming World Congress (which must rule on our relations in the Philippines and give the tasks set forth above the importance they warrant. These include a better understanding of the situation and political clarity, consolidating organisational relations, political dialogue and ties of solidarity on different levels, means of concrete assistance…). The journey I have recently returned form is far from sufficient to achieve these aims. Between now and the World Congress, this means that several of us must travel to the Philippines. Moreover, we must take all opportunities to invite and meet our Filipino partners, on the international level.

Roman, 14 May 2001

---