A few quick lessons from the Ukrainian parliamentary elections

1) The count is not finished, but the turnout is down compared to the presidential election in May this year: 53.27 per cent (taking into account that the official figure is proportional to all those on the electoral roll, including those in the South-East and in Crimea, who were unable to vote). In May, the turnout was quite high for Ukraine, no doubt because of the feeling of national defence associated with the fact of voting and because Poroshenko was not yet in power and gave some hope.

Now he is, and a “political offer” that was quite largely oligarchic, whereas the Maidan aimed at the destruction of the oligarchy, goes far to explain that discontent was this time much less constrained by the feeling, which remains, of national defence.

Participation is higher in the West, which is quite classic: 70 per cent in Lviv oblast, 68.3 in Ternopil, 64 in Ivano-Frankivsk, 65 in Volhynia, 55.7 in Kyiv; it falls to 39.5 per cent in Odessa. Donbass oblast is at 32.5 per cent and so is Luhansk, which is relatively high when we take into account the prohibition on voting imposed by the “separatists”: the majority of registered voters were not able to vote.

2) The result of the supporters of incumbent President Poroshenko is bad compared to the forecasts. With 21.45 per cent of votes cast, the “Poroshenko Bloc” comes in just behind the “Popular Front” coalition of Turchynov, Yatseniuk and Avakov (president of the outgoing Parliament, Prime Minister, and Minister of the Interior respectively) with 21.82 per cent, which comprises all the forces that took power after the flight of Yanukovych, apart from, precisely, Poroshenko (and the Svoboda party); this can be seen as a serious symbolic failure, attesting to a rapid and quite understandable erosion...

3) Although the “Popular Front” can boast of having as many or slightly more votes than the “Poroshenko Bloc”, it appears however as an addition of forces, each of which is just as contested and disappointing as the others. The fact that it has 10 per cent more than the polls had indicated appears to be a great success, but it is primarily an expression of distrust in Poroshenko and of a kind of manœuvre of the electorate which, even while voting for not very appealing parties, did not want to concentrate all powers in any one of them.

The “Opposition Bloc”, coming from the former Party of Regions, is at 9.73 per cent and the KPU (Communist Party), whose banning by the “Nazis” was recently announced for the umpteenth time by the "communist resistance” (if we can call it that!) blogosphere is at 3.9 per cent; therefore the forces that were in power until February have 13.66 per cent, a vote which has little ideological content but is an expression of the slowness of the old clienteles to reclassify themselves (it is still they who are concerned by the biggest case of vote-buying in this election, in Kirovograd ...).

Yulia Tymoshenko’s Baktivshchyna (“Fatherland”), with 5.66 per cent, is lastingly marginalized and the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, which was being given 15-20 per cent by the polls and looked as if it was going to pick up Svoboda’s vote, has only won 7.39 per cent.

Svoboda is below 5 per cent (4.72). Its collapse is even more pronounced in its historic stronghold of Galicia than elsewhere: it seems that the party will only keep 5 MPs, elected in constituencies by majority vote, of whom only two in Galicia. (50 per cent of the Rada is elected in this way, the other half proportionally, with a threshold of 5 per cent). Pravy Sector is at 1.87 per cent, but gets two deputies through this system, including its leader Yarosh in Dnipropetrovsk, although he is far from having won a majority of votes.

Naturally the blogosphere, agitated by the “Ukrainian Nazis”, adds up the votes of Svoboda, Pravy Sector and the Radical Party (whose political nature is different, it is a mixture of demagogy, nationalism and peasant populism), and still others, in order to say that with some 15 per cent of the vote or more, according to them, “the Nazis” multiply tenfold their score compared to the presidential election (1.6 per cent for Tiahnybok of Svoboda and Yarosh of Pravy Sector, combined!), which had upset many of them because it contradicted their delusional propaganda, and which up to now they had avoided talking about.

In fact, the scores of Svoboda and Pravy Sector are unsurprising; they correspond in the circumstances of the legislative elections to their presidential results and illustrate this political reality: the far right in Ukraine has not been strengthened but weakened by the Maidan movement and the fall of Yanukovych, having the upper hand only in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts with Russian help.

But more generally, the elections express weariness, rejection or disappointment with regard to almost all the political forces that stood.

4) The exception is Samopomich with 11.12 per cent of the vote, the only really victorious force in this election. Samopomich means something like “let us organize ourselves,” best translated in English by the term “self-help”.

This party was formed this spring by the mayor of Lviv, Andriy Sadovyi, hostile from the beginning to the rise of Svoboda in his region (Svoboda had conquered the majority in Galicia, but not in Lviv, hence the mobilizations against the administration appointed by Svoboda). On a programme that could be described as democratic and cooperative, it is an organization that relies on neighbourhood committees and sectors of the Uniate Church which are hostile to Svoboda and to it being taken over by ultranationalists.

But in fact, what gave Samopomich a real boost was the decision taken by “Semen Semenchenko” the pseudonym of the leader of the Donbass Battalion (a native of Donetsk, he wants to protect his family) to support the party and to put forward in the elections candidates coming from his battalion.

Semenchenko, who is hospitalized for treatment of war wounds, clashed severely with the government at the end of August and the beginning of September, advocating the use of volunteers rather than conscription (where those who dodge the draft give rise to waves of protest), demanding weapons and food for the volunteers and accusing the government of abandoning them, demanding the resignation of the Minister of Defence. In fact, his “Donbass battalion”, the majority of whose recruits seem to come from south-eastern Ukraine, was largely abandoned and horribly massacred by Russian forces, just before the signing of a cease-fire, in the Ilovaisk pocket (it seems that photographs of victims of the massacres have been circulating on the “communist resistance” blogosphere and the far right, to illustrate the “genocide committed against Russian-speakers” – it should be pointed out that the Donbass battalion is perfectly “Russian-speaking”!).

This battalion was precisely the principal formation of armed volunteers to be to be in practice not controlled by either the Ministry of Defence or the Ukrainian far right, or both. Needless to say, the blogosphere mentioned above was particularly well supplied with “information” making it into a kind of “SS division”: such “information” is necessary for the non-understanding of what is really happening, and therefore the internationalist non-mobilization. It is therefore likely that in adding up the votes of “Nazis”, the neo-Stalinist and neo-fascist blogosphere accounts in Samopomich so as to be close to 25 per cent!

Of course, there is no question of idealizing either the Donbass battalion or Samopomich, but of analyzing the political facts: the only significant political success of these elections is one that combines a commitment to national defence, contestation of the present government and refusal of the far right.

 Highly significant: Samopomich comes top of the poll in Kyiv.

Moreover, the political forces of the radical left, which the article below from Alexandr Volodarsky deals with, was not able to field candidates. There is therefore a gaping political vacuum, and the various “phenomena” such as Samopomich, but also Lyashko, and partly before him Svoboda, and even earlier Tymoshenko and Natalia Vitrenko, if you go back twenty years, bear witness in their fashion to this vacuum. Furthermore, it is not enough to take note of the existence of this vacuum in order to fill it!

Another interesting indication is given by the election, by an absolute majority in his constituency, of one of the very few independent candidates, without a sponsor, an established party or financial means: Volodomyr Parasiuk, who on the Maidan in Kyiv, by a decisive intervention, demolished the manœuvre of the three party leaders of Baktivshchyna, Udar and Svoboda, coordinated with the German, French and Polish foreign ministers, to form a national unity government, maintaining Yanukovych in power. Very popular for this historic role, he was wounded and captured, without his real identity being discovered, during the terrible massacre of Ilovaisk at the beginning of September. In the hands of Russian military intelligence, who did not identify him, he was exchanged for separatist prisoners. He has just, all alone, won 54 per cent of the vote in a territory of Western Galicia.

We cannot at all say what will become of him politically, how he will turn out. But men of his calibre would have their place in a movement of emancipation, in order to drive out all the oligarchs!

 The Ukrainian left torn between Maidan and Anti-Maidan

Alexandr Volodarsky

[The extensive notes and comments by Vincent Présumey are published on his blog as a separate article. We are publishing them as conventional footnotes in order to make it easier for our readers to find them via the footnote link.]

The profound divisions between the various protagonists in Ukrainian politics have also affected the radical left. The fracture, which has its roots in the differing interpretations of the Soviet experience, was manifested in all its magnitude when the Maidan and Anti-Maidan movements led to the creation of the “people’s republics” in the Donbass. [1] Today, any unity of the left, against the background of this bloody war, seems impossible. [2]

The Maidan movement has completely changed the previous relationships of forces in the political life of Ukraine. Many key players have left the stage, and others who were only minor pawns have become the kings of the stage. Parties that were previously outsiders, such as the “Oleg Lyashko Bloc” [now the Radical Party] and “Solidarity” [renamed the “Petro Poroshenko Bloc”] are currently leading in the polls. The influence of the”Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc," which had in reality taken power after the Maidan, but lost it in the course of the presidential election, has collapsed. Svoboda has lost its image as the most radical player in parliamentary politics and no longer has the possibility of repeating in the general election its success of 2012, when it won more than 10 per cent. The Party of Regions has disintegrated and fallen into a coma, its members actively supporting the separatist movements in South-Eastern Ukraine, or seeking to forget their past by attaching themselves to less discredited political forces. Vitaliy Klychko, who had appeared as the most likely candidate for the presidency, is now mayor of Kiev and will hardly be able to rise beyond that. [3]

The breaks in continuity do not only concern the main political forces, but also those, more marginal, about which the great masses have little information. This should not be underestimated and it is necessary to consider it carefully. Pravy Sector, although not at all having received any broad support in society (it is stagnating at one per cent), has become a major media phenomenon and played a role of catalyst in the passage of Maidan from the peaceful period to that of street fighting. [4] The core of this movement is made up of far-right organizations which, compared to a larger force like Svoboda, seemed up to then to be small sects condemned to political death. Similarly, the far-right monarchist and pro-Russian organizations in eastern Ukraine, restricted until then to a narrow circle, have become an important factor, which can be described as the key factor, in the very formation of the separatist movement. [5] The small “Republic of Donetsk” organization, which had existed since the mid-2000s primarily in cyberspace, is now witnessing a life-size incarnation of its fantasies. Thus, even political sects of a few hundred, or even a few dozen activists, can in certain circumstances influence the masses and modify radically the political situation.

The organizations of the Ukrainian far left have also been very much shaken up by recent events. Today they play a secondary role and their voice has difficulty in making itself heard against a background noise which is predominantly on the right; but with rising social tensions, left orientations can reduce the relative weight of the nationalists , or even marginalize them, in the coming protests to come. But if the pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian right-wing forces have logically found their place on opposite sides of the barricade, according to their national and linguistic preferences, on the left the processes that are under way are more complex. The principal line of division flows from the relative positions on the USSR, which from being a historical and theoretical question, has turned into a subject of burning topicality.

 Red Maidan and black Maidan

The Left Opposition, which brings together democratic socialists [6] and Trotskyists, took part in the Maidan in Kiev from the first days. [7] They came down to the square with Euro-socialist slogans, brandishing a red flag with EU colours. [8] Also present on the Maidan were the anarchists, the most active organization being Terra Libera, which is eco-anarchist, associated with activists from all the organizations, and with the left artists of the Khudrad union and the student union Direct Action. Because of the symbols that they used, skirmishes occurred between them and Pravy Sector, which was still little known. The left activists from various groups were able to assert their presence, not so much on the square as in occupied buildings; the students operated a film library, where meetings were held and where the left press was available. Although we cannot say that in Kiev these activists imposed themselves as an integral part of the movement with their full political identity, we cannot say either that there was no left on the Maidan, or that it was “completely expelled.” The anarcho-syndicalists of the Autonomous Workers Union of Kiev had initially taken a neutral stance towards the Maidan because they did not see the possibility of having an effective influence on the movement in the conditions of hegemony of the right, but they eventually gave it their support when Yanukovych passed the January 16 laws against the right to demonstrate and the right of assembly. For its part, the Kharkov cell of this organization took part from the beginning in the Kharkov Maidan, in which the influence of the far right remained very much a minority and where they could develop without obstacles, with their symbols, an orientation centred on social issues.

From the beginning of the fighting on Hrushevsky Street, many left and anarchist activists took part in humanitarian actions and it was a group of anarchists and left-liberals who organized the “Hospital Brigade”, which intervened in the hospitals to prohibit the removal of the wounded by the forces of repression. The activists of Direct Action stepped up to the forefront on December 1, initiating the formation of the First Aid Brigade. Many of them found themselves on the front line, either as doctors and nurses or directly in the fighting. One of the tanks was burned by anarchists. The threats from the armed formations of the far right prevented us from going so far as to explicitly form an anarchist century, which would also have drawn in the ultras of Arsenal football club, who, unlike other supporters, defined themselves as “anti-racist”. Anarchists, together with activists of the student movement, managed to take their small revenge [on Pravy Sector] following the storming of the Ministry of Education. Access to the building by activists of Svoboda and Pravy Sector was forbidden [9], and a series of demands was sent to the new Minister of Education, who could not get into his ministry as long as he had not signed. Some of the participants in the action felt this success to be a bit doubtful, because the choice of Sergey Kvit [Serhiy Kvit], because of his far-right past, was not acceptable. Despite the pressure of the anarchists, the professional “student leaders” were able to avoid an escalation of the conflict, preferring to work with the minister.

We must also recognize the role of the left nationalists of Autonomous Resistance. Until quite recently this organization was closely associated with Svoboda and more particularly with one of its leaders, Yuri Mikhalchishin. But a conflict opened up between the students and the teacher and Autonomous Resistance went into opposition to the influence of Svoboda in Western Ukraine. Part of the left saw Autonomous Resistance as a possible ally, another part kept its distance, since they still use a nationalist and conservative rhetoric. We must not underestimate its role in the Lviv Maidan, which was opposed not only to the Party of Regions, in power at the national level, but also to the local Svoboda government. Autonomous Resistance took an active part in the “night of anger,” a series of attacks against the buildings of the Ministry of Interior Security Services (SBU) and the Chancery [in Lviv]. [10]

 The Anti-Maidan

The only significant left formation to have opposed the Maidan from beginning to end is Borotba, although its position actually evolved somewhat. [11] In November and December [2013] Borotba criticized the Maidan, but at the same time taking its distance from the Anti-Maidan (among other things they published a resolution for the formation of a Krasny Sector [Red Sector], which had only a virtual existence and claimed responsibility for burning some cars in Kiev). [12] With the radicalization of the situation, Borotba increasingly swung over to the side of the Anti-Maidan, described as “anti-fascist forces.” At the end of February and the beginning of March [2014] Borotba demonstrated side by side with the pro-Russians of Oplot and Slav Unity, in Kharkov and Odessa. Furthermore, Borotba collaborates with the Communist Party of Ukraine, which for a long time has never been considered by radical activists as being in any way on the left. [13], fighting the Gestapo...

More seriously, the doings of the KPU (and more secondarily of Borotba, whose importance resides especially in its reputation with international “leftism”) enable the Ukrainian government and the Right to launch attacks against “communism” and “socialism” which can rebound against, or especially be directed against, social struggles.]]

A serious and violent confrontation between left activists (even though each side denies to the other the right to call itself “left”), between supporters and opponents of Maidan, was triggered in March, starting from the occupation of the regional administration building in Kharkov . [14] The pro-Russians and Borotba, together, beat up local Euromaidan activists who had barricaded themselves inside the building, also hitting those who did not put up any resistance. Among their victims were anarchists, including the famous writer Serhiy Zhadan, who was seriously injured. Declaring on many occasions its support for the Anti-Maidan, Borotba included its explicitly right-wing components. Describing the Kiev regime as a “fascist junta”, Borotba called for a “broad anti-fascist front.” This broad front materialized in Odessa, where Borotba teamed up with Rodina and Slav Unity, two organizations that Borotba had denounced in its time for Russian nationalism. [15]

 A major fracture

Following the events of Kharkov, various left and anarchist organizations published an open letter taking their distance from Borotba (16). [16] The open wound was aggravated by the tragic events of the House of Unions in Odessa [17]: although some people sympathized with Borotba, others accused it of direct support to armed provocateurs [in the first phase of the events of 2 May] and attributed part of the responsibility for what happened to the leader of Borotba in Odessa, Aleksy Albu. However, during the first phase of the Maidan, the Odessa branch of Borotba had conducted joint activities with the local cell of Autonomous Resistance, without worrying about its Ukrainian nationalism. It is therefore not correct to simply talk about “pro-Russian” or “pro-Ukrainian” sympathies to explain this division, because the dividing line is not based on the national aspect.

This fault line has, moreover, an international character. In Germany we have seen activists taking action with the “Ribbon of St. George” and waving Russian flags, and others attempting to block such actions. There is no unity in the ranks of the principal left parties: thus, in Die Linke there are opposed positions, ranging from support for the “people’s republics” of Donetsk (DPR) and Luhansk (LPR) to an attitude fiercely critical of them. Rote Hilfe, an organization dedicated to helping political prisoners and victims of the far right, initially raised money for Borotba but then stopped doing so under the influence of the anarchists. Analogous tendencies can be observed in the left forces in Poland, Spain, Sweden, France, England and practically everywhere else in the world. We find in Russia this division between those who support the DPR and LPR and those who condemn them outright. [18]

 (It is not) our war

The resolution “Stop the war in Ukraine”, adopted at the beginning of June at a conference held in the Belarusian capital Minsk, expressed through the blur of its formulations two antagonistic positions simultaneously, giving rise to different public interpretations by its authors. On the Russian left site Rabkor we can read an interesting debate between Denis Denisov (of the Left Opposition) and the editorial group of the site. The first sees in the Minsk resolution a call to lay down arms, addressing both the Ukrainian army and its opponents. The editors of the site see a call for the capitulation of the Kiev government and the recognition of the DPR (19). [19]

The manifesto of the anarchists, entitled “War on War” leaves less room for various interpretations and has received the support of a number of leftist and libertarian organizations from various parts of the world. In this document the regimes of the DPR and LPR are characterized as reactionary, and as oppressors who are consciously threatening the populations of the two regions, at the same time as are denounced the potential threats coming from the Ukrainian government and from the right which is receiving arms. The solution of the conflict must be based on the development of a movement of workers which starts from below.

A similar conception - condemnation of the far right in the two camps, support for workers’ movements and for the unions, affirmation of the discourse putting the emphasis on social issues as a means of defence against the war - is also formulated by the Left Opposition. [20]

 After the Maidan

Despite these many problems, after the Maidan the political activity of the left has not ended, and has even intensified. The Autonomous Workers’ Union (AWU) of Kiev frequently organizes actions against the present government and the authorities of the city. An anarchist demonstration on May 1 was attended by hundreds of people, although it had to change the assembly point at the last minute for security reasons. Such events were also held in Kharkov and Zhitomir.

The Kharkov AWU is actively engaged in supporting refugees. In the manner of European anarchists, they have occupied a municipal building that had been abandoned for several years and turned it into a social centre. The refugees who were forced to abandon Slovyansk have organized there independently, along with the anarchists. The local authorities are making threats of eviction, but are not willing to find a place for the refugees.

The representatives of the Left Opposition participated in the municipal elections in Kiev, and although they did not obtain significant results, they continue to act for a presence of the left in the parliamentary arena, now increasingly deserted. With this objective they have created the “Social Revolutionary Assembly”, which brings together union activists and “left intellectuals” who want to find a point of support in real politics.

Borotba has chosen the path of integration into the structures of the “people’s republics“. The leader of this movement, Sergey Kirichuk, is at present in Germany, where he is seeking refugee status. He is acting there in close liaison with “anti-imperialist” left groups, especially those who support the “Monday demonstrations for peace.” Part of the leadership of Borotba has transferred to Crimea, while the rank-and-file members have remained in their respective regions, where some of them have been arrested by the security services and the police.

We can say with certainty that in Ukraine there will be no more “left unity”. The heirs of the Soviet political tradition and their opponents are now divided not only by their historical memory, but by still fresh blood, which could even flow more abundantly, as the conflict is far from over.

Vincent Présumey

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